What about the Americans, any major mistakes?
Probably the biggest was not seeing the writing on the wall and being caught practically defenseless in the Philippines without sufficient means to support the troops there at the beginning of the war.
The Americans, like the French before them, let their guard down in the Ardennes, thinking that a large scale offensive was beyond the Wehrmacht, 80,000 casualties later they were proved wrong.
The Anzio landings I always wondered what would have happened if the landing force would have pushed in,instead of halting around the beach
They may well have been slaughtered in the German counterattack…
As far as mistakes, the Tank Destroyer Doctrine is up there…
True that The Allies landed three divisions there? I know it wasn’t a huge landing force I always wondered about the logic in that landing
Plus sending the M10’s to the Pacific theater Why send an opened top fighting armored vehicle there?
Especially when the tanks there weren’t that good…
If you read Rick Atkinson’s “Day of Battle” on the Italian campaign, he goes in depth about it. (both “Day” and “An Army at Dawn” are excellent reads.) Unfortunately I stored my copy away, but the idea from memory (in which both Generals Alexander and Clark are culpable) was to divert German resources away from the Gustav line --to facilitate an offensive that ultimately bogged down anyways.
The landing was initially a failure as it did not divert enough German forces away to allow a breakthrough in the terrible Italian terrain, and the three divisions (which was initially only ONE, and Clark, to his credit, fought for more). But as this was at the height of the preparations for Normandy, there simply weren’t enough troops to go around). The troops became bogged down after expecting the Germans to counterattack, which they did. The initial commander MG Lucas was relieved for this, perhaps somewhat unfairly. But he could have driven at least a little further inland to have created a better defensive position, but I think he was ultimately vindicated as three divisions would have quickly overextended themselves and been annihilated.
A bloody battle of attrition ensued in which the Allies ultimately got the better of the Germans in my opinion --but only after suffering heavy casualties. After Lucas was relieved, one of the better American generals, Lucian Truscott, took command and was able to “breakout” several months later and sack Rome in the controversial diversion from Alex’s plan that Clark made (even Truscott is highly critical of him for countermanding a direct order, though it is debatable how many Germans could actually have been bagged and what the impact on the Italian Campaign that was loosing steam would have been anyways).
So, in some ways, the operation did achieve its ultimate objective to some extent. But as with most of the Italian Campaign, it took far longer with the diversion of resources mostly being allocated to Overlord…
Actually, as with the ETO, the tank-killers were put to good use, as the high velocity 76mm gun was adept at penetrating concrete bunkers and turned out to be an effective indirect artillery fire piece. The shell actually had the surface explosive power of a 105mm howitzer, though it lacked subsurface penetration…
We can say the same thing about the “open top” in Normandy BTW, as tank destroyers were essentially used an mobile anti-tank guns and infantry support vehicles where their crews were vulnerable to snipers! 
Was Clark wrong in focusing on Rome rather than trying to bag the German army in May-June 1944?
i always thought the policy of returning wounded soldiers to strange units was absurd
Ignoring that inturruption, I think that might be because the unit received reenforcements and then the units might have been full, so that there wasn’t any more people allowed in.
our biggest mistake was how we tried to stop sabotage before pearl harbor happened in late 1941
What ?
I believe he’s referring to aircraft being stored wingtip to wingtip at Pearl Harbor to prevent sabotage, rather than having them stored in such a way as to protect them from aerial bombing
Two words: Hürtgen Forest
The Hürtgen Forest cost the U.S. First Army at least 33,000 killed and incapacitated, including both combat and noncombat losses; Germans casualties were between 12,000 and 16,000.
Historical discussion revolves around whether the American battle plan made any strategic or tactical sense. One analysis is that U.S. strategy underestimated the strength and determination remaining in the psyche of the German soldier, believing his fighting spirit to have totally collapsed under the stress of the Normandy breakout and the reduction of the Falaise Pocket. American commanders in particular misunderstood the impassability of the dense Hürtgen Forest and its effects of reducing artillery accuracy and making air support impracticable. In addition, American forces were concentrated in the village of Schmidt and neither tried to conquer the strategic Roer(Rur) Dams nor recognized the importance of Hill 400 until an advanced stage of the battle.
Another word: Peleliu:
Totally useless battle that wasted American lives for nothing.
Famous blunder from duty officer Lieutnant Kermit Tyler while unexplained blips on the radar were reported to him at Pearl Harbor:“well,don’t worry about it”
Thanks for the translation :mrgreen: