My recollection is that there were two significant aspects (for which I can’t find references but which I’m trying to reconstruct) which might have altered the result in Malaya in 1941-42.
Churchill diverted forces originally destined for Malaya to North Africa, allowing Auchinleck to launch Operation Crusader in mid-November 1941 but thereby locking Commonwealth troops in to North Africa during the Japanese assault on Malaya.
There was a substantial RAF reserve kept in Britain following the Battle of Britain a year earlier which could have been sent to Malaya, thus providing more modern aircraft capable of fighting the Japanese aircraft, and more of them than the second rate aircraft actually used in Malaya by the British.
I’m trying to work out whether I’m suffering from brain fade here or whether Britain could really have sent useful forces which might have altered the result in Malaya.
Anyone have any more detailed info on what could have gone to Malaya?
Moon Over Malaya: Jonathon Moffat and Audrey Holme McCormic.
Offers an excellent description of the fighting withdrawal of the only British units in-situ that were jungle warfare trained. they had some successes, but they were up against overwhelming numbers. The other British units were pretty much afraid of the Ulu and had a greater fear of being out-flanked.
Under the circumstances, as described in this book and others, I don’t see how Britian could have held. They might have held Singapore, but then it would have become an isolated garrison under siege?
[b]The Stirling Observer September 1999
Last week saw the publication of the very unusual book on the history of the 2nd Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in Malay during the second World War .
Why unusual? Well most such books are either written for the academic and can be totally unreadable or so low-key that they are almost useless. The volume bridges the gap completely. It to so full of well research information that it will instantly become a standard history of this campaign.
At the same time the authors have talked with survivors throughout the world and brought to life the horrific experiences of the Argylls and of the Royal Marines - the Plymouth Argylls - who fought alongside our local Battalion against overwhelming numbers of better equipped Japanese.
It covers the disastrous battle on the Slim River where nearly 400 Argylls out of a compliment of 576 were either killed or captured. The remnants of the Battalion fought a fierce rearguard action down the Malayan peninsula and were the last to cross the causeway onto the doomed Singapore island .
it describes the massacre of 323 occupants of Alexandra hospital. It describes the various escapes and of the horror of life as a prisoner of war of the Japanese.
It is not, however, all doom and gloom. There are various incidents of the irrepressible humor of the Jocks. To myself personally some of the most poignant passages are the descriptions of life after Malay as those men try to rebuild their lives, with, in many cases, little or no help from the British government.
“Moon over Malaya” is named after a song composed by the Argylls. Jonathan Moffatt and Audrey McCormick’s story is of the up most bravery and sheer determination of the 2nd Battalion “The Thin Red Line” of our local regiment.
It comes at an appropriate time as 1999 sees the 200th anniversary of the founding of the 93rd which became the 2nd Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. As many of these soldiers fade away it is also appropriate to knowledge once again how much we owe them. They certainly lived up to them motto of " Sans Peur"- with out fear.
In all, one of the best military histories published in recent years and certainly one which is taking pride of place on my own bookshelves.
In 1854 they went to the Crimea. On the 24th October they routed the Russian Cavalry charge at Balaklava earning themselves the nickname of “The Thin Red Line”.
From a purely British point of view, I would imagine that after the scare of Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain, there would have been a great reluctance to send what defences there were out of area. Particularly as in November 1941 hostilities with the Japanese had yet to begin. Singapore was considered impregnable, from the sea, and the jungles of Malaya were also considered impregnable. Added to that was the arrogance of the British colonial psyche which could not envisage the Japanese, or any other oriental, being clever enough to defeat them.
Churchill did, eventually, give in to pressure from the Austrsalian government to release troops (both British and Australian) for Singapore, and they arrived just in time to be put ‘in the bag’ by the Japanese. This was a part of the on going problem of failure in the Western Desert.
