SAS ‘suicide mission’ to wipe out Exocets
By Michael Smith, Defence Correspondent
THE Special Air Service planned to mount a raid on Argentina by submarine in order to destroy the Argentine navy’s stock of Exocet missiles, according to a new book on the Falklands conflict.
Argentina was known to have bought five Exocet missiles from France before the outbreak of hostilities in April 1982. Two were used in the attack on the destroyer Sheffield, which alerted the British to the Exocet threat, and Task Force commanders were desperate to destroy the remainder.
The submarine raid came about after the decision to scrap Operation Mikado, a plan to land a detachment of SAS in two RAF Hercules at the Argentine airfield at Rio Grande on Tierra del Fuego, where the Exocet-equipped unit was based. The aim was to destroy the missiles, the five Super Etendard aircraft that carried them, and to kill the pilots.
According to Task Force, which reveals for the first time the full details of Operation Mikado, British commanders then devised a fresh plan using the Royal Navy submarine Onyx to infiltrate the SAS into Argentina.
By that point the British had suffered another critical loss to the Exocet in the shape of the container ship Atlantic Conveyor and her cargo of heavy-lift helicopters.
A successful attack on Hermes or Invincible, the two carriers at the centre of the Task Force, could have spelt the end of the operation to recover the islands.
Under the plan, two dozen SAS troops were to be taken by Onyx to the coast of Tierra del Fuego, before rowing ashore in Gemini rubber boats.
They would then make their way to Rio Grande and destroy the Exocets and Super Etendards with anti-tank rockets and explosive charges, before killing the pilots in their living quarters.
The SAS carried out rehearsals for the operation in San Carlos Water, on the west coast of East Falkland, with advice from the Royal Marines’ Special Boat Service.
One of those involved recalled: "We were to be dropped off from the submarine several miles offshore at night and then make our way to the coast aboard rubber inflatables. There was a lot of equipment and weapons and the plan left nothing to chance, and we were all confident we could have carried it through.
“Earlier ideas to land a Hercules at the Argentine base were quite frankly suicidal, but this had a good chance of success. However once the job was over that was it. There was no plan to get us out. We simply had to make our way to Chile and link up with our people there.”
What the British did not know was that the Argentines had bolstered the security around Rio Grande with three battalions of marines. An SAS attack would probably have ended in disaster.
The book shows the extreme lengths to which the British were prepared to go to deal with the Exocet threat. The first option was to use Fleet Air Arm Sea Harriers or one of the RAF’s last remaining Vulcan bombers to bomb Rio Grande.
But the Sea Harriers were too few and too precious to be risked, while a Vulcan strike on Port Stanley airport had proved inconclusive. Thus was Operation Mikado born.
The man in charge of the planning was Brig (later Gen) Peter de la Billiere, the director of the SAS and SBS Group.
Mikado involved landing about 55 men of B Squadron SAS from the two Hercules, which would remain on the tarmac with their engines running while the detachment went about its business. If the aircraft survived to take off, they would head for the Chilean air base at Punta Arenas, just across the Stratis of Estrecho.
The fall-back plan if, as seemed likely, the Hercules were damaged during the operation, was for the assault party and the aircrew to make their way to the Chilean border, about 50 miles distant.
The SAS was deeply sceptical that the Chileans would agree to the plan but, while diplomatic approaches were being made, B Squadron went ahead with rehearsals.
By the time the political clearance came through, some of the more experienced members of B Squadron were suggesting that the operation had little chance of success, effectively amounting to a suicide mission.
A helicopter carrying the SAS reconnaissance team took off from Hermes on the night of May 17, but was detected by Argentine radar.
The Sea King had