How does 'Deep Battle' compare with 'Blitzkrieg'?

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#1

I beginning to believe that the success of the Blitzkrieg tactics used in Western Europe, were essentially on account of the limited size and geography (including human geography) of the battlefiled.

Would the tactics of ‘Deep-battle’ have faired better in other arenas where those of the Blitzkrieg had limited results?

Deep-battle

During the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet military theorists introduced the concept of deep battle. It was a direct consequence from the experience with wide, sweeping movements of cavalry formations during the Russian Civil War and the Polish-Soviet War.

Deep Operations encompassed maneuver by multiple corps- or army sized formations simultaneously. It was not meant to deliver a victory in a single operation, but rather multiple operations conducted in parallel or successively were meant to guarantee victory. In this, Deep Operations differed from the usual interpretation of the Blitzkrieg doctrine.

AimThe objective of Deep Operations was to attack the enemy simultaneously throughout the depth of his ground force to induce a catastrophic failure in his defensive system. Highly mobile formations would then exploit this failure by breaking into the deep rear of the enemy and destroying his ability to rebuild his defenses.

The role of technology
Soviet deep-battle theory was driven by technological advances and the hope that maneuver warfare offered opportunities for quick, efficient, and decisive victory. The concurrent development of aviation and armor provided a physical impetus for this doctrinal evolution within the Red Army. Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevsky stated that airpower should be “employed against targets beyond the range of infantry, artillery, and other arms. For maximum tactical effect aircraft should be employed in mass, concentrated in time and space, against targets of the highest tactical importance.”

Deep Operations in theory and practice

Deep Operations were first formally expressed as a concept in the Red Army’s “Field Regulations” of 1929, and more fully developed in the 1935 Instructions on Deep Battle. The concept was finally codified by the army in 1936 in the Provisional Field Regulations of 1936.

The Great Purges of 1937–1939 removed many of the leading officers of the Red Army, including Tukhachevsky. As a consequence, and as a result of experiences from the Spanish Civil War and the Winter War against Finland, the concept of Deep Operations was abandoned, until its potential was shown again during the rapid German victory over France in Operation Yellow in 1940. An early example of the potential effectiveness of deep operations can be found in the Soviet victory over Japan at the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan), where a Soviet corps under the command of Tukhachevsky’s disciple G. K. Zhukov defeated a substantial Japanese force in August–September, 1939.

Deep Operations during World War II
The development of Soviet operational doctrine during World War II owes a lot to the sound doctrinal base that was present in the 1936 Field Regulations, and the ideas of Deep Operations. The rapid growth of a competent mechanised force, as well as its adept handling, were remarked on by German officers such as F.W. von Mellenthin. The two military operations that came closest to the ideal of Deep Operations were probably the Vistula-Oder Offensive against the Wehrmacht in January/February 1945, and the Operation August Storm against the Japanese Kwantung Army in Manchuria in August 1945. Both were rapid and crushing victories for the Red Army.

#2

Another issue with Blitzkrieg is simply that it was applied against armies not ready for it. Even in 1940 it had problems - notably against the British who were the only fully motorised army. The British were kicked out of France, but the Germans failed to break them as an army or even cause mass casualties - something they should have been able to do at any other time in history in kicking an army back that far and that fast. In 1941 it was only successful against a Soviet army that was virtually decapitated by it’s own leadership and fighting according to some truly dumb orders. Once the Soviets found their feet again and the German force densities dropped a bit, the Germans were pretty much stopped cold.

#3

Generally agree. Von Manstein gave them a fright at the Third Battle of Kharkov, though, and it would have been interesting to see how things would have gone at Kursk if the Soviets had not been forewarned.

#4

I would go further and say that there wasn’t really a universal definition of “Blitzkrieg” in the thinking of the German generals at the time. Even the use of what amounted to using panzer divisions in a deep penetration raid to cut off the armies springing into Belgium was not anticipated nor planned too be carried out to the initial extent that Rommel and Guderian took them in Fall Gelb. As both German generals were largely ignoring orders and driving hell-bent for the Channel coast, they out ran their infantry and supply lines preventing any consolidation of victory until things caught up. And time and space are the greatest enemy to any rapidly advancing army, as the Germans found out in the Operation Barbarossa, and to a much more limited extent in France…

#5

They also found out in North Africa.

The term Blitzkrieg was first coined by the British press.

