True to some extent, but I think this view might have grown a bit with the passage of time.
Certainly there were plenty of instances of the disdainful “shortsighted little men can’t fight” attitude at various levels of the English-speaking officer corps (what is the plural of corps when I’m referring to the officers corps of several countries?), but it was balanced by more realistic attitudes among other officers. I recall one instance of an English officer lecturing Australian troops to that effect in Malaya shortly before the war started. After he left, an Australian officer of similar rank addressed the troops, commencing with a warning to disregard the bullshit they had just heard and to remember that the Japanese had been fighting a gruelling war in China for years and were competent and experienced troops.
The much, and I think unfairly, maligned Malaya commander, General Percival, had a realistic assessment of their fighting abilities and correctly anticipated their tactical movements, but he was hamstrung in his defence by various political, geographic, tactical, and resource factors not of his making and which he could not correct. Those aspects gave Japan a significant advantage at all stages of the campaign and, most importantly, in the early phases when it was establishing beachheads and driving inland. Without taking anything away from what was a very well planned and executed campaign by the Japanese, they were lucky that Percival was as hamstrung as he was and could not dispose all his forces with a free hand. The Japanese were also lucky that Churchill, with his customary military incompetence in peninsula campaigns spanning two world wars, put Percival in a virtually unwinnable position.
In the early phases of the war, it was Japanese battle hardening which gave them an advantage over green, and often very poorly trained, Allied troops on the ground, plus vastly better air support in Malaya, which was the campaign that really mattered to allow the push into NEI and its oil which was their biggest prize and critical to their ability to continue the war.
Their endless successes certainly gave their ground troops, both IJA and IJN, an air of invincibility until the Australians repelled a SNLF of about brigade strength at Milne Bay in August 1942, closely followed by Australian success in the Kokoda campaign and Australian success with American support at the Gona, Buna and Sanananda beacheads at the end of 1942, and the American success at Guadalcanal soon after.
It is instructive that the Australian successes occurred in large part because our battle hardened units from the Middle East confronted the battle-hardened Japanese and because some officers and NCOs from our Middle East units were transferred to our militia units. Two militia battalions bore the brunt of the Japanese attack in the early phase of the Japanese advance on Kokoda. One performed very poorly, the other splendidly. No prizes for guessing which one was heavily reinforced with battle hardened officers and NCOs and which one wasn’t.