there is no proof of the (modernized) Pz IV being less efficient design.
A war of defence often tends to favour hunters and assault guns, like the StuG, of which 7900 were built. The Panther’s succes was ambush, front armour and walhallah gun. almost all present in the StuG and Jagdpanzer L70. Kill ratio’s and StuG “aces” are stunning. Were Panthers had to lead an attack, a role specificaly for a tank, they were expensive canon meat. Pz IV were at least as effective in the Bocage/Normandy, where constant mobility into small places (requiring as few fuel as possible and etreme reliability) was precious.
And against air forces no tank is safe, better to lose a IV than a tough and costly built Panther
Panther tank cost about 1.5 times the cost of the Panzer IV and 1/2 the cost of the Tiger tiger. If you increase Panther production numbers, its cost per unit will fall accordingly. Any new Panzer IV model may well initally cost as much as Panther, until production is in sufficent numbers to reduce fixed cost per unit.
The basic argument against the Panther would be tonnage argument. As rule a 40 ton tank requires twice as much maintenance resources as a 20 ton tank and a 60 ton tank is twice the 40 ton tank interms of logisitics. You can see one tangable aspect of this since the vehicle train to support a panther battalion is noticably larger than the same train for a Panzer IV battalion. Mind you I would be surprised if it raises the divisional vehicle park by more than 50 vehicles per battalion.
In terms of divisional tonnage its not going to change much , since you need to get fuel for 4000 wheels and another 200+ tracks and 400 1/2 tracks anyway.
I would add the following comment. Any change directed to happen from 1943 on is pretty much too little too late. Any meaningfull change has to occur in 1940-42 period to radically alter the outcome of the war.
How much older is the concept of the “hybrid III/IV chassis”?
The one depicted here is not older than 1943-44. But neither is the Panther ;).
There is however a big difference between a new Panther and a modified Pz IV. Many parts were already in production , ammunition remained the same, etc…
And don’t forget there was a Jagdpanzer IV produced from 44-45. This had many similarities with III/IV superstructure. Main flaws of the Jagdpz IV were inherent to the utilizing the L70 long gun and it’s low ground clearance.
IV’s were very easy transported by trains, smaller and lighter.
(on the other hand, 38t’s and II’s were frequently transported by truck 
)
I think that’s quite an important point. The bigger the tank the more fuel it eats and more logistical support and maintenance required. This is where an upgraded Pz IV would have an advantage over the Panther, smaller tank = less support (well hopefully, but you never know).
The IV would
-
get less bogged,
-
far less break down between effective battle
(and for both: if so, towing would be easier) -
be less prone to unexperienced drivers (that weren’t used to the barrel length and mass of Panthers and King Tigers)
-
would easily get maintenance by it’s own crew
-
require less support,
-
transported in larger numbers
-
consume less fuel
-
be far less missed if knocked out
-
be a better vehicle for reconnaissance mission.
-
fit with steel roadwheels and other late war technology it would be cheaper and produced quicker than a Panther
Along with this, it would have been possible to stop Tiger production, never come up with the King Tiger and produce reliable small run of Panthers (equivalent of Tiger production but at 50% of resources)
This would come with thicker side armour on turret and superstructure (+/-60-70mm), settling for a slower tank (40km/h instead of 45) = King Tiger light. The reduction of armour on the actual Panther was chosen to achieve higher mobility and speed.
Yet the “speed” of the Panther was a bit overrated. Yes, quite good, but on the other hand to slow for a medium/recon tank (still 10km/h slower than the “old” T34), and on the other hand a bit useless if used as heavy support tank, giving a heavy but still underarmoured vehicle.
Don’t forget that both Panther and King Tiger never fully used their potential, because of breakdowns, fuel shortage, green drafted crews, … resulting in a far worse balance than forseen when rejecting other projects, reducing the side armour etc etc
original engine
Maybach HL 120 = 12 000cc rated 300hp / 3000 rpm
in practice used up to 270hp @ 2800rpm.
