Revising Gen. Mark Clark

In reading Rick Atkinson’s excellent “Day of Battle” regarding the Italian campaign, I have begun to reassess my views on General Mark Clark. Whereas I once regarded him as a cold, ruthless press whore, I now see him as a capable and intelligent commander; if one with many flaws. Atkinson paint’s a somewhat sympathetic portrait of a man that was just powerful enough to be isolated from those in his own command that sought to avoid him in a manner comically reminiscent of the Major Major character in “Catch 22” (he brought his dog back with him from a leave for some companionship) and forced to make difficult decisions in which he was fully accountable for, but not with the kind of sway that Ike had in pressing his will. Often isolated, Clark was caught in a very difficult position between the British under Churchill that wanted to prosecute the war through Italy while placing a great deal of importance on the Mediterranean Theater and the Americans that generally thought this was a useless sideshow distraction preventing the entering Europe closer to German industry.

He faced a tough, determined enemy, was fighting on ground mostly favorable to the defender, and real problem with feeding the liberated Italian population causing logical nightmare. He was also beset with the prospect of the Italian campaign becoming a backwater theater that would be shorted in supplies and manpower once D-Day was underway.

I think the most interesting thing is that I learned that at least some of what history has painted as Clark’s incessant press whoring was actually a case of his wife granting interviews and exposing his private letters to her to the newspapers in order to celebrate her husband and to push him into politics after the war. He actually found this quite embarrassing and it caused him rebuke from Gen. Marshall…

More info:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Wayne_Clark

http://korea50.army.mil/history/biographies/clark.shtml

Well, he totally screwed up the plan to take Rome and let a very large number of Germans escape just so he got the good PR from it personally. Given that this led among other things to the tragedy of Monte Cassino, I have very, very little sympathy for him.

Clark’s views on the wider implications of the Dragoon / Anvil invasion of southern France are worth considering.

The opinion that an Anglo-American drive into south-east Europe might have prevented some countries from falling into the Russian sphere of influence has been expressed by General Clark, who succeeded Alexander as commander of the Allied Armies in Italy (redesignated Fifteenth Army Group) in December 1944 and later was Military Governor of Austria. He claims that ‘a campaign that might have changed the whole history of relations between the Western world and Soviet Russia was permitted to fade away, not into nothing, but into much less than it could have been. … the weakening of the campaign in Italy in order to invade southern France instead of pushing on into the Balkans was one of the outstanding political mistakes of the war…. I am firmly convinced that the French forces alone, with seven divisions available, could have captured Marseilles, protected Eisenhower’s southern flank, and advanced up the Rhone Valley to join hands with the main overlord forces. The VI American corps, with its three divisions, could then have remained in Italy. The impetus of the Allied advance in Italy would thus not have been lost and we would have advanced into the Balkans…. I later came to understand, in Austria, the tremendous advantages that we had lost by our failure to press on into the Balkans…. Had we been there before the Red Army, not only would the collapse of Germany have come sooner, but the influence of Soviet Russia would have been drastically reduced.
p.193 at http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2-2Ita-c5-1.html

His attack directly into Rome was definitely questionable. But it wasn’t completely self-serving. Clark honestly believed that the American Army deserved more of the glory for liberating Rome than did the British one, which is a bit silly since the British seem to have had no designs on taking Rome to begin with. Yet Clark seemed to think he was racing them. He also believed that an overshadowing of the Italian campaign by the Normandy landings would lead to a starvation of men and equipment…

But, there is some question as to how effective an attempted envelopment of German forces would have been since the road network was poor and the terrain was slowing pursuit considerably. And the Germans were aware that Route 6 north of Rome was a death trap, so many simply took alternate back roads. So it’s not as easy, nor as cut and dry, as a lot of historians like to make it seem…

Also, Casino had a lot to do with bad generalship but that wasn’t just Clark. General Freyberg, along with a number of underlings, was the one that ordered the bombing the Cassino and conducted much of the attack and Clark was also involved in conducting Anzio at the time.

And in doing so killed an awful lot of British and American soldiers unnecessarily. Something I personally find unforgivable.

Which makes him worse than most other generals in WWII how?

There are a handful I respect immensely - Slim for starters - but it’s a pretty short list :wink:

I agree…

There seemed to be a pretty bad overall collective lot in Italy. Clark had some good ideas, but was resentful and arrogant. Alexander was promoted to his level of incompetence, and Leese was mediocre; but Churchill undermined them all with is incessant meddling…

I’d recomend the several biographys of Clark that have been around for many decades. WGF Jacksons ‘The Battle for Italy’ is a good refrence for the Italian campaign. It provides a broader description of the events with more information on the British army, not quite the same depth understandably. Tho, it has some bits on the outside influences on the Med commanders that Atkinson does not include.

Clarks actions cant be looked at in a vacum. The thinking, decisions, and influence of Eisenhower, Alexander, Marshall, Brooke, Churchill, and others has to be fitted in to understand Clarks decisions. This applies to his subordinates as well.

The war memoirs of Spike Milligan are also quite a good reference on the Italian campaign, if not quite so highbrow as some books…

I guess you’ve articulated one of my points better than I could…