Even after the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, the Far East was considered a lesser priority than Europe and, thus, equipment was slow in arriving. For example: Slim required parachutes to supply the embattled troops in Burma. He knew he would have a heck of a long wait for chutes from Britian, as Burma was a low priority. So, he decided to have chutes made in India. He toyed with the idea of having paper chutes manufactured, but it would have taken too long to research and develop the texture of paper required, so he resorted to chutes made from Jute. These were of a lesser quality than silk, but only cost about £1 each to produce, as opposed to £20 for a silk one. They were less effective than silk chutes, but as they were only to be used for dropping supplies, they would suffice. They became known as ‘Parajutes’ - no duff!
I expect you know all of this and I have no sources for you other than ‘Defeat into Victory’ where Slim explains about the chutes/jutes.
Thanks for the references, but I’m familiar with those details.
The best account of the Malaya operation, in my view, is by the man who planned it and accompanied the forward elements, Col Masanobu Tsuji in “Singapore: The Japanese Version“.
I started this thread because I’m trying to dig up alternative availability and disposition of forces which I’ve come across before but can’t find now, to see if Britain could have done better in Malaya.
No disrepect George, but this is an example of why I find Wiki is so unreliable and or misleading as a historical source. It says
“In 1937 Major-General William Dobbie Officer Commanding Malaya (1935 - 1939), looked at Malaya’s defences, he reported that during the monsoon season from October to March landings could be made by an enemy on the east coast and bases could be established in Siam (Thailand). He predicted that landings could be made at Songkhla and Pattani in Siam, and Kota Bharu in Malaya. He recommended large reinforcements to be sent immediately. His predictions turned out to be correct but his recommendations were ignored.”
So far as it goes, it’s accurate in saying that Dobbie submitted the report. The actual assessment was done by none other that Brigadier Arthur Percival, who in due course as a general would be forced to surrender to the Japanese early in 1942 after being unable to fight successfully a campaign he had predicted five years earlier that the Japanese would wage and win, unless Britain improved its defences. Which Britain did not do.
So poor old Arthur Percival goes down as the man who lost Malaya, when he might have been the hero who kept it if his sound, soldierly, and prescient assessment had been accepted by idiots like Churchill who still had an arrogant European contempt for the Japanese until they were soundly defeated by them.
Poor old Arthur Percival is remembered forever as the sad figure with the white flag surrendering to the haughty Japanese, and blamed for losing Malaya and Singapore. He was a better soldier and better strategist and better able to appreciate the situation if Japan attacked Malay than the terminally arrogant Churchill ever was. And he was denied the means to do it by Churchill.
Churchill had more to do with losing Malaya and Singapore than any other single man, as he did with Greece. But Churchill remains in history as the defiant British bulldog while the poor bloody soldiers who gave him sound military advice, which he ignored and by so doing duly caused the predicted losses, are most unfairly regarded as deficient and blamed for the losses.
I’m starting to ramble.
Here endeth one of my occasional anti-Churchill sermons.
Presumably this hopeful (or forlorn) appeal flows on from the failure of “Ill met by moonlight” to attract the right sheilas?
Or, apparently, even one sheila?
It’s not for me to presume to tell you how best to dangle your tumescent bait in over-fished waters, but could I suggest that you’re more likely to find that bad girls don’t come with fine wine, and vice versa. If you want a bad girl, ditch the wine and offer beer and chip butties on a throbbing Triumph bike (or Triumph Stag, if you want to get really overheated).
Undoubtedly. But forces were sent out from Britain to various places, not always with the most intelligent use. Churchill got the Commonwealth forces involved in Greece for obscure political reasons about supporting the Greeks and, as predicted by sound military advice, duly lost there. But for the Australian commander’s, Gen Thomas Blamey’s, excellent appreciation of the doomed campaign and identification of embarkation points for the defeated troops before the campaign even started the troops which saved Australia after Churchill also lost Malaya and Singapore would have been in the bag in Greece and Crete. Had Churchill appreciated in Greece and in Malaya / Singapore that air forces were crucial to naval and army successes, then he might, with luck and better leadership than he could ever have provided in the field, have won one or both campaigns. Certainly the enemy would not have had such an easy win with virtually unchallenged air superiority, while Winston in his Victorian / Edwardian fog thought that the world could still be controlled by battleships.
