Among the finest British Generals of WWII? or one of WWII’s finest generals, period?
Few can argue that he accomplished much with so little. Or that so much potential was lost with his tragic death…
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orde_Wingate
Or was he just dodgy? 
"Wingate was known for various eccentricities. For instance, he often wore an alarm clock around his wrist, which would go off at times, and a raw onion on a string around his neck, which he would occasionally bite into as a snack. He often went about without clothing. In Palestine, recruits were used to having him come out of the shower to give them orders, wearing nothing but a shower cap, and continuing to scrub himself with a shower brush. Lord Moran, Winston Churchill’s personal physician wrote in his diaries that “[Wingate] seemed to me hardly sane — in medical jargon a borderline case”
the crazy guys always make the best commanders
I can. What exactly did he accomplish? Wider acceptance of the idea of fortified deep penetration bases behind enemy lines supplied by air seems to be about it, and that’s rather limited. After all, the classic example of his strategy being applied is Dien Bien Phu.
Wingate seems to have been flattered by the circumstances he found himself in. His first expedition with the Chindits was by any standards an abject failure, but came at a time when the British badly needed to believe that they could beat the Japanese in the jungle - so was played up as proving exactly that. His second expedition came by coincidence just when the Japanese were attacking at Kohima and Imphal - which meant both that the Japanese couldn’t respond to him effectively and that his being across their supply lines had a disproportionate influence.
Ummm… what? Have you ever had a crazy commander? Believe me, they really, really don’t make a good commander. Adolf Hitler is a shining example…
Certainly one of Britain’s finest nut cases in a position of power.
Something that’s been overshadowed by the Chindit period (and I mention this with some trepidation in case Chevan stumbles on this post 
) is his obsession with Zionism and contribution to IDF doctrine.
To a very large extent Wingate shaped both the fighting tradition of the Haganah and that of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and may be looked upon as the founder of the Haganah as an army. “Taking the war to the enemy” and many of his other ideas became part of Haganah and IDF military doctrine. His proteges, including Moshe Dayan and others, went on to see service in the Jewish Brigade and as leaders of the Haganah and IDF. He instilled the traditions of commando warfare, night fighting and covert operations in the Haganah, as well as the tradition that officers lead from the front, a practice which was his trade mark.
Wingate kept a Bible with him at all times. He seemed focused on defending the Jews with an intensity that the Zionists, not knowing his family background, usually did not understand. … His habits were eccentric and he had an affinity for the Jews not shared by many other British officers. One biography itemizes what other officers disliked about Wingate:5
“[H]is rebellious scorn, his arrogance, his paranoid touchiness, his reckless rudeness, his flouting of convention, his personal scruffiness, his leftish ideas, and (dare one suggest it?) his strange obsession with Zionism and the Jews.”
http://www.zionism-israel.com/bio/Charles_Orde_Wingate.htm
True, the results were mixed. Not just for the Chindits, but for Merrill’s Marauder’s as well. But then, the tactics were a bit behind the technology (helicopters). And Dien Bien Phu was taking things too far with a fixed redoubt and underestimating the enemy, things Wingate can hardly be called guilty of…
Wingate seems to have been flattered by the circumstances he found himself in. His first expedition with the Chindits was by any standards an abject failure, but came at a time when the British badly needed to believe that they could beat the Japanese in the jungle - so was played up as proving exactly that. His second expedition came by coincidence just when the Japanese were attacking at Kohima and Imphal - which meant both that the Japanese couldn’t respond to him effectively and that his being across their supply lines had a disproportionate influence.
Well I agree. But he was promoted quickly and was dead after only a short time into his second, more successful foray. So we have only a little time to really see what he could have done…And granted, he was a bit lucky (before being killed, which was pretty unlucky), but then, you create your luck. He had an opportunity the Japanese had presented him and his forces had an impact greater than their numbers would indicate. In any case, he is at least somewhat influential in special operations circles. But perhaps I exaggerated his importance. But it should be said that bringing back a demoralized army and instilling confidence in them is no small thing…
Ummm… what? Have you ever had a crazy commander? Believe me, they really, really don’t make a good commander. Adolf Hitler is a shining example…
Yeah, here we agree. Although overlord does make a point here. Most effective battlefield commanders are somewhat nonconformist and “eccentric.” But Gen. Wingate seems to be pushing the envelope with a suicide attempt and a generally weird demeanor. Though to be fair, he was on malaria drugs at the time, which can be rather debilitating to some…
No. No, they don’t.
But I see what you mean, most talented people are a bit “savant’ish,” but commanders that are full on crazy is sort of demoralizing to subordinates
So that’s two faults of Wingate then - firstly he was using inappropriate tactics for the technology available, and secondly he took things too far with fixed positions cut off by the enemy (disputed - I still hold that his first expedition demonstrated this).
Not all that much greater, compared to say the effects the SAS and LRDG had already had in the Western Desert with comparatively tiny forces. It’s worth noting that nobody has really tried to use the Chindit model again with success - all special forces ops nowadays are heavily modelled on the original SAS work in the Western Desert.
Personally, I would give Bill Slim the credit for this one. After all, he did the same for the whole of 14th army - so why should Wingate get the credit for the same thing happening in one particular sub unit?
Both excellent points. But perhaps I phrased it poorly as “technology” when I should have said resources, as reliably bountiful aerial supply was certainly not the norm the Pacific theater that was largely starved for resources that were going to the European and the Mediterranean theaters. But it was deliverable give enough transports and fighter support. Furthermore, it was only two operations. He never really got the chance to refine the tactics further. And the Japanese were far more vulnerable than even the Viet Minh were when forced into offensive operations against static fortified positions and probably suffered a far higher number of casualties as a result though I agree that’s not a good enough reason to sacrifice elite light infantry…
Not all that much greater, compared to say the effects the SAS and LRDG had already had in the Western Desert with comparatively tiny forces.
