i’d say the british protection of the channel is enough to earn my vote especially when you consider that most of americas naval battles in the pacific were won largely because of actions in the air
My vote goes to the USNavy. It faced and defeatet most of the might of a sizeable and capable opponent. When it comes to (major) UK opponents Germany didn’t have much of a Navy (besides E and Uboats, we kinda seem to like those, just like panzers :D) and Italy is well, Italy.
Maybe there are two separate topics here.
Who had the best navy on paper?
Who did the best with the navy they had?
The answers to both questions shifted as the war progressed, but much attention could be devoted to the Italian and French navies in the early part of the war, on both questions.
The French can point to political factors inhibiting the use of their naval power after Vichy. Italy has fewer excuses.
The RN still stands out until early 1942 as fighting everyone on the Axis side, in various seas and oceans. Germany was the only other one to venture much outside the Mediterranean during the same period, which involves much more than simple tactical moves but also reflects the economic power of the combatants and their access to fuel oil, supply ships, supply ports etc.
Germany’s U boat war was perhaps the most successful and least successful sustained naval campaign. It threatened Britain’s survival, but lacked the resouces to strangle Britain before the US entered the war.
What nowadays is too often ignored is the effect of the German commerce raiders in the early part of the war. They had some significant victories by any standards, and more so for civilian ships converted to covert fighting ships.
One of Japan’s many great failings, flowing from its outdated warrior concepts, in waging a long war was its failure to identify and target commercial shipping, while its own commercial shipping was being steadlily sunk by the Allies.
US victories are based on intelligence and airbattles.
Did US Navy ever engaged in WWII without being superior in numbers and having excellent intelligence information about what their enemies were up to? (Oh yes, Pearl Harbor, that didn’t end so great for US).
Japan had already battled almost a decade in WWII (lost many great solders, overstretched it resources) before it faced US. I do not see any greatness required to destroy tired enemy who doesn’t have any real natural resources and who is fighting many many enemies.
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I think commerce raiders have suffered because U-boats have taken up all the (navy related WWII) headlines.
It’s easy to “forgot/overlook” German Navy achievements in WWII. They had very very limited resources (For starters Germany had very limited natural resources, and most of those went to ground forces and Luftwaffe). And they faced powerful experienced enemy in Royal Navy. And their codes were broken from time to time. Considering all that: they did great.
German surface fleet had pretty impossible problem to solve: Tiny force needed to be effective without risks!
_
Your last statement…really, come on. Japan had been fighting China since 1937. I doubt Japan suffered any significant naval losses against China. At the start of serious hostilities, Japan was a naval juggernaut, hardly a “tired enemy”. They had prepared for war years in advance and were quite experienced. Japan’s navy excelled in night fighting capabilities and their “Long Lance” torpedo was the most advanced in the world. Need I mention the quality of their naval aviators.
Intelligence and airpower remain as key factors in waging war, if you can achieve superiority in both, then all the better. “All’s fair in love and war”.
BTW, American submarines sank more total tonnage of Japanese ships than did all American surface ships combined.
Interestingly, prior to the war, the Japanese had a pretty intricate network of spies operating in the Pacific regions that they attacked or invaded (Pearl Harbor, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, etc.)
The Japanese interest in naval airpower started long before WWII. They were impressed as observers at Billy Mitchell’s anti-ship bombing demonstrations in 1921.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Mitchell
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Mitchell#Anti-ship_bombing_demonstration
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Billy_Mitchell#Promoting_air_power
In 1922 Mitchell met the like-minded Italian air power theorist Giulio Douhet on a trip to Europe and soon afterwards, an excerpted translation of Douhet’s The Command of the Air began to circulate in the Air Service. In 1924, Mitchell’s superiors sent him to Hawaii, then Asia, to get him off the front pages. Mitchell came back with a 324-page report that predicted future war with Japan, including the attack on Pearl Harbor. His report, published in 1925 as the book Winged Defense, foretold wider benefits of an investment in air power:“Those interested in the future of the country, not only from a national defense standpoint but from a civil, commercial and economic one as well, should study this matter carefully, because air power has not only come to stay but is, and will be, a dominating factor in the world’s development.”
The book was little read outside the air power community.
