Operation Downfall: The Invasion that never happened.

I think a thread on this topic is needed if the atomic bombings are to be examined…

The Story of the Invasion of Japan
by James M. Davis

Deep in the recesses of the National Archives in Washington, D. C., hidden for over four decades, lie thousands of pages of yellowing and dusty documents. These documents, which are now declassified, still bear the stamp “Top Secret.” Contained in these little examined documents are the detailed plans for “Operation Downfall,” the code name for the scheduled American Invasion of Japan.

Only a few Americans in 1945, and fewer Americans today, are aware of the elaborate plans that had been prepared for the American Invasion of the Japanese home islands. Even few are aware of how close America actually came to launching that invasion and of what the Japanese had in store for us had the invasion of Japan actually been launched.
“Operation Downfall” was prepared in its final form during the spring and summer of 1945. This plan called for two massive military undertakings to be carried out in succession, and aimed at the very heart of the Japanese Empire.

In the first invasion, in what was code named “Operation Olympic,” American combat troops would be landed by amphibious assault during the early morning hours of November 1, 1945, on Japan itself. After an unprecedented naval and aerial bombardment, 14 combat divisions of American soldiers and marines would land on heavily fortified and defended Kyushu, the southernmost of the Japanese home islands.

On March 1, 1946, the second invasion code named “Operation Coronet,” would send at least 22 more American combat divisions against one million Japanese defenders to assault the main island of Honshu and the Tokyo Plain in a final effort to obtain the unconditional surrender of Japan.

With the exception of a part of the British Pacific Fleet, “Operation Downfall” was to be a strictly American operation. It called for the utilization of the entire United States Marine Corps, the employment of the entire United States Navy in the Pacific, and for the efforts of the 7th Air Force, the 8th Air Force recently deployed from Europe, the 20th Air Force, and for the American Far Eastern Air Force. Over 1.5 million combat soldiers, with millions more in support, would be directly involved in these two amphibious assault. A total of 4.5 million American servicemen, over 40% of all servicemen still in uniform in 1945, were to be a part of “Operation Downfall.”

The invasion of Japan was to be no easy military undertaking and casualties were to be extremely heavy. Admiral William Leahy estimated that there would be over 250,000 Americans killed or wounded on Kyushu alone. General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur’s Chief of Intelligence estimated that American casualties from the entire operation would be one million men by the fall of 1946. General Willoughby’s own Intelligence staff considered this to be a conservative estimate.

During the summer of 1945, America had little time to prepare for such a monumental endeavor, but our top military leaders were in almost unanimous agreement that such an invasion was necessary. While a naval blockade and strategic bombing of Japan was considered to be useful, general Douglas Mac Arthur considered a naval blockade of Japan ineffective to bring about an unconditional surrender. General George C. Marshall was of the opinion that air power over Japan as it was over Germany, would not be sufficient to bring and end to the war. While most of our top military minds believed that a continued naval blockade and strategic bombing campaign would further weaken Japan, few of them believed that the blockade or the bombing would bring about her unconditional surrender. The advocates for invasion agreed that while a naval blockade chokes, it does not kill; and though strategic bombing might destroy cities, it still leaves whole armies intact. Both general Eisenhower and General Ira C. Eaker, the Deputy Commander of the Army Air Force agreed. So on May 25, 1945, the combined Chiefs of Staff, after extensive deliberation, issued to MacArthur, to Admiral Chester Nimitz, and to Army Air Force “Hap” Arnold the Top Secret directive to proceed with the invasion of Kyushu. The target date was set, for obvious reasons after the typhoon season, for November 1, 1945.

On July 25th, President Harry Truman approved the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which called for the initiation of Operations “Olympic” and “Coronet.” On July 26th, the United Nations issued the Potsdam Proclamation, which called upon Japan to surrender unconditionally or face “total destruction.” Three days later, on July 28th, DOMEI, the Japanese Government news agency, broadcast to the world that Japan would ignore the proclamation of Potsdam and refuse to surrender.

During this same time period, the intelligence section of the Federal Communications Commission monitored internal Japanese radio broadcasts, which disclosed that Japan had closed all schools to mobilize its school children–it was arming its civilian population and forming it into national civilian defense units, and that it was turning Japan into a nation of fortified caves and underground defenses in preparation for the expected invasion of their homeland.

“Operation Olympic,” the invasion of Kyushu would come first. Its purpose was to seize and control the southern one third of that island and to establish American naval and air bases there in order to effectively intensify the bombings of Japanese industry, to tighten the naval blockade of the home islands, to destroy units of the main Japanese army, and to support “Coronet” the scheduled invasion of the Toyko Plain, that was to come the following March.