Possible engine would have been the one intended for the VK1602 Leopard project
Maybach HL 157 = 15 700 cc rated 550hp / 3500 rpm
This would have to been trimmed down to max 2600 rpm, looking at history and the resulting effect on reliability. giving at cruisespeed +/- 410 hp @ 2600 rpm.
resulting in +/- 14.5 a 15 hp / ton. Slightly more than a Panther.
Engine would have +30% capacity. Resulting in slightly less extra (20%?) engine deck space.
SO there is no proves that seriously modified PziV (in terms of armor and gun up to level of Panther) will be less expensive then the Panther was.
Endeed the Kittys was realized by itself the NEW ideology for tank in ww2 - first of all the wide tracks, that let them not to sink in the mud. Second, the powerfull gun. In fact all those qualities were introduced by Germans after analisys of the battles on Eastern front. If you improve the PzIV to the Panther abilities- you will have got the another Panther;)
A war of defence often tends to favour hunters and assault guns, like the StuG, of which 7900 were built. The Panther’s succes was ambush, front armour and walhallah gun. almost all present in the StuG and Jagdpanzer L70. Kill ratio’s and StuG “aces” are stunning. Were Panthers had to lead an attack, a role specificaly for a tank, they were expensive canon meat. Pz IV were at least as effective in the Bocage/Normandy, where constant mobility into small places (requiring as few fuel as possible and etreme reliability) was precious.
Well , it’s not actually a secret that the allies entire 1944 has no real means to hunt the German’s heavy tanks. Neither they had a serious tank’s armies on Europe. They had nothing till the Pershing and Centurion , that came up too late to war. As for the Eastern front- the PzIV even with 75mm gun was no match for the T-34/85 ( which was still more speedy) and monstrous 122mm gun of Is-2.The mobility can’t compensate the rised helpless. If you need the universal tank like Sherman or T-34 then PzIV again had to weak gun for this role.
the more tonnage is the more abilities and adventages endeed.
Which is the logistic to built the 60-tonns Abrams with powerfull gun as the basic tank of US army,If they may to develop succesfull 30 or 40 -tonns project instead?
the everything is about gun and armor. The 48-tonns Panther with 100 mm frontal armor was almost unbreakable for the all types of allied guns in 1943 from a distance 1000 meters. The unique quality for that period.
Weight, tracks, gun , … all symptoms of exageration.
The point of a “modernized IV” is exactly going to a point where all the negative sides of monstertanks are compensated. It’s not about achieving Panther abilities, it’s about whether the gained abilities of the Panther are enough to compensate for the acquired troubles.
Sloped armour is nothing, if the sides are weak. A heavy tank is useless, if it needs to be medium. Many of the Panther features were spoiled by situation. Where the IV fought at its best.
This means: upgunning to Kwk 40 as main gun was enough, the size was enough. The soviet monsters were on itself an answer to the big German “Cats”. And all theories about reliability and mobility vs monster tanks are valid against the IS-2 as well.
Well , it’s not actually a secret that the allies entire 1944 has no real means to hunt the German’s heavy tanks. Neither they had a serious tank’s armies on Europe. They
had nothing till the Pershing and Centurion , that came up too late to war.
Well, they didn’t need it, it seems … did they?
As for the Eastern front- the PzIV even with 75mm gun was no match for the T-34/85 ( which was still more speedy) and monstrous 122mm gun of Is-2.The mobility can’t compensate the rised helpless. If you need the universal tank like Sherman or T-34 then PzIV again had to weak gun for this role.
Many claim the IV with 75 long gun was in fact a match for the T-34/85. In other words: the 34/85 was still not ahead. Armour still was vulnerable and the 85 didn’t perform better than the 75. Especially if the Soviets were the attacker. German sight system was better, 5-man crews were better, 85 and 122 gun were less powerful than German guns with the same caliber, mostly because of ammunition engineering.
Interesting production:
[ul]
[li]30% 38(d) chassis / hull, waffentrager
[/li][li]60% III/IV, alias IVB
[/li][li]10% Panther, alias V, alias King Tiger
[/li][/ul]
Not for the crewmans;)
I remember the memours one German tanker driver who fought in Kurs battle with newest Tiger. He recall that the tank was hited …8 times , but stay undamaged and able move and fight. And crew was lucky.Considering the fact that the basic soviet AA-artillery was 76-mm gun - very enough to finish any PzIII/IV from 1-2 hits.
