So far as I’m aware, Patton spoke only French and English, not German…I’ll check that one in a Biography I have called “Genius for War”…
Wow… Quadruple post… Havn’t seen that yet… 
new age!
The great irony in all this being is that some speculate that Patton himself showed the telltale signs of battle fatigue. Spontaneous outbursts and mercurial emotional mood swings being major symptoms…
And while I do think Patton was a very good general, I also think he was vastly overrated. I’d take Omar Bradley over Patton any day of the week. Many forget that Patton really was disliked by most of his troops. He certainly did restore spirit and discipline in the US soldier after the defeat at Kasserine and the disastrous reign of Fredendall. But he was mental, and actually mandated that soldiers go into battle wearing ties! This was the first edict Bradley dropped when he replaced him in North Africa.
Some also believe Patton, specifically Rick Atkinson in “An Army at Dawn,” tended to pass his failures onto others. In one instance, he ordered a division commander, Gen. Orlando Pace, to essentially lead his troops as a lieutenant, knowingly sending him to his death. Pace picked up a carbine, and dutifully led his troops into a futile night attack against German strongholds in the mountains after Patton ranted and belittled him, goading him into his own likely death. After hanging up the phone, George is said to have almost sobbed and said, “I just sent a good man to his death.”
Pace survived, but only after his face was sliced open by shrapnel. He was later relieved, but would redeem himself as a corp commander leading the armored thrust into Germany.
Incidentally, a lot of US soldiers resented old “blood and guts,” lamenting him as “His guts, our blood!”
Lets look at Bradley then…
During the planning for Normandy, an officer from the Pacific was sent to the ETO (Maj Gen. Charles H. “Pete” Corlett), specifically as an advisor on the amphibious preparation for the landings…not only was Corlett’s advice ignored, but Corlett said he was,
“…flabergasted by the reception. It was made quite clear to me that ETO had NOTHING TO LEARN from me, and that I was in the “Big League”.”
Corlett’s good advice went unheeded…and, when the situation on Omaha became critical, it was the orders and fireplan of OMAR N. BRADLEY that cost so many people their lives on Omaha…the situation was saved by GERMAN MISTAKES in deployment and reserve allocation, with all but two battalions of the 352nd Infantry Division placed 12 miles back from the beach, and then sent to BRITISH beaches in support, rather than wiping out the beachhead entire at Omaha.
How many other times did Omar Bradley IGNORE good advice and cost the lives of his men by the thousand? Casualties on Omaha were the worst for D-Day, and the exact number of men lost has always remained hidden…look through Patton’s record…You won’t find ANY examples of similar behaviour…Why? Patton was a PROFESSIONAL, whereas Bradley less so, and Omar N. was far more pigheaded than Patton ever knew how to be…
The measure of great commander cannot be found buried in his autobiography. Compare Patton’s casualties to Bradley…Patton comes out on the winning side in most cases, even when his Army was getting a battering, like at Fortress Metz.
Most military historians find Pattons tactics in the Lorraine Campaign to have been badly flawed, leading to the deaths of many of his troops
Compare Patton’s casualties to Bradley…Patton comes out on the winning side in most cases, even when his Army was getting a battering, like at Fortress Metz.
Bradley was an Army Group commander, he was in charge of a number of armies, while Patton only commanded the one army, so Bradley’s casualties are bound to be higher.
ps I’m not a great fan of Bradley, he was in my view,(stealing Churchills quip about a fellow politician)
“A modest man, with much to be modest about” 
Of course. But the ETO was fighting an enemy of another stripe. One that could actually strike back with armor. While no doubt there was much to learn, the sheer scope of the campaign would pale anything in the Pacific by comparison. And Bradley, Monty, Ike, Tedders, and Patton all had their own amphibious experiences in North Africa and Italy. Well, maybe not Air Marshal Tedders. But he was probably the best of the lot as far as planning went.
Corlett’s good advice went unheeded…and, when the situation on Omaha became critical, it was the orders and fireplan of OMAR N. BRADLEY that cost so many people their lives on Omaha…the situation was saved by GERMAN MISTAKES in deployment and reserve allocation, with all but two battalions of the 352nd Infantry Division placed 12 miles back from the beach, and then sent to BRITISH beaches in support, rather than wiping out the beachhead entire at Omaha.
