Then how do you propose to calculate accurately the contribution of individual nations when they didn’t all fight in the same oceans? How do you propose to calculate the contribution of each Allied nation to the defeat of individual Axis powers when, for example, the Japanese didn’t have naval or merchant shipping outside the Pacific and Indian oceans and the British, for practical purposes, weren’t in the Pacific from mid-1942 to the end of 1944?
Becasue I can not explain why one would seriously sugest 21 criteria where 15 cover naval warfare! Tell me why in your mind naval battles account for 72% (that is seventy two!!!) importance in the defeat of the Axis powers together?
That’s only 72% of where I got to. I noted that I could add another couple of hundred items without scratching the surface. Naval items would then be only about 7% of a list of 200, which is about one seventh of the real significance that naval and merchant marine activities had in WWII, although admittedly not on the steppes of eastern Russia where you seem to think the whole war was fought while the other Allies piddled about in a couple of insignificant engagements during the 4 to 6 years that they were involved.
If you don’t understand the significance of naval and merchant marine contributions in contributing to victory in WWII, then you cannot begin to make any accurate assessment of any nation’s contribution to victory.
For a start, the Pacific War was primarily a naval war, and the naval component of it was undertaken very largely by the USN.
In 1942 the US would have lost Guadalcanal without the USN , which fought continuing and major battles during the campaign. If it had lost Guadalcanal the course of the war would have been very different as Japan might have been able to carry out its intention to isolate Australia by cutting the naval supply lines to Australia, which would have prevented the American build up in Australia and removed Australia from the war, and probably led to the eventual invasion of Australia. This would have forced the US to launch all land and naval attacks from the mainland or Hawaii, which would have limited it to a central Pacific thrust without significant land bases in its near rear, thus dangerously extending its lines of communication in attempting land attacks and leaving its naval forces and merchant marine and troop transports vulnerable to attack from the major IJN base at Truk, among other places. As it was, the naval and land campaigns in the Pacific forced Japan to evacuate its naval forces from Truk about the time that the Allied (i.e. 100% American naval, land and air forces) central Pacific thrust was really developing. Guadalcanal was also a 100% American victory on land, sea and in the air. Apart from the primarily Australian campaign in Papua New Guinea, it was the most important land engagement with Japan for the first couple of years of the war with Japan.
The Battle of the Coral Sea, again a 100% American victory so far as combat went, prevented Japan taking Port Moresby, which again would have altered the course of the war in Japan’s favour.
Midway, again a 100% American victory, altered the balance of naval power in the Pacific and altered the course of the war in the Alliess’ favour
The Philippines, again 100% American, involved major naval battles which finished off the IJN.
None of the landings in the Pacific would have occurred without US naval power, and largely US merchant marine power to supply that effort and the large and continuing naval and naval air effort unrelated to landings.
America’s shipbuilding capacity vastly exceeded Japan’s, and America sank Japanese naval and merchant vessels much, much faster than Japan could replace them.
The most significant single contributor to the defeat of Japan was the loss of its merchant tonnage, and in particular the sinking of its tankers trying to bring oil back to Japan from the occupied territories, which was largely an American victory.
The NEI was the third largest oil producer in the world at the time Japan invaded. Japan was forced to go to war, in its mind, because it had only one year’s oil supply and could not surivive the Allied oil embargo. Oil was at the heart of the Pacific war. No oil, no fighting. Simple. Several of Japan’s main capital ships sailed for the Philippines to meet the invading US with only enough oil for a one way trip, which shows just how desperate Japan’s position was and how critical the primarily US cutting of the supply lines was.
I won’t bore you with primers on other areas of the naval and merchant aspects of the war.
I accept that you don’t want to talk about these or any other naval issues individually, but if you don’t talk about them and, more importantly, if you don’t understand them, then you cannot begin to understand what each nation contributed to victory. The fact that you don’t see the need to cover these issues shows just how little you understand about the total picture of WWII.