On October 27th, the preliminary invasion would begin when the 40th Infantry Division would land on a series of small islands to the west and southwest of Kyushu. At the same time, the 158th Regimental Combat Team would invade and occupy a small island 29 miles to the south of Kyushu. On these islands, seaplane bases would be established and radar would would be set up to provide advance warning for the invasion fleet, to serve as fighter direction centers for the carrier based aircraft and provide emergency anchorage for the invasion fleet, should things not go well on the day of the invasion.

As the invasion grew imminent, the massive power of the United States Navy would approach Japan. The naval forces scheduled to take part in the actual invasion consisted of two awesome fleets–the Third and the fifth.

The Third Fleet, under Admiral “Bull” Halsey, with its big guns and naval aircraft, would provide strategic support for the operation against Honshu and Hokkaido in order to impede the movement of Japanese reinforcements south to Kyushu. The Third Fleet would be composed of a powerful group of battleships, heavy cruisers, destroyers, dozens of support ships, plus three fast carrier task groups. From these fast carriers, hundreds of Navy fighters, dive bombers and torpedo planes would hit targets all over the island of Honshu.

The Fifth Fleet under Admiral Spruance would carry our invasion troops. This fleet would consist of almost 3,000 ships, including fast carriers and escort carrier task forces, a gunfire and covering force for bombardment and fire support, and a joint expeditionary force. This expeditionary force would include thousands of additional landing craft of all types and sizes. Several days before the invasion, the battleships, heavy cruisers and destroyers would pour thousands of tons of high explosives into the target areas, and they would not cease the bombardment until after the landing forces had been launched.

During the early morning hours of November 1, 1945, the actual invasion would commence. Thousands of American soldiers and marines would pour ashore on beaches all along the eastern, southeastern, southern and western coasts of Kyushu.

The Eastern Assault Force consisting of the 25th, 33rd and the 41st Infantry Divisions, would land near Miyaski at beaches called Austin, Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, Chrysler, and Cord and move inland to attempt to capture this city and its nearby airfield.

The Southern Force consisting of the 1st cavalry Division, the 43rd Division and Americal Division would land inside Ariake Bay at beaches labeled DeSoto, Dusenburg, Essex, Ford, and Franklin and attempt to capture Shibushi and to capture, further inland, the city of Kanoya and its surrounding airfield. On the western shore of Kyushu, at beaches Pontiac, Reo, Rolls Royce, Saxon, Star, Studebaker, Stutz, Winton, and Sephyr, the V Amphibious Corps would land the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Marine Divisions, sending half of its force inland to Sendai and the other half to the port city of Kagoshima.

On November 4th. the reserve force, consisting of the 81st, and 98th Infantry Division, and the 11th Airborne Division, after feigning an attack on the island of Shikoku would be landed, if not needed elsewhere, near Kaimondake, near the southern-most tip of Kagoshima Bay, at beaches designated Locomobile, Lincoln, LaSalle, Hupomobile, Moon, Mercedes, Maxwell, Overland, Packard, and Plymouth.

The objective of “Olympic” was to seize and control the island of Kyushu in order to use it for the launching platform for “Coronet,” which was hoped to be a final blow aimed at Toyko and the Kanto Plain.

The rest here.

Other links:

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_downfall1.html

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/war.term/olympic.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall

http://www.ww2pacific.com/downfal0.html

Wow - what a truely massive endeavour that would have been. Just think of the costs in lives and materiel that would have incurred.

Thankfully the A bombs made it unnecessary.

Thank you, God, for the A-bomb! …Naaaaaat!!!

Thank God we got it before the Nazis or Japanese did…

In anycase, this thread is not directly about the A-bomb, it’s about what could have been…

Excellent post indeed, honorable Mr. Nickdfresh! Truly prolific, intellectually stimulating, and factographically ponderous one. However, I think that the presentation of earlier, already evaluated US military alternatives has to be incorporated in this, beyond doubt, intriguing thread too.

So here you have the first part of genuine US… well, “alternative military solutions” that were proposed either as completely independent military answers toward successful finalization of US war effort, or as auxiliary measures of the previously mentioned operation.

All presented documents are factual reproductions of the original US WWII periodicals.

So here they are:

Starvation of Japan – Newsweek, May 28th 1945; p. 42

Starvation of Japan – Newsweek, May 28th 1945; p. 41

Of course, this is only the fist part of indeed intriguing photo-material I was lucky to find.

