Wondering if you guys have any info on the Kwantung Army ? I know they were in Manchuria, and that they have millions of men. What I’m interested is like which battles did they fought ? Also you guys have any info on the Kwantung Army in China ? Like the battles ? 
Anything would be helpful
They had the Kwantung Army or Guandong Army.
They were units of the Imperial Japanese Army that originated from a Guandong garrison established in 1906,… to defend the Kwantung Leased Territory and the areas adjacent to the South Manchurian Railway.
They were initially composed of a regular army division and a heavy siege artillery batallion, both stationed within the Kwantung Leased Territory.
Their Army in 1941 consisted largely augments of 700,000.
The Army fought against the Red Army of the Soviet Union at Zhanggufeng in 1938 and Nomonhan in 1939. Since the outbreak of the Pacific War, many troops were mobilized to the Pacific islands from Manchuria. When the Soviet Red Army invaded into Manchuria in August 1945, the Army retained approximately 600,000 soldiers. To cope with the Soviet invasion, the Army planned to form the defence line near the capital of Manchuguo, but the Emperor of Japan Hirohito ordered them to surrender before the main defensive engagement took place.
Thanks Jordovski That really surprises me… I heard that the Kwantung Army was the pride of the Japanese Empire. Yet they surrendered most of it to the Russians… Did they ever return to Japan ? Or did they remain in Russia to work as slave labours ?
I think alot of them did Return to Japan, but some weren’t.
by the way, you talked about your history teacher or something in another room, which tells me your still in school, which year may i ask ?
Well I suppose the japanese came out of it better in the end than they would have if the Soviets had been allowed to opress them as well. The Soviet invasion into manchuria was nothing more than a land grab. Stalin wasnt interested in war with Japan, in fact Japan may have survived longer if they had declared war on the Soviets in 1941. Most of the US aid that saved the Soviets in ww2 came through Vladivostok in US ships registered as Soviet ones. If Japan had declared war they could have helped the Germans and themselves by stopping this aid and forcing the US to rely more on the Norther Atlantic route and the Iranian route.
Slightly off topic but releveant to the end of the war I think.
It is my understanding also that the invasion of Manchuria by Russia did play a role in hastening the use of both weapons.
OTOH as a liberal-lefty on some things I do find this tendency to take up hindsight positions is execrable, amoral and silly too.
I remember meeting a young American who had a big problem with Lincoln for being basically a racist! I’d just been to Washington my ist time.
well yes in late 20c terms, yes, BTA a significant minority of Americans still ARE!
I agree with Chevan, the A-bombs were mainly dropped to impress/scarry USSR.
Why is it in every post here lately coming out of Russia…the Soviet army or the Soviet goverment is the reason that everything in the war happened?..Given the russians late,…VERY late, entry into the war in the Pacific, I doubt that that figured into why we dropped the bombs except in a very limited ,secondary sense.Truman was a very pragmatic person who was usually interested in solving the problem in front of him at the moment…at the time,that was the impending invasion of Japan with an estimated 200,000 US casualties for the intial stages of the invasion.The Japanese had already shown themselves to be willing to fight to the last man ,woman and child at Saipan and Okinawa, and had been quite public about the fact that they would make the Allies pay for every inch of Japanese soil…
i don’t know it maybe saved many lives but it destroyed 2 towns killed too much people and even now that act affects you because of radiation, years after people were dieing because of radiation. there would be less casaulites if the allies atacked japan.japan would have kapitulated because italy,3.reich and other countries did
No, they wouldn’t have…surrendering the country was completely abhorrent to the Japanes culture and mindset.For thousands of years the Japanese had been unconquered in their island home and they would have fought to the death for it…The only reason they did give up was because the Emperor ordered it…
The way you wrote it sure does sound like bullshit.
I am not claiming that USSR was the main force that defeated Japan (and I think Chevan think so neither), but the Kwantung Army was the best Japanese force in August 1945.
And considering your insight in to the Japanese psychology we now know for sure that they did their 110% to defended Japan.
Would you care to elaborate on “ill equipped and poorly organized” thing, please?