I’m not sure which advice of Corblett’s was ignored. But laying the casualties at Omaha beach at Bradley’s feet is silly. Omaha was “poor (&) bloody” for many reasons that were beyond anyone’s control. We can argue that the “funnies” could have been used bringing in more armored support to the beach. But a myriad of factors such as geography that was wholly favorable to the defender, fog, billowing smoke from burning grass, arty and air strikes that fell too far inland due to friendly fire concerns, etc. Most of these factors were out of Omar’s hands. And Omaha was a clear success, despite the firestorm of death in the opening hours. And if you’re going to blame Bradley for Omaha, then at least give him credit for Utah!
How many other times did Omar Bradley IGNORE good advice and cost the lives of his men by the thousand? Casualties on Omaha were the worst for D-Day, and the exact number of men lost has always remained hidden…look through Patton’s record…You won’t find ANY examples of similar behaviour…Why? Patton was a PROFESSIONAL, whereas Bradley less so, and Omar N. was far more pigheaded than Patton ever knew how to be…
Which “advice” did Bradley ignore? He was far from the only planner of Normandy, and he should be commended as one of them that perhaps one of the most difficult mission tasked to any army, and amphibious landing under fire, was executed successfully by-and-large.
Patton was a “professional?” Perhaps, but he could also be an eccentric and pompous ass! Ask one of their veterans which one they preferred! Patton also grew easily frustrated when not moving forward, often causing him to be impetuous and waste mens’ lives in futile attacks. This was something easily noted in both the Lorraine and in Tunisia/Algiers. He was also not particularly gifted when it came to logistics and he was horrible as the regent of Sicily.
Bradley moved the II Corp through the Tunisian mountains in bloody hand to hand fighting, in situations where Patton had faltered and was immensely respected by his men. He was a nonsense professional in every sense of the word and was key to some of the better decisions made by Eisenhower such as completely restructuring the II Corp after Kasserine, with Patton in charge (who also like and immensely respected Bradley)…
Just because Bradley wasn’t a “press corp general” doesn’t mean he was any less competent than his peers, and I suspect he was probably better than most (actually, he did finally succumb to towing around a media entourage late in the War after he was stung by Monty’s famous Battle of the Bulge press conference). Patton, Monty, Mac - they were all preening attention whores and self-promoters to an extent. That certainly didn’t make them bad generals, and all of them were very good to one extent or another, just remembered as perhaps better than they really were or remembed better than some of their predecessors that often laid the ground work for their successes.
The measure of great commander cannot be found buried in his autobiography. Compare Patton’s casualties to Bradley…Patton comes out on the winning side in most cases, even when his Army was getting a battering, like at Fortress Metz.
A measure of a great commander also can not be found in a press release or conference! Of course Patton did come out winning. But Bradley didn’t come out on the “winning side?” And the casualties argument is again opaque. As mentioned above, Omar had more responsibility, and just ask II Corp vets from North Africa who cared more about them and was less insane. I’m pretty sure most would vote Bradley as their best commander…
You mean he wasn’t an interview-whore that crowed about every success, took credit for others’ work, and spun defeats off on others or ignored them…
There’s a difference…
Humble men don’t write long autobiographies. Quiet, introspective ones do…
Here is passage from the article by Military History Quarterly Staffer WILLIAMSON MURRAY…The Piece is entitled “Needless Slaughter At Omaha”, from their Spring 2003 issue…Page 30 of the Magazine…
""General George C. Marshall, the Army’s Chief of Staff, was well informed by his subordinates as to what was happening in the Pacific. Struck by the success of the Navy-Marine-Army operation in the Marshalls, the COS ordered the commander of the army’s 7th Division, Major Gen. Charles H. “Pete” Corlett, to Washington in early April 1944 tp report on his division’s landing on Kwajalein and the general lessons that the army and Marine Corps had learned in the Pacific. Corlett was then ordered to Europe, where he was to pass on these lessons to senior commanders in that theater. Thereafter, he was to assume command of a corps once the invasion had taken place and the buildup was underway.
Corlett was astonished at the reception he recieved in Europe. None of the senior U.S. commanders in Britain who were preparing “Overlord”, especially Omar N.Bradley, displayed the slightest inclination to learn anything from the amphibious experiences of U.S. forces in the Pacific. Corlett soon discovered that the prevailing attitude was that
“Anything that happened in the Pacific was strictly bush league stuff”, of little relevance to those who were fighting the big war in Europe. Not only was Corlett alarmed by the lack of fire support for the initial landings, he also warned that the planners were considerably underestimating the ammunition allocations required for the upcoming battle in Normandy. Vice Admiral Kent Hewitt, the Navy’s leading practitioner of amphibious war in Europe, admitted to Corlett that the army in Europe was six months behind the practices in the Pacific, but there was nothing he could do to educate it’s leaders, given their attitude that they had nothing to learn. Ironically, only Maj. Gen Alexander Patch, who would command the Southern France “Dragoon” landings in August, sought out Corlett to learn from his experiences in the Pacific. His advice, combined with the sobering struggle in Normandy, was sufficient to persuade the army leaders in the Mediterranean to heed the Navy’s recommendations and pay far closer attention to the initial fire support for the amphibious forces.
