Could Normandy invasion have been successful without total Allied air superiority?
Germans lost a lot of men and material because of Allied aircrafts, and they limited the moving speed of german units to 2-10% of normal, and they directed artillery fire to be efficient, and so on.
Without aerial superiority Allied ground forces would have faced significantly more battles (against better supplied germans - ammo usually helps to stop invasion ;-D), and germans would have been able to move their units much much more quickly to the front and build more pressure early on.
Remembering how difficult things like taking Caen were even with total air control, it’s hard to believe allies could have advanced without airpower… at least not quickly.
But it’s also difficult to see germans pushing Allied back to the sea (naval artillery, etc).
To answer your question, no.
there were only 2 german fighter planes that did fly over the beaches in the morning of the landing, and they didn’t stay for long…
Interesting fact : the film shot by one of the plane (gun cam ?) survived the war. I saw it at the Caen memorial. It was showed side by side with another film, made by an allied war correspondant. So you had the view from the air and from the beach at the same moment.
I dunno. By late 1943, the US and Commonwealth forces were near air supremacy anyways. And even where they hadn’t had air superiority, North Africa and in the Italian campaign, German air power gradually waned and there was minimal damage inflicted on the invasion fleets…
But I’m not sure the Luftwaffe would have been terribly more effective in stopping the onslaught of the RAF & USAAF in direct support if they had a few more fighters; one could even make the argument that the onslaught would almost inevitably given the Allies a measure of air superiority as the Luftwaffe actually had a banner aircraft production year in 1944. The only real question is would a few more competent and even killer-ace German pilots have been around to do some damage…
In fact, I’m going to post something about this later on in the Bomber Harris thread (about the Allied “direct support to armies” concept that the air generals had to virtually be ordered by Eisenhower, on the advice of Air Marshal Tedders, to implement, that is)…
It’s impossible to say for certain that an invasion of France in 1943 would have failed. But without complete mastery of the air [which was not achieved till 1944] specialised landing craft, etc, it is difficult to see how an opposed landing, attempted by inexperienced American troops and commanders, would have been possible. What made Overlord [or “Roundup” as it was then called] impossible in 1943 was the demands of operation Torch in '42/43. In other words, it was either one or the other. An invasion of France in '43 would have meant no Torch in '42. So a D Day in 1943 would have been the first meeting of American and German ground forces – and bearing in mind the American experience at Kasserine, this might very easily have been a disaster
And even if the Allies DID establish a beachhead in France in 1943, there seems to be no reason to assume that this would necessarily have won the war any sooner or any more cheaply than the strategy that was employed. The assumption seems to be that the war would somehow just automatically end one year after the invasion of France – i.e. if you move this one event forward then everything else would have been moved forward as well. Very convenient, but is there really any basis for such an assumption? By 1943 the Second World War had become a great war of attrition. The German Army still had to be beaten, and it was considerably stronger in 1943 than it was a year later, following further crippling losses in Russia, in North Africa, and Italy. Would a reduced Allied invasion force have made rapid progress against the much stronger German [and Italian for that matter] forces? It seems doubtful to me. How long might the Allies have been restricted to their beachhead in these circumstances? It is easy to imagine Roundup having turned into a campaign very similar to that which emerged in Italy [or perhaps Anzio would be a better analogy], only on a larger scale. In all likelihood it seems that a Second Front in France in '43 would probably have got bogged down and turned into a prolonged war of attrition similar to what was happening on the Eastern Front.
Industrial capacity is not immediately convertible into military strength. The Americans needed time to build up and train their forces before they could hope to engage the full weight of the German Army in France. North Africa, Sicily and Italy offered theatres where they could meet the Axis forces on roughly equal terms, gain valuable experience and divert German forces from the Eastern Front [and later from France.] At the same time, by 1944 Italy had clearly become a strategic dead end, and the Americans were probably absolutely right to have made the British stick to Overlord.
The air superiority was not just a single advantage of allies in Normandy.
The Germans had the lack of fuel and ammos also.
The one of the critical part of supposed Germans succes was to capture the Allies stores with fuel( this has not happaned).
So even having the air parity the GErman’s Plan has been risky and vulnerable.
From the pure military sense the whole Italian compain of 1943 was just losing the time.
This did not bring the GErmans serious damage, even has not reach the any other aims exept pure political.
The already almost dead Italians army ( who was one of the most worst Axis army- as it has been demonstrated in the Eastern front , Stalingrad).
From military poin the Allies lost whole Year in Italy - without any profit for our anti-germans fight.( except the distraction of couple divisions from the Eastern front).
What did they do there? Improved their combat experience and wait when they would reach the air superiority?
This year let GErmans additional time to mobilize its economy ( even creat the principal new kind of wearpons)
I do not even tell about one sad fact - most of victims of Germans dead-camps have been “delivered” and later exterminated during the LAST YEAR of war, since mid 1944.