The ovens. Do you have an idea for how long can an oven continiously burn bodies before its reflective bricks would start fall down and the oven would had to be repared?
ill equipped and poorly organized
the Kwantung Army was the best Japanese force in August 1945.
the kwantung army was nearly the only organized japanese army left at that point…lol…
large portions of the kwantung army were scattered about in operations against the chinese communists and and nationalist guerillas.parts of it had been recalled for the defence of the home islands as well.also you can’t compare the japanese mech units,what little they had, with an experienced soviet army armed with things like the T34/85 and the SU122.the japanese armor was outmoded within the first couple of years of the war.and they had outmoded artillery and little or no AT guns.it’s just that most UK and US units in the far east had little or no priority of supply before the war and were very under trained and under equipped.the reason the UK lost at singapore was because of their inability to understand or deal with the speed of the japanese advance down the malay peninsula.the same thing happened in the oil rich dutch east indies where a very poorly equiped dutch army constabulary force was speedily dealt with by japanese paras and naval landing troops.though the japanese weapons and equipment were outmoded for most of the war their early sucesses were based mainly on a concentration of force against weaker units and their abilty to move more quickly than their opposition.
I am not claiming that USSR was the main force that defeated Japan (and I think Chevan think so neither
maybe not, but what is coming through seems to be a belief that the A-bombs were dropped more to impress the soviets than to hasten the end of the war.also ,from both of you guys statements you seem to be of the opinion that the US spent the last year of the war doing more to get set to fight the russians that it was to invade japan.public opinion in america after the nazi surrender was of a “let’s beat these japs by any means neccesary and get our boys home” variety.for the planners who were looking at such huge losses for an invasion the A-bomb was a stand off godsend.you have to remember that very few people knew about the manhattan project even after the first test bomb was set off.many of the PTO planners didn’t even know there was such an item until right before it was dropped.
as for the bricks…hmmmmm… i not able to give you an exact time figure but i know that the crematorium in the mortuary i worked in for a time had been in regular use for almost 50 years with no need to redo the interior bricks.though i don’t think the nazis were planning on the “final solution” taking that long…
savoy6
the kwantung army was nearly the only organized japanese army left at that point…lol…
So you mean that there was no organised military unit available for the defence of Japanese homeland? Nice to know! Otherwise it is a funny picture you draw. In Japan itself there were no good units but the Japanese would fight like hell and cause USA immense casualties. In Manchuria, on the other hand, there was an organised army but they were sissies and could not provide resistance.
large portions of the kwantung army were scattered about in operations against the chinese communists and and nationalist guerillas.parts of it had been recalled for the defence of the home islands as well.also you can’t compare the japanese mech units,what little they had, with an experienced soviet army armed with things like the T34/85 and the SU122.the japanese armor was outmoded within the first couple of years of the war.and they had outmoded artillery and little or no AT guns.it’s just that most UK and US units in the far east had little or no priority of supply before the war and were very under trained and under equipped.the reason the UK lost at singapore was because of their inability to understand or deal with the speed of the japanese advance down the malay peninsula.the same thing happened in the oil rich dutch east indies where a very poorly equiped dutch army constabulary force was speedily dealt with by japanese paras and naval landing troops.though the japanese weapons and equipment were outmoded for most of the war their early sucesses were based mainly on a concentration of force against weaker units and their abilty to move more quickly than their opposition.
So, have you looked at the OOB for the Kwantung army in August 1945? What is your conclusion?
I don’t think so.
The Soviets frustrated Japanese attempts to negotiate a surrender through the USSR; strung out Japan without letting the other Allies know about the Japanese approaches (although the other Allies got a certain amount of information about them from decoding Japanese traffic); and then declared war on Japan in the dying moments of the war against Japan, to Japan’s considerable surprise, and when Japan was unable to defend itself.
On 20 June the Emperor on his own initiative called the six council members to a conference and stated that it was necessary to have a plan to close the war at once, as well as a plan to defend the home islands. He asked what the council thought of that idea. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Navy Minister stated that they fully concurred with the Imperial view and that such steps were then being taken to that end. Then the Emperor in turn asked when the ministers expected they would be able to send a special ambassador to Moscow. The reply was that it was uncertain but they hoped he could be sent before the Potsdam conference. Sakomizu testified that after this expression from the Emperor, Suzuki decided he could stop the war; when he returned from the conference he told Sakomizu “Today the Emperor said what everyone has wanted to say but yet was afraid to say.”
