World War III scenario: mid-1946

Not a consideration. There are more pressing problems.

Certainly, but I think an inevitable shift would have taken place and the allies would have targeted primarily Soviet logistical centers, oil refineries, and rail marshaling yards…

Covered that in one of my sweeping postings regarding supply depots.I could have listed labels but assumd people understood my meaning.

It’s almost impossible to say as the scenarios are boundless…

Of course it is, that’s why I asked.

But I think the month time frame you gave to be a tad unrealistic, I think any open hostilities would have taken longer, probably at least three to six months. I think that what might have happened would most likely have been a gradual disintegration of cooperation punctuated by skirmishes. This might lead to larger scale “reconosense in force” operations (by the Soviets here) in order to probe the strengths and weaknesses of the Allies…

Totally disagree. The Soviets could never have continued to support massive armies beyond a month and if they hadn’t achieved their goals by then, they never would.

Such an operation would have undoubtedly been preceded with the infiltration of espionage, saboteurs, and special operations agents in an attempt to cause some havoc.

Not so easy as you make it sound. Easier for the Allies to use Stay-behind forces to disrupt Soviet lines of communication.

Off hand, without knowing the exact geography of the final “halt positions” of the Allies with the exception of the “Elbe river,” the most sensible thing for the Soviets to do would be to attempt to “split” the UK and US forces by driving an armored spearhead wedge between them. This would maximize confusion and reduce Allied coordination. But to affect this, would the Soviets have to perform a hostile river crossing?

It has always been envisaged that a Soviet assault would strike accross the norht German plain. This ground best suits their armoured divisions and their M.O.

Their only chance of real success would be to mass artillery and tactical aircraft to saturate the area as a “fire sack.” But this would be challenging if not impossible due to the probably Allied advantage in local tactical air assets…

Soviet tactics were to send forward armoured recce units to probe for weaknesses in the Allied defenses. Once discovered, a massive artillery bombardment would be used to weaken them further before sending their armoured division in.

Even without significant obstacles the Soviets may have had a hard time sustaining any initial successes. The Soviets would have to mass artillery and insure that it kept up with the tanks and infantry, if it didn’t, more than likely, I see Allied troops gradually attriting them down and inflicting losses that would be unsustainable and leading to a probably Allied counterattack, even where there are no rivers. I just don’t think the Red Air Force tactical aviation could sustain a Westward thrust with concerns of fuel and the tactical quality of the USAAF and RAF fighters. They heavily outnumbered the Luftwaffe which was fighting a two-front pincer battle of attrition. This might again come as a shock to Soviet air crews…

Well, quite frankly, there are obstacles. Along the Wesser (obviously, I have some familiarity with the area) for example, their are ridge lines which could be defended effectively and upset the Soviet timetable. In the area of Minden, there is a gap (known as the Minden-Gap) which the Wesser flows through. This would be a great strategic prize for any Soviet force advancing westward. However, it’s going to be defended, and I mean DEFENDED!

I think the question of Soviet morale might also be visited, since the average soldier, just like a GI or Tommy, might begin to seriously question the advancing on a former ally, especially when you are using much of his equipment he sent you…

This I find interesting. By 1946 the Tommies wnated nothing more than to go home. Remember, Britain had been at war for six years, longer than any other nation. Having said that, war veterans called-up for service in Korea just got on with it and did a mighty fine job. I wouldn’t like to say, at the time, who had the betteer morale. The Soviets might also want to go home, and the Great Patriotic War was fought to rid themselves of the Nazis, not to expand their borders. Even though they did so in Eastern Europe.

And of their ability to provide artillery and air support to their troops…

Not easy when they’re being bombed to pieces. If resupply was coming in from a disbursed industrial base in the east, how effective were the Soviet lines of communication from those areas? I hink we’re back to bombing there rail yards etc.