Particularly as in November 1941 hostilities with the Japanese had yet to begin. Singapore was considered impregnable, from the sea, and the jungles of Malaya were also considered impregnable.
Actually, no. Not by Brigadier Arthur Percival whose 1937 appreciation said just the opposite. His recommendation that the whole of Malaya should be defended was more or less accepted but not satisfactorily implemented, but nobody bothered to accept his concerns about the jungles not being a barrier to a Japanese advance from Thailand, which is pretty much what happened and resulted in Britain losing Malaya and Singapore. And, in some respects, the rest of its Empire as other colonial peoples saw that it was not, after all, the great nation which could protect everyone.
Added to that was the arrogance of the British colonial psyche which could not envisage the Japanese, or any other oriental, being clever enough to defeat them.
Definitely. It’s a simple example for which I don’t have the reference but I well remember an Australian soldier’s account of a lecture by a British officer in Malaya who spouted the usual stuff about Japanese being bespectacled craven idiots who couldn’t fight European troops (despite flogging Russia 35 years earlier and flogging China for all of the previous decade), then an Australian officer told them to disregard what they’d just been told because the Japanese could fight as well as anyone. But that Australian officer wasn’t necessarily in the majority of Australian or British Commonwealth officers in Malaya, many of whom were infected with the arrogance that Japanese planes were made of paper and bamboo (the Zero being one of the strongest designs of its era with its unitary wing spar) and flown by clumsy apes (such as Col Masanobu Tsuji who managed to fly, as a passenger, unchallenged over Malaya shortly before the invasion to establish critical information for the invasion) who represented the general military joke that Japan was. It was racial arrogance at its worst, and most harmful to those who believed it.
Churchill did, eventually, give in to pressure from the Austrsalian government to release troops (both British and Australian) for Singapore, and they arrived just in time to be put ‘in the bag’ by the Japanese. This was a part of the on going problem of failure in the Western Desert.
Not quite.
The 6th and 7th AIF divisions returned to Australia from the Middle East, leaving the 9th AIF Division there, despite Churchill unilaterally diverting them to Burma en route to Australia but ultimately succumbing to Australian demands for them to return to Australia. This episode shows just what a military dickhead Churchill was for, leaving aside any question about what the Australian troops might have done before being defeated in Burma, the troops were on one lot of ships while their equipment was on another lot of ships and not even tactically loaded. The best Churchill would have achieved would have been landing a lot of unarmed Australians unable to fight the Japanese about to capture them.
Two brigades of the 8th AIF Division went to Malaya and fought and were captured there. The 8th Division never went anywhere overseas beforehand.
The 6th and 7th AIF divisions were battle hardened in the Middle East and reinforced the Australian forces fighting the Japanese in the critical days in 1942.
The 8th AIF Division elements in Malaya weren’t very well trained and had no battle experience apart from what they got fighting the Japanese in Malaya. To their credit, Col Tsuji, the Japanese officer who planned the Malayan campaign and who accompanied and urged the Japanese troops and officers fighting it said of the first time that the Japanese encountered the Australians that they fought with a courage and skill that the Japanese had not encountered before. Not that it mattered much in the end.
Even after the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, the Far East was considered a lesser priority than Europe and, thus, equipment was slow in arriving.
All part of the “Germany First” policy agreed by America and Britain, without bothering to consult or even inform the inconsequential Australia, which found out about it only by accident in May 1942 when it was the only remaining nation in the path of the Japanese advance but being reassured by Roosevelt and Churchill that it had nothing to fear from the Japanese. People I know who lived through that time have a rather less sanguine recollection of the risk from Japan.
I’ve found some of my sketchy notes but, alas, not the sources.