Germany’s ethos for rapid movement had been around since th Franco-Prussian War, if not before. The Schliefen Plan was Blitzkrieg without the technology. The Storm Trooper tactics of 1918 were another example.

The Allies had won the first war and considered fighting the second in the same way - if it works why fix it?

Germany was a far more militaristic state, in a continental sense, than Britain ever was. Britian was busy policing its Empire.

After the first war, the German’s spent the next twenty years examining what had worked and not worked, and why. They studied the pioneering works from other sources such as Britian, USA , Soviet Union and France, and then put them into practice in Spain.

Guderian appreciated what could be done with modern technology. He would say say “Don’t spit at them, put the boot in!”

Rommel’s dash and daring was a continuation of the same methods he had used in Italy in the first war, but this time it was upgraded with Panzers.

When up against Armies with decent armour, the Germans had to rethink. We’ve all heard of the battle winning effect the T34 had. The entrance of the Grant (which was a Lee modified to British specifications) and the Sherman, in the Western Desert, also began to make a difference.

The USA, with its isolationist psyche did not envisage fighting a ‘Continental’ type of war. The US’s focus was more in the direction of the Pacific, and so did not pursue the development of armoured strategy.

#6

The term “blitzkrieg” was a propaganda buzzword that first appeared in 1939 in the propaganda broadcasts organized by Gobbels state information service. It had nothing to do with German military doctrine or tactics. There were several other terms German military writers used to identify their doctrines and thinking, but “blitzkrieg” was definitly not one of them.

English language newpapers and radio picked up the term during WWII and used it to mean just about anything connected to warfare. Since WWII 'blitzkrieg has been commonly used by pop historians in the English language as a substitue for identifying the actual terminology the Germans used, or knowing anything about the same.

#7

A euphemism?

#8

The British army was not destroyed in 1940 but the debacle that occurred seems humiliating enough as it is. I’d be interested in knowing people’s opinions as to why the British/commonwealth/French did not crush the German army in 1940.

#9

Basically, it was a critical error in doctrine, having complete asshats (that said incredibly stupid things) in command, and certain weaknesses within the French military system which are easily masked by the numbers on paper (of men and tanks). But numbers that fail to account for the spreading out of those tanks and artillery along the line whereas the Germans massed them, and that the large French Army was recently called up and not fully trained nor integrated into units by early 1940. In short, the French believed in “Methodical Battle” as the basis of their combined arms approach to warfare, a doctrine that stipulated that the flow of war would move much slower than in the fact Germans decided it would be. The French were also beset my problems such as a low birthrate of the male population of about half that of Germany’s, and a fundamental distrust of a large, professional standing army by the political establishment.

The French strategy was inherently defensive, not just in terms of the Maginot Line, but in the planning of fighting a defensive battle for 1939-1940 and hoping that the Germans would fillet themselves, wear themselves down, against French defenses. Other key weaknesses, the main glaring one, was that the French Air Force lacked a serious tactical and strategic bomber arm, and that their newer fighters on par with the Me109 were only beginning to be delivered by 1940, and the Luftwaffe was superior to even the combination of the RAF and the Armee de l’Air in terms to tactical air support as this was deeply ingrained in Luftwaffe doctrine and planning. Most Luftwaffe generals had indeed been infantry officers at one time, since the Reichswehr was forbidden air assets…

Both the French and the British, as well as the Germans, realized that in may respects that they had the strategic advantages in production and access to raw materials. Germany’s desperate gamble, as indeed Plan Yellow and Plan Red were, a reaction to their perceived weakness and dependence on the Soviet Union for trade. In a sense, they were in a waiting game, hoping that the coming German offensive would play to their strengths and that they could inflict heavy casualties in a battle of annihilation, preferably in Belgium. And whether this did happen, or not, were planning for a decisive combined arms offensive into Germany in about 1941, after they had gained the overwhelming upper hand in terms of production, and had blockaded Germany. When the battle did come, the French and BEF sprung their best forces forward into Belgium; their most mobile forces were then pinned down by a Wehrmacht holding action, and then cut off by a slightly brilliant plan that combined daring, a LOT OF luck, and two generals that essentially ignored orders whenever they found them to be unrealistic and overcautious: Guderian and Rommel. The Wiki page on all this, for once :), is actually a pretty good one and worth the read…

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_France

#10

Well? I’d like to see some more responses to this worthy thread…

And why was Deep Battle considered heretical to the Stalinists?