Did Germany save Western Europe from USSR attack?

In “Stalin’s Other War: Soviet Grand Strategy 1939-41”, Rowman & Littlefield, Maryland, 2002, Professor Albert L Weeks suggests that Stalin used the period before Barbarossa to allow the capitalist European nations to bleed each other and to build up his forces for an attack on Germany, and possibly further into Western Europe against France and Britain, which was pre-empted by Barbarossa. http://books.stonebooks.com/cgi-bin/foxweb.exe/feedback/feedback?1007840
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1529-921X.2003.00072.x?cookieSet=1

Weeks’ argument is more subtle and less dogmatic than indicated by my summary and the linked review as it depends upon conflicting interpretations of Soviet documents, complicated to some extent by different eras in Soviet history which influenced certain interpretations, which Weeks deals with in the book.

It is not the only interpretation possible from the documents as other writers interpret them as being consistent with aggressive defence of the USSR rather than initiating an attack on Germany.

Viktor Suvorov’s Icebreaker: Who Started the Second World War, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1990 http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v16/v16n6p22_Bishop.html looks at additional factors about military production and forces to conclude that the USSR was building up massive forces which could be used only for attack into Europe.

If such interpretations are right, it follows that the Soviet entry into the Alliance was a coincidence produced by the necessity of national survival after Germany attacked and stopped the USSR attacking Germany and replacing it as the aggressor against the rest of Europe.

In that context, the Greek campaign becomes critical as the longer it delayed the German forces the more it could delay Barbarossa and the more likely it became that Stalin could launch his attack. If Churchill had deployed adequate forces, and especially adequate air forces, in Greece he might have achieved a victory which in the long run did Britain and Western Europe a lot more longstanding harm. Maybe the best thing that happened for Western Europe was losing in Greece.

Hahahaa!
This is a classic one! I will comment later - want to see what others have to say! :wink:

I thought you might comment. :slight_smile:

Surprise me by not saying anything about what an unreliable traitor and mental case Suvorov / Rezun is. :wink:

Absolutely astonish me by not mentioning Glantz and Gorodetsky. :wink:

I don’t accept the interpretation as a historical fact, unlike Barbarossa which is a historical fact as is the Soviet defence, but it’s still an interesting one that Weeks supports in his book, without the bias or prejudices that Suvorov is often accused of.

I have nothing against this topic per see! No objection, lets talk!
But I want to see what others have to say. I promiss to comment on it as I have been interested in this particular subject before and trtied to read as much as I could (not enough thoug).

So for now I wait for other comments.

I haven’t read a lot on it. The problem seems to be that the Soviet primary documents are capable of different interpretations but, depending upon what additional evidence the writer wants to introduce from whatever source, there is nothing that confirms any view as the ‘correct’ view. That’s why I’ve been careful in my posts to refer to ‘interpretations’. Anyway, let’s see if anyone else can do anything with the topic.

I would suggest the fact that throughout the cold war the Soviets didn’t attack is fairly good evidence that they weren’t planning an attack on western Europe at the time. Planning an attack on Germany is quite likely - and given both the available German documents at the time and what they subsequently did was an eminently sensible thing to do.
Stalin also of course had every reason to be happy about the Germans and the rest of Europe bleeding each other dry - both of them were natural enemies of a powerful Russian empire such as the one he ruled.