The foremost explanation for the troubles at Omaha Beach has been the placement of the 352nd Infanterie Division on the coast caught the Allied high command by surprise. Yet, Allied intelligence had placed the 352nd as close as St.Lo, within 20 miles of Omaha beach. Moreover, intelligence had suggested that,
[COLOR=“Blue”]“all of these things indicate that the enemy intends to defend the coastline as strongly as possible in an effort to hold the attackers until mobile reserves arrive.”[/COLOR]
Thus, even if the 352nd were not up on the coast, it was certainly in a position to rapidly intervene. Nor should planners have assumed that the Germans might not catch some indication that Allied forces were about to launch the invasion, and move the division up to the coast.
The real reason for the U.S. Army setbacks on Omaha Beach involves the nature of Bradley’s fire plan. And the conception was almost entirely Bradley’s. Here, that general officers’ lack of understanding of amphibious operations along with his disinterest in Naval capabilities resulted in a fire plan that relied almost entirely on air bombardment. This over-reliance on aeriel power was partly because the army air forces were still part of the army, and partly due to narrow service parochialism that simply ignored the potential of naval support.
Whatever the reason, the fire plan for Omaha Beach called for a massive, precision aeriel bombardment…(Theres a contradiction in terms…B5N2Kate) of the German Beach defences. How capable the Army Air Forces were at executing such a mission is suggested by the precision bombing they would conduct in support of Operation Cobra in July, when during clear weather bombers managed to kill 111 Allied soldiers and wound 490. But the weather on D-Day was cloudy. Dropping their loads from above the clouds, the airmen feared they might hit the landing force. The result was that they did not hit a single one of the German bunkers and fortified positions lining the hieghts and the draws leading up to the ridge and away from the beaches.
With so much emphasis on aeriel bombardment, the naval bombardment was minimal. The naval plan called for three distinct phases; the first would be a bombardment of the main German batteries in the area to start at dawn; the second, a “drenching fire” against enemy positions; and the third, on-call fire once naval shore parties had established themselves. The second phase was scheduled to last a mere twenty minutes, from H-20 to H Hour. And that “drenching” bombardment was to be executed almost entirely by destroyers.
The size and constitution of the battleships assigned to the first phase bombardment speaks volumes on how undervalued naval gunfire support was to army planners and Bradley. The naval punch for the most important amphibious operation launched by the Allies during the entire course of WW2 was provided by three of the oldest battleships in the U.S. Navy: NEVADA (14in guns) was laid down in 1912; ARKANSAS (12in guns) and TEXAS (14in guns) were even older. The Chief British contribution, HMS WARSPITE (15in guns), was a veteran of the 1916 Battle of Jutland. One of the U.S battleships bombarded targets on Utah Beach, where the 4th Infantry division landed; a second American battleship spent much of the morning bombarding German batteries that lay between Omaha and the British beaches. Thus, for all intents and purposes, the initial Omaha Beach landing recieved direct support from a single battleship for a period of TWENTY MINUTES.
The contrast with the Kwajalein and Namur landings the previous February could not be more graphic - six to seven battleships firing 16inch guns over a period of three days compared to one battleship over a twenty minute period. Admittedly, there was no possibility of a sustained daylight bombardment, given the differences in the strategic situation between the Kwajalein and Normandy landings. But it is worth noting that the British landings took place a full hour and a half later than the American landings, and much of that time was taken up with a bombardment of German positions. a 90 minute bombardment by a battleship force the size of the one that attacked Kwajalein would have gone a long way toward suppressing, if not destroying, the German defences on Omaha beach.
In his memoirs, Omar Bradley suggested that he made a major effort to get additional naval support for the bombardment. According to Corlett’s memoirs, however, there is scant evidence to support this. In fact, had Bradley done so, he undoubtedly would have occasioned an enourmous fight with Admiral Ernest J. King in Washington over the transfer of battleships from the Pacific theaters. It was a fight that King would most probably have lost. But the absence of any contentious correspondence in the National Archives underlines that niether Bradley, nor for that matter his boss, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, was interested in greater naval support - an attitude in which King was more than delighted to indulge his Army collegues, but one that was to cost the lives of all too many young Americans…
As the American military embarks on the 21st Century, it appears far removed from the petty jealousies and narrowmindedness that all too often characterized interservice cooperation during World War 2. Yet, it’s military leaders should not forget the cost in blood that U.S. soldiers suffered to make good on the carelessness of senior commanders who were too smart or too arrogant to learn from another service or from other theaters. What is particularly striking about Omaha Beach is the harsh reality that the time was there and the ships were available for a longer and heavier bombardment. Would such a bombardment have prevented heavy casualties on Omaha? Probably not. But a greater reliance on naval gunfire support would certainly have lowered the casualty bill suffered in one of the worst days in U.S. military history.
