If Japan conquered all of the Pacific Islands and soem asian countries, what would be next?
I think they were going to link up with the Germans at Iraq. And after that Japan would be helping the Germans on Air support in the Eastern front. And after it, the Japs will be invading Eastern Russia. And encircling Moscow. What do you think? Post your comments now!
India and Australia were reserved for future decision in March 1942.
India was more attractive for its own resources; proximity to Japan and its conquests in SE Asia and Burma; and as a route to Middle East oilfields, but it required a victory in Burma and then one in India, neither of which happened.
Australia, although it had some useful resources which Japan had attempted to garner by commercial deals before the war, was probably of less importance in itself than India but much more important as a potential base for America to strike back at Japan. America and its industrial and military might posed a far greater risk to Japan based in its belly in Australia and in its face in Hawaii than Britain did based in India and Colombo as little more than a holding force.
The American build-up in Australia in 1942 made cutting the sea routes from America to Australia more important for Japan, which was part of the reason for Guadalcanal
Not in a fit.
Japan lacked the production capacity and pilot training capacity to replace its own losses in the Pacific. Indeed, after its initial successes at PH and a draw in the Coral Sea it went steadily backwards after Midway. There wouldn’t have been any Japanese planes helping Germany anywhere.
As for a Japanese attack on the USSR, Japan and the Soviets faced each other with significant forces on the Manchurian border for the whole war with Japan lacking the strength and will to attack and the knowledge after Nomonhan that the Soviets would almost certainly beat them again. As indeed they did in the final days of the war, albeit hugely reinforced by the transfer of Soviet troops released by the victory against Germany.
As for a Japanese attack on the USSR, Japan and the Soviets faced each other with significant forces on the Manchurian border for the whole war with Japan lacking the strength and will to attack and the knowledge after Nomonhan that the Soviets would almost certainly beat them again. As indeed they did in the final days of the war, albeit hugely reinforced by the transfer of Soviet troops released by the victory against Germany.
When they faced each other in Manchuria back in 1945, I believe that the Japanese Soldiers inflicted much heavier casualties against The Soviets. It is because the Japs will fight to the death and they are much experienced and battle-hardened even if the Soviets have the Armor, Planes and Resources.
That certainly wasn’t reflected in the very rapid and crushing advances by the Soviets.
I think you need to read up a bit on “August Storm.” The already seriously weakened Japanese fell into a catatonic shock when faced with the massive firepower and mobile forces of the Red Army in open terrain…
The Japanese simply weren’t interested in helping Germany with it’s strategic objectives, nor did they have the aircraft or other military resources to spare from the Pacific Theater and China. It’s pure fantasy to think that Japan and Germany could have ever “linked up” anywhere, or that they were interested in trying. If you study the Japanese foreign policy papers issued in the 1930’s, you will see that they are focused almost exclusively on China, Southeast Asia, Oceania, Manchuria, and Soviet Siberia. Even the Japanese realized that India, Iraq, and points west were beyond their reach.
Wizard, was it not the case that the only co-operational agreement between Japan and Germany outside of technology issues was a joint Trade Co-operative at Shanghai?
If I recall it rightly, this was to be broadly based on a 1937 agreement of joint trade interests between the two governments.
I’ve a memory of reading such when I was about 15, but have not bothered following that up since, in research.
Like you, I have no information at all that either government had any conception of joint strategic goals.
In fact, the contrary may be said to apply: each agreed to recognise each-other’s “Sphere of influence” and conduct both trade and foreign policy accordingly.
IIRC, that’s about as far as any future planning of any nature went or progressed. Which tends to tie-in to your posting above.
Kind and Respectful Regards, Uyraell.
Like you, I have no information at all that either government had any conception of joint strategic goals.
In fact, the contrary may be said to apply: each agreed to recognise each-other’s “Sphere of influence” and conduct both trade and foreign policy accordingly.
IIRC, that’s about as far as any future planning of any nature went or progressed. Which tends to tie-in to your posting above.
I sure know that if the Allies lost the war, Japan and Germany would be hateful enemies because their goal was too take over the world, and they don’t want to share it to any country.
