Could Operation Barbarossa Have Worked?

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#1

I did a search and didn’t see anything implicit on this “what-if” topic. But would like to know what other’s think. It seems that the Germans had much initial success and captured, killed, or destroyed almost mind-boggling totals of men and equipment. Yet, many a German commander was haunted by the “1812” overture in their dreams, and the more they tried to “kick the door” into the “rotten structure,” the more it seemed like a pretty solid structure. Soviet troops did not give up easily for the most part, and the Wehrmacht was behind schedule and suffering large casualties in the early happy times of 1941…

But, let’s suppose that Hitler is not so overconfident to the degree of shear “megalomania.” Suppose he orders a quick transition of the German economy to a war footing in 1941. Suppose the word “winter” is not a dirty one, and provisions are made to send winter clothing to the troops by October. And most of all, consider if the Germans had not sent units into the Ukraine, but had instead narrowed the focus to Moscow and they had taken it before the harsh winter had set in and at least partially caught the Soviet gov’t off-guard.

Could they have won? Or was the vast expanse of Russia, and its boundless numbers, simply too much for any army to conquer?

#2

as envisioned, no. The objectives set were far too ambitious. Had the Germans followed the Napoleonic route, lunged for Moscow, sent a force towards Leningrad, fought a holding action in the south, sat tight over the winter, and THEN gone south to take Ukraine, then it might have worked. Germany could have defeated the soviet union: it would have just taken them more than one campaign season.

#3

A nice paper on Barbarossa:
“Barbarossa: Planning for Operational Failure”, PDF

I think some one linked to it previously on this forum. Or was an other forum… anyway enjoy.

#4

I don’t beleive that the Germans had enough men to span the entire front. Even with it’s “allies” (conquered nation’s conscripts), the line was to huge to man, and have reinforcements for. The same thing is to be said for tanks, artillery, AA-guns, AT-guns, etc.

To succede, Hitler should have sent about half of his forces to N. Africa, to capture the Suez Canal and then make air bases in Turkey, keep going into the Arabian Penninsula and capture the oil there, and then go on to Georgia and Armenia. Conquer those areas and then invade southern Russia from the Balkans and the Armenian region. Link up and take the Caucasus oil feilds and Stalingrad. Then, once reinforcements had quickly arrived, go for Moscow. If you wanted to capture Leningrad, send and army into Finland from Norway. Then drive south and capture Leningrad. Link up and clean up from there.

How does that sound? And tell me about any modifications that could work out with this type of plan.

#5

In my opinion Barbarossa might have worked (better) if:
It was launched when initially intended (thus leaving Italy on its own in Greece (something Italy could handle, if only the British would stay away (they wouldn´t)))
Hitler didn´t carry too many of his sudden inspirations out; though the 6 week Ukraine detour from the drive on Moscow was a big tactical succes (and might have detroyed more Soviet “fighting power”, than the original plan (in a direction more or less anticipated by the Soviets), Moscow was a big centre of communications (road, rail, government, etc.), production and a more important target. Leningard was more or less open to conquest for a couple of weeks, but Hitler hestitated, talking about what a bother it would be to have to handle all those people in the city (he considered putting an electric fence around the city later and wait). (Stalingrad also lay comparatively defenseless for two weeks, but was of little importance in the plans during that time. Then Hitler suddenly found it ridiculously important).

But apart from that, unless Stalin would consider a settled peace (on very very unfavourable terms), the Soviet Union could not be defeated in one campaigning season.

As for the war economy: Barbarossa was planned so late (in industrial terms), that there was little that could be done in 1941. It was December 1941, before planning for the Eastern campaign seriously began in terms of military production.

To succede, Hitler should have sent about half of his forces to N. Africa, to capture the Suez Canal and then make air bases in Turkey, keep going into the Arabian Penninsula and capture the oil there, and then go on to Georgia and Armenia. Conquer those areas and then invade southern Russia from the Balkans and the Armenian region. Link up and take the Caucasus oil feilds and Stalingrad. Then, once reinforcements had quickly arrived, go for Moscow. If you wanted to capture Leningrad, send and army into Finland from Norway. Then drive south and capture Leningrad. Link up and clean up from there.

This is certainly not Barbarossa… Do you suggest it could all take place in 1941? (Remember that the Soviet Union grew stronger for every month at this point (fx. they produced 600+ KV tanks & 1200+ T-34´s in the first half of 1941 against Germany´s 1272 tanks of all kinds)).
(It depends on a quick defeat of the British in NA/Med., the very friendly cooperation of Turkey, the assistance of the Finns (The Germans got nowhere in Finland when the Finns wouldn´t play ball (German attempts to cut the Murmansk railway)).

#6

I said to invade turkey with about half of Hitler’s forces. The Turks probably couldn’t have succeded in defending themselves, even with Britain’s help. Same thing with Finland, invade from Norway, because the German’s already had that territory. The only drawback that I would see from the invading of Finland from Norway, is the long distance you would have to travel to get to Leningrad.