This means: upgunning to Kwk 40 as main gun was enough, the size was enough. The soviet monsters were on itself an answer to the big German “Cats”. And all theories about reliability and mobility vs monster tanks are valid against the IS-2 as well.
You are mixing up the events a bit. Endeed the first monsters the Germans ever faced in WW2 was soviet Kv-1/2 in 1941. they got certain troubles also with hunting the T-34/76 in the early period of war. The entire Panther project was began as the GErman answer to “T-34” and initially the germans was going to make an “copy” for themself. But the Panther was just the improved the German vertion that , nevertheless had many common points to T-34.
Many claim the IV with 75 long gun was in fact a match for the T-34/85. In other words: the 34/85 was still not ahead. Armour still was vulnerable and the 85 didn’t perform better than the 75. Especially if the Soviets were the attacker. German sight system was better, 5-man crews were better, 85 and 122 gun were less powerful than German guns with the same caliber, mostly because of ammunition engineering.
The IV with 75 mm gun was match to T-34 ONLY in tank-tank duel. Having good velocity gun and better optic it often won. But as infantry support tank ( especially in attack) compared to T-34 it was OBSOLET. It wasn’t effective exaclty in attack.It losed to more heavy but speedy T-34.Plus the 85 mm gun still had more shrapnel effect.
True, but the same Tigers wre knocked out in Tunis by 6 pdr’s.
Tactics are more important. No tank design could make the Kursk battle a win for the Germans.
And the modernized III/IV would certainly be less vulnerable.
You are mixing up the events a bit. Endeed the first monsters the Germans ever faced in WW2 was soviet Kv-1/2 in 1941. they got certain troubles also with hunting the T-34/76 in the early period of war. The entire Panther project was began as the GErman answer to “T-34” and initially the germans was going to make an “copy” for themself. But the Panther was just the improved the German vertion that , nevertheless had many common points to T-34.
It was precisely the 75/48 gun that brought the answer in knocking out the T34. By the way a 34/76 has in rough lines the same armour as a 34/85.
The best tactics in facing the KV’s were … run away run around and leave it be.
The IV with 75 mm gun was match to T-34 ONLY in tank-tank duel. Having good velocity gun and better optic it often won. But as infantry support tank ( especially in attack) compared to T-34 it was OBSOLET. It wasn’t effective exaclty in attack.It losed to more heavy but speedy T-34.Plus the 85 mm gun still had more shrapnel effect.
Of course battles are won by other means than simple tank vs tank. 
Pure tank vs tank battles you say tend to give benefits to the German 75 gun, in other attacks, there is no assumption of a massive tank fleet.
Or you attack on open field mostly vs tanks, or you go in urban region, were tanks often are fragile.
A III/IV would have answers as in
- higher production
- better protection
Waffentrager production was to be inplace of the Zug 3/4 tractor production, so it would not factor in percentage of output unless you were including tractor production.
I still need to know when was the earliest Panzer III/IV hybrid proposed?
Very interesting. That III/IV looks like a German T-34. What would have been most useful would be machine with the good features of the T-34,( wide tracks, sloped armor, diesel engine in light weight) and the long German 75 produced in large numbers. Say a Panzer Mark Four and a Half instead of a Panther.
The Panther was supposed to be an improvement over the T-35, but they got carried away with the improving. So they ended up with a machine with double the weight and I suspect 8 times the cost of the T-34.
mass production of the Panther made up for the initial cost, but it wasn’t until early 1944 that the Panther was a mass product with at least a minimum in reliability.
Flaws in armor and suspicious labour quality however tackled the tank, much more than the IV production.
Flaw-Panther costed not tthat much more than a IV.
On the other hand, a IV “B” (III/IV) would have costed less than an old IV.
The Panther would have made a very good heavy tank, better than the expensive and even more heavy Tiger, if more armour would have been allowed and a more allround gun would have been attached.
I see Hitler’s influence - as in everything - as a block on evolution.
One must understand that even before the blitzkrieg choices had to be made, no perfect development could be reached, given the timeline. However, right choices were made and there were no hundreds of projects being produced.
The most striking is the adoption of the Czech tanks and the Czech manufacturing plants, without bothering about German superiority philosophy. Taking over the Czech capacity was far superior than any equivalent.
I do agree that Hitlers micromeddling crippled the German war effort from the moment he took power. He had no respect for the General Staff and their strategic vision. He refused the concept of the ‘Wehrmacht command’ that would have avoided unnessesary duplication and he dismissed the attempts to transition armaments production to massed production.
Hitler scuttled the multi phase expansion programme already in place, for his 4 year plan in 1936. This seriously screwed up the German growth making the army build more horse infantry divisions based on a ‘limited war economy’, instead of transforming the exsiting stucture into a moderatly sized motorised-mechanised juggernaught backed up by a ‘total war economy’. Likewise the airforce was denyied the multi engined strategic bomber it badly needed in place for more and more medium bombers demanded by Hitler. Even the navy lost out; being forced to build a moderately sized ‘anti French’ fleet instead of going for a larger ‘anti British fleet’.
Remove Hitler from the equation and everything can change for Germany.
With reference to the thread; I think the best strategy for Germany if it fails to secure a European empire by mid war; would be to adopt a defensive posture and utilize a ‘high low mix’ approach in the armed forces and transforme the force with the array of ‘special weapons’ developed prewar.
For my purposes this meant a Panther production in place of all other heavy weapons programmes, included small run specialized models . These would be concentrated in Panzer korps along with SPW and enough SPHow production to match. The rest of the considerable AFV production would be devoted into convert all obsolote and captured tanks into Marder type improvizations and improvised Munitions AFV and Armroed recovery AFVs as well as Flak vehicles. Mean while the rest of the AFV production would be transformed into massive production of Marder/Hetzer/waffentragger.
A larger production run of modified Panzer IV could work in place of the Panther/Tiger production etc since the enemy threats , like the 17lb/76/90 gun and the Stalin tanks were all reactions to the Tiger and Panther in the first place. Remove them from the historical record and there is no need for the allies to develope any responce in the first place.
In a way, you describe 90% what happened, with the exception of the Panther vs Tiger and small run spec…
Of course along with Hitler’s unsound disruptive decisions, the Germans did what they could nevertheless where they could escpae from the tiran’s hand.
One of the biggest problem was the far to late implementation of war economy, along with to big reliance on slave labour. Re-armamant growth was cut after fall gelb/rot. A completely useless decision, unless an easier armistice with the UK was aimed for.
Aha, found something
explains cheaper production.
http://www.panzerbaer.de/models/35_ncm_pzkfw_iv_w1466-a.htm
OK lets get some form of a translation happening here.
LLK) - on the basis a design drawing (W 1466) of Krupp from January 1943 a project engineering advancement tank combat car of the IV with bent armour-plates became admits. This version should be considered officially as execution H. The modernization would have led tanks in connection with winter chains to an increase of the total weight of the IV on over three tons. In consequence its stood a substantial load of the drive assembly and the steering gear to expect, particularly since of them was exceeded originally computed load already at the latest. Although improvements for the driver view had to be obtained and the nose mg would have received a new ball screen, the tank commission decided Panther because of the expected worse handling characteristics as well as a therefore higher fuel consumption in favor of the traditional shaping and the started production of the PzKpfw V „“and did thus without a conversion of this proposal.
Krupp, meal, made a design (AKF 31941) of a simplified tower for the tank IV, having six edges, to July 1944 again. It pointed a simplified cannon screen, but neither to Seh & Mg flaps still another commander’s cupola up. Instead two hatchways in the tower roof and evenly such two-door hatch at the left tower side were intended. The commander would have kept his place at the left side in all other respects further in the tower the KwK placed. In the course of the introduction of the tank hunter IV with the 7,5cm KwK L/70 this tower construction was likewise rejected.