BTW: Undeniably the best available presentation of previously mentioned Operation Downfal (as well as numerous other US operations) you will be able to find here:

http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/wwii/MacArthur%20Reports/MacArthur%20V1/index.htm#contents

Other interesting aspects of this operation are also presented here:

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Pearlman/pearlman.asp

And here:

http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/huber2/huber2.asp

I wish you a pleasant further study. I’m sure that we will have another fruitful debate here.:slight_smile:

In the meantime – all the best!

The “War of Attrition” is discussed in the downfall links and had its proponents in the US military/gov’t…

But two factors bear consideration:

A.) A blockade could have caused the War to last into 1948.

B.) “Starving the Japs” may have killed more Japanese via famine and pestilence than the bombings or an invasion…

Oh welcome back dear mr. Librarian.
Nice to see you again:)

This was rather a “speculative” factor.
I heared the oppinion that Japane had to capitulate no later end of 1945 even USSR didn’t joined to the allies.

B.) “Starving the Japs” may have killed more Japanese via famine and pestilence than the bombings or an invasion…

Also rather speculative.
I have already told there not exact facts to support this. This statemen is based only hypotetical supposion of native stupidity and fanatism( which borders on the idiocy) of Japanes.

cheers.

Perhaps, but the US was prepared to the invasion to take years due to seasonal factors. And Japanese capitulation is even more speculative. Even if the Emperor was thinking of capitulation, the Japanese Imperial Army may never have let this happened, as certain factions nearly did not even AFTER THE BOMBINGS! :confused:

Also rather speculative.
I have already told there not exact facts to support this. This statemen is based only hypotetical supposion of native stupidity and fanatism( which borders on the idiocy) of Japanes.

cheers.

What? Starvation and food shortages will not lead to famine and diseases? How am I “stupid?”

What in the world would this have to do with Japanes “fanatism?”

Right Nick BOBBING indeed had a less influence to the Japane desicion for the capitulation. The figures of victims ( after the first week) were even less that after firebombing of Tokio in march of 1945.
The situation had changed in august 1945…
Your point is based that Japane would continie to fight in aug 1945 as fanatic as for Okinava and island till the German capitulation.
You simply ignored some importain factors.
It seems you forgot that after the German capitulation (more correctly after the death of president Rusvelt) the Allies and USSR was not such “friends” as it could be . In fact in may 0f 1945 Churchill ordered to developer operation “Unthinkable”- the possible beginning of total war with USSR. I’m not sure japanes knew about " Untinkable" but certainly Japane intelligence knew about problems inside allies .
If the total war between USSR and US/UK had begin in july of 1945 the Japanese had a GREAT CHANCE to the survive. In this way the most of war US/UK resources were directed against USSR ( and i have no doubt A-bomb would dropped to the USSR).
This situation could force the USSR come to the alliance with Japane - and thus it could be another history way after 1945.
So this way the Japane crazy resistanse till the summer 1945 could be understanging.
They were fanatic and fierced becouse it HAD A SENSE till the USSR joined the war agians Japane. After this the Japanse hopes fall down and it was absolutly clear the Allies with USSR decided to finish them first.
After this the further resistance lost any sense. Becouse a little remaining material supplies from the Manchiria was lost becouse Kvantun Army was quick crashed till the any way. Then would the liberation of China and … the inevitable invasion of USSR to the home islands. For instanse Hokkaido. Why not?Red Army (which landed to the Kuril islands) could it began already in end of september/october of 1945.

What? Starvation and food shortages will not lead to famine and diseases? How am I “stupid?”

Are you “stupid”? :wink:
Mate don’t be too emotional. You are one of my favorite forums opponent , so i’d be very sad if you are “stupid”, “hook-nose” or somebody like ets… :wink:
But i think you’ll agree that Comminust Japane in 1945 could much worst than “starvation and food shortages” or A-bombing for the Imperor. They could lost everything if they will continie to fight.

What in the world would this have to do with Japanes “fanatism?”

Don’t equal please “fanatism” and “idiotism”.

Cheers.

This mythical “story of invasion” is just one of the manies possible war plans which USA developed as a reserve.
Don’t you wish to say Nick that for instance if US have the plan “Dropshot” (the total nuclear distruction of USSR) they must did becouse US just had it?
And who did you say my friend that comrade Stalin would simply see to the american invasion to the home islands and waited when all the Japane will crashed?
I don’t think so. Stalin look forward always. How neatly he used the the allies agreements to join the war against Japane to create the Communist China. (What’s genius :wink: He always thought about future). Well as good as thought Trumen and Churchill.
I think after the capturing the Manchguria and China Red Army certainly would joined to the invasion to the Home islands.
This was a two possible resaults of soviet invasion:
-first, Japane after the war would devided into two part of influence (like Germany was)
-sec, US and USSR simply leaved the Japane after the war. Japane must be the neutral ( like Austria )
Anyway US had a great political lose. They simply extremaly neded to finish this war already in august.
Becouse the lost of political influence in Japane ( together with conninist China) could mean the catastrophe for the US interests in Asia.
Thus those poor japene who lived in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were simply killed for the US politic interests. Nothing is more.