I’m not sure that that is a fair comparison. The desert is made for speeding around in reliable motor transport and of course the SAS and LRDGs were especially adept at this. But we cannot forget that they had blunders and a learning curve as well. Some units, including a Free French unit and ethnic Germanic SAS troops were wiped out in some operations in North Africa…Those hit and run operations were the culmination of experience and proven doctrine…
It’s worth noting that nobody has really tried to use the Chindit model again with success - all special forces ops nowadays are heavily modelled on the original SAS work in the Western Desert.
I don’t agree. Though they certainly did not follow the exact Chindit/Merrill’s Marauder mission with the same expectations and scale, the US Army had Long Range Ranger Patrols in Vietnam using the deep penetration tactics. I think the Rhodesians did as well in the Bush War. Granted, the units were much smaller, but they were invaluable in gathering intelligence, keeping the enemy off balance, and in emphasizing training and doctrine in jungle warfare…
Personally, I would give Bill Slim the credit for this one. After all, he did the same for the whole of 14th army - so why should Wingate get the credit for the same thing happening in one particular sub unit?
Well, you’ve a point there. But Slim still had many of the same logistical problems of being in what was considered a backwater theater…
Again, Slim did far better than Wingate in solving his own problems - even to the extent of growing his own food immediately behind front line units when needed (!).
Forgive me if someone has mentioned this, but the Chindits pioneered air-supply, which was used to such good effect at the ‘Admin Box’, and Imphal and Kohima. They also demonstrated that the British could better the Japanese on their own terms in the Ulu. Wingate offered a way of hitting back at a time when the British Burma Army new nothing but failure. Not disimilar to Churchill forming Commandos to strike back at Germany, following the disaster of the BEF in France and belgium.
Mike Clavert, once map reading on foot and directing an elephant, ahead of him, through tall grass, forgot to look up, as he peered down at his compass, and was stopped in his tracks by a stream of elephant piss. 
Slim admitted that the inspiration for holding a position and then counter attacking came from a Chinese general (but it was the Chindits that had demonstrated that a position could be resupplied by air drop), who had done the same thing and, at that point, was the only Allied commander to have defeated the Japanese in battle.
Comparing Wingate and Slim, doesn’t work for me. They were opposites, the orthodox and the unorthodox. Slim didn’t believe that special forces were effective, Wingate thought special forces could win alone. The reality is probably somewhere in between - each played their part.
Wingate’s successor wasn’t up to the task. Also the Chindits and the Merrill’s Marauders were misused later in ops that they weren’t suited for.
Stillwell is to be blamed for the latter.
The Chindits were ‘misused’ because they no longer had Wingate to fight their corner.
He is also reputed to have re-introduced ‘flogging’ as there was no other way of disciplining his men when deep in enemy territory.
From all that I have read, they more closely resembled SAS operations in Malaya and Borneo, than those of the Chindits/Marauders in Burma.
Typically, the LURP consisted of small patrols of about four or five men operating for three or four days. They were inserted into their patrol area by helicopter, being dropped a couple fo valleys away from that in which they would operate.
When various formations began to train and deploy more LURP units - on account of the success rate - they began to loose their effectiveness, sacrificing quality for quantity.
Here’s a couple of fairly good source:
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Stealth-Patrol-Making-Vietnam-1968-70/dp/0306812738
http://www.amazon.co.uk/Inside-LRRPS-Michael-Lee-Lanning/dp/0804101663
I haven’t heard that before but, if true, I have difficulty with it.
It suggests that Wingate failed to have a properly trained and disciplined force up to the task, responsibility for which rests with him. That could reflect his own erratic personality and its deficiencies.
Moreover, I suspect that flogging might have been counterproductive if ordered from above in such circumsances. If imposed by the OR’s on shirkers or malingerers in their ranks it probably would have worked.
I don’t recall John Masters ever recounting anything like that in his seemingly frank accounts of the Chindit operations.
I think it was more on account of desperate circumstances, conditions and situation, rather than any real breakdown in discipline or lack of training training. Just the grinding down of the physical condition of the troops which was the nature of these operations.
Stop making work for me.
This is an extract from: Burma the Longest War - Louis Allen
“…One found a sentry asleep, which of course endangered the security of the entire column. Lockett records that he (Wingate) gave the culprit three choices, to be shot, to be flogged, to be banished from the column and set off alone back to the Chindwin, eight miles away. Lockett saw nothing unusual about this, and had men flogged himself during the 1944 expedition.”
one of Alllen’s noted sources:
Tulloch op. cit., p.85 “Flogging wasn’t always very severe. More like caning”
Bugger being flogged. Or shot.
I’d be off on me own!
Explains everything.
No problem for officers, being used to caning and Whacko! What! in their private schools. I mean, they got caned when they attended their private schools, not caned in their privates. Then again …
Work alright in Irish regiments, too, used to the nuns giving them a flogging with the cane end of a feather duster. Mother Rectoress busted a couple on me, the sour old bitch. As for the Christian Brothers with their straps …
Must have been harsh on the Anglican boys from state schools. Poor little buggers, with no experience of sadism until the Japs got them.
I’ve always liked some old buffer I saw on one of those WWII TV documentaries in the '70’s who’d been in Colditz or similar. He said something like
‘Colditz and the Jerries didn’t worry me. It was nothing compared with a British boarding school.’
Not too mention that flogging could make men highly prone to infections in the nasty jungle environment…
Exactly.
Interesting also to find out about the floggings/canings. One would think that maybe the Chindits belonged to the Royal Navy or the militant wing of the boarding schools.
“What’s next, General?”
“Let’s see…hmm…I’m off to flogg Private Parts.”
My thoughts precisely