Particularly, after the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 which limited Japan to a ratio of three battleships to every five of the US Navy and British Royal Navy, Japan saw the aircraft carrier as a means of offsetting their numerical disadvantage in battleships. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Naval_Treaty
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Washington_Naval_Treaty#Effects
The US had six carriers at the start of the war, not including the old CV-1, Langley, as she had been converted to a seaplane carrier (AV-3) in 1936 to allow for the completion of Wasp (CV-7). After the Washington Treaty terminated, the US laid down six new carriers, starting with Hornet (CV-8) (a repeat Yorktown) and Essex (CV-9) (the first of a new class). Japan converted incomplete battleship Kaga and battlecruiser Akagi to aircraft carriers to conform to Washington Naval Treaty. These conversions provided much needed experience and helped to build future classes of aircraft carriers. Japan had ten carriers at the start of the war.
The Battle of the Coral Sea was pretty evenly matched.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Coral_Sea
The battle is considered a tactical victory for Japan since the United States carrier USS Lexington was lost, while Japan only lost the light carrier Shōhō in the battle. At the same time, the battle was a strategic victory for the Allies because the Japanese abandoned their attempt to land troops to take Port Moresby, New Guinea. The engagement ended with no clear victor, but the damage suffered and experience gained by both sides set the stage for the Battle of Midway one month later.
The Japanese had numerical superiority in carriers at the Battle of Midway.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway
During the battle, the United States Navy defeated a Japanese attack against Midway Atoll, losing one aircraft carrier and one destroyer, while destroying four Japanese carriers and a heavy cruiser.
The battle was a decisive victory for the Americans, widely regarded as the most important naval engagement of the Pacific Campaign of World War II. The battle permanently weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), particularly through the loss of over 200 naval aviators. Both nations sustained losses in the battle, but Japan, industrially outstripped by America, was unable to reconstitute its naval forces while the American shipbuilding program provided quick replacements. By 1942 the United States was three years[citation needed] into a massive ship building program that sought to expand the Navy to a size superior to Japan’s. As a result of Midway, the Japanese were faced with naval inferiority within months as this created a steady flow of aircraft carriers and other ships of the line. Strategically, the U.S. Navy was able to seize the initiative in the Pacific and go on the offensive.
I have the Battlefield documentary series and remember some comments made concerning the damage control systems of American carriers prior to the battle of Midway.
Battlefield: The Battle of Midway - Prelude to Battle (Time-Life)
http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_ss_v/102-3240256-7489714?url=search-alias%3Dvhs&field-keywords=Battlefield%3A&Go.x=10&Go.y=12
From the video The Battle of Midway - Prelude to Battle - US Pacific Fleet: Weapons and have transcribed the comments here.
…All three of the carriers that were to take part in the Battle of Midway were of the Yorktown class. They were the aircraft carriers Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise. Yorktown carriers were notable for their advanced damage control systems to minimize the risk of fire. Aviation gas [avgas] fuel lines could be filled with carbon dioxide when an enemy attack was imminent. The carrier’s decks were also specially designed for combat conditions. The flight deck was unarmored and constructed with 6-inch planks of teak - more easily repaired than metal and less likely to cause severe splinter wounds to crewmen…
… Where the Americans had a real edge on the enemy was in damage control. Damage control parties were highly trained in their duties, and their ability to deal with fires (the greatest threat to any warship) was unsurpassed. At the battle of Midway the relative damage control skills of each side would prove a key factor in deciding the outcome of the fight.
From: The Pacific War Encyclopedia, James F. Dunnigan & Albert A. Nofi, Checkmark Books, 1998, p 20.
The Japanese had a policy of not storing aircraft on deck, a practice that the US Navy adopted before the war, and embraced enthusiastically during it. As a result, US carriers of comparable size usually could operate as many as 65% more aircraft (90-100 as against 55-65). British carriers tended to have smaller aircraft capacity (55-65), due to a decision to provide relatively heavy armor. In compensation, British carriers were much more survivable ships.
A second critical factor in carrier effectiveness, and more important than carrier size, was the ship’s capacity to carry avgas (aviation fuel) and fuel, which determined operational endurance. While this was, of course, partially connected to the size of the vessel, once again policy decisions and design were a factor. In consequence, US carriers tended to have greater fuel capacity than either Japanese or British ones, which meant American carriers could generate more missions between trips to the barn.
