M-27 Tank: Should the US Have Replaced the M4 Sherman?

World War II American Military
#1

Designed from the T-20 prototypes, the US Army Ordinance Dept. had a ready replacement for the Sherman that was already beginning to show it limitations. The M-27 had sloping armor, mounted a 76mm higher velocity gun putting it roughly on par with the T-34…

The M27

With their 76mm guns, torsion bar suspension and low silhouettes, the T20E3 and T23E3 were roughly comparable to the Russian T34, and the German Panzer IV so, on the basis that the M4 was becoming obsolete, the Ordnance Department requested the T23E3 and the T20E3 be standardised as the M27 and M27B1 in July 1943. However, the request was rejected and neither design was ever mass produced.

The reason for this lay partly in the decision of the Army Ground Forces command (AGF) not to act upon the growing obsolesence of the M4 design. The Sherman had performed admirably in North Africa and Italy so there was no sense of urgency to replace it. German Tigers had already been encountered by this time, but only in small number and the AGF did not expect to see them fielded in quantity.

Additionally, the AGF declined to adopt the M27 as they did not wish to interrupt M4 production, although by 1943 the manufacture of M4’s had reached such a mammoth scale it seems unlikely that a staged switch over to M27 production would have significantly reduced tank output. Perhaps also of significance the M27 would have mounted the 76 mm gun, the introduction of which to the tank force was opposed by the AGF. The Ordnance Department would later suffer almost equal difficulty convincing the AGF to accept the upgunned versions of the Sherman with the net result that not a single 76 mm armed Sherman was in service in time for D-Day, even though they could have been available months earlier. The AGF’s reason for rejecting the 76 mm gun was that it would encourage tank crews to stalk enemy tanks, an idea in conflict with then current US armour doctrine, and had a much less effective high explosive shell than the 75mm M3 Gun. The 76mm and 90mm guns were both accepted much more readily into the Tank Destroyer service, however US tanks would not always be able to avoid direct confrontations with German tanks and the shortcomings of the 75mm M3 gun against armour would handicap American tanks for much of the war.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T20_Medium_Tank

The M-27 would ultimately evolve into the M-26E3 Pershing Tank, with a more powerful gun and thicker armor…

#2

I think the should’ve just because of the fact the Tiger and the 88 gun the Sherman didn’t have a chance but maybe this may of had a bit more of a chance to survive

#3

That wasn’t the US doctrine at the time, tank VS tank.

#4

Just found these that might show some light either way:

Combined Arms Research Library: Kasserine Pass

Combined Arms Research Library:Army Doctrine 1938-1945

#5

Good stuff! Thanks for the read! :mrgreen:

#6

it sure would have saved alot of lives of tank crews but could these be produced as fast as the sherman?, there would be a brief period of time after switching production from the M-4 to the new model, but that means that for a very short period of time there would not only be a shortage of shermans for a while, but there wouldnt be any new of these new, improved tanks better, so the US would be sacrificing quality AND quantity

#7

First note that there were hundreds of production changes in the M4 Sherman series. Some wereas great as the difference between cast upper hulls and welded hulls. Several completely different turrets were fitted. All of these changes had their effect on slowing production.

If you get hold of Hunnicutts book on the M26 Pershing Tank you will find detailed information on the components of the entire T20 thru T26 series. Nearly everything in the T20 & T23 was compatible with the older M4. Same basic engine, same track parts, same motors for turning the turret. One of the turret designs for this series was used on the M4 with the 76mm gun. The only fundamental difference between the M4 & T20 was in the hull or chassis. It was a completely new design, derived from observations of destroyed tanks in Africa in 1942. A lower sillouete, better side armor, better ammo storage. Changing over hull production would have been the only significant manufactoring change.

#8

Excellent points. And I think the link states that with overall production of the M-4 in 1943, little disruption would have been noticed…

#9

Although the Sherman was not as good a tank as the Pershing, or others of its type, there was a problem with supply. Not just of component parts, (those not common between the two vehicles,) but of transport. While rail cars should carry either one, the ships that carried the things were designed & set up to carry Shermans, and the other such vehicles that went with them. The loading plans for ships were very detailed, and took a long time to configure (development stage) It may have been too difficult for the shipyards to re-configure for the pershing, and its equipment, different ammo, all of that. It seems a trivial point, but that may have bearing on why the T-20 types took so long to get into the war.Just a thought.