The guts of these notes is that despite Germany attacking the USSR in mid-1941, the RAF remained concerned with home defence in Britain.
Around mid-1941 the RAF had a full fighter strength of 79 squadrons equipped with current fighters. The availability of current fighters is consistent with my memory that the problem in the Battle of Britain was not planes, of which there were many, but pilots, of whom there were few.
The planes in Britain were used in sweeps through France and Belgium, which hardly did much to force Germany to surrender. One view is that this was just ‘make work’ and ‘on the job training’ rather than having any serious tactical or stratgegic value.
About 30 squadrons were sent out of England in 1942, mostly to North Africa / Middle East.
What would 30 squadrons of current British fighers have done in Malaya in late 1941 / early 1942. Or even just 10 squadrons?
Could Britain have put in a decisive air element that would have supported the ground troops and, perhaps, saved Repulse and Prince of Wales?
What air forces did Japan have available to counter such an injection of British air forces?
Given that the whole Japanese effort was a fairly fine run thing, would an injection of substantial RAF forces have made a difference?
If the RAF could have attacked the Japanese LOC with effect, would Japan have succeeded?
It is entirely possible to be an Anglophile without loving Winston Churchill.
Winston’s mother was, after all, an American. Just like Uncle Albert.
That makes him (Winston, not Uncle Albert) half English, and the rest unloveable!
Anyway, WTF would Uncle Albert know about the deep seated animosities that Australians held towards Britain, which we released by consistentely thrashing the Poms in every sport that mattered to them. Except soccer, but it’s a poofter wog game which we’ll get around to in time, once we learn how to give a decent headbutt, or Liverpool Kiss**, when upset with the endless boredom of the round ball game.
**This story has an apochryphal element to it, but a mate of mine assures me that a mate of his is a reliable source for this event. (Like this is a new basis for such stories!)
Bloke A gets into a tussle with Bloke B.
Bloke A decides to give Bloke B a Liverpool Kiss.
Bloke A grabs Bloke B’s tie and pulls Bloke B towards him as Bloke A drops the nut.
Alas, Bloke A hits nothing as Bloke B is wearing a tie front with elastic around the collar, so he remains upright while Bloke A tries to nut the non-existent Bloke B.
Bloke B responds poorly and people are hurt.
P.S. I’m not an Anglophile. I’ve never seen even one angle I liked!
I once had a similar experience with a chap from Livrpool. He was trying to give me a ‘Glaswegian Kiss’ but, sadly for him and happily for me, he muffed it and, therefore, got maced
I have found one or two interesting writings which will serve to illustrate the thinking of the time:
“I expected terrible forfeits in the East, but all this would be merely a passing phase…there was no doubt of the end.”
Winston Churchill in his History of the Second World War on hearing of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and the entry of the USA into the war.
Chapman:
[i]"To foster resistance movements in the Far East brings one up against many problems not encountered in Europe. The native populations are a hotch-potch of various racial, religious, and poltical elements, and among them include the colonies of three major European Powers. What patriotic or ideological driving force could such countries have to help them to resist an invader? Again, no European can live for a day in an Asiatic country without being recognised as a white man. Therefore, unless a safe area among a friendly people can be found, a European must be perpetually in hiding, with obvious bad effects on his health and morale; and if he operates at night or in disguise the strain will be even greater. There is also the porblem of language: few Englishmen can speak Siamese, Chinese, Karen or even Malay, like a native.
Then there are almost insuperable geographical difficulties. A country like Burma or Sumatra has, in its mountainous or swampy jungles, an infinite number of hiding-places where guerrillas can go to ground; but life is very precarious and unhealthy in such places even for a native, much more so for a white man. Food is hard to get; distances are vast, and communications difficult. It may take a month’s hard travelling, even for a fit party, to cover a distance of a hundred miles on the map. So vast are the distances that there may be no possibility of suppying the guerillas with arms and other equipment, or of the the interchange of agents: Malaya, for example, until the arrival of the new Liberator bomber in 1944, was out of range of any available plane flying from any base in India or Ceylon except the old Catalina seaplane, which is far too slow and vulnerable for modern warfare. And the west coast of Malaya is so shelving as to be almost inaccessible to submarines…"[/i]
I’m going to continue this on word before posting further, in case it becomes too large.