New Connection Models already offers both upper tub the having diagonal armour-plates and the simplified tower since longer as separate conversion kits on basis of the Tamiya to tank IV kits.
If a not realized project is to thus develop, why no combination. Thus here a fiction developed on basis of the standard tank of the armed forces. As basis kit served the PzKpfw IV, Ausf. H, early version, of Tamiya (No.35209). In the selection of the drive assembly parts, additional armor, the exhaust for the tower swiveling work one should to standard and/or early execution the H tanks of the IV adhere. New drive wheels and poured idlers are of it exceptional. When any Zurüstteile, entrenching tool, jacking equipment, chunk, steel cables etc. is missing to project the 7,5cm KwK 40 L/48 inside the simplified tower continues to sit there, the visible pipe length between muzzle brake and front tubing coat/cannon screen at the model amounts to only 46.5 mm on the basis the publication „Begleitwagen tank combat car IV “- New edition volume of 5 from the series military vehicles, engine book publishing house of walter J. Spielberger.
Historically the Hetzer programme began in spring of 1943 on demand from Guderian and was designed and in mass production within a year on a chassie that was 1/2 meter wider than the Pz 38t that it was based on. Essentially this is a complete redesign of the chassie.Almost an entirely new AFV. So I would suggest with the same kind of political will, such a tank design [W 1466] could enter mass production by the end of 1943, because the bulk of the chassie remains unchanged and thats the main production effort.
Panzer IV with projekt W 1466 upgrade
Upper Front: 50mm sloped (angle determined by distance to nose to front super structure - I’m thinking closer to 60 degrees) on Panzer H, 80mm same angle, on Panzer K/L.
Lower Front: 80mm sloped (same angle as before) for H, K and L.
Upper Sides: 45mm sloped (angle determined by distance from “tread guards” to super structure) for H, K and L.
Turret Front: 80mm sloped (have no clue, not more then 20 degrees though) for H, K and L.
Turret Mantlet: 80mm unsloped (I am not sure at all, this is an educated guess based on what I see and infered from perceived front turret thickness) for H, K and L.
Turret Sides, Rear: 45mm, sloped (angle unknown) for H, K and L.
http://forum.worldoftanks.com/index.php?/topic/31788-panzer-iv/
You see a similar thing happening about the same time in the UBoat wars where timing was everything. The Type VII & IX were to be phased out from 1945 on with the ElectroBoat Type XXI.
The old models were evolutionary developments of WW-I unterseeboots, which meant there underwater speed/endurance was about 1% of the surface speed/endurance They relied on operating moslty on the surface. By mid war reality had set in and the ‘prewar games’ turned out to be accurate…that given enough time the allies would develope sufficent ASW assets to drive the UBoat underwater and neutralize there offensive capability. Which is why the balanced fleet was pushed. However Hitler reversed this and went all UBoats instead. Given the time it takes to convert an industry it was only getting going when the allies ASW effort took over.
The problem is that the long term planning was in the “Walter Peroxide Submarines” with 10 times the underwater endurance of Uboats and ultimatly would have endurance of 2/3 of the surface endurance through the Schnorkel. But this new technology was too difficult to impilment with a back drop of so many other special new tech being developed. So the mass production slipped from 1943 to 1944 and only when the design changed from Peroxide turbines to very high powered electric generators that offered at most 1/4 of the ability the peroxide boats offered.
At about the same time this whole process was underway 1943/44 , a similar proposal was put forward to modified the 400-500 existing Uboats to exploit the various ideas and technology developed. While this could have been adopted into operational boats immediately instead of waiting until 1945, it was rejected since it would delay the type XXI/XXIII submarines to long [undefined].
The fact is that when Donitz withdrew the Uboats in late 1943 and retasked them to coastal efforts the following year, they effectively conceeded “The Battle of the Atlantic”. The solution was needed in 1943 not 1945. Had Donitz been left to push Walters peroxide boats they could have been operational by late 1943/44 while the improvisations could have been applied to the ongoing UBoat fleet development from mid 1942 on, allowing them to keep pace of the ASW threats.