(CONTINUED BELOW)
(CONTINUED FROM ABOVE)
As far as Pearl Harbor goes, it was a Japanese surprise attack on a neutral country. They failed to sink any American aircraft carriers as none were in port. Also, the Japanese failed to destroy Pearl Harbor’s fuel storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor
Some military historians have suggested the destruction of these oil tanks and repair facilities would have crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet far more seriously than did loss of its battleships. If they had been wiped out, "serious [American] operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year.
As to the eight American battleships that were sunk at Pearl Harbor, six were raised from the harbor’s shallow waters, then repaired and refitted to more modern standards. In retrospect, had any of the battleships been engaged at sea and sunk in the open waters of the Pacific, I doubt that the US Navy would have been able to salvage them.
Five of those six rebuilt American battleships participated in the last battleship versus battleship engagement in naval history when they took part in the destruction of Japanese Rear-Admiral Shoji Nishimura’s fleet (of “Southern Force”) at the Battle of Surigao Strait.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Surigao_Strait#Battle_of_Surigao_Strait
…As they passed the cape of Panaon Island, they ran into a deadly trap set for them by the 7th Fleet Support Force. Rear Admiral Jesse Oldendorf had six battleships (Mississippi, Maryland, West Virginia, Tennessee, California, and Pennsylvania, all but the Mississippi having been resurrected from Pearl Harbor)…The Battle of Surigao Strait was, to date, the final line battle in naval history. Yamashiro was the last battleship to engage another in combat and one of very few to have been sunk by another battleship during World War II. This was also the last battle in which one force (the Americans, in this case) was able to cross the T of its opponent, enabling the U.S. ships to bring all their firepower to bear on the Japanese ships.
Battle of Leyte Gulf
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf
Battle of Surigao Strait
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Surigao_Strait#Battle_of_Surigao_Strait
The six American battleships that were salvaged and modernized following the attack on Pearl Harbor:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Nevada_(BB-36)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Pennsylvania_(BB-38)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Tennessee_(BB-43)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_California_(BB-44)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Maryland_(BB-46)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_West_Virginia_(BB-48)
SEE ALSO:
Imperial Japanese Navy Page
http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm
The Pacific War: The U.S. Navy
http://www.microworks.net/PACIFIC/
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90607&postcount=22
Japan had a great design of Battleships and their late Aircraft carriers were very advanced could do great damage if used correctly, but their were no aircraft and the Yamato lacked in many things and were not used to its full advantage.
I think that Japan’s naval warfare during WW2 were poor. They used everything after Pearl Harbor very poorly. They US navy did great things and used everything they had by using their ships and aircraft for their roles they were intended for.
The German navy just did not have the numbers and Hitler actually did not really care about the navy. The channel dash was a great plan and everything were used to make it great. The U-Boats just never had the numbers to do what they tried to do.
The Italians sucked at naval warfare and the morale in their navy was poor and they did not care.
The US did not just have the numbers, but they had the skill to make their naval warfare great.
Yes. Look up the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway.
Japan had already battled almost a decade in WWII (lost many great solders, overstretched it resources) before it faced US. I do not see any greatness required to destroy tired enemy who doesn’t have any real natural resources and who is fighting many many enemies.
_
I guess having the “Enigma” code doesn’t count against the British? Nor outnumbering the Kriegsmarine in every significant sea battle?
You’re just nitpicking, and it’s nonsense…
Did US Navy ever engaged in WWII without being superior in numbers and having excellent intelligence information about what their enemies were up to?
Ummm… surely this is a point in favour of the USN? Only the dumb get into battles they’re going to lose!
But they were at a significant disadvantage in night fighting against the USN while the USN had radar from the end of 1942 and the Japanese didn’t deploy it widely in the IJN until a year later. This gave the USN a distinct advantage at Midway and Coral Sea.
Need I mention the quality of their naval aviators.
In the early part of the war the Japanese airmen were generally superior to the Americans, and to the other allies, as well as usually having superior machines, but that gradually changed as the Japanese didn’t adapt their training system to produce pilots more quickly in the numbers required to replace their losses, while the Americans produced larger numbers of well trained pilots so that, probably by somewhere in 1943, it tipped the balance in America’s favour.
One major reason for the evolution of kamikaze pilots later in the war was that the Japanese pilots were capable of flying their plane into a ship, but most lacked the skill to bomb or torpedo ships with the accuracy that Japanese pilots had early in the war.