Yes this was “plan of CHurchill” - to invade the Italy from the South.
Later the even relatively small germans forces have stoped the Allies in the mountains.
Till the almost end of war the allies in Italy has reached nothig.They simply stoped here and wited till the 1945.
Genious plan:)
The same “Genious plan of Churchill” was to Invide the Balcans from the South:)
Where the allies should meet the 45 Turkey’s division , joining the allied side.
This plan has been losed absolutly - when the Red Army captured just few areas of Northern balcans- the GErmans were in the pocket from both side ( one side the Ugoslavian partisans in the forests- from othe side the soviet troops in the North).
Churchill believed a quick invasion of Italy “underbelly of Europe” might hasten an Italian surrender and produce quick military victories over the German troops that could be trapped fighting in a hostile country. However, things didn’t go quite to plan.
At the time it was launched, the campaign probably looked like the best, and maybe only, option for the Allies. It was another case of what looks easy on the map isn’t so easy on the ground, and there was also that awkward factor of WWII - the Germans.
But, at the very least, it did knock Italy out of the war, made Mediterranean sea routes secure, created a latent threat to the German position in the Balkans [another 20 or so div’s] and southern France, and made the Mediterranean an Allied lake, kept about 27 German divisions busy, [including pulling experienced div’s away from Kursk] and cost them about 250,000 casualties, provided bases for the U.S. 15th Air Force in Italy to operate strategic bombing campaigns around Europe, such as at Romanian transportation hubs, French harbours, and German factories.
Well i’ve heard the attack of southern Italy wasn’t a single plan for the allies after capturing of Sicily.
The other perspective was to land in Nothern-west Italy coast- this could creat much more threat for GErmans.
But the attack of South was more light and obvious for the allies command.
But, at the very least, it did knock Italy out of the war, made Mediterranean sea routes secure, created a latent threat to the German position in the Balkans [another 20 or so div’s] and southern France, and made the Mediterranean an Allied lake, kept about 27 German divisions busy, [including pulling experienced div’s away from Kursk] and cost them about 250,000 casualties, provided bases for the U.S. 15th Air Force in Italy to operate strategic bombing campaigns around Europe, such as at Romanian transportation hubs, French harbours, and German factories.
Well you right
Althout the landing in southern Italy had no any influence to the Kursk battle ( the Battle of Kursh has been finished in Jule , and the Invasion to the Italy has been just started in september).
German actually withdrew about two or one divisions from a Kursk in summer 1943( as i remember it was the Das Raich or Great GErmany)- this was a not so critical for the 30 of divisions that have been already stopped near Belgorod and Orel in jule of 1943.
During the later period - NO one division has not been withdrew from the Eastern front ( even during the operation Goblet)
Beside Germans very succesfull RESISTED in the Italy having 8 times less strenght. They fought almost 8 mounth in the fortified areas of Mountains.
As to Balcans, vell don’t forget those 20 div’s was already busy by the fought with a partisans, so they were already out of combats actions of Both Fronts:Eastern and Western.
The only one positive moment was that after capturing of Sicily allies could start the strategic bombings of the Romanians oil fields in Ploeshti.But again - the Southern Italy has nothing to it.
I agree that it makes sense. But some of the argument for an earlier expedition into France entails that fact that although the Allies were not nearly as powerful as they would be in 1944, the German defenses in the Western (Atlantic) Wall were also far weaker, and it was the failures to quickly wrap up the Afrika Korp in Tunisia which really prevented the Allies from getting into France sooner…
Also, keep in mind, although the source states that the German Army was more powerful in 1943 than it was in 1944, this seems somewhat unlikely as it was on towards the end of 1943 (and amplified in 1944) that the Wehrmacht began to reap the fruits of the recently transformed full German War economy as production soared, and newer weapons came online…
But the US bears much of the blame, as had they fought more completely and dispensed with unrealistic doctrines (the Tank Destroyer Doctrine) sooner, more pressure could have been put on the British command of Brooke and Churchill to deemphasize the Mediterranean Strategy…
July 9/10, the Western Allies mounted the invasion of Sicily.
Three days later, Hitler summoned von Kluge and von Manstein to his Wolfsschanze headquarters in East Prussia and declared his intention to “temporarily” call off Operation Zitadelle, and trasfere Panzer Korps to Italy. Von Manstein attempted to dissuade him, arguing that he could still cause major damage to Sov’s reserves.
In any event, only one German division, 1st SS Panzer Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, departed for Italy without their equipment, the others remaining behind in the USSR to try and stem the Soviet counteroffensive launched in the wake of the failed German offensive.
Is it just me, or are we slightly off thread ‘‘Normandy invasion successful without Allied air superiority?’’