Cheers.

This situation could force the USSR come to the alliance with Japane - and thus it could be another history way after 1945.

Well, this is an interesting point for me, because I was wondering about where did that condition in the “Unthinkable” about USSR alliying with Japan come from. I made no sence for me until now.

So now it seems very possible that in case “Unthinkable” goes to reality USSR is left without allies (just like in 1939) and is forced to ally with Japan. Thecnicaly it would not be a problem, as they had non-agression agriment in place.

Right Igor.
I think the USSR had simply no anothe way - it must be ally with Japane. And you right it could be the real reason why operation Unthinkable had not begin in jule of 1945.

Cheers.

Correct.

Your point is based that Japane would continie to fight in aug 1945 as fanatic as for Okinava and island till the German capitulation.
You simply ignored some importain factors.

Perhaps, but my point is based on careful study of Japanese preparations to defend the home islands, some of which was based on Gen. Kuribayashi brilliant defense of Iwo Jima, called “prairie dog warfare” by US Marines commanders because the Japanese basically fought from completely underground, making US mechanization and firepower superiority irrelevant to an extent.

The weakness is that this strategy could only be employed in mountainous and inhospitable terrain. The US probably would have faced a very tough fight with heavy casualties in the initial fazes of the battle. After the mountains had been by-passed, it would have been a matter or time as US tanks took Tokyo.

It seems you forgot that after the German capitulation (more correctly after the death of president Rusvelt) the Allies and USSR was not such “friends” as it could be . In fact in may 0f 1945 Churchill ordered to developer operation “Unthinkable”- the possible beginning of total war with USSR. I’m not sure japanes knew about " Untinkable" but certainly Japane intelligence knew about problems inside allies .
If the total war between USSR and US/UK had begin in july of 1945 the Japanese had a GREAT CHANCE to the survive. In this way the most of war US/UK resources were directed against USSR ( and i have no doubt A-bomb would dropped to the USSR).
This situation could force the USSR come to the alliance with Japane - and thus it could be another history way after 1945.
So this way the Japane crazy resistanse till the summer 1945 could be understanging.
They were fanatic and fierced becouse it HAD A SENSE till the USSR joined the war agians Japane. After this the Japanse hopes fall down and it was absolutly clear the Allies with USSR decided to finish them first.
After this the further resistance lost any sense. Becouse a little remaining material supplies from the Manchiria was lost becouse Kvantun Army was quick crashed till the any way. Then would the liberation of China and … the inevitable invasion of USSR to the home islands. For instanse Hokkaido. Why not?Red Army (which landed to the Kuril islands) could it began already in end of september/october of 1945.

You are massively overestimating the US’s supposed hostile attitude towards the USSR. In fact, they were largely indifferent until the late 1940s. Gen. Patton himself discussed a plan to invade the Soviet Union, but he was rebuked by Gen. Omar Bradley (America’s most underrated, and possibly greatest general in my opinion, as well as by Gen. Eisenhower).

The Red Army smashed through open terrain defended by an underarmed Japanese Imperial Army that lacked mobility, any effective tanks, and even anti-tank weapons in any numbers virtually making them useless in a modern combined arms warfare. The problem was that the Japanese could “bring down” the fighting on Pacific islands to basically a replay of WWI, where tanks were of limited use and artillery could not reach the troops underground.

And the Kuril Islands were a largely undefended backwater to the Japanese, because they hadn’t expected an attack from the USSR.

And I think Churchill was “losing it” by the end of the War, a key reason he was quickly replaced in an election shortly after WWII ended by the grateful British people, but one looking to move-on into peacetime.

Are you “stupid”? :wink:

Sometimes.

Mate don’t be too emotional. You are one of my favorite forums opponent , so i’d be very sad if you are “stupid”, “hook-nose” or somebody like ets… :wink:

LOL ditto here mate…

But i think you’ll agree that Comminust Japane in 1945 could much worst than “starvation and food shortages” or A-bombing for the Imperor. They could lost everything if they will continie to fight.

Don’t equal please “fanatism” and “idiotism”.

Cheers.