Well, I was referring to the IJN at the start of hostilities after Pearl Harbor. That goes for night fighting capabilities and pilot quality. As mentioned earlier the Japanese Navy lost some 200 of their best pilots at Midway. The air battles in the Solomons also whittled away at Japan’s qualitative edge. And eventual fuel shortages curtailed pilot training time.
I think it also reflected the values of the opposing sides. The Japanese had been indoctrinated to serve their emperor who was worshiped as a god. The individual was of little consequence and was expected to sacrifice himself for the emperor if need be. Therefore, there was less consideration for the safety of the individual. I think this mindset was also reflected in their earlier aircraft design. Japanese planes had the edge in agility, but at the sacrifice of armor protection to reduce weight, and they lacked the self-sealing fuel tanks of their American counterparts. Japanese pilots were less likely to survive once their planes were hit.
In the United States, the rights of the individual were cherished and human life more valued. And I think that this was reflected in American aircraft design. Greater consideration was given to pilot safety. Although, initially not as maneuverable as their Japanese counterparts, American planes were more rugged and survivable. They also tended to carry more firepower.
The Japanese pilot was more likely to die after his plane was hit, whereas the American pilot stood a greater chance of bailing out and living to fight another day. This combined with their different approaches to pilot training that you explained above, in the end proved the American system to be superior.
See the thread on Japanese Navy Aircraft
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=4081
Particularly the excerpts from: Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific, Eric M. Bergerud, Westview Press, 2000
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90810&postcount=2
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90811&postcount=3
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90812&postcount=4
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=90813&postcount=5
And as you say radar did eventually negate the Japanese night fighting capabilities. Although on occasion radar could go down as with the battleship USS South Dakota (BB-57) at the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Washington_(BB-56)
USS Washington (BB-56), the second of just two North Carolina-class battleships…has the distinction of having served the entire Pacific War without losing a man to hostile action, and only being hit once by enemy ordinance: a 5" shell that passed through her radar antenna without detonation. There were some close calls, as she was exiting the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, several Japanese “Long Lance” torpedoes detonated in her wake. Several Washington sailors died in minor accidents and she was involved in a collision with Indiana in 1943.Washington is also one of two US modern battleships to fight in a battleship duel, which was the Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. The only other battleship versus battleship engagement of the entire Pacific Theatre was Leyte Gulf in 1944. Washington is also the only one of her contemporaries to sink an enemy battleship in warfare, Imperial Japan’s Kirishima.
(The other battleship engagement being Battle of Surigao Strait Involving six old US battleships) - see: http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=111228&postcount=47
Naval Battle of Guadalcanal
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Battle_of_Guadalcanal
Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, November 14–15
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Battle_of_Guadalcanal#Second_Naval_Battle_of_Guadalcanal.2C_November_14.E2.80.9315
Low on ships, Admiral William Halsey, Jr., detached the new battleships USS Washington and USS South Dakota, of Enterprise’s support group, together with four destroyers, as Task Force 64 under Admiral Willis A. Lee to defend Guadalcanal and Henderson Field. It was a scratch force; the battleships had only operated together for a few days, and their four escorts were from four different divisions—chosen simply because, of the available destroyers, they had the most fuel. The U.S. force arrived in Ironbottom Sound in the early evening of November 14 and began patrolling around Savo Island. The U.S. warships were in column formation with the four destroyers in the lead, followed by Washington, with South Dakota bringing up the rear. At 22:55 on November 14, radar on the South Dakota and Washington began to detect the ships of the Japanese force near Savo Island around 18,000 m range.
…Washington passed through the area still occupied by the damaged and sinking U.S. destroyers and fired on Ayanami with her secondary batteries, setting her afire. Following close behind, South Dakota suddenly suffered a series of electrical failures, reportedly during repairs when her chief engineer locked down a circuit breaker in violation of safety procedures, causing her circuits repeatedly to go into series, making her radar, radios, and most of her gun batteries inoperable. However, she continued to follow Washington towards the western side of Savo Island until 23:35, when Washington changed course left to pass to the southward behind the burning destroyers. South Dakota tried to follow but had to turn to right to avoid Benham which resulted in the ship being silhouetted by the fires of the burning destroyers and made her an easy target for the Japanese.