I don’t suggest this be done in 1941. Maybe later, one or two years. And I never said this was Barbarossa, this is just what I would have done to invade the Soviet Union…

#7

An attack on turkey would have triggered an immediate response from russia.

#8

Russia was going to be attacked anyway, so that would only make the attack come sooner.

#9

I posted this on another thread…

If you consider that the invasion of such a vast country with a force built for a short war, not total War, then it was indeed a folly from the start.

I have yet to see a convincing statement that shows Germany could have won in the East without changing the whole German premise for the invasion and the building of German Armed Forces and industry in the late 1930’s. To have succeeded would have required differences that the Nazi’s and their leader would never have adopted.

No matter how good your forces are operationally and tactically, if they do not have a strategy that is sound they cannot win.

Germany proved this in two wars.

In other words the Wehrmacht’s chances were doomed to fail, because they were led around by the nose by a psychopathic Corporal who thought he was a better commander then Generals like Rundstedt, Manstein, Guderian etc, and put more faith in henchmen like Goering and Himmler.

The top Nazis just weren’t up to it.

The problem was probably much deeper then just taking Moscow or not,[or the myriad of other so called Hitler mistakes once the war started] the whole Nazi regime was built on corrupt and rotten foundations.

Industrial war potential and not just the quality of the military forces determined the outcome. The Nazis forgot that economic potential had to be activated.

Class and party corruption and Bureaucratic infighting was rampant in Germany, and branches of the military fought against each other, key Nazi leaders like Goering tried to maximize their controls over industry to gain more power and wealth at the expense of centralised production. [Besides being Luftwaffe leader, and later Reichsmarschall, Goering was responsible for the economy as well as the build-up of the German military in preparation for the war, he admitted he knew nothing about economics.]

The Nazis did not really understand what total war meant until it was to late. Nor did they initially have a real strategic aim.

#10

euroquisling had a go at this a few months ago…

#11

Industrial war potential and not just the quality of the military forces determined the outcome. The Nazis forgot that economic potential had to be activated.

The nazi´s did not forget this. It´s the very reason why they planned Barbarossa (in order to secure the “war potential” to defeat Britain) and planned to execute Barbarossa in one season. They feared the the two front war as they knew they couldn´t not win it. Barbarossa was a one shot gamble to win the war. (“The world will hold its breath”… you know).

#12

But one could argue that it was the paralysis of Stalin’s orders for Soviet units not to do anything to “provoke” the Germans even though he was receiving near unanimous reports that an attack was imminent, as he was entertaining a fantasy that the whole Wehrmacht build up was a bluff…

#13

Yes, but that follows his paranoia after the Great Purge of the Soviet Command after his rise to power. He wasconsolodating his power, and to do that, it helps to not provoke a nation already at war. He thought that he could trust Hitler’s word, so he ignored everybody’s info.

#14

Actually it was pure economical plan - to take the agricaltural Ukraine and Caucaus oil for continie of war.
In fact Hitler planned barbarossa according Economical Germans needs ( and Politicals as well).
The Enourmous cheap “manpower” ( the crowd of slaves) in the East was also a “reason” to attack the USSR.
And finally the Hitler’s obsessed idea Lebensraum im Osten
So from many points the realization of Barbarossa was very profitable for the GErmany.

#15

Stalin actually nothing ignored…
But the Hitler was waiting for him to do something to provoke the Germany to attack the USSR.
Hitler was needed a Political justification and motivation of war agains USSR.
Stalin knew it exactly , he mobilized the troops but lack of wide combat experiense of soviet high staff make soviet losed in the main direction -Soviet Western front.
In other fronts ( Nothern and Southern ) the soviet could saved the front and retreated without great pockets.

#16

This is very true. But I think it was Manstein that was critical of the Fuhrer, saying that if Army Group Centre had continued to Moscow and taken it before the Winter rather than supporting operations in the Caucasus and in the Ukraine, then they might have been able to knock out a coherent Soviet defense --by mitigating the first really effective Soviet counterattack of the War using Siberian troops freed up from the East…

The speculation is that Hitler was trying to avoid the missteps of Napoleon, only to doom Germany to repeat them…

#17

Well i think Hitler was right when has stopped the MAinstain.
The group Armyes Centre has advanced a much into the Soviet territory, there were still the treat for thier flanks from the South.
So Hitler delayed the March to the Moscow to liqudate the Southern Soviet resistence near the Kiev.
And you right…they repeat the mistake of Napoleon finally.

#18

What I was getting at by Industrial war potential was from 1939-'42 the German war potential was a fraction of what it could have been.

Hitler wasn’t to sure how far he could push the German people for all out war, so settled for a ‘‘guns and butter’’ war.

