As we debate who is the better general, here and there, it seems to me that those that we consider the better generals, are those that have made something out of nothing, or have achieved something were all others failed.
One general who impressed me, was General Byng, particularly for his performance in capturing Vimy Ridge. This was done in style and, considering other batles of the time (and even those of the French from whom he took over the operational area) the Canadians suffered relatively light casualties. This was mainly on account of the Canadian forces being small in number and, therefore, not to be wasted. Byng developed an excellent plan and succeeded in capturing the ridge.
I’d add Plumer and Monash to that list for the same reasons.
The other one is Haig. Distinctly controversial, but if you read into it (John Terraine is IMHO particularly good) it becomes more and more apparent that Haig’s reputation was destroyed by Lloyd George for political reasons. Indeed, I’m coming around to the opinion that Lloyd George’s libelling of Haig and his general attempts to obfuscate the victories scored by the BEF in the last hundred days of WW1 are one of the major factors responsible for WW2. I’m coming around to the opinion that the “stab in the back” legend exploited by Hitler wouldn’t have survived without also being believed in France and the UK - and Lloyd George’s hatchet job on Haig and the BEF was largely responsible for this.
Interesting politicking. I have very little knowledge of this area, just bits which I have picked up here and their in short articles. I’m sure that you’re right, Lloyd George was yet another man with a massive ego.
To illustrate a point, during the Kaiserslacht in 1918 (aka the Ludendorff offensive) there were about 500,000 trained British soldiers sitting around in the UK “defending against an invasion” - on the explicit orders of Lloyd George. Had those troops (or even a large fraction of them) been made available to Haig then the German offensive would have been contained with far less difficulty and British casualties would have been a fraction of what they were. As it was they did nothing - largely because Lloyd George hated Haig, was persistently trying to undermine him by any means possible and was obsessed with a strategy of knocking the German satellite countries out of the war.
In reality, of course, the war was won on the Western Front and largely by the BEF. IMHO Lloyd-George’s attempts to disguise this to cover up his own political misjudgement are at the root of the current “lions led by donkeys” attitude, and to a great extent the cause of the “stab in the back” myth not being discredited until way too late.
The First World War was IMHO the greatest military victory in the history of the UK, and a crushing military defeat for Germany on the Western front in particular.
Edit: Couple of book suggestions -
Forgotten Victory by Gary Sheffield - covers the whole war, and seeking to explode myths rather than provide a history of the war.
To Win a War by John Terraine - more of a conventional history, but only really covering from about Cambrai onwards. Focuses more on the high level command decisions (Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Haig, Pershing, etc.) than on the actual battles. Highly recommended.
By 1918 the French were knackered, as were the Germans, nd the Americans had only begun to become involved. The only army in the field of any consequence was that of the British.
That’s basically it. The French army stopped the Germans in 1914-16, when the British army was either a tiny force (the old contemptibles) or still learning it’s trade (the Somme). Prior to the Somme the British army was about as important as the Belgians in terms of the amount of front they covered and their impact on the war (the Royal Navy are an entirely different matter).
From about spring 1917 onwards to the end of the war the French army was effectively crippled - Chemin des Dames in spring 1917 led to widespread mutiny and from that point onwards the French army wasn’t really capable of more than local offensives. The British army however was still gaining in strength until early 1918, and was able to inflict significant defeats on the Germans in summer 1917 (third Ypres) and throughout 1918.
In 1918? You need to read a bit more history. The French had more impact than the Americans, but the British (& Empire/Dominion) forces had more impact than everybody else put together. In the last hundred days, the BEF captured 188,700 prisoners, while the French, Americans and Belgians between them captured 196,700 (of which the Americans captured 43,000). In terms of distance covered (always a misleading figure in WWW1), the Americans advanced a maximum of 30 miles, averaging about 15 over the course of the last hundred days. The BEF averaged about 60, while even the Belgians managed about 50 and the French managing a similar amount in the Chemin des Dames region. There are good reasons for this - the Americans were by and large still following a doctrine that had riflemen closing with and destroying the enemy as the decisive arm which would not have looked out of place on the Somme, and which everybody else had discarded two years previously. Fortunately for them they were not facing the German Army of 1916, which had largely been destroyed at Verdun, the Somme and Ypres. Had they been doing so then they would almost certainly have been stopped dead.
The expression “the western front was largely won by the BEF” is like saying a football match which ended 7-6 in the 93 minute was won by the guy alone who scored the seventh goal in the 92nd minute.
More like the 5th, 6th and 7th goals. In the last few years of WW1 the BEF had the majority of the offensive power of the allied armies and was responsible for the majority of the damage to the Germans.
The british were able to muster more offensive power because france had to defend the longer lines (and do you know that it actually physically pains me to defend the french military capabilites :twisted:)
So imho it’s a bit unfair to reap the rewards of a combined effort.
And the role of the US is imho pretty hard to evaluate as they probably influenced the whole game more through potentials than through actual physical presence and fighting. But imho they were crucial to finally tip the balance.
My sense of fair play has to agree with some of this. The French military prowess consisted of the Pantaloon Rouge - a veritable meatgrinder.
Yes the American factor was its potential. It did help to tip the balance, but I wouldn’t agree thta it was crucial (One of the demoralising factors, from the German point of view, during their Spring Offensive, was the amount of British supply dumps they overran as they advanced. They grew steadily to understand that they could not win a war against an army which was, even at this stage of the war, so well supplied, while they were short of just about everything).
In the meantime the BEF was doing some serious fighting, and winning.
The French spent themelves at Verdun, once again because of Gallic elan. They, in their wastage of manpower were a spent force and needed the BEF to distract the Germans with the Somme offensive. British politicians once again interfering and overruling the advice of their generals.
What I find impossible to tell is how an absence of the US in the war would’ve played out in the minds of the french and italians in late 1917 after the collapse of russia and during their respective mutinies.
Depends when - by the end of the war the French lines weren’t all that much longer than the British, and they had a very large sector (through the Vosges mountains down to Switzerland) where nothing really happened during the war (60,000 casualties on both sides for the entire war in the Vosges sector).
As for the US, my attitude is that Pershing did less with more troops than any general since McClellan.
