i was watching saving Private Ryan the other day and i had a thought, why weren’t smoke screens deployed on the D-Day landing beaches? I know they were used during other landings in the Pacific. Then not long after the though also occured to me that there may have actually been smoke deployed on the beach and i’ve never noticed so my real question is
Why was smoke not deployed on the d-day beach-heads
or
Why was said smoke so ineffective
Probably because hitting a beach at dawn is hard enough without obscuring all navigational features with smoke. Smoke isn’t bulletproof after all…
It was used to protect the flanks of the invasion fleets.
It couldn’t be used on the beaches because;
a) the smoke would cause mass confusion amongst the landing craft.
b) It would obscure the beach obstacles exposed by the low tide
c) it would prevent any close support from naval vessels.
The biggest lifesaver on D-Day would have been for the American commander to deploy the DD Sherman tanks correctly, rather than sinking them a few miles from the beaches.
What I find surprising is how the Allies had so many casualties on D-Day despite having air superiority.
Why is it surprising? Almost none of the casualties were caused by enemy air power.
Another way lives could have been saved: the rockets designed to crater the beach in the American sector should have been fired at the correct distance to actually hit the beach rather than attempting to crater the sea instead.
But smoke(grenades - colored) WAS used on D-Day (I presume we’re talking about Omaha Beach here) - to “illuminate” bunkers and other targets by some very courageous soldiers for the USN & RN destroyers that nearly beached themselves providing direct fire in a desperate but successful attempt to help save the landing.
The problem with Omaha was it was simply the worst beach to land on geographically speaking. The seawalls effectively contained tactical movement within a kill-box so those that survived the murderous gauntlet of MG42, mortars, and cannon fire then had to face significant obstacles, both man made and natural before they could counterattack. Also, it (though somewhat disputed) is said that the aerial bombardment completely missed the beach for erring on the side of caution, the AAF dropped their bombs too far inland because the US landing forces were obscured by the elements (something smoke wouldn’t have helped with much 
)
The Naval bombardment wasn’t much better as most vets of that battle (and I’ve personally spoken with one) reported no cover from bomb and shell craters being present…
I think it must also be said that a factor in the US casualties suffered on Omaha would be that their opposition, unlike most of the second-rate German Atlantic Wall garrisons, many of whom were combat-hardened veterans capable of sustaining themselves in combat beyond the initial overrunning of the beaches.
For what it’s worth I’ve walked Omaha beach and there is no comparison between it and the British beaches further East (I’ve not been to Utah beach). The beach is utterly dominated by some very high dunes immediately inland of it (less than 100m from the high tide mark), and there are really only one or two ways off the beach for anything but infantry. The current road in goes down what is virtually a canyon, and there are cliffs at either end of the beach which enfilade it. In comparison the British and Canadian beaches have no real headlands at either end, there is no high ground for some distance behind the beaches and no real obstacles to moving off the beach.
yeah i even did some research after my initial post and someone raised a good point when they said that smole would get in the way if allied observation planes reporting to eisenhower on the battle, however this also raises the question on why there was not more close air support from allied fighters during the landings
Have you ever seen an infantry action from a distance? It’s horrendously confusing - it’s bad enough when you’re plugged into the platoon radio net, close up with eyes on. Providing “more” close air support is simply a command and control issue - and you’re limited by the available number of forward air controllers, number of available radio frequencies, etc. Extra aircraft are the easy bit.
Smoke can be more of a hindrance than a help to ground troops, especially when combined with aerial bombing, as U.S. Major General Lesley McNair found out while observing Operation Cobra in France on 25 July 1944.
Mc Nair was warned by USAAF commanders that bombing close to their own troops, as McNair wanted, would lead to the bombing zone spreading with each successive wave as smoke and dust obscured the intended target area, so that it was likely they’d bomb into their own lines sooner or later. Mc Nair didn’t accept their advice and insisted on bombing close to his own lines.
Maybe he realised that the USAAF commanders were right, a few seconds before he was killed by a USAAF bomb.
I think his death gives the USAAF the distinction of killing the highest ranking US army officer to be killed in action in Europe.
How would dazed and confused American soldiers call in, and direct, close air support on such a narrow stretch of land (beach) using 1940s technology without getting themselves blown to even more hell than they already were? They barely had any radio contact with the fleet and virtually all command and control had broken down on Omaha…
In any case, they were able to get direct naval gunfire support via colored smoke, and that was far better than tactical air strikes circa 1944…
They didn’t have laser guided bombs, son.
And the time delay of info flowing to Ike was very wide gap indeed…
i do understand the problem with relaying radio transmissions to the naval fleet, but you’d think even a p-51 just circling the beach would be able to tell the difference from a struggling allied soldier and a machine gun nest, and also as mentioned before wouldn’t colored smoke work well?
Not a ghost of a chance. It’s hard enough on the ground at close range.
What pdf27 said.
Also the problem that a P51 was too fast for arty observation and fighter pilots weren’t trained artillery observers.