Receiving reports of the destruction of the U.S. destroyers from Ayanami and his other ships, Kondo pointed his bombardment force towards Guadalcanal, believing that the U.S. warship force had been defeated. His force and the two U.S. battleships were now heading towards each other.
Almost blind and unable to effectively fire her main and secondary armament, South Dakota was targeted by gunfire and torpedoes by most of the ships of the Japanese force, including Kirishima, beginning about 00:00 on November 15. Although able to score a few hits on Kirishima, South Dakota took 25 medium and one large-caliber hit, some of which did not explode, that completely knocked out her communications and remaining gunfire control operations, set portions of her upper decks on fire, and forced her to try to steer away from the engagement. All of the Japanese torpedoes missed. Admiral Lee later described the cumulative effect of the gunfire damage to South Dakota as to, “render one of our new battleships deaf, dumb, blind, and impotent.” South Dakota’s crew casualties were 39 killed and 59 wounded, and she turned away from the battle at 00:17 without informing Admiral Lee, though observed by Kondo’s lookouts.
The Japanese ships had continued to concentrate their fire on South Dakota and none had detected Washington approaching to within 9,000 yards. Washington had been tracking a large target for some time but had refrained from firing since there was a chance it could be South Dakota. The ship had not been able to track South Dakota’s movements because she was in a blind spot in the Washington’s radar and could not raise her on the radio to confirm her position. When the Japanese illuminated and fired on South Dakota, all doubts were removed as to which ships were friend or foe. From this close range, the Washington suddenly hit Kirishima with at least nine main battery shells, causing heavy damage and setting her aflame. Kirishima was hit below the waterline and suffered a jammed rudder, causing her to circle uncontrollably to port.
At 00:25 Kondo ordered all of his ships that were able to converge and destroy any remaining U.S. ships. However, the Japanese ships still did not know where Washington was located, and the other surviving U.S. ships had already departed the battle area. Washington steered a northwesterly course towards the Russell Islands to draw the Japanese force away from Guadalcanal and the presumably damaged South Dakota. The Japanese ships finally sighted Washington and launched several torpedo attacks, but by adroit maneuvering by her captain, Washington avoided all of them and also grounded his ship in shallow waters. At length, believing that the way was clear for the transport convoy to proceed to Guadalcanal (but apparently disregarding the threat of air attack in the morning), Kondo ordered his remaining ships to break contact and retreat from the area about 01:04, which the Japanese ships complied with by 01:30.
SEE ALSO:
USS South Dakota (BB-57)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_South_Dakota_(BB-57)
All good points, and all true.
Putting it in simplistic terms, the Japanese thought it was weak and offensive to the warrior spirit to armour their planes (somewhat curious in view of the Samurai use of armour), while the supposedly weak Americans used armour and survived to defeat them.
I can’t think of the exact episode, which I read somewhere ages ago, but it illustrates the difference in Japanese and American thinking, on a number of levels. An American submarine made a number of risky approaches to some island in the Pacific to rescue a downed American airman and faced solid Japanese fire. Ultimately it succeeded. Subsequently a Japanese commander said he couldn’t understand why the American submarine crew would risk themselves and their boat repeatedly to save just one person.
That translates into a point I think I’ve made in some other forgotten thread, which is that the Japanese medical services which were as good as any up to WWI were relegated to the background in WWII. The nationalist idiots running the IJA were obsessed with the notion that ‘spirit’ could overcome hunger, disease and the enemy, and that illness reflected a weak spirit. Billions of tiny little mosquitoes who didn’t speak IJA Japanese proved them wrong on that point in any number of places, along with lousy field hygiene and other stupid resistance to modern science. All the more remarkable in a nation which which had all the skills and knowledge to equal its enemies, if it had been allowed to flourish as a democracy instead of being suppressed by the nationalists whose outdated martial spirit took it to war, and defeat.
Applying that just to Japanese aircraft, the single spar wing of the so-called Zero gave it immense strength, but the idiots running the show wouldn’t put armour in it to give the pilot, long to train and precious to lose, the same chance of surviving.
Also on armoured planes, my recollection is that there was a lot of resistance to it in the RAF early in the war, more from the hierarchy than the pilots, I think. Can’t recall exact reasons but I think it was more do with cost and reduced performance than anything else.
Just a quick comment on this.