Some production stats…

Aircraft production

1940 10.247…
1942 15.409…
1944 39.807…

Fighter production

1940 3.106…
1942 5.213…
1944 28.926…

Artillery production (over 37mm)

1940 5.000…
1942 12.000…
1944 41.000 …

Automatic weapons production

1940 171.000…
1942 317.000…
1944 787.000…

Munitions production

1940 865.000…
1942 1.270.000…
1944 3.350.000…
(tons)

Submarine production

1940 40…
1942 244…
1944 387…

Manpower strength of the Wehrmacht

1940 5.600.000…
1942 8.600.000…
1944 9.100.000…

Source: “The Penguin Historical Atlas of the Third Reich” by Richard Overy

If the economy could support even the 1942 production, let alone '44, it may have made a difference.

#19

That’s the much debated 64,000 dollar question isn’t it.:slight_smile:

Go for Moscow like the all rampaging Guderian [and Bock] wanted, or, as happened the turn South.

Found this on ‘‘articles of war’’ the ‘‘what ifs’’ of Hitlers decisions.

Having lost their battle for Moscow with Hitler, the German generals applied themselves to the rapid conclusion of the diversion of Army Group Center’s panzer’s southward with the expectation of advancing on Moscow once this move was complete. Among the benefits of a panzer drive south was that the vulnerable and extended southern flank of Army Group Center would then be secured. Once it was completed, there would be no threat of a northward thrust against the rear of the army group by Soviet forces nominally to the south or southwest of it.

Whether such a threat to the flank of Army Group Center ever existed, however, is open to debate. Despite the fact that the Soviet Southwestern Front was stronger than the fronts opposing the advances of the German army groups further north on the Eastern front, its armies were being pushed back. They had thus far managed to avoid being caught in the destructive battles of encirclement that other Soviet armies had been trapped in, but the Soviet forces fighting Army Group South were not in a position to disengage without risking destruction.

In order for even a small part of these forces to represent a serious threat to the German advance in the center, against Moscow, they would have had to have been fully disengaged in the south first. To do this implied weakening Soviet resistance in the Ukraine. Withdrawing substantial forces would have meant significantly weakening the Soviet defense in the south. Since the Soviet forces in the Ukraine were already being pushed back by the German offensive, doing so would have risked turning what was a battle for the Ukraine into a Soviet rout comparable to that occurring further north. Under these circumstances it was extremely doubtful that an effective Soviet attack could have been mounted against Army Group Center’s exposed southern flank.

In the postwar period, under the influence of the writings of German generals involved in Barbarossa campaign – Guderian in particular, there has been a great deal of attention given to the implications of a successful German attack on Moscow. Some historians, Stolfi for example, have gone so far as to suggest that a German victory in the war against the Soviet Union depended on capturing Moscow before the winter of 1941-42 and that there were no good military reasons for the Germans not achieving this result. Such writings focus on the redirection of panzer forces south – on Hitler’s orders – as the primary reason the German campaign failed to reach Moscow before the winter. In response, other historians like Glantz have suggested that part of the reason the Germans turned south was the increasing Soviet resistance on the Moscow axis at the time of the Battle of Smolensk and the need to secure Army Group Center’s southern flank. These are the same reasons expressed by Hitler in his arguments with the army generals and written into Directives 33 and 34.

And the debate goes on.:mrgreen:

#20

Actually it was pure economical plan - to take the agricaltural Ukraine and Caucaus oil for continie of war. In fact Hitler planned barbarossa according Economical Germans needs ( and Politicals as well).

That´s what I said.

The Enourmous cheap “manpower” ( the crowd of slaves) in the East was also a “reason” to attack the USSR.

Never heard that stated as a reason, rather the nazi´s had calculated that there were 25-30 million excess people in the area they planned to occupy. The idea was that they could be put to work on the infrastructure or mining in the east, originally there was no plan to import slaves.

Ashes:
It´s the same as saying that USA didn´t produce what it could in 1942, because it produced a lot more in 1944.
Germany in 1939 probably had the most militarised peacetime economy the world has seen. But it is right that the Germans did not mobilise the economy for a war on scale it fought from mid 1941 from September 1939. Until December 1941, it was all about immediate needs, fx. from oct39 to jun40 armaments production was artillery shell biased as they thought they´d need a LOT of artillery shells, like in WWI, from dec41 the needs of the eastern front dawned upon them and they acted accordingly, the results showed in 1944 (just like in the USA). In 1939/40 Germany was under pressure from France/UK and could not afford (remember, they did not know, and did not even believe possible so easy a victory in France) to rely on planning for a surge in output for a hypothetical Russian campaign two years into the future.
Output and producing the means to raise the output is very often in competition. Speer did not walk in and do miracles all on his own, the work was begun (even though he liked to take most of the honour).

(There was several long term plans pre war, as Hitler briefed his generals of when they should expect to be asked to wage war against whom, at first from 1944, then in 1942, but events (France, the UK and USSR arming themselves as an aswer to developments in Germany) caught up with these plans, and Hitler wasn´t slow to act when he felt that time worked for someone else. Waiting a couple of years with instigating a war would have meant that the predicted enemies got stronger compared to Germany, not the other way round).