Well, Japan may well have been split into North and South like Korea was. But the Red Army/Navy/Naval Infantry did lack any significant, large scale amphibious capability. And there is a difference between landing on an island, and landing exactly where the enemy expects one to land.

And I don’t equate “fanaticism” with “idiotism.”

Nickdfresh said:

You are massively overestimating the US’s supposed hostile attitude towards the USSR. In fact, they were largely indifferent until the late 1940s.

If someone overestimate something here, please feel free to mention. :wink:

Just want you to read 2 quotes from interview by Valentin Falin, the ex soviet ambasaddor in West Germany. I did not have time to find the source material he refferes to, so I just quote him.
The translation from Russian to English is mine.

If what he says is true, then the quotes speak for themself. If it is a lye, then my aplogies.

Quote 1: The article in russian: http://www.rian.ru/analytics/20050627/40769409.html
[INDENT]

On the 23rd of April 1945 Truman declared his plan on the turn around on the foreign policy. In short, his point was, that Moscow has played the role, intendent to it by the democratic states, in the strugle against the nazi Germany and USA does not require any longer the collaboration with Moscow. Americans alone, without Soviet assistance, can force Japan to capitulate. Thus, Yalta agreements lost any importance for USA governement. An important note: at the moment of this speach Mr.Truman was not yet informed about the “Manhattan project”.

But the american millitary were strongly opposed to the president ideas. …
[/INDENT]

Quote 2: The article in russian: http://www.rian.ru/analytics/20050628/40776301.html
[INDENT]

Immidiately after Truman left Potsdam, the president gave order to Eisenhower to elaborate a plan “Totality” - the concept of millitary opposition to USSR. The “Strategical map of industrial resources of Russia and Manchuria” was prepared torger with the UAF in August 1945. The document contained 15 biggest soviet cities with a the list of their first priority targets and estimates, taking in to account the experience of the A-bombing in Japan, of the requiered nuclear charges. This was cynicism on the verge of perversion, as it took place during the days when the Red Army in coordination with American Army ironed out the million strong Japanese army in MAnchuria.
[/INDENT]

Letting out the emotinal part (it’s allowed in an interview), I still think that it looks rather plain and abvious what was going on.
There is no need to be paranoic about it, but it is not possible to deny that USSR was kind of an “enemy” (a rival if you want) for US at that time.

.

First of all, the purpose of this thread isn’t to revisit the first days of the Cold War.

But, since you keep repeating this: Why ever would the ultraconservative, borderline revolutionary Imperial Japanese military ever form an alliance with the Soviet Union? They were extremely anti-communist…

What exactly are you basing this on other than idle, “evil American empire” speculations?

And BTW, you’ll forgive me if I don’t totally see the speculations (with no sources or proof) of the ex-Soviet ambassador of W. Germany as an objective, historical take on the situation.

Again. You two ignore actual facts. The US military’s conventional forces were gutted after WWII in favor of nuclear weapons. The draft/conscription ended and much of the arsenal was put in “mothball” storage. And even the nuclear deterrent of the US was still very problematic since the only think readily available to carry nuclear weapons was the B-29, a bomber that the Soviets not only had numbers of (after impounding them when Allied airmen, who were also interned, landed on their territory with battle damaged aircraft --thanks BTW), but had produced an almost exact copy of it via reverse engineering…

Mate your naivete is wonder me.
And how could the nazy Germany in 1939 conclude piecfull non-agression pact (practically alliance agreement) with USSR?
How could Britain which was ready to declare the war to the USSR in 1940 during the winter war with Finland, this Britain joined to the alliance with the USSR after 22 june of 1941( and begin the lend lise)?
When you want to live my friend you will ready to be the friend with everybody who could help you, couldn’t it?

What exactly are you basing this on other than idle, “evil American empire” speculations?

There were not speculation- there were the concrete the war plans against USSR in 1945.

Again. You two ignore actual facts. The US military’s conventional forces were gutted after WWII in favor of nuclear weapons. The draft/conscription ended and much of the arsenal was put in “mothball” storage. And even the nuclear deterrent of the US was still very problematic since the only think readily available to carry nuclear weapons was the B-29, a bomber that the Soviets not only had numbers of (after impounding them when Allied airmen, who were also interned, landed on their territory with battle damaged aircraft --thanks BTW), but had produced an almost exact copy of it via reverse engineering…

What’s we ignore? In fact that since 1945-1949 US had the world monopoly for the A-bomb lets the US gov simply cut down a lot of army. But this is absolutly don’t prove the “friendliness” to the USSR. Furthermore the numerous plans of the atomic bombings of soviet cities (like “Dropshot”) was the favorite matter of American military staffs beginning from 1946.
And it were no speculations Nicdfresh, only concrete plans.

