106th Inf. Div.

This was the div. that was involved in the battle of the bulge it was the most forward place div. and was underman and its lines were thinly manned so history says.It was surround by the germans and had two regiments surround one regiment did fight its way out back to U.S. lines.This div. surrender to the germans it was the 2nd time a unit of this size surrender the other time was at Battan Any one have any info on this ?

Dupuy’s ‘Lion in the Way’ has a lot of good detail about the history of the 106th Div. It is a bit laudatory and up beat.

Whitings book is quite a bit more negative. He draws on the same sources as Dupuy, even reproducing identical quotes in hs text, but he leaves out a lot of positive items and focuses on the negative.

The author Kurt Vonnegut was a young draftee in the 106th, was taken prisoner, and wrote about his experince in the novel ‘Slaughter House Five’.

A web search for “US 106th Division” will turn up several dozen book titles and articals.

“… it was the most forward place div.”

Its position was exposed, but not any further forward than others. It had just arrived in Europe and taken over the attack positions of the 2d Divsion. This was bad as the last position the 2d Divsion had occuped were not the best defensive locations.

“… and was underman and its lines were thinly manned…”

The battalions were very near full strength, but it lacked the extra tank and tank destroyer battalions many other US divsions were reinforced with. It was spread out, but not badly considering the terrain.

“It was surround by the germans and had two regiments surround one regiment did fight its way out back to U.S. lines.”

In the confusion of the first two days fighting two regiments and a antiaircraft company were surrounded. The remainder of the divsion was forced back out of the Schnee Eifel. One artillery battalion lost its cannon which were stuck in frozen mud in their firing positions. The divsion commander consolidated his command arround St Vith. He was reinforced with a regiment cut off from the 28th Divsion and a armored Combat Command from the 9th Armored Div. Another armored Combat Comand of the 7th Armored Div was ordered to join the 106th. The divsion attempted to counter attack east to relieve the surrounded regiments. The divsion commander and his staff had little previosu combat experince, and no training or experince at commanding armored units. In the face of German infantry and armored divsions the counter attack failed.

The senior regimental commander of the surounded group became demoralized as his part of the attack failed. Without food and caught on exposed hillsides he choose to surrender his two regiments. Some men did not comply with his order and evaded the Germans for many days. Some were eventually caught, some made it to the US lines, and a few died ambushing German truck columns in the forrest.

After the counter attack failed it became impossible to hold the St Vith pocket & the mixed unit divsion fell back a few kilometers. There it was again surrounded on three sides and forced to fall back again. This time many kilometers. Between these retreats the divsion commander died from cardiac arrest or heart attack.

After joining the main 1st Army defence line the armored Combat Commands and the 28th Divsion regiment were returned to their proper divsions. The 106th fought on through the battle into January with its remaining infantry and artillery regiment. In Febuary it was withdrawn to France & rebuilt with replacements from the US. In late March it was ordered to support the Communications Zone Command in taking custody of the several million German prisoners that were being sent west across the Rhine. Many large areas were hastily fenced in and the 15,000 man 106th Div stood guard over roughly one million prisoners during April and May.

Intially the 106th was attacked by both a German armored corps and a infantry corps. These were reinforced by two more corps, so by the third day of the battle up to eight German infantry and armored divsions were operating in the 106ths sector. The inexperinced divsion staff and commander could not cope with the situation, or properly handle the large armored units they were reinforced with.

did not know the div. co died is that right

I was mistaken, he did not die from the heart failure. Was hospitalized & eventually returned to the US.

http://www.freewebs.com/106thinfantry/thecommanders.htm

His heart failure occured on the 22d of December, seven days after the German offensive started. He may have been relived of command shortly as the corps commander thought he & his staff were overwhelmed by the complexity of their situation, were unable to effectively handle the two armored groups attached, and because the counter attack from St Vith to the Schnee Eifel failed.

While it is clear the inexperinced divsion was in over its head at all levels it must be kept in mind they were under pressure from several Geman corps, the units on either flank had failed to hold (104th Cavalry Group on the left & 28th Divsion on the right). Futhermore the corps commander & staff had not given the 106th Div leaders enough clear information on the overall situation early in the battle. At critical moments on the 17th & 18th the 106th did not know the units on either flank were in trouble or the scope of the German armored penetrations on either flank.

I cannot judge how a veteran unit like the 2d Divsion would have handled the situaton. The key would have been ordering the two regiments at risk to retreat very early. The 2d also had a inependant tanks battalion and a tank destroyer battalion attached, which would have helped immensely during the first two days. Real tank support for the 106th in the form of the Combat Command from the 9th Armored Div did not arrive until it was nearly too late.