#10

I think it should be clarified that the M-27 is similar too, and of the same DNA as, the M-26E1 Pershing. In fact he M-27 was almost a mini-Pershing that was lighter and could have gone anyplace the M-4 did. The Pershing was just an up-armored, slightly larger version with a bigger gun. A much bigger gun. The M-27 was pretty close to a T-34 in most other respects…

The Pershing was ready for the War by August of 1944 in truth, but was rejected by the US Army Ground Forces Command despite several complaints that the Tank destroyers, while useful vehicles, were not up to par and the idea of using them to “stalk” panzers was simply impractical when on the offensive and commanders tended to find other uses for them. I think someone referred to them as the “US Army’s most successful failure” although the M-36 Jackson “Slugger” served on into Korea…

#11

The problem with the T-23 was it’s troublesome electrical drive system and wasn’t ready for production. The T-25 was the better choice with a more conventional drive system and was essentially a t-26 with 1 inch less armor. In my opinion the better option was adapting the 90mm M3 tank gun for the M4.

#12

yeah good point i didn’t realize that,

#13

I think,. Sherman would do just fine,… few heavy’s might be good,. but Allied won’t won the war without Sherman,…

let those Motor Carriages with their 9incher knock off those panza,…

#14

The Americans had no major need to replace the Sherman since the Allies had air superiority. Tigers slowing troops down? No problem, they can order a tank buster air strike.

The only Allied tank that could really take a Tiger on was the Soviet T-34, yet the Allies were not really cowering in fear on the Western front.

#15

Somewhat true, but the tiger really wasn’t the main problem since there were less than 100 operational at any one time in Normandy. The Sherman’s high profile and overall exposure of side armor above the tracks made it quite a tempting target for infantry with panzerfausts. And even the far more numerous Pzkpfw IVs, long since upgunned (with the long barreled 75mm) and armored went from being an inferior tank to the Sherman to a much better one. Then of course, the Panther was simply in a different class…

The only Allied tank that could really take a Tiger on was the Soviet T-34, yet the Allies were not really cowering in fear on the Western front.

Not really. The supposed T-34 kill ratio to German tanks (11:1) was even greater than the Sherman’s…And the improved Sherman (M-4A3E8) “Easy Eight” was pretty much equal to the T-34s (76) used by the Chinese and North Koreans during that War…

#16

Where have yo got that “supposed kill ratio” ?
According you ratio soviets should lost all their tanks 4-5 times during the war:)?
It seems you rather underestimate the M4 Sherman gentlemens.
This was enough effective medium tank , the some of modification (like Firefly) could be used succesfully agains germans tanks Panthers and T-IV.
I think that the serious replacing of the basis Medium tank during the total war- this inevetably would had the bad consequences for mass production.Neither Americans , nor Soviets did it.And this was absolutly right.
We have the one excellent example- Germany.
That’s right , they had fully developed from zero and creted the absolutly new kind of HEavy tank Tiger and half-heavy Panther.( with Great figures of lacks initially)
And what?
Since the 1942 till the end of the war they made ONLY 1250 of Tiger all of modification ( 1/2) and about 6 000 of Pantheres:)
This is NOTHING in comparition with over 35 000 of Shermans and over 50 000 of T-34 all of modifications that were prodused during the entire war.
Do not forget the mass production is the first condition to win the war.
So although some of GErmans crew could destroy the fantastic figures of allies tanks ( especially from ambush) - the Germans tanks armies lost strategic advantage i the end.

#17

That’s why I said “supposed” as these things have been exaggerated, including the supposed 5:1 kill ratio of panzers over the Sherman, for the reasons you correctly mention. I was only illustrating a point, that the exposure of maneuver warfare led to German tanks essentially picking off Allied tanks as a sniper would shoot up exposed infantry. Never-the-less, exposed T-34s maneuvering on the offense, where going to take losses higher than they could inflict…

It seems you rather underestimate the M4 Sherman gentlemens.
This was enough effective medium tank , the some of modification (like Firefly) could be used succesfully agains germans tanks Panthers and T-IV.