After that the Government redoubled its talks with Russia and decided to send Prince Konoye to Moscow if he were persona grata. On 10 July the Emperor called Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo and said, “As it is now early July should not our special ambassador be dispatched to Moscow without delay?” Since Soviet Ambassador Malik was ill in Tokyo and the conversations there were not progressing, Sato was again instructed to put the matter directly to the Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Russia asked for more details concerning the mission and Sato was directed to explain the mission as follows: (1) to make an improvement in relations between Russia and Japan (in view of Russia’s denunciation of the neutrality pact), and (2) to ask Russia to intercede with the United States in order to stop the war. The Soviets replied on 13 July that since Stalin and Molotov were just leaving for Potsdam no answer could be given until their return to Moscow. On 12 July meanwhile the Emperor had called in Konoye and secretly instructed him to accept any terms he could get and to wire these terms direct to the Emperor. Konoye also testified that when Sato was sounding out the Russians he reported the Russians would not consider a peace role unless the terms were unconditional surrender, and that this reply had a great influence on the Emperor.
In the days before the Potsdam Declaration, Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai became pessimistic about the Russian negotiations. They expected eventually that they would have some answer; but
–7–
if it were unfavorable they concluded that their only recourse would be to broadcast directly to the United States.
On 26 July the Potsdam Declaration was issued. In their deliberations on that statement, which began immediately, no member of the Inner Cabinet had any objections to ending the war. Suzuki, Togo, and Yonai felt that the declaration must be accepted as the final terms of peace at once, whether they liked it or not. The War Minister and the two chiefs of staff on the other hand felt that the terms were “too dishonorable”. Discussion centered around first the future position of the Emperor, second the disposition of war criminals, and third the future form of Japan’s “national polity”.On 6 August in the midst of these discussions an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima. Early reports to Tokyo described very great damage, but the military did not think it was an atomic bomb until President Truman’s announcement and a mission of Japanese scientists sent to Hiroshima confirmed it. On the morning of 7 August Suzuki and Togo conferred and then reported the news to the Emperor, stating that this was the time to accept the Potsdam Declaration. The military side still however could not make up their minds to accept it.
These differences continued to be examined and hope of favorable word from Russia had been all but abandoned when very early in the morning of 9 August the news arrived that Russia had declared war. Although considerable pessimism had prevailed regarding the outcome of the negotiations, the Government was not prepared for war with the Soviets, nor the military capable of any effective counter-plan. Suzuki calculated that he had a choice of resigning or taking immediate positive action, which could be either declaring war on Russia and continuing until the whole Nation was destroyed or accepting the Potsdam Declaration.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/JapansStruggle/index.html
I have.
It wasn’t impressive.
Common sense alone tells us that the Japanese were hardly likely to leave crack units and top troops facing the USSR where there was no fighting there from 1941-45 when they were fighting for their lives and nation elsewhere. They didn’t leave them there. They sucked the guts out of the Kwantung Army and left it a shell of poor troops with little support by the time the USSR attacked. I’m not diminishing the excellent planning and execution of the Soviet attack, but it wasn’t an equal fight by any means.
Surprise was the essential element in the Soviet
offensive plan. [12-37] The Russians successfully deployed
30 divisions to western Manchuria without Japanese
awareness. [10-1] Deception and surprise was achieved by
heavy reliance upon night movement, utilization of assembly
areas far removed from the border and simple but strict
measures such as instructing senior Soviet officers to not
wear rank insignia and to use assumed names.[10-1] The 6th
Guards Tank Army left all tanks, self-propelled artillery
and vehicles behind in Czechoslovakia and picked up new
equipment manufactured in Soviet Ural factories. [7-52]
This extraordinary effort resulted in the Soviet Union’s
ability to field a force in the Far East comprised of 11
combined-arms armies, one tank army and three air armies.
Thus, without discovery by the Japanese at the start of war
with Japan, the Russian Army fielded 1,577,725 men, 26,137
guns and mortars, and 5,556 tanks and self-propelled
artillery pieces. [9-62] The Air Force possessed 3,800
aircraft while the Soviet Navy (Pacific Fleet and Amur River
flotilla) had distinct superiority on the seas (600 fighting
ships as touted by Gorelov) and an additional 1500 A/C. [l2-
38] This vast array of men and arms gave the Russians a
2.2:1 ratio advantage in men, 4.8:1 in artillery and tanks
and a 2:1 advantage in aircraft. [10-29]
The threat which kept 40 Soviet divisions, including
two tank divisions, from the European front was the
Kwangtung Army. In existence since 1919, the Kwangtung Army
was more than 1 million men strong in early 1941. [10-25]
Manchuria represented the breadbasket and military warehouse
for the Japanese armed forces. However, as the Allied
effort in the Pacific war intensified, the Japanese Imperial
General Headquarters began to withdraw elite divisions from
the Kwantury Army to counter the Allied threat elsewhere.