Cheers.

Yea i heared about “prairie dog warfare”.
But the preporations for the derence of Home islands were just POSSIBLE war plans as reserve. This is absolutly don’t mean this plan must be realized.
In fact japanes militarists wished to continue to fight after the A-bombing. They simply ignored the numbers of victims ( in firts days it seems the victims less then afteer the firebombing the Tokio). They absolytly don’t bothered the victims of Hirosima.
But the Japanes politicans decided “that’s enough”. The obviouse reason -full politic and war isolation.This was clear becouse in 8 august 1945 the Red Army began the operation “August storm” in Manchguria.

The Red Army smashed through open terrain defended by an underarmed Japanese Imperial Army that lacked mobility, any effective tanks, and even anti-tank weapons in any numbers virtually making them useless in a modern combined arms warfare. The problem was that the Japanese could “bring down” the fighting on Pacific islands to basically a replay of WWI, where tanks were of limited use and artillery could not reach the troops underground.

But i don’t think in Okinawa they hadn’t lacked of mobility, any effective tanks and anti-tank weapons. The situation was simular for Kvantun Army and the small groups of armies which defended the islands.
Yes you right the Japane tactic in the end of war was not such effective. But don’t forget in the 1941-42 they using it’s "imited usend artillery and tank they were able to effectively rashed the US/UK troops. As the instance, remember battle fof Singapore, when 36 000 of japance force to capitulate the 85 000 harnison of Singapure.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Singapore
If they use a “obsolete” tactic so what tactic did use the Britains? :wink:

And the Kuril Islands were a largely undefended backwater to the Japanese, because they hadn’t expected an attack from the USSR.

Not true in the one of the biggest island of Kurils - Sachalin there was a Japane military base, also other islands had a own japane garrisons. The reason of quick defeat of Japanes was from one hand the effective tactic of Red Army , from the other hand -in fact the Japane don’t hate in Red Army like the allies therefore the batlles with Red Army weren’t such bloody and fierce like in Okinawa.

Sometimes.

sometimes we all make the mistakes :slight_smile:

Well, Japan may well have been split into North and South like Korea was.

Yea here is the point i think you have to agree that this “situation” should be much worst for the Japane. Therefore they made everything didn’t let it. Even if they need capitulation in aug 1945.
So a-bombing had nothing to deal with decision of capitulation- it was pure politic.

But the Red Army/Navy/Naval Infantry did lack any significant, large scale amphibious capability. And there is a difference between landing on an island, and landing exactly where the enemy expects one to land.

Indeed it wasn’t nessisary to land to the Home island. That’s enought to show the “determination to the landing” what Red Army did when landed to the Sachalin and Kuril Islands.
There were not doubts the Japanese ( as you agree they were not idiots) solved all its inner problems ( possible they had to kill the most crazy war fanatics) and simply surrendered till sep/october 1945.

Nickdfresh:

And BTW, you’ll forgive me if I don’t totally see the speculations (with no sources or proof) of the ex-Soviet ambassador of W. Germany as an objective, historical take on the situation.

Great! Let’s ditch the Mr. Ambassador’s opinion just because he was an ambassador. Obviously, as every school boy knows ambassadors opinions are not to be trusted. :wink:

And now seriously. Let’s try to find out what was the Mr. Truman’s position during this White House hearing on 23rd of April 1945. You are an American so maybe you can easier find the relevant material.

And let’s find when plan “Totality” was ordered.

Can you get any info about it from the sources that you find trustful? Will you try?

Again, no paranoia. Just lets verify these 2 fact if we are interested in history. Or you find that these two are irrelevant?

First of all, the purpose of this thread isn’t to revisit the first days of the Cold War.

The cold war didn’t start from one day to the other. It grew “naturally” out of WWII. USSR being communist was considered (rightfully or not is irrelevant at this point) as enemy or rival. The closer the end of WWII approached the stronger the cold war felt. IMHO during the period after German capitulation the considerations of the future cold war were as important for all the sides as the current war with Japan, if not stronger. So in practice the WWII and cold war overlapped. That is why it is relevant for this discussion.

But why would the USSR even bother? What would be the point. It’s just idle speculation based on nothing, just another “what if?” And not even a very good or logical what if.

There were not speculation- there were the concrete the war plans against USSR in 1945.

Whose “warplans?” Churchill’s?

And I mean there are always contingency plans, but the US barely had an invasion plan for the nation it was at war with (Japan), much less warplans for the USSR? What was there even left to fight over at this time?

