This has probably been done before, but what the heck…
What do you think were Japans biggest mistakes in the following…
Battlefield (specific battles, campaigns or operations)
Non-Battlefield (i.e. production decisions, etc.)
Political (alliances, promotions, demotions, etc.)
Was Pearl Harbour a mistake, or inevitable?
Could another way of Japan tackling the problem of oil and raw materials have been handled any better?
The militarists in Tokyo, naturally assumed that the US Navy would interfere with their plans to invade South East Asia, but would that be a fait accompli?
By attacking the U.S. at Pearl Harbour it ensured that the Americans would never rest, no matter how long it took, and how much blood was spilt, until Japan was totally defeated.
It was a minor victory for Japan, with great negative consequences for the Axis powers.
If on the other hand, the Japanese took the risk of just campaigning South to Malaya and the East Indies, and did their best to placate America, could they have gotten away with it, at least in the short term?
Even if Roosevelt somehow conjured up a plan to get the majority of an isolationist America [64% against war unless attacked] and more importantly, Congress, to instantly declare war on Japan, how much commitment would there be to fight to help save European colony’s, none of which had much interest for Americans.
In other words, there must be a very good reason for the U.S, to throw themselves wholeheartedly into a major war, and PH was the catalyst.
But I guess the two Pacific powers were going to butt heads sooner or later.
i have two,first, not finishing the attack on pearl harbour, the dry docks and oil storage contanors, second, underestimate the u.s. it’s will to fight and it’s industrie.
No mistakes that mattered in the initial advance phase to mid-1942, until they got caught up in their wins and went past Rabaul and managed to turn a stunningly rapid series of great victories into slow and complete defeat by expanding into areas they didn’t need and which weren’t part of the original war plan as an alternative to attacking areas which were potential targets in the long term war plans, being Australia and India. All of this came from the lack of a unified grand strategy which controlled the army and the navy, so that the advance past Rabaul was an ad hoc measure to compensate the IJN for being denied a fanciful belief that it could invade Australia.
Failing to grasp the importance of protecting their own, and attacking the enemy’s, merchant shipping. Which is unforgiveable and incomprehensible given that the whole purpose of the war was to gain materials and commerce for Japan which almost completely relied upon sea transport.
LOC.
Rations, relying on foraging and scavenging. Increasingly disastrous after the initial advance phase, causing more casualties from malnutrition and related deficiencies in some areas than from battle, often over several years.
Ignoring the limits of their merchant shipping capacity and being unable to make up its losses.
Not altering pilot training to produce more a lot more pilots more quickly, as the Americans did, to replace the highly trained pilots lost early in the war.
Complete failure to understand the fatal consequences of attacking the US, and a general lack of appreciation of political and economic reality on a global scale due to inbred narrowness, outside a few people like Admiral Yamamoto who knew what would happen and tried to persuade others to avoid the folly they were embarking upon.
Hello,
As early as 1940 the Japanese had wargamed a move to seize the NEI [prior to a US embargo] and concluded that it was possible but pointless, becuase, as ADM Zengo Yoshida recognized (correctly) Japan hadn’t the shipping bottoms to get the fuel back home anyway… To their discredit they ignored these sensible conclusions and went ahead…although many other factors contributed to the eventual decision to move South.
This also caused untold deprivations and horror for the Chinese populations living under occupation…
And elsewhere.
Early in their invasion of Papua New Guinea the Japanese were raiding the subsistence gardens of the natives for food, with predictable consequences for the natives. It was one of the reasons the natives generally supported the Allies, and did it stunningly well, although the Allies weren’t exactly innocent of destroying native food supplies either.
I think one of Japan’s greatest mistakes were starting a war without a unified military. There was a huge gap between the Army and Navy. They were not in the war together. The Army made their own planes and so did the Navy. If they were co-operative and attacked together, they would of made a significant difference.
Also they should of gotten rid of their stupid samurai ways. Banzai charges is nothing but charging and screaming head on fully exposed.
Another mistake was that they were not keeping pace with the technological advances of the US war machine. For example when they made the Zero, they had great success and the F4F Wildcat struggled. When the superior F6F came out Japan had made only little changes to their Zero.
if Hitler’s offices had suceeded in killing him in jul 44 the war ends. then the massive transfer of forces to the pacific would have ended that war a lot sooner. if and buts and maybe.
Japan: no technical upgrades to hardware. the zero ruled but the americans defeated it with the F6 hellcat. the zero was never replaced and wound up target practice. suicide charges killed 1000’s. maybe tens of 1000’s. stupid.
the Mariana turkey shoot. over 400 jap planes flamed in 1 battle. 1 day. inexperience costly.
see what happens when you put the army in charge of the navy???