Even with a flawed bombardment and amphibious plans, the landing did succeed. But one should not forget, to use the Duke Wellington’s comment after Waterloo, that it was “a near run thing.” Nor should one forget how much the mistakes of the 352nd division’s commander contributed to the correlation of forces that finally allowed the landing teams of the 1st and 29th Divisions to crack German defences.
War is a learning experience. One can learn from the experiences of others, or one can learn at the cost of one’s own soldiers.
Omar Bradley and the Omaha Beach planners chose the latter path…"
Any takers for Omar N. Bradley?..Not this poster, at any rate…
“Laying the casualties at Bradley’s feet” doesn’t look so silly after all…
AND…must object to the sentiment expressed above that,
“Humble men don’t write long auto-biographies.”
What about U.S. Grant?..not exactly a short book, and a humble man if ever there was one in military circles, and he’s rated as one of the best exponents of the craft of General Officer Soldiery…
Maybe you should have said…“Humble men don’t write autobiographies…”
Putting the articles overly harsh criticism and typical seeking of the single factor that would have made Omaha less bloody, do we then apply the same standard to Patton for being a callous, ruthless prick regarding his mens’ lives? I really would like to suggest that you read Rick Atkinson’s “An Army at Dawn” and “Day of Battle” covering the US Army’s foray into North Africa and Italy respectively, and the British as well…He is harshly critical of Patton is several passages. For instance, he writes that when informed that in a combat action in Algeria that no junior officers had been killed (a minor cause for jubilation, since North Africa was a meatgrinder for lieutenants), although a disproportionate number of NCOs and enlisted had been killed or wounded (the USA suffered typically high junior officer death ratios early on in Torch), he ordered the commander (Pace) to essentially send two lieutenants on a suicide mission in order to prevent the perception by the enlisted men that officers were spared danger or received preferential treatment. I believe the order was thankfully ignored. Most enlisted men would have been glad to have learned their platoon leader’s hometown before he was killed or wounded at that point! Patton also made errors costing the lives of his 3rd Army. You simply cannot judge a general by one operation. Secondly, why wasn’t Patton put in charge of D-Day planning? Because every knew that wasn’t his forte’!
The article brings up some interesting points, but it is essentially hindsight that leaves out a good deal or the situation on the beach and almost solely blames Bradley for his arty plan. I find this a bit ludicrous. The idea that there was some “magic bullet” that would have spared the opening waves their miseries is very disingenuous, even revisionist, at this point. I’ve heard the argument that the tanks were let out too far from the shore, the beach plan should have been altered, etc. These are valid arguments. But at the end of the day, it came down to the geography of the beach heavily favoring the defender with good visibility and possessing an open, clear zone of fire. Naval artillery would still have been ineffective against the beachhead unless they made direct hits on the extensive bunker complexes, even with 16" shells. It was only when US and Royal Navy destroyers moved in and fired almost pointblank into the bunkers, often times expending 25 shells on one emplacement, that they were reduced.
The air strikes missed because of poor visibility, and also the fear that they would hit the landing craft approaching the shore. The article also implies that tactical air power is somehow inferior to artillery in support of armies. I think he brinks up the infamous strike during Operation Cobra in which over 110 US troops were killed. I’m unsure (since the author neglects to provide context), but I believe he is referring the specific targeting of a panzer division using waves of strategic and tactical air assets. If so, they did indeed kill over 100 of their own, but they also completely rendered an entire Heer division combat ineffective as the dazed Kraut zombies were essentially rounded up the next day as they wandered around their overturned tanks…
I’m sorry. I’m not buying that Bradley wasn’t good simply because Omaha was “poor and bloody” for the opening waves. The Canadians on Juno also suffered heavy initial German resistance. The difference? They were fighting in a residential seaside villa area and were able to move into the town under fire, then quickly flank and outmaneuver the defenders. Omaha was simply and open field of bluffs with a seawall, providing a perfect killzone for the German defenders with little or no cover for the assault troops to wheel and maneuver…
Have any of you seen patton the movie? He is awsome!
yeah! I love that movie! Yellow patton tanks VS Green pattonn tanks!