[i]“….In 1941 the High Command in Malaya were not in the least interested in guerrilla warfare in any of its forms. At that time the war in Europe had set no example of a successful resistance movement, and there were too many at Far Eastern Headquarters who still thought in terms of the last war. The idea of stay-behind parties consisting of Europeans and Asiatics seemed an extravagant and impracticable notion; the defence of Malaya was considered to be a purely military undertaking and to be already well under control through the proper channels’……
…it was only three months before Pearl Harbour and the air-raid on Singapore that I arrived in Malaya. In Australia the impression I had gathered was that the outbreak of war with Japan was only a matter of months, but that Australia at least was in no way ready to defend herself. In Malaya the impression was just the opposite. From the Press and conversation with people who should have known, one gathered that the Japanese was economically incapable of declaring war, but that, if she did, the British and American Pacific Fleets would prevent her reaching Malay, and in any case the defence of the Peninsula, especially Singapore, was impregnable.
Entering Singapore produced a comfortable feeling of security. Uniforms of all kinds were to be seen everywhere. Aeroplanes droned incessantly overhead, and at night the sky was streaked with pale beams of searchlights. There was the great Naval base, which had cost £60,000,000 and taken nearly twenty years to build. By day and night one heard firing practice from the fifteen-inch guns which defended the island. The ‘whiskey-swilling planter’ is a myth: the planters were all in the Volunteers, whose eight battalions had not been mobilised, as their officers were considered to be more valuable where they were – on the estates and mines….
…the Japs had marched into southern Indo-China in the summer of 1941. thus bringing their advanced base a thousand miles nearer to Malaya, but it was assumed the Siamese would be willing and able to withstand the increasing, Japanese pressure!….
…The possibility of having to fight in the ‘impenetrable’ jungle – as seen on either side of roads by Staff Officers – seems hardly to have been taken seriously. No specialised jungle technique or equipment had been evolved, and of all the troops stationed in Malaya only the 2nd Battalion of the Argylls had had any serious training in jungle warfare. Nor had the natives of the country been in any way prepared to expect or resist invasion. There was no united front!..”[/i]
Source: Frederick Spencer Chapman - The Jungle is Neutral.
“The story of Colonel Chapman’s adventures is typical of the British way of war, and therefore begins with a complete lack of preperation. He was posted in August 1941 to a school of guerilla warfare in Singapore, which had as one of its main objects the organisation of parties to stay behind in parts which the Japanese might overrun. Since, however, the Malayan Command had no belief in the ability of the Japanese to invade Malaya, let alone overrun it, nothing was allowed to be organised till a considerable portion of Malaya had already been overrun. But when the inevitable tragedy had occurred and the return match had been staged, British capacity for improvisation and detailed organisation asserted itself as usual - ‘still as Saxon slow in starting, still as wierdly wont to win.’ The uncoordinated efforts - because communication was impossible - of Colonel Chapman and a number of similar adventurers, the majority of whom eventually fell victim to their foes or to the jungle, caused the Japanese much trouble and loss. Colonel Chapman found the Jap, in spite of the much boasted efficiency in jungle fighting, easy money for ambushes and sabotage, so long as explosives and ammuntion lasted. Meanwhile, unknown to them, a great effort was gradually being built up overseas. In the end touch was established, and a powerful weapon was forged inside Malaya for the discomfiture of the enemy when the time for the invasion came. The Japanese surrender made the return to Malaya a walkover; had it been played the result would have been an innings defeat for the Japanese, in which the guerllia forces organised within the Peninsula would have played a large part.”
Field-Marshall Earl Wavell
June 1948.