Japan never had any ambition to take over the world. Siberia was the only definite main target it didn’t take. India and Australia (and probably by necessary implication New Zealand) were long-term targets but no firm plans were ever made to invade them.
Japan couldn’t have cared less what Germany did outside those areas, while Germany had no real interest in the Pacific.
India and Australia (and probably by necessary implication New Zealand) were long-term targets but no firm plans were ever made to invade them.
I don’t know what came to the Jap’s mind to take over Australia. They can’t even take China and many men are still fighting there, they have no more man Power left to invade Australia I think?
I am not aware of any actual trade agreement between Germany and Japan in the late 1930’s, but there was an “Agreement for Cultural Cooperation between Japan and Germany” signed in November, 1939. I don’t have the details, but it sounds like some sort of “feel-good” resolution without much practical effect. Nevertheless, Germany and Japan did engage in some trade, mostly after 1937, despite the difficulties of geographic distance, currency exchange problems, and diverging foreign policy distractions. Germany sold Japan machine tools, instrumentation, and other finished goods in exchange for commodities such as rubber, quinine, alloy metals and small quantities of silk. At first this trade was conducted by merchant ships, but after the outbreak of the European war, most was via the trans-Siberian railway through the Soviet Union. After 1941, what little trade was conducted between Germany and Japan was by blockade-runners, usually submarines.
There was some cooperation between Germany and Japan in the area of military weapons; Germany selling Japan the plans and licenses to manufacture various German weapons and aircraft, and also a license to build and operate synthetic fuel plants. This did not amount to much since German manufacturing techniques were not suitable for Japanese industry and German weapons did not suit Japanese tactics.
Overall Germany’s strategic goals were aimed at conquering the Soviet Union while Japanese strategic goals involved the achievement of autarky by seizing what Japan called “The Southern Resources Area”; the two strategic visions did not mesh well. Germany hoped to use Japan as a military counter-weight to the US, at first deterring the US from meddling in the European war, and then, after Pearl Harbor, to keep the US from throwing it’s full weight into the European war. Japan looked at Germany as the distraction necessary to keep the British Empire and the US occupied while Japan seized the European possessions in the Southern Resources Area.
Neither Germany nor Japan, of course, had the military/economic/industrial power required to achieve their goals, so neither managed to attain their strategic aims, but between the summer of 1941, and the summer of 1942, it certainly appeared to observers that the Axis (Germany, Japan, and Italy) just might pull it off.
There was an “Axis Military Council”, the purpose of which was to “coordinate Axis military operations” with the aim of enabling joint strategy initiatives. But it was, in fact, little more than a cheer-leading team, and had no authority such as the British-US Joint Chiefs of Staff. Neither Hitler in Germany, nor the militarists in Japan, paid much attention to the Military Council’s pronouncements
In any case, the material situations of both countries pretty much excluded military cooperation even if either country had wished it. Germany was very effectively blockaded by the Royal Navy, had almost no access to vital materials, and was fully engaged after 1941 in a death struggle with the Soviet Union. Japan produced barely enough military material to maintain it’s position in China and a limited area of the Pacific. Once it engaged the US in war, Japan could not afford to spare planes, ships, or troops, in any significant numbers outside of China and the Pacific. Both Germany and Japan were seriously short of logistical resources for the sort of global war in which they found themselves. Lack of oil, or any way to move sufficient quantities of fuel, seriously hampered their long range operations. Since their geographic separation was so great, this factor alone made real military cooperation impossible.
Where is that quoted from, I think I read it somewhere…
If your referring to my post #12, you’ll have to be more specific. I did not quote directly from any single source, the post reflects my general reading of historical secondary sources and research into original documents.
Lack of oil, or any way to move sufficient quantities of fuel, seriously hampered their long range operations. Since their geographic separation was so great, this factor alone made real military cooperation impossible.
Lacking of oil is not Japan’s real problem because they don’t have much vehicle used in the war. I think they lack the men and planes and even inter-connected territories to supply their troops fighting overseas. In fact, all of their troops were fighting overseas.
But they would need oil for ships,aircraft,lubricants for all sorts of weapons and for the war industry.
An adequate supply of oil is essential for any country,the more so if they have a large war machine engaged in combat.