Last year the Danish battalion had to defend a local police station in Musa-Kaleh in south Aghanistan for a month a so.
One day a dane was hit by a hostile sniper in beck of his head. He was taken to a room for laying bondages, but as possibility for the serious medical treatment of the injured all but existed in the stronghold in the middle of the hostile territory, Danes called for a British Helicopter. The rule is that the injured has to be deliverd within 1 hour to the main hospital at Camp Bastion.
But despite the requests the Brits said that they are not going to risk a choper for one such a seriously wounded man who has no chances of survival. The Danes kept asking for help for several hours but the answer remained - NO.
Finaly one of the Danish officers called up one of the Americans officers he had personal connection to. And they got the American choper to fly the wounded to the hospital.
Result: The wounded survived but remaines cripled for the rest of his life. The Dnaes were pissed by such a treatment.
There were numerous instances in Vietnam of American, and other, chopper pilots being weak on going anywhere near hot spots (one of which contributed to a major Australian cock up because the Aussie commanders on an air recce couldn’t persuade the American pilot to get low enough to view the ground properly, so an LZ was identified which wasn’t able to be landed on when the assault choppers arrived) and also outstandingly brave, to the point of being foolhardy (which resulted in some Australian troops believing American chopper pilots would fly through the gates of hell to load wounded Aussies or get supplies to them under fire, and being unwilling ever to hear a bad word said about American chopper pilots) . Those were instances of individual character by the pilots.
The British one in Afghanistan sounds more like a decision made independently of a pilot.
After reading through all of this I have a few observations.
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The US Navy didnt always engage with more numbers. Midway for one. Corall Sea another. Many other engagements.
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Japanese nightfighting was superior to the US despite Radar up until late 1943. We only have to witness countless engagements in the Slot of Gaudalcanal to appreciate this. At the end of the GC campaign, yes the US Navy was better at night.
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In 1941, the Japanese Navy was perhaps the best in the world, especially the Naval Air Arm. Its crews were extremely well trained and they had in the Kate, Val and Zero a combination of excellent aircraft which out ranged all allied carrier and all land aircraft [multi engined bombers excluded].
Where the Japanese fell down was their obvious lack of mass production for carriers and aircraft compared to the US and UK and in their training programme, which just did not produce the quality needed at the time.
SO the question is worded wrongly. WHo had the best Navy in ww2? Anti Submarine, well thats the Brits, no doubt. Overall by 1945, the US, again no contest. 1941, the Japanese win hands down.
As with all questions, the answers can be all to subjective I think.
I agree with all of the above. Asking questions like this thread topic is a bit overweening. Most of the navies listed above were well trained and had similar capabilities on some level. I’m not saying that the US Navy was “better” because its personnel were anymore capable, but the US simply had more which made it the most powerful. And of course, like the RN or the IJN, they had traditions and much culture in seafaring which allowed for a stable cadre on which to expand after wartime mobilization.
The USN, like the Royal Navy, was constantly improving in certain areas and its crews were extremely efficient at the various facets of warfare, such as the all important (but yet unmentioned) damage control and firefighting for instance. And yes, codebreaking is part of Naval warfare proficiency. Not just the ability to break the codes, but also the ability to disseminate and exploit the information is a key element.
Prior to the Battle of Midway, for instance, the USN had in fact partially broken the Japanese code, but not to the extent they could read traffic in real time (I might be wrong about that) and the Japanese still maintained a certain discipline in their communications making it hard to predict their exact intentions. Prior to the battle, the US Navy codebreakers had to use a ruse to figure out the next Japanese target, suspected to be the Marine garrison on the critical US base of Midway Island, but as of yet unconfirmed. I believe the Japanese term for Midway, “AI”, was cracked when the US garrison was told to send a message they were low on water, as the desalinisation machine had broken down - to be sent in an uncoded transmission to Hawaii. The Japanese then sent out a transmission that AI was running low on fresh water, thereby allowing the US Navy to concentrate what forces they still had against the Imperial Navies invasion fleet. SIGNIT is just another dimension of warfare, on sea, land and air…
LOL
So you don’t think all those say “US Navy is the best because it’s the biggest” are sort of doing the same? ;-D
I’m just trying to talk at the same level %-D ;-D
My point being:
In most cases US Navy was superior both in numbers and in intelligence information. So, in most cases, anything but clear victory is a sort of failure for them.