By early 1943, the Japanese had approximately 600,000 troops
protecting Manchuria against an estimated 750,000 Soviet
troops deployed on its borders. [18-11] Approaching the end
of 1944, this former vanguard of Japanese military prowess
found its strength reduced half again from its number in
December 1942. [18-118] The Japanese Army was short in more
than manpower. They were severely deficient in aircraft,
engineer support, communications and armor. What few tanks
the Japanese did possess were armed with 57mm guns and were
grossly overmatched by the Soviet T-34’s.
The day of 7 March 1945, saw the complete annihilation
of Japanese forces on Iwo Jima and brought the Allies closer
to the Japanese homeland. Japanese Imperial General
Headquarters (IGHQ) issued orders on 15 March 1945, which
withdrew all remaining elite divisions from Manchuria to the
homeland and included two divisions on the border. This
also removed the Kwantung Army’s 1st Tank Division, the last
armor division in Manchuria. [18-125) The result left the
Kwantung Army a mere shadow of its former self (its most
seasoned division was formed only as late as the spring of
1944). [9-63]
This drain on the strength of the Kwangtung Army
required a drastic change in the defense plan against the
Soviet Union. The Japanese formerly planned to defend along
the northern and eastern Manchurian border areas, the
expected Russian avenue of approach. They believed the
western approaches to be untrafficable to any sizeable
Soviet formation due to the vast Mongolian desert and the
natural barrier of the Grand Khinghan Mountains.
Accordingly, the Japanese had 17 fortified areas covering
the assumed approaches into Manchuria over a 1,000 kilometer
stretch in the northern and eastern border regions. [12-37]
Due to the extreme reduction in strength and armaments,
the Kwangtung Army adopted a new operations plan in May
1945. It called for a delaying action along the border,
withdrawal to subsequent prepared defensive lines and
finally to a stronghold area in southeastern Manchuria for a
final defensive action approximately 650 kilometers from the
northern and western borders. [10-34]
The Kwangtung Army believed that the terrain, long
distances involved and determined Japanese resistance would
weaken the attacking Soviet forces by the time they reached
the final defensive positions and their advance would be
stopped and possibly subjected to a decisive counterattack.
In this plan only one-third of the Japanese Army would be
positioned on the border and the remainder deployed in
depth. [10-34]
In order to prevent the Russians from discovering their
alarming weakness in Manchuria, the Kwangtung Army mobilized
reservists and new recruits to form new divisions and
brigades to maintain the appearance of a formidable fighting
force. In early July 1945, the Kwangtung Army was expanded
from 11 infantry divisions to more than 24 divisions.
Unfortunately for the Kwangtung Army, more than one-fourth
of its entire combat force was mobilized only ten days prior
to the Soviet offensive (8 of 24 divisions and 7 of 9
brigades). [4-63] One of two very weak tank brigades was
not formed until July 1945, and both brigades were far
removed in south central Manchuria. [9-63]
The Japanese IGHQ and Kwangtung Army had not heeded the
lessons learned at Nomonhan. In the Summer of 1945, their
army had no artillery larger than 75 mm, few tanks, no
rockets, nor any modern anti-tank weapons. The newly formed
149th Infantry Division did not have a single piece of
artillery in its possession when war commenced! [9-63]
Ammunition and weapons were in such short supply the
Japanese resorted to arming soldiers with bamboo spears.
[18-154] Of the 24 divisions in the Kwangtung Army, the
Japanese themselves rated only seven or eight to be combat
effective. [9-63] In fact, eight of their infantry
divisions were rated at being only 15% combat effective
while all nine independent mixed brigades were rated at 15%
combat effectiveness or less. [18-161]
By August 1945, the Kwantury Army had pieced together a
combat force of 1,155 tanks, 5,360 guns and 1,800 aircraft,
most obsolete. Discounting Japanese forces in South
Sakhalin, Korea and the Kuriles, the Soviets faced an
inexperienced army totalling little more than 710,000 men.
[10-29]
In May 1945, the Japanese commenced their unit
redeployments and construction of fortifications and
barriers to conform with the new defense plan. [18-134] The
Japanese problem and “Achilles heel” was simply that their
troop redeployments and military construction projects were
underway and incomplete when the Russians attacked on 9
August 1945.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1986/RMF.htm
I do not get it… When you talk about possible invasion of Japan by US you clame enormous losses could be inflicted to the Americans due to ferosiousness of the Japanese fighters.