Not to mention that the large concrete block houses and bunkers would be largely immune to bombs and rockets carried by small aircraft…
Small pre-landing tactical strikes using napalm might have helped, but then again, so would have actually hitting the targets in the initial air strikes and naval gunfire, most of the heavies (12" & 14" shells) “went over the bluffs”…
Only direct naval gunfire from the fleet’s destroyers, often directed by soldiers throwing smoke grenades in front of German emplacements, was effective at this point. The heavier battleships and cruisers continued to provide indirect fire over the bluffs preventing reinforcement and retreat of the Germans, and knocking out heavier anti-ship batteries…
The first destroyer to begin direct fire support was the USS McCook captained by Lt.Cmdr. Ralph “Rebel” Ramey, out of desperation at observing the first waves being wiped out, used the 5-inch guns to blast positions on the Veirville exit draw and tear it open. She also provided cover for successive waves of landing craft both literally as Higgins boats initially hid behind her and then with her guns. At 0950, Adm. C.F. Bryant, commander of the gunfire support group, called in the destroyers over the radio, “Get on them man!” The destroyers, some scrapping bottom, joined the fray including the USS Carmick, the Shrubrick, and the Shatterlee. Most thought that the destroyers had “saved the day.” Most fired from between 500-1200 rounds of 5-inch ammunition and were able to precisely fire on German pillboxes, bunkers, gun-emplacements, trenches, and obstacles and were invaluable to the soldiers essentially reorganizing themselves into ad hoc units moving up the bluffs…
*Info. from D-Day: June 6, 1944 by Stephan Ambrose, Simon & Schuster (p.387-389)
When you compare dDay to other battkes, perhaps lives were saved. Compare it to the Hurtgen Op or the Scheldt say and the casualty figures aint that bad. Sure the casualties were higher on some beaches but all in all I think the Allies had a good well worked out plan for the 1st day. Dieppe comes to mind somehow when thinking about this.
what about a big plume of yellow smoke wouldn’t they see that
What firefly said…
Balakowskis recent book on Omaha Beach is recomended. There is another long out of print book ‘The Far Shore’ by Rear Adm. Ellsberg which hs a excellent description of most of the key events of that morning. Ellsberg was also involved in the establishment of the prefabricated Mulberry harbor, and his book is very usefull for understanding that aspect.
The casualties on Omaha Beach were bad compared to the other four landing areas 6 June, but certainly not the worst of WWII assualts. the primary reason for the problems were: 1. Failure in fire support. 2. A much stronger German unit moving into that sector in May. Had the fire support worked as anticipated the better quality German unit would have meant little. Had the previous weak infantry battlaion occupied that ground the failure of the fire support would have been less noticable.
Fire Support Failure
The heavy bomber attack missed its release point by several seconds. The overcast was low and the lead bombardier was releasing by time of flight from a backup aim point at sea. He was concerned that he would hit the landing craft so he hesitated. The 300 to 400 five hundred pound bombs hit fields inland and killed a few cows.
Preliminary Naval Gun Fire. This started at the earliest light a little over thirty minutes before the first landing craft entered the surf line. From the examples on many other amphbious assualts in WWII this was inadaquate vs the defense on Omaha Beach. The volume of fire of the ships available was not suffcient to Neutralize, or even Suppress the defenders. by contrast the British who landed a hour after the US had 90 minutes of NGF on their beaches. I also suspect insuffcient armor piercing ammunition was used by the heavy ships. In the Pacific it was found in 1943 that a significant part of the ammo mix had to be AP in order to damage deep earthworks and concrete structures.
Rocket Bombardment. A barrage of several thousand 128mm rockets (5 inch) was launched just a few minutes before the first landing craft touched the beach. Insuffcient training, haze, and rough water spoiled the range estimates of the rocket boats. Most rockets hit in the surf & further out.
A group of L5 spotter planes for NGF observation were lost or delayed while evading Allied antiaircraft fire. These were needed to for accurate fires on the German arillery positions inland. With those delayed for several hours the German artillery support was not effectively countered.
The DD tanks (two battalions) and the two artillery battalions mounted in DWKU vehicals were launched in rough water. More than half of those vehicals were sunk. About 30% of the DD tanks made it ashore and none ahead of the infantry as planned. Those at did land straggled ashore with the second & third wave as their landing craft crews brought them to the surf line.
Failure of the Naval Gun Fire communications network. The delay of the spotting aircraft was part of this. Casualties amoung the Spotting Teams in the first wave was next. As the teams took heavy casualties they were dispersed and the radios lost along the beach. Some nfantry commanders attempted to direct NGF, but alternate methods had not been adaquately trained for. When the infantry commanders tried to spot targets over their radio frequencys/networks the HQ stations aboard the ships did not understand the problem and had insuffcient training to pass on the call for fire to the support ships. The problems of the infantry radio network of course did not help either.
In the Pacific it had been learned through bitter experince that calls for NGF had absolute priority during the assualt phase. If the NGF radios were not working then any radio available had to siezed to relay the call for fire. And, all radio operators and CP staff had to understand how to relay the NGF call to the appropriate station. They also learned oter radio messages had to be interruped to give right of way to the NGF calls. Fewer breakdowns in NGF communication occured in the Pacifc due to this extra training.
Other Problems
As mention above the plan was to capture the exits roads which passed through the gullys or draws first. These were apparently well covered by the defense and the infantry that attempted to enter them failed. Eventually some of the comanders found the bluffs had some weak points and they were able to advance up the face of the bluffs.
The First Divsion was a well trained & veteran unit. The 28th Divsion had practically no veterans and its training was average. The 28th suffered much higher casualties and advanced slower.
Smoke
This is tricky. If in exactly the right location at precisely it aids the attack. Otherwise it is useless or worse. There was one smoke screen that aided the assualt. On the far left flank of the beach some dense brush caught fire and the smoke concealed a intact infantry company that came ashore there. In addition to a intact company the wire & mines were thinner and there were fewer defense positions covering that sector.
By 7:30 an hour after the first wave, NGF communications begain to restore. In some cases by visual signal instead of radio. The handfull of tanks that made it ashore begain to have their effect, a few infantry groups had made it to the bluffs and begain picking off defense positions. A German officer who survived testified that by 8:00 many of the forward positions were no longer responding to signals. A regimental commander reported at 8:30 that his casualtys from the NGF prevented any further counter attacks by his command. These and other remarks from the German side suggest things were bad all around.