I have to say, his cricketing metaphors alone have me convinced.
And, of course, ‘The Old Way!’
While the Brits like to revel in their supposedly amateur status, the reality is that they were always a very solid military and naval, and from WWI an air, power. No nation acquires and holds for a couple of centuries an empire like Britain did by being the sort of arrogant military idiots that Japan and Germany were when they tried the same exercise in WWII. And therein is a lesson. Britain had a great belief in its superiority derived from its achievements as a colonial power. As did France, Spain and Portugal at various times. Japan and Germany in the 1930’s had a great belief in their superiority derived from what they kept telling themselves about how good they were because of their racial superiority, which led them to attempt achievements in keeping with their arrogant beliefs but well beyond their national capacities.
The problem in Malaya in 1941 wasn’t a complete lack of preparation. There was very good preparation following Percival’s assessment five years earlier, especially in relation to placing air bases at, as the Japanese invasion showed, accurately identified points critical to stopping a Japanese invasion; plans for the 11th Indian Division to seize Singora and Patani and destroy the Japanese before they could establish themselves; and sound back-up plans and fortifications such as the defensive positions at Jitra.
Rather than Malaya being lost from a complete lack of preparation, it was lost because of a lack of complete preparation. What’s the point of positioning airfields to dominate critical Japanese invasion and advance points if they don’t have enough aircraft to do the job, and the right type of aircraft to meet the Japanese aircraft on at least equal terms? This woeful position flowed from the British arrogance that the Japanese planes were vastly inferior to the inferior British fighters stationed in Malaya, which were said by London to be “good enough” for Malaya.
Another major factor was the timidity of the initial British response in implementing sound plans, notably failing to launch the 11th Division‘s planned attack on Singora and Patani, because of concerns about alienating Thailand by invading it. Given Thailand’s subsequent conduct, it’s a pity it wasn’t’ invaded by Britain a week earlier and British positions fully established to meet the Japanese attacks.
Another important factor was poor communications between HQ and field commanders, resulting in critical early delays in executing plans.
If the preparations had been fully implemented in every practical sense, and the plans carried out promptly and vigorously in the early days, Britain might not have lost Malaya. As it was, sound but incomplete preparations and sound but inadequately executed plans for Malaya’s defence showed that the problem was not in a British failure to recognise every aspect of the Japanese threat and its likely execution and to prescribe adequate counter-measures, because it correctly anticipated Japanese plans and prescribed adequate counter-measures. The problem was simply Britain’s failure to implement those counter-measures properly. That was as much the fault of the powers that be in London as the commanders and troops on the ground in Malaya.
As it was, the Japanese appreciation of Britain’s position in Malaya was spot on. Both the British and Japanese military and political leaders were widely arrogant and contemptuous of their enemy. The Japanese, unlike the British, also happened to be quite right in their assessment of Britain’s ability to defend Malaya, as they convincingly proved.
Anyway, WTF would Uncle Albert know about the deep seated animosities that Australians held towards Britain, which we released by consistentely thrashing the Poms in every sport that mattered to them. Except soccer, but it’s a poofter wog game which we’ll get around to in time, once we learn how to give a decent headbutt, or Liverpool Kiss**, when upset with the endless boredom of the round ball game.
It is not a great feat to defeat England in its minority sports i.e. Cricket and Rugby. For generations they have been little more than amateur sports, with the emphasis being, not on winning, but taking part. In other words, it is about playing the game for the sake of the game; to enjoy the art and science of the game; to play and win by the rules and applaud each play whether performed by home team or opponent. To be both courteous and chivalrous to the opposition and to applaud and cheer them whether win or lose. Until recent times, Rugby Union was an amateur sport in England, and even in that lesser game, Rugby League, which was considered professional the players received so little pay, that they still needed a ‘Day-job’. Most practitioners of cricket, rugby and athletics (track and field) began to learn their trade at the better schools (Grammar and Private Schools) and not many state schools invested time in training young chaps in these sports. As times are changing and the sports are opening up to others because of their professional status, the teams are, supposedly, becoming better. However, the game itself is suffering and it is losing some of its essence.