Little question. I think the only real Red Army trump card here is the quality of their tanks vs. the Sherman and the waste of time and resources know as the American “tank destroyers.” Still, even an M-10 or M-36 was essentially designed for defensive work, and both the US and the British were just starting to get better and better tank designs into the theater at the end. So, in a sustained conflict where the front was stabilized, I doubt even this would have been much of an advantage…

By this time, both britain and the U.S. had better tanks than the Sherman coming on line e.g. Cromwell and Centurion. Besides, by this time the Allies had learnt how to defend a hard place with the equipment They had. The Brits had learnt from the Germans, particularly in the Western Desert, by driving their tanks onto the German 88’s - not a good idea!

I still go for the airpower option. Strategic and tactical bombing had won through in every theatre either by the Axis forces, in the beginning, or by Allies later. When we speak of forces confronting each other, it’s not just about the quality of the tanks, it’s about logisitics, communications, command and control and coordinaton of combined operations.

I really don’t think that the soviets had the logistics to attack the western allies, who would probably once again win air superiority, and while Stalin may have ruled with an iron grip, everyone has limits to what they can do, i don’t think he would be in power for very much longer if he dragged Russia into ww3

Not as much significant splitting …
For instance when the Brits and Soviet have occuped Iran in the summer 1941 - there were enought few divisions.
Besides the whole Soviet far East army was never more then 1.5 mln i.e about 20% of whole forces.
So the Soviets couls easy capture the Tyrkey and Iran for the short time and cut off allies from a Iran oil.
Only after than they could lead the war agains Allies more or less succesfully for a long time.

Perhaps the range factor would have made air assets useless to put there then…

That’t exactly what i /m talking about.
And this fact reflected in plan Untinkable. So there is no evidence thant the Strategic abviation could critically influence at the Soviet Industry.

Well, since they didn’t really control the country until 1949, they didn’t have a choice. One could argue that any conflict with the Soviet Union by the West may have saved the Kuomintang regime?

There is not need to controll the sountry- enough just to support the civil war and support the chinas communists with ammunition and soviet advisers as it was in Vietnam.
The chaos of sivil war simply did not let the allies use the Chinas territory effectively in faight against USSR.

I never said they were, however, I think post War studies showed that using strategic aircraft in essentially a tactical role could be highly successful (i.e. the pre-D-Day raids).

It could be succesfull in JUST if allies would have the absolute AIR superiority - which thay had over Germany last period of war.
But if you would be so kind - and watch at the British staff report- the overal figures of Soviet fighter in the Europe was even more then Allies.
True they have no special aricraft like the nights fighter but in daylight they could meet the strategic fleet with a great enjoy:)

And by Korea, the USAF had modernized, or was in the process of doing so, its front line units with the newer B-36s and B-47s while using the leftovers from WWII (the B-29s and B-26s, which became a serious morale issue incidentally) to hit Korea.

Well firstly the piston-jet B-36 was also moral obsolet in the mid of the 1950 already.
Secondary the SOviet aviation aslo had modernized during Korean war.The Mig-17 was enough speed and high-altitude to hit the any strategic bombers.

And I don’t think that anyone can claim that UN/US aviation was “neutralized” in Korea as they had air superiority and a severe handicap of not attacking over the Yalu River…There may not have been so many MIG-15s in the air if their bases had been pulverized.

Sure the total quantity of Migs in Korea was not so great - no more 300-350 at moment( against 2000 of allies aircrafts) .Therefore they could have just the limit succes.
However if the whole soviet far east aviation would enter the war- the allies would have been lost not just 100 b-29 and 150 b-26 but in several times more.At least half of Strategic fleet reserve:)
The Soviet analyse-report of battles in Korea against B-29 clearly demonstrated that even the relatively small group of Migs ( about 20-40) could effective neitralize the formation about 20-30 b-29 with escort fighters.I mean to prevent them to drop the bomb with accuracy. Besides about 5-10% of Bombers usially were shoted down.
So i would not like to hope for the strategic aviation :slight_smile:
In case with the soviet great distances they inevitably would have the very limit success and a great casualties.