In most cases Kriegsmarine was inferior both in numbers and in intelligence information. So, in most cases, anything but clear defeat is a sort of great victory for them.
US build 349 destroyers, Japan 63 destroyers. (US had to face Germany, but Japan had to face UK). Cruisers: 48 vs 9. So, US was, what, something like 500% stronger.
Add to that the fact that Japan was lacking many natural resources and it had to enlist younger and younger men, etc etc etc.
Considering how easy the “setup” was for the US Navy, I just cannot call them great, best or something like that.
And, one has to remember that by being selective in a proper way (whatever that is), one gets people interested and they do (their own) research and actually learn something - and it annoys them to post messages on the forum ;-D
_
But I didn’t say any navy was “the best.” As I think I’ve also said that this thread premise was weak.
I just find your comparisons faulty logical and devoid of any real factual, unbiased comparisons…
My point being:
In most cases US Navy was superior both in numbers and in intelligence information. So, in most cases, anything but clear victory is a sort of failure for them.
But yet you inferred that the Royal Navy was in some ways superior to the US Navy, yet they usually shared the advantages in numbers and intelligence.
And it was a US Navy ship that captured a U-Boat, and thereby helped further gain the intelligence advantage.
On 4 June 1944, a hunter-killer group of the United States Navy captured the German submarine U-505. This event marked the first time a U.S. Navy vessel had captured an enemy vessel at sea since the nineteenth century. The action took place in the Atlantic Ocean, at Latitude 21-30N, Longitude 19-20W, about 150 miles off the coast of Rio De Oro, Africa. The American force was commanded by Captain Daniel V. Gallery, USN, and comprised the escort Carrier Guadalcanal (CVE-60) and five escort vessels under Commander Frederick S. Hall, USN: Pillsbury (DE-133) Pope DE-134), Flaherty (DE-135), Chatelain (DE-149), and Jenks (DE-665). As a result of the American attack on U-505, the German crew abandoned the boat after setting scuttling charges and pulling plugs to sink the submarine. Then Pillsbury sent its motor whaleboat to the circling submarine where Lieutenant (junior grade) Albert L. David, USN, led an eight-man party on board. Despite the probability of U-505 sinking or blowing up at any minute and not knowing what form of resistance they might meet below, David and his men clambered up the conning tower and then down the hatches into the boat itself. After a quick examination proved the U-boat was completely deserted (except for one dead man on deck - the only fatality of the action), the boarders set about bundling up charts, code books, and papers, disconnecting demolition charges, closing valves, and plugging leaks. By the time the flood of water had been stopped, the U-boat was low in the water and down by the stern. Lieutenant David was awarded a Medal of Honor for his role in this operation.
From: http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq97-1.htm
In most cases Kriegsmarine was inferior both in numbers and in intelligence information. So, in most cases, anything but clear defeat is a sort of great victory for them.
LOL Nice semantics. So they have an excuse to lose now, despite the fact that they were considered the cream of the German crop, and had the largest most efficient submarine force? And I think they were clearly defeated having failed to prevent Allied landings anywhere and serving as little more than a nuisance by the end of 1943…
US build 349 destroyers, Japan 63 destroyers. (US had to face Germany, but Japan had to face UK). Cruisers: 48 vs 9. So, US was, what, something like 500% stronger.
So? What good did that do for them when they were in battles and were in fact outnumbered by the Japanese, and the US Navy’s “intelligence” advantage was hardly a real asset during the battle since it was not “real time intelligence.” In battles such as the Coral Sea, Midway, and Leyte Gulf, the “intelligence advantage” went out the window often when the battle started…
And intelligence warfare is part of Naval warfare. Is a service having a shitty intelligence function make them somehow a better navy, or gives them an excuse to fail?
And the numbers provided are useless as a direct comparison when you consider the fact that the US Navy was fighting a two ocean war, supporting amphibious and air support operations the Mediterranean and European theaters as well as against the Japanese…
Add to that the fact that Japan was lacking many natural resources and it had to enlist younger and younger men, etc etc etc.
No. That’s why they invaded the Pacific Rim, to get natural resources. They failed to defend their sea lanes…
Considering how easy the “setup” was for the US Navy, I just cannot call them great, best or something like that.