The emphasis on winning and money is witnessed by the decline of the West Indies in the cricket world (if for nothing else - the one thing the West Indies were known for, and great at, was cricket!). With the advent of satellite TV the young West Indian boys no longer aspire to become great cricket players, as did their forefathers, but they prefer to try for a scholarship to some American university or other as a path into the NBA.
The rivalries will always be there – I hope – but hopefully not to the detriment of the sport. For myself, I still enjoy watching a cricket match on a village green, it might not be great cricket as far as skill is concerned, but it is usually rich in the spirit of the game.
Soccer is described as ‘a sport for gentlemen, played by hooligans’ whereas rugby is described as ‘a sport for hooligans, played by gentlemen.’
I don’t agree with this. I don’t think they revel in it. I think that the British forces have always had the drawbacks imposed upon them by the Treasury. I would argue that they resort to their amaturish outlook to conceal their embarrassment at beginning just about every campaign, of note, with a retreat (tactical withdrawal). For example: Crecy, Agincourt, Corruna, Waterloo, Mons, Dunkirk, Burma, El Alamein - to name a few. The reasons for this unpreparedness have usually been on account of spending cuts and the British psyche(it wasn’t for nothing that Wavell quoted from ‘The Old Way’).
The question of Malaya, i.e. the thread, has to be taken in the same context as those pertaining to Dunkirk and the European war. Where Britain was at the outbreak of the war; the psyche of the leaders; the disarmemant policies of the previous years; the rivalries between forces; the backwards thinking of the various forces leaders. There is the shock of the evacuation from France to consider, and the resulting battle in the skies above British cities. The fear of total defeat - no dress rehearsal.
Yes, Britain could have won in Malaya if it had been prepared, but it would have required many people - political, military and colonial - to climb several metaphorical mountains to enable this to happen.
Having said all of that, it would be fun to explore this topic further to discover a means by which it could have won.
Plus add the problem that resources were always finite and it wasn’t possible to give every command everything it needed. Despite that, I still think that the British leadership’s (London’s) approach to the defence of Malaya (including Singapore) was very poor.
Yes, Britain could have won in Malaya if it had been prepared, but it would have required many people - political, military and colonial - to climb several metaphorical mountains to enable this to happen.
Maybe.
The person who had the biggest mountain to climb, and the least likely attributes for climbing it, was Churchill. His military advisers were generally a lot more clear headed.
I still think that the plans for defending Malaya were reasonably adequate, although by no means a guarantee of victory. The deficiency was in the gap between the plans and their implementation, much of which flowed from Churchill imposing his outdated imperial arrogance on the situation and refusing to learn from experience, such as Taranto etc which as you rightly mentioned were the clearest instructions to anyone on how air power trumped naval power without air support.
Having said all of that, it would be fun to explore this topic further to discover a means by which it could have won.
Why not?
Kota Bahru serves as an example of how, in my view, Malaya was lost in London long before Japan attacked.
I think the faults on the British side come down to two things: London (in large part synonymous with Churchill’s ill-conceived opinions and interference in matters military for reasons political) and lack of air power. The second is really just a consequence of the first.
The first requirement was to implement the preparatory plans, devised in Malaya and agreed in London.
This failed because Malaya command was never given the resources to do so. That was London’s fault.
Malaya command was left to prepare for defence on the basis of the agreed plans, while London never bothered to tell it that it had no intention of giving it the necessary resources and that it had better come up with some different ideas, quick smart.
In the agreed plans Malaya command recognised the need for air power, in particular in northern Malaya to cover the likely, and accurately identified, Japanese landing points and subsequent advances.