I agree that the improved Shermans were more than a match for the vast majority of the actual German AFVs on the battlefield, including the PzIVs. And of course the Red Army was the beneficiary of the upgunned US 76mm variant…

The M-27 design, as evidenced with the heavier, but very similar hull-layout, of the Pershing which lowered the hull flush with the tracks giving the crew better protection from side shots. US production would not have really suffered much as most of the components (aside from the hull) were pretty much identical to the Sherman. And even the numerous, mostly political and bureaucratic, obstructions to the Pershing development, over 2500 were still produced by the end of the War showing that the Allies could still eclipse Germany in armored production, even with newer designs…

I think that the serious replacing of the basis Medium tank during the total war- this inevetably would had the bad consequences for mass production.Neither Americans , nor Soviets did it.And this was absolutly right.

You may have an argument here. But the M-27 was still a medium tank about the size and class of the T-34. And an orderly, phased over production would have resulted in little, if any real, loss of production.

In addition, variants of the Sherman would have been continued to have been produced on a limited basis for infantry support and where they were more ideally suited after 1943: The Pacific Theater of Operations…

We have the one excellent example- Germany.
That’s right , they had fully developed from zero and creted the absolutly new kind of HEavy tank Tiger and half-heavy Panther.( with Great figures of lacks initially)
And what?
Since the 1942 till the end of the war they made ONLY 1250 of Tiger all of modification ( 1/2) and about 6 000 of Pantheres:)

This is true, but again, only part of the picture. The Tiger was around in concept since about 1937(?) and the Panther was an unnecessarily equivalent of the T-34. Part of the problem was the great complexity of these tanks. Another problem is that the Germany never completely switched over to a War economy until 1942, and the disruptions in production by Allied bombing, the resulting problems brought by dispersion of production, confused, duplicate design programs, and the use of obstinate slave labor also combined to hinder German war production…

This is NOTHING in comparition with over 35 000 of Shermans and over 50 000 of T-34 all of modifications that were prodused during the entire war.
Do not forget the mass production is the first condition to win the war.
So although some of GErmans crew could destroy the fantastic figures of allies tanks ( especially from ambush) - the Germans tanks armies lost strategic advantage i the end.

I agree overall with your points on this, but they are not in anyway necessarily relevant to the introduction of newer, better models as it would have been a blip in US production.

#18

Hello Chevan,
Inaccurate figure there.:idea:
It is, as far as I know :1300 Tiger 1’s Plus 485 Tiger 2’s
which gives a figure of 1785 Tigers of both versions.
The 6000 Panther figure is, as far as I know, 5985 excluding the Panther 2 and Panther F prototypes, so I’m not debating your figure, there.

As to Germany having lost the strategic advantage I somewhat agree.

As to the viability of replacing the M4 medium with the M7 medium tank, I see no real reason it should not have been done, as self-propelled howizers such as the M7 Priest were available in reasonable numbers for bunker-busting etc. and could easily have been employed in that role, much as the Soviet army employed its’ SU series AFV’s for the same role, though the SU’s had the advantage of being employable against tanks also.

It therefore would not have cost the USA much in operational terms, to make the change to the M7 medium tank. The point elsewhere made in this thread about having to reconfigure the transport ships, while fair, is a little misleading, since such ships were based on deck area a cargo occupied, and had multiple chain anchoring points grouped between and around each specific vehicle location.
The “square areas” occupied by a Sherman and an M7 medium would have been identical, within inches.

Regards, Uyraell.

#19

Perhaps the reason for sticking with the Sherman was simply because the Sherman perfectly fit the role of what a tank was supposed to do by the U.S. doctrine of the time. The new tank would have better filled the grey area between a tanks job of infantry support and a tank destroyers role of engaging enemy tanks. With the benefit of hindsight we can clearly see that a tank to fill the role between the Sherman and the tank destroyers was exactly what the U.S. needed but that would have also required a complete overhaul of training doctrine for armored warfare. Perhaps the high command didn’t want to go through all that in the middle of a war that they were already winning. It is tragic for many brave tank crews but throughout history high commands have usually been very reserved about changing doctrine, especially when the current doctrine is succeeding.

#20

Inclined to agree.
Though I am glad you drew the distinctions you did, in your post.
Yes, the US Army was winning that war, but doing so despite the doctrine as regards the employment of armour, rather than because of that doctrine.
As regards revising a doctrine in the middle of a war, I certainly agree that it is a thing rarely done, even if it should be.

Regards, Uyraell.