Of course the non-nuke scenario was unfortunately unlikely. Especially considering the British attitude towards them (nukes).
Remember how we sopke of the Soviets having first strike doctrine and Nato not having one. It came out that Nato had a similar first nuke strike principe anyway.
And here is another interesting peice of history for you, guys. This is a “what if” pseudo documentary about a possible conflict with USSR. Enjoy!

In the mean while note who first desided to use nukes according to this british movie (time 01:49 and 14:26 in the file).

The War Game (1965)

Bonus: And here is the similar pseudo documentary from 1984 - “Threads
I have not seen this one yet so I can not commnet.

How do you have the time?

The movie is 48 minutes long. I ment that they reffer to first nuclear strike descision at about 01:49 and 14:26.

But I do recomend to watch the whole film. Very impressive. I almost had a tear on my eye. No sh*t.

I’d suggest that the basic problems underlying this scenario are that Stalin had any interest in

a. ‘liberating’
b. the ‘proletariat’
c. from the the ‘imperialist occupying armies’
c. of the ‘international bourgeoisie’,

let alone expanding his empire to the Atlantic.

He was a dictator who wanted to consolidate his power, in areas he could control.

His, and Soviet, moves were always about protecting Russia and the USSR from attack, and cementing his power. Just like everyone else’s in Europe before, during and after WWII were about protecting their own interests.

Middle Europe was just a buffer, for both sides.

If Stalin wanted to cause real trouble without even firing a shot, all he had to do was remove all his forces from the Chinese front and leave America (because that’s what it would have come down to) to deal with the Chinese and remnant Japanese, then transfer those forces to push into the southern areas of Iran etc, which are immune from naval attack; have some advantages against air attack compared with mainland Europe; and, given the way the Soviets flogged even the worn out Japanese in August 1945 with massive forces, would cause some problems for any land force composed of American, British and, in a wild moment, French forces. None of which had much stomach for the fight, by then.

Don’t forget about the Able Archer incident, which very nearly led to a Soviet first strike…

I thought that was what I said? In fact I agree with MOS, I dont think that the West could do anything but use the Nuclear option and as Nuclear was in its infancy [and more importantly the Soviets didnt have any to throw back] I also think they used in tactical situation against Soviet military formations.

If you’ve never read it, I would recommend ‘Chieftain’ by General Sir John Hackett (one of the better generals) - very excellent novel based on WW3 Scenario, and probably fits with your thoughts.

here’s another entirely forom the Soviet viewpoint - very, very good.

http://www.amazon.com/Red-Army-Ralph-Peters/dp/0671676695

From the U.S. forces viewpint, try ‘Team Yankee’ - “SABOT!!” is probably the most freQuently used cOmmand in this novel.

You want to say that the USSR had the same principle as USA, i.e. in case of inevitable attack the preemption massive nuclear strike should be conducted in order to destroy the enemy’s capability to fight?

That is surely true. What are we arguing about then???

A little food for thought for all of you fatalistic defeatists that believe the West would have been overwhelmed by the Soviets in 1946.

During the Yom Kippure War of 1973 , there was a battle in a place up in the Golan Heights. It has become legend to the Israeli Defence Forces as the ‘Valley of the Fires’. Basically, there were seven (as I recall) IDF Centurian tanks, dug-in, in hull-down positons, with inter-locking arcs of fire allowing mutual defense.

Said Centurions were attacked by a Syrian armoured Brigade, spearheaded by T54/55 tanks. The Centurians lit up sixty-five of the Syrian, assaulting tanks and A.P.C.'s before they were ordered to bug-out. The reason they had to pull back was that the Israelis had ordered a general withdrawal to better and more easily defended posiitons. None of the Centurians were lost.

Western equipment and tactics V Eastern equipment and tactics.

I agree. But I think the West would have needed more incentive to rearm their frontline forces, such as continued series of border clashes and perhaps a culmination of a crisis…

I agree. But I think the West would have needed more incentive to rearm their frontline forces, such as continued series of border clashes and perhaps a culmination of a crisis. I think they would need more tanks and men than they had in place by 1946…

According to the scenario, the West has time to build up their forces, and one ought not underestimate airpower. Also, I would opt for the pre-emptive airstrike. It would have become obvious by now (1946) that Stalin wasn’t going to honour any of his Yalta pledges regarding the Eastern-European states and that he was a threat to western Europe. All the signals would have been their, with build up of forces, and that also is clear by the scenario.

We are discussing a scenario, here, it never did happen, and so the arguments ought to be within the frame-work of the scenario, and less the political reality.

Pre-emptive airstrike? Does one wait for the enemy to steal the initiative and make full use of his numerical advantage, or do you negate his ability to execrise that numerical advantage. The rightings on the wall, they’re going to be coming at you and, in this situation, ‘jaw-jaw’ isn’t going to achieve anything other than allowing you to strike first while seeming to be wanting to negotiate a peace - element of surprise.

The Golan '73 - Syrian forces sieze the initiative (extract)

Emerging from the bunker close to 1 a.m., Hofi and Hod took a jeep down into the Hula Valley and up to Northern Command headquarters on a Galilee hilltop. Looking across the valley, Hod could see the Golan Heights covered with bonfires, as if it were Lag Ba’omer. Many of those fires were burning tanks. It was impossible to tell which were Syrian and which Israeli, but it was clear that hardly 12 hours into the war the Syrians were already on the foreslope of the Heights overlooking Israel…

…Askarov had chosen as his gunner the finest tank sniper in the brigade, Yitzhak Hemo of Kiryat Shmona. Tank sniping is not a skill but an art that can enable its practitioners to hit twice as many targets as an ordinary gunner, even in the stress of battle.

Within five hours, Askarov would count some 35 tanks hit as well as a number of infantry-carrying Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs). It was Askarov who picked the target and turned the turret, rougly aligning the gun. But it was the gunner who did the final 10 percent of fine tuning that made the difference between hit and miss.

Askarov could not help admiring the Syrians’ courage and determination. They kept pushing to get through the Israeli line and were not deterred by the losses they were suffering.

About 7 p.m., Hemo hit a tank at 50-meter range that had come up from the main track from Kudne to the left of the ramp. Suddenly Askarov saw another tank approaching 30 meters away on the service road leading up from the UN post to the right. He swung the turret and shouted to Hemo, who fired the same instant as did the Syrian gunner.

Askarov was blown out of the turret. Retrieved by men from the bunker, he reached Safed Hospital within a few hours with wounds to his face and vocal cords that enabled him only to whisper. He was operated on and told by the doctors that he would be able to leave the hospital in two weeks. The young officer, however, would be taking leave — and returning — much sooner than that.

That is seriously close for tanks (I’m assuming the Israelis were in a tank from the references to turret and gunner).

It suggests an element of surprise by the Syrian tanks.

Do you have more details about the location and how the Syrian tanks popped up so close to them?

The Israelis were caught with their pants down for a number of reasons, not least, being overconfident. It was Yom Kipur, and many of their frontlline troops had been given leave. It was a classic dawn attack (on this position).

Yes, the guner was in a Centurian, hull-down, and used as a sniper tank, as described. The Syrians got close because the Iraelis were withdrawing and the Syrians were attacking in massive numbers. They were able to get closer as they were afforded cover by the battlefield clutter of previously knocked-out tanks. Also, there was the terrain, obviously, this was a mountain pass and didn’t offer the same long fields of fire as an open plain or desert. So, it could work for and against both opposing forces in this situation.

A conventional attack by the Soviet Union in August 1946 would have been a close thing. Allies would have been inferior in numbers of troops, tanks and artillery pieces. They would have had vastly superior quality in artillery (caliber and range) as the largest deployed numbers of their guns was 152mm while the Allies had 155, 175, 8inch and 240mm weapons. The Allied tactical air strikes would take out Russian armor by the thousands and all of their artillery. Strategically, B-29s, B17s and B24s would have strangled Russian lines of supply and communication. However, if the Soviets did cross the Rhine, the atomic weapon option would have been available and President Truman would not have hesitated because he knew Stalin for the monster he really was.

So, how about a battle picture/scenario?