Malaya command therefore embarked on building airfields at strategic points. As a result of London’s failure to provide resources, these potentially decisive strategic airfields became millstones around Malaya command’s neck… Of the 9 airfields in the north-west at the time the Japanese landed, only 3 had planes; only 2 of the 3 in the north-east had planes; and only 3 of the 7 in the south had planes. Not only were these airfields unable to fulfil their function in the plans, and thus totally useless, but they also needed to be defended to deny them to the enemy, thus dictating tactical dispositions which hampered Malaya command’s ability to respond with an otherwise free hand to the Japanese attack.
The Chiefs of Staff considered Malaya command needed 336 planes to defend Malaya, while Malaya command said 582 at its latest pre-invasion estimate. London gave it 13 squadrons totalling 158 aircraft, less than half of what London thought it needed. The aircraft it had, and certainly the fighters, were woefully inferior to the Japanese planes. What aeroplanes were in Malaya were doomed before they took off, but take off and fight gallantly they did.
The consequences of these failings were that Malaya command lacked the capacity to repulse the Japanese landings with air power. If we contrast the great effect of the fighters at Milne Bay which flew air support for ground troops and damaged troop landing and supply barges with the mpact of the bombers at Kota Bahru, which had to withdraw fairly quickly as the airfield was in early danger of being taken by the Japanese, it is likely that even two or three squadrons of top line British fighters with good pilots in ground support roles could have tipped the scales at Kota Bahru. The Indian troops at Kota Bahru fought bravely and effectively at the landing point, to the extent that Col Tsuji said it was the most costly fighting in the Malayan campaign. With air support it might have been a lot more costly, perhaps to the point of victory.
The IJN escort at Kota Bahru wanted to leave fairly early in the piece because of the damage they were suffering from air attacks. The IJA commander persuaded them to stay, because he wanted support for his advancing troops on the ground. Had his troops been subjected to solid air attack he might have had a different opinion.
Another consequence of the lack of planes was the loss of the Repulse and Prince of Wales. In part this was due to Admiral Phillips’ radio silence and failure to call for air support in the latter part of the disaster, but in the early part he was informed that air support would not be forthcoming as he moved towards Singora. Had the British held Kota Bahru and had they had decent air forces stationed there, consistent with its strategic and tactical importance, Phillips would have steamed on to Singora. Or he could have backed up at Kota Bahru, where the Prince of Wales, Repulse, and the three remaining RN / RAN destroyers would have faced an IJN heavy cruiser, light cruiser, and four destroyers. The IJN commander at Kota, already worried about the risk of damage from the air with the meagre forces actually used, might then have withdrawn. At the very least, he would have had to fight and head for sea room to do it, which then deprived the landing forces and transports of naval support, leaving them easy prey for air forces. Phillip’s force might have destroyed or dispersed the Kota naval force, and even got in among the landing force with devastating results. One or two British destroyers against troop transports would be enough.
Or maybe Japan would have diverted sufficient air forces to neutralise or defeat the air power at Kota and sunk the British naval force there instead of further south. Who knows?
Whatever might have happened, the Kota example illustrates how improved air force could have altered dramatically what actually did happen. As the first battle of Wake Island, and Coral Sea on a much larger scale, showed it was possible to repulse a Japanese landing force if its naval force could be sufficiently mauled before landing, and as Milne Bay showed it was also possible to repulse it after landing with ground troops with adequate air support.
On the Japanese side of the ledger, the simple facts are that it had better troops; better tactics; more aggressive troops; more determined troops; troops generally with battle experience against troops generally without it which, all other things being equal, can be decisive on its own; better planes; and probably better, but certainly not more courageous, pilots.
I don’t know that there was much that could have been done to overcome the superiority of Japanese troops once they were on a roll. The psychological effect on an army in retreat is hard to reverse. The time to beat them was on the beaches. Which is where air power comes in. Double the air power, which was still less than the Chiefs thought necessary and less than half what Malaya command thought necessary, would have had a huge impact on the result, and perhaps changed it by, among other things, giving ground troops sufficient support to avoid the early reverses which turned into a retreat.
