I have every doubt that we would have gone to war to defend the Dutch East Indies. There was no obligation or treaty to do so and even if we had wanted to help, our Asiatic Fleet was feeble to the point of uselessness. I’m quite sure that Roosevelt would have wanted to assist, but that’s not the sane thing as being able to assist either militarily or legally.
This is a rather superficial view of the situation the Japanese, British, and Americans found themselves in just prior to the actual attack on the NEI.
True, both the US and British Empire forces in the immediate area were weak and there was no written treaty obligation for either country to come to the aid of the Dutch. However, there is absolutely no doubt that the US and Britain both would have viewed such an attack as a causus belli and would have declared war on Japan. Yes, it would have been difficult for Roosevelt to get enough votes in Congress for a declaration, but the US did have vital interests in the NEI and would have viewed a Japanese attack there as an indication that Japan was indeed joining the war in Europe; this would have been unacceptable to both Britain and the US.
In his book, “D-Days in The Pacific”, pages 5-6, Donald L. Miller states;
“America imported more goods from the Far East than any other place on earth. Three colonies alone – British Malaya, The Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines – accounted for approximately one fifth of all American foreign purchases…In all, the area provided more than half of America’s needs for at least fifteen vital commodities, including chromium and manganese, metals essential in the steelmaking process. By 1940, key policymakers in the State Department were prepared to defend America’s freedom to trade for those resources, by war if necessary should they come in danger of falling under the control of the Japanese. Fascist Japan in possession of South Asia could cut off trade with the United States and Britain or dictate extortionate concessions to continue it. Secretary of The Navy Frank Knox put America’s interest in the region in the sternest possible language in his congressional confirmation hearings of 1940: ‘We should not allow Japan to take the Dutch Indies, a vital source of oil and rubber and tin…We must face frankly the fact that to deny the Dutch Indies to Japan may mean war.’”
It is a serious mistake to think that either Roosevelt, the American Congress or the American public had no interest in defending the NEI against Japan, or that Roosevelt wouldn’t have been able to get the votes for a declaration of war if Japan had limited it’s attack to the NEI. You may doubt such a scenario, but there is no historical support for such a conclusion.
Moreover, the Japanese Navy, after so much lobbying to get it’s Southern Strategy accepted as a national policy, refused, once the Southern Strategy was adopted, to participate, unless the plans included aspects that would clearly initiate a war with the US. This was because, only a war in which the US Navy was involved could justify the massive allocation of resources which the Japanese Navy was adamantly seeking. So the Japanese power elites were forced to approve unnecessary military strikes against US territories in order to get the Japanese Navy to agree to the overall plan. In essence, the Japanese could not have attacked just the NEI with any hope of success because the Japanese Navy would not have been on board with such a plan.
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