What’s we ignore? In fact that since 1945-1949 US had the world monopoly for the A-bomb lets the US gov simply cut down a lot of army.

Thank you. I’ve been trying to make this point for a while. You’ve finally gotten it!

The weapons were for deterrence. And lacking a large conventional army, what is the point of launching nuclear war? What is the objective, l or even the point?

But this is absolutly don’t prove the “friendliness” to the USSR. Furthermore the numerous plans of the atomic bombings of soviet cities (like “Dropshot”) was the favorite matter of American military staffs beginning from 1946.
And it were no speculations Nicdfresh, only concrete plans.

Cheers.

I never said “friendliness,” just nonaggression. I said the US was relatively benign as most Americans wanted to get on with their lives.

And of course there were contingency plans since the USSR was the only nation capable of destroying the US and Europe. The plans were to attack the Soviet Union if they were succeeding in Europe. And Stalin had warplans of his own, to storm Western Europe if he felt threatened. There was also extensive Soviet espionage targeting the US, which presented America with a certain intelligence gap and paranoia. There was a great deal of mistrust on both sides.

Perhaps you can compare the sizes of the US and USSR’s armed forces at this time? I bet I know which one was far larger…

If the US wanted to destroy the USSR in some insidious plot, then why didn’t they do it?

Cheers.

I’m not ditching his opinion, I just don’t consider it objective. He had his own 'agenda" as well. And I think his statements were exaggerations of borderline hysteria for political consumption…

And now seriously. Let’s try to find out what was the Mr. Truman’s position during this White House hearing on 23rd of April 1945. You are an American so maybe you can easier find the relevant material.

And let’s find when plan “Totality” was ordered.

Can you get any info about it from the sources that you find trustful? Will you try?

Again, no paranoia. Just lets verify these 2 fact if we are interested in history. Or you find that these two are irrelevant?

Sure. Here’s a contemporary historian critically attacking blatant misquotes of a one of Truman’s diaries by revisionist Japanese nationalist seeking some sort of indictment against Truman:

From: http://hnn.us/articles/20869.html

1-30-06
Did Truman Really Oppose the Soviet Union’s Decision to Enter the War Against Japan?
By D.M. Giangreco

D. M. Giangreco coauthored Eyewitness D-Day by Barnes & Noble Books (2004) and Dear Harry… Truman’s Mailroom, 1945-1953: The Truman Administration Through Correspondence with ‘Everyday Americans.’ with Kathryn Moore. Mr. Giangreco’s previous works include Delta: America’s Elite Counterterrorist Force and War in Korea.

The following letter was sent to the Journal of Military History, which published a shortened version.

To the Editor:

The old saying tells us that “you’re never too old to learn” — and it’s true! Reading David T. Fuhrmann’s review of Tsuyoshi Hasegawa’s Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (JMH 69, October 2005), I realized that my first impressions of the book were all wrong. Although the reviewer found Racing the Enemy “balanced and thoroughly documented,” I’d originally been appalled at the unnerving regularity with which Hasegawa’s copious footnotes implied that something exists in a document when it simply did not — but that has all changed.

What I now realize is that I was expecting too much when I assumed that Hasegawa would actually produce real evidence that President Truman had embarked on a desperate race to defeat Japan with nuclear weapons before the Soviet Union could enter the Pacific War. Being overly picky, I was put off by what appeared to be gross misrepresentations of Truman’s words through use of ellipsis in accounts like the following of Truman’s first meeting with Stalin at Potsdam:

Truman noted in his diary: ‘I asked [Stalin] if he had the agenda for the meeting. He said that he had and that he had more questions to present. I told him to fire away. He did and it is dynamite --- but I have some dynamite too which I am not exploding now. . . . He’ll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about.

Hasegawa goes on to explain that “Truman took Stalin’s announcement as ‘dynamite.’ It is clear that he saw Stalin not as an ally committed to the common cause of defeating Japan, but as a competitor in the race to see who could force Japan to surrender.”

How could I have been so obtuse? I’d thought that the 50 or so words replaced by the ellipsis implied that the president was talking about something completely different. The excised portion of the diary entry read:

He wants to fire Franco. To which I wouldn’t object, and divide up the Italian colonies and other mandates, some no doubt that the British have. Then he got on the Chinese situation, told us what agreements had been reached and what was in abeyance. Most of the big points are settled. [Emphasis added.]

