OVER VIRGINA -- (From left) An A-10 Thunderbolt II, F-86 Sabre, P-38 Lightning and P-51 Mustang fly in a heritage flight formation during an air show at Langley Air Force Base, Va., on May 21. The formation displayed four generations of Air Force fighters. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Ben Bloker)
Strasser- You’ve mentioned that MacArthur was (counter)attacked by an unexpectedly tenacious enemy. My problem with this is that it seems to be a recurring theme with him and the third time he thoroughly violated the tenets of Sun Tzu as he didn’t “know thy enemy” nor the “self” and was sloppy to the point of recklessness. He violated the US War Plan Orange and attacked the Japanese in the Philippines after getting his air forces slaughtered, instead of initiating an orderly fighting-retreat to Bataan and Corregidor. By the time they got there, they had too many civilians to feed and the force was bloated with lessor quality Filipino units instead of the elite ones. While a US defeat at the hands of the IJA there may have inevitable, they could have held out for much longer.
<br />As for Inchon, where I will give Mac some credit for what seemed to be an original stroke of genius (as opposed to in WWII where he often took credit for others’ work), the landings themselves were highly controversial and there was significant luck involved. MacArthur actually believed the port to be strongly defended and therefore believed (counter-intuitively) that the NK Army would never expect it. In fact, it was held by a token force. Many Marine officers said later that had Inchon been held by as large of a force as originally believed, they’d of suffered very heavy casualties. One vet also stated that had the port been defended expertly like the Japanese and Germans did against amphibious operations in WWII, the marines would have been in serious trouble. It should also be noted that although Inchon was a “coup de main” operation and was initially successful, many have criticized the slow, plodding and reactionary advance towards Seoul, which robbed much of the momentum as they failed to fully exploit their success. <br />
It should also be noted that Mac had many enemies not only in the Democratic political establishment, but in the US military itself as many of his peers and subordinates began to grow weary of his belligerence, arrogance, and his steady failures punctuated by successes like Inchon as they thought he was losing touch. It was the members of the National Security Council that actually called for his head before Truman tripped the guillotine and many of his fellow officers in the Army and Marines agreed that he had to go and that Ridgeway was a far more capable, no-bullshit leader.