Nick…tactical airpower WAS inferior to Naval artillery…no doubt about it, especially for the job at hand on Omaha…
If you are so wrapped up in the “Patton Bashing” that you don’t wish to see anything alse, then all the proof of Bradley’s typical arrogance will fall on deaf ears…
You asked me to provide some sort of proof…I did…And now it’s somehow not good enough?
Stick up for Rommel and watch me shoot that down as well. I found Omar Bradley to be just as pigheaded and arrogant as Patton, but without a trace of tactical or strategic genius…for all of Patton’s faults, he was essentially irreplaceable and unique…his orders shorteded the war…No such claim can be made by Omar N. Bradley, and the lack of press conferences simply means he really had nothing significant to offer them in the way of news, whereas Patton was making headlines by his very actions, good bad or indifferent, all the time…
I guess you could say the vote has already been cast a long time ago as to which was the better performer…the one that got all the publicity…
And it WASN’T OMAR…Tough luck…the press know a winner when they see one…and it wasn’t Bradley…
Is all critique that you don’t agree with classed as “overly harsh?”…show me “less overtly harsh” criticism then. Criticism is, by it’s very nature, HARSH most of the time, sorry to inform you…
If you wish to be an apologist, youv’e also got to have something to bring to the table…it’s no use telling me to “just read this”…I maY NOT HAVE A COPY…why dfon’t you paraphrase the books essential points, rather than simply tearing me down without any executive proof of your own,apart from the titles of two books…
This is supposed to be informed debate…and youv’e offered very little in the way of information…CAPTAIN nick…
BTW…your statement regarding the Destroyers at Omaha left me wondering what would have been achieved with a proper bombardment…they were only DDs, yet you credit their success at reducing bunkers, even if it did need 25 shells each, who cares? Ammunition should be the least of your worries at that particular point of the operation…Those airstrikes missed because of the essential unsuitability of them for the role…and a lot of people died for that alone…and that IS to be placed fairly and sqaurely, at the feet of Omar Bradley, the planner of the fire plan, and man on the spot thats supposed to accept responsibility when things like this happen. You won’t find arrogant Omar admitting to much of anything in the way of mistakes, which is entirely typical of that General Officer, as demonstrated by his attitude to Maj. Gen. Charles Corlett.
I think youv’e just got it into your head that Omar was a better soldier, based on the fact of his lack of press conferences, and his “un-Patton-like” personality.
Put yourself in Eisenhower’s shoes…If Patton was such a disaster, then why was he kept on?..Generals like Omar Bradley could have removed
Patton if they actually thought his record was less than secure…they could not find much to attack Patton for, really, and had to rely on bullshit slapping incidents to make press over Georgie’s “unsuitability”…
They didn’t all cry “Let George do it” for nothing…Patton restored mobility to Normandy, and like Grant, his actions “got this thing over and done with as quickly as possible” in the best American tradition…and as for uniforms in the Third Army, it’s like a musician that plays better in his suit…men fight better when they are clean, well fed and with dry feet…
Omar Bradley…responsible for not much in the way of innovation, just another commander who was there, like Miles Dempsey…they all envied Georgie for his genius, and people like Bradley and their apologists are not, now, going to take the credit for it either, just as they tried to do sixty plus years ago…
Your turn to provide a little in the way of proof, Captain Nick…and don’t get “fresh” with me!..(he he!)
BTW…Patton was kept out of the limelight for D-Day because of an intelligence “sting” called FORTITUDE that had the eyes of the German High Command firmly fixed on what Georgie was doing…Georgie’s part in this deception probably guaranteed the success of the landing, as it fudged the thinking of the Germans…they knwe that Patton would be at the forefront of any push to Paris and beyond…while he sat as commander of the fictitious Army Group Patton, and still theoretically in England, then he was doing far more for the cause of actually getting ashore than he would have as a planner…and there was nothing wrong with his abilities, he just had a larger role to play…
WHERE does it say ANYWHERE that “planning wasn’t his forte”…I think you just made that one up out of thin air…SOURCES please, not sentiments!
Nobody likes a professional that loves his job in the armed services…and Patton LIVED for the craft of Soldering…Bradley was just an arrogant office geek with the same inflated opinion of his own actions, but without the tactical or strategic ability…
Prove me incorrect…a few quotes would be nice, not some generalized pointing at the entire works of elsewhere…what can you bring to the table for the here and now?
More than titles, I hope…
Why writing five consecutive posts,one big one is not enough?
Fun war film, but a piece of poo when it comes to historical accuracy.