It is here that Hasegawa picks up the comments on Stalin entering the war. Now, while it is true that ellipsis are often a revisionist’s best friend, perhaps Hasegawa just didn’t notice that he had utterly changed the meaning of Truman’s diary entry. In another passage, Hasegawa’s gives this account of Truman’s “laconic” response on 8 August to the news that the Soviets had entered the war:

A few minutes after 3:00, Truman held an impromptu press conference. Although he entered the Press Room with a smile on his face, he quickly assumed a solemn expression and read a statement to reporters: “I have only a simple announcement to make. I can’t hold a regular press conference today, but this announcement is so important I thought I would call you in. Russia has declared war on Japan.” Then he added laconically: “That’s all.” This was the shortest White House press conference on record.

This terse statement reveals the profound disappointment Truman must have felt over the news. 

Foolishly, I had thought that the very sources Hasegawa’s cites, widely known eyewitness accounts by the New York Times’s Felix Belair, Jr, and Washington Post’s Edward T. Folliard that appeared on 9 August, directly refuted his depiction of Truman’s mood. The president did not walk into a room full of waiting reporters, he was seated at his desk flanked by Admiral Leahy and Jimmy Byrnes when the White House press corps was ushered in. Both reporters stated that Truman was smiling and both commented on his uncharacteristically casual behavior.

The president sat “with one leg thrown carelessly over the arm of his chair and his right arm stretched across the back,” according to the Times’s Belair, and “hid completely the importance of the information he was about to impart.” His “dramatic statement,” moreover, was “issued with all the casualness of a routine proclamation.” Folliard of the Post did say that Truman “assumed a solemn expression,” but only when “he rose to make his announcement.” The president then “rocked with laughter,” according to the Belair, when his concluding words sent reporters crowding the doors to file their reports.

While it may at first appear that even the most casual reading of these articles reveals that Hasegawa’s account might be construed as pure fiction, it seems more fair for me to admit that Hasegawa clearly displays a much better ability to read Truman’s mind than I. In fact, now that I have recognized my error, it is obvious that the president was determined to personally share his mortification — what Hasegawa describes as his “profound disappointment” — instead of taking the easy out by having press secretary Charley Ross routinely read a statement to the reporters.

In any event, I now have not the slightest idea what I was thinking when, before reading Fuhrmann’s review, I concluded that a close examination of Hasegawa’s own sources throughout the book either don’t support — or in some cases, utterly demolish — his contention that Truman had been “racing the enemy” and was crushed when he found out he had “lost” to Joe Stalin. But most fundamentally, I was wrong about how and why the war began. Thanks to Hasegawa, I have been forced to concede that the war did not begin until April 1945.

Hasegawa’s closing paragraph sets me straight that we are looking at simply “a story with no heroes but no real villains either — just men. The ending of the Pacific war was in the last analysis a human drama whose dynamics were determined by the very human characteristics of those involved: fear, vanity, anger, and prejudice.”

It is now perfectly clear that any examination of these acts committed in the name of the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere — Pearl Harbor and the Bataan Death March; the 10 to 25 million Chinese who died between the Marco Polo Bridge incident and 1946; the death (according to the UN) of hundreds of thousands of Asian slave laborers and Allied POWs along the Burma Railway and in mines and factories scattered from Java to Hokkaido; the grisly biological warfare experiments of “Unit 731” in Manchuria — any examination of these acts is nothing more than a cynical attempt to deflect guilt from the Allies in general, and America in particular.

No, Fuhrmann is quite right that Hasegawa deserves praise for “providing an international perspective lacking in previous studies,” and far be it from me to suggest that Racing the Enemy offers an extraordinarily biased and rather dishonest perspective that may appeal to neonationalists in Japan, but will not be useful to many others.

Regards,

D.M. Giangreco

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

So in essence, Truman’s words have been selectively edited to show far more insidious intentions than actually existed. This is what happens when historians have political and nationalistic agendas.

The cold war didn’t start from one day to the other. It grew “naturally” out of WWII. USSR being communist was considered (rightfully or not is irrelevant at this point) as enemy or rival. The closer the end of WWII approached the stronger the cold war felt. IMHO during the period after German capitulation the considerations of the future cold war were as important for all the sides as the current war with Japan, if not stronger. So in practice the WWII and cold war overlapped. That is why it is relevant for this discussion.

Well I agree with the first part of your statement. The problem here is that you are projecting far too much of the Cold War rivalry and dismissing vital military implications of a US invasion of Japan.

Roosevelt was initially worried that Stalin would not claim War on Japan, then he was worried that the Red Army would attempt landings on the home islands, no easy task as their difficulties, much like the US’s difficulties, of landing amphibious infantry tended to favor the defender mightily.

Cheers.

Here’s to detente.