But they would need oil for ships,aircraft,lubricants for all sorts of weapons and for the war industry.
An adequate supply of oil is essential for any country,the more so if they have a large war machine engaged in combat.
But back then, they are lacking of planes, ships and vehicles. They rely on their Infantry back in Okinawa. Much of their Tanks and Planes were thrown into China and gone with the wind.
Many Thanks Wizard.
Your Post #12 clarifies much, and adds to what I’d read over the years.
I had no awareness of formalised co-operation beyond that I mentioned, and had considered the source (a 1970’s economic history text) to be of at times dubious value.
I fully agree the respective geographic locations of German and Japan were a significant obstacle and detriment to meaningful co-operation between the two nations, regardless of the war being ongoing.
As to the resources issue: I’ve always held the view that both nations were adequately resourced for a short-term campaign (say 30 months) but were certainly not going to be able to maintain a long-term campaign, as was eventually the case/circumstance each was facing.
Kind and Respectful Regards, Wizard, Uyraell.
Lack of oil was essentially the reason Japan went to war in the first place.
While it is true the Japanese Army was not motorized to any great extent, it did use oil (refined into gasoline) for what motorized forces it had and for it’s aircraft. The Imperial Japanese Navy consumed a lot of oil for it’s aircraft and ships. Beginning in mid-1942, the IJN experienced shortages of oil in places like Truk and Rabaul which hampered it’s operations against the USN in the South Pacific. Theoretically, the Japanese had solved their oil problem with the seizure of the NEI, which, in 1941, produced about 2.8 % of the world’s crude oil. In practice, the former Dutch oil fields were not brought back into production as quickly as the Japanese had planned, and there was a shortage of tankers to move the crude oil to Japan for refining, and thence back out to the operational areas in the Pacific. The American submarine offensive worsened the situation when it began attacking tankers as a priority. By mid-1944, the oil situation was so bad for Japan that it restricted fleet operations to certain areas where oil was relatively plentiful. At about the same time, air operations, including the training of new pilots, was restricted because there was no longer enough aviation fuel to satisfy the demand for both combat operations and training operations. Japan actually had more planes than qualified pilots in late 1944, early 1945 because the pilot training programs had been truncated for lack of fuel.
The other unsolvable problem Japan faced was a severe shortage of logistical shipping, and this got worse as the US submarine campaign gained traction. Japan never had sufficient merchant bottoms to both supply it’s overseas garrisons and satisfy the demand of it’s war industries for raw materials. Besides insufficient tankers to move adequate amounts of oil, Japan lacked sufficient merchant carriers in every category. Naval ships returning to Japan from the Southern Resources Area carried deck cargoes of every conceivable commodity from rubber to rice to tin and other ores; even hospital ships, in violation of international law, were pressed into service to carry ammo and provisions when they were outbound from Japan, and rubber, rice, bauxite, and coal when they were inbound. At least one Japanese “hospital” ship was stopped by US naval forces and found to be carrying troops and commodities in violation of international conventions.
I don’t know where you are getting your information, but it is not correct.
As late as October, 1944, the Japanese had managed to mass over a thousand planes on Formosa and Luzon for the defense of the Philippines against MacArthur’s invasion forces. At the battle of Leyte Gulf, the Japanese committed almost fifty ships, including seven battleships and five carriers (albeit with less than 100 planes). At Okinawa, in 1945, the Japanese managed over 3,000 aircraft sorties, both in kamikaze and conventional attacks. It was reliably estimated that the Japanese Navy and Army air forces would be able to throw somewhere between 10,000 and 12,000 aircraft into the defense of Kyushu during Operation Olympic.
In China, Japanese ground forces were never defeated in any large battles, and most of the aircraft, tanks, and other motor vehicles, committed to the Chinese theater remained in operation until September, 1945, when they were surrendered to Allied authorities. The only exceptions were those mechanized units which lacked spare parts and/or fuel. In Manchuria, Japan retained several armored or mechanized divisions until August, 1945, when the Soviets attacked, and either destroyed or captured most Japanese forces in the very last weeks of war.
Japan was not nearly as bereft of motorized units, aircraft, and ships as you seem to think. Oil and fuel was a major concern of the Japanese high command until the very last days of the war.