Well, the point is that one cannot judge “the best,” but yet you seem to indicate that the Kriegsmarine or the Royal Navy were “better” despite having their advantages as well.
And isn’t it a challenge for a large navy to maintain a certain quality level while undergoing massive expansion, in skill sets such as firefighting, gunnery, and aviation?
And, one has to remember that by being selective in a proper way (whatever that is), one gets people interested and they do (their own) research and actually learn something - and it annoys them to post messages on the forum ;-D
_
Well, I’m glad you’ve learned something.
I don’t know where alephh gets his figures from, but they seem to be way off.
Also, the US and Royal Navies operated across the globe, whereas the Imperial Japanese Navy focused on certain regions of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
Because of their size and the vastness of the areas in which they operated, the US and Royal Navies also faced the greater logistical challenge IMHO.
World War II aircraft carriers of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_II_aircraft_carriers_of_Japan
24 Japanese carriers
World War II battleships of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_II_battleships_of_Japan
12 Japanese battleships
World War II cruisers of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_II_cruisers_of_Japan
50 Japanese cruisers
World War II destroyers of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_II_destroyers_of_Japan
106 Japanese destroyers
Ships of the Imperial Japanese Navy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Ships_of_the_Imperial_Japanese_Navy
World War II naval ships of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:World_War_II_naval_ships_of_Japan
Imperial Japanese Navy of World War II
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Japanese_Navy_of_World_War_Two
Order of battle:
Imperial Japanese Navy Warships at time of Pearl Harbor Attack in December 1941:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_Japanese_Navy_of_World_War_Two#Order_of_battle
List of ships of the Japanese Navy
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ships_of_the_Japanese_Navy#Battlecruisers
Naval ships of Japan
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Naval_ships_of_Japan
Imperial Japanese Navy Page
http://www.combinedfleet.com/kaigun.htm
The Pacific War: The U.S. Navy
http://www.microworks.net/pacific/
HyperWar: US Navy in World War II
http://www.ibiblio.net/hyperwar/USN/index.html
Partial repeat of one of my previous posts on this thread:
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=111226&postcount=46
I have the Battlefield documentary series and remember some comments made concerning the damage control systems of American carriers prior to the battle of Midway.
Battlefield: The Battle of Midway - Prelude to Battle (Time-Life)
http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_ss_v/102-3240256-7489714?url=search-alias%3Dvhs&field-keywords=Battlefield%3A&Go.x=10&Go.y=12
From the video The Battle of Midway - Prelude to Battle - US Pacific Fleet: Weapons and have transcribed the comments here.
…All three of the carriers that were to take part in the Battle of Midway were of the Yorktown class. They were the aircraft carriers Yorktown, Hornet and Enterprise. Yorktown carriers were notable for their advanced damage control systems to minimize the risk of fire. Aviation gas [avgas] fuel lines could be filled with carbon dioxide when an enemy attack was imminent. The carrier’s decks were also specially designed for combat conditions. The flight deck was unarmored and constructed with 6-inch planks of teak - more easily repaired than metal and less likely to cause severe splinter wounds to crewmen…
… Where the Americans had a real edge on the enemy was in damage control. Damage control parties were highly trained in their duties, and their ability to deal with fires (the greatest threat to any warship) was unsurpassed. At the battle of Midway the relative damage control skills of each side would prove a key factor in deciding the outcome of the fight.
From: The Pacific War Encyclopedia, James F. Dunnigan & Albert A. Nofi, Checkmark Books, 1998, p 20.
The Japanese had a policy of not storing aircraft on deck, a practice that the US Navy adopted before the war, and embraced enthusiastically during it. As a result, US carriers of comparable size usually could operate as many as 65% more aircraft (90-100 as against 55-65). British carriers tended to have smaller aircraft capacity (55-65), due to a decision to provide relatively heavy armor. In compensation, British carriers were much more survivable ships.
A second critical factor in carrier effectiveness, and more important than carrier size, was the ship’s capacity to carry avgas (aviation fuel) and fuel, which determined operational endurance. While this was, of course, partially connected to the size of the vessel, once again policy decisions and design were a factor. In consequence, US carriers tended to have greater fuel capacity than either Japanese or British ones, which meant American carriers could generate more missions between trips to the barn.
ALSO:
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showpost.php?p=111228&postcount=47