But when you are talking about the best regular Army that the Japanese had left, you say “was unable to defend itself”.
So on the islands japanese showed hell to US marines, but in Manchuria they were sissies? Are there different breeds of Japanese available?
Contradictione muy grande!
Where did I say anything about the
best regular Army that the Japanese had left
facing the Soviets. Or anyone?
The Kwantung Army facing the USSR weren’t sissies, but they were generally very poor troops with lousy artillery, armour and air support. Because the best of everything had been drawn off them for years to fight the real war s in the Pacific and Burma theatres, and then at the end their remaining strengths were pulled out to defend the home islands.
The Soviets, during the few days they fought the Japanese, never faced Japanese troops of anything like the quality and support that the Americans and Australians faced from mid-1942 to the end of the war in the POA and SWPA, nor anything like the quality that the British faced in Malaya in 1941-42 and Burma 1941-45, or that the Dutch faced in the NEI 1941-42. Nor did the Americans, Australians, British or Dutch every have anything remotely like the military, territorial or logistical advantages the Soviets had against the Kwantung Army.
As I said earlier, I’m not trying to diminish the great success of the very brief Soviet engagement with Japan, but it wasn’t anything like what the other Allies had been doing for several years beforehand, nor did it contribute a great deal to the defeat of Japan.
I don’t recall saying anything about that, either.
I’ve based my opinions on what the Allies, which in this case is really the Americans, estimated as losses because that is what encouraged them to use the atom bombs.
Just to clarify that point about Japan being unable to defend itself, I was referring to the Soviet attack in the dying minutes of the war against Japan.
So far as defeating Japan goes, it ranks roughly with someone watching a bloke get the shit kicked out of him by a big gang until he’s unconscious and moments away from bleeding to death, and then running in and giving the victim a kick in the head and claiming responsiblity for his death.
egorka,
you seem to think that somehow the condition of the kwantung army is a corolation with how much the japanese people would have resisted the allied invasion of the home islands. the japanese people have a history of resisting invasions with every resourse availiable,whether military or civilians.every person possible was mobilized to resist the 2 attempts by the mongols to invade.
what we are stating is the fact that the kwantung army was a paper tiger by the end of the war and no match for the soviets that rolled through it in the closing days of the war.the reason the emperor surrendered the nation was to prevent the destruction of the japanese nation by either A-bomb or invasion.the last few days before the surrender saw a junta of nationalistic officers actually attempt a coup of sorts to prevent the surrender by trying to make the emperor a captive in his palace,and not make the announcement he had recorded.they saw it as a greater shame to surrender and save the people then to have the nation sacrifice itself against the allies.luckily they were stopped by retainers loyal to the emperor who hid the recording and got it into the hands of the right people to get it broadcast…
oh, and thanks for the backup info rising sun…with 2 jobs i just didn’t have time to find the background info…lol…
Semper fi. 
Even if we’re not Marines.
This current thread is related
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?p=100196&posted=1#post100196
Right. I agree it was like that. The main reason USSR joined in was to secure its interests. The minor reason ws also that the were obliged to do it 90 days after the Germany’s capitulation and USA actually wanted them to do it (remember the our Potsdam discussion).
But I also guess that you can kind of see at least a tiny reason in that some Soviet/Russian peope say the same thing about western front in Europe.
I am not claming that USSR did any very sizeable impact on the defeat of Japan if we look at the whole was period, though USSR inpact at the moment it joint the war was very significant. Japan was practicaly defeated. Japan had only chance if they could hold Manchuria. Because it was practicaly the only source of many crusial raw materials. And even then it was too weak. Maybe Japanese could try some political intrigue or something. But! It is absolutely another thing when it comes to the specific battle where RKKA crushed Kwantung army.
My main message is that Kwantung army lost not because it was weak, but because RKKA was strong. Essentially RKKA defeated a normal regular Japanese army, which was NOT worse than that fighting on the islands against Americans. And before you start arguing with me lets settle the first bit in this equation: see the next post
Ok , guys! Savoy6 and Rising Sun!
Before we start talking about the strenght of the force that oposed RKKA in Manchuria in August 1945, lets settle one thing.
The question:
Do you agree that the Kwantung army was mentaly set to fight until the end, just like they did on the islands and just like they would do it in case of the Japan’s invasion?
If possible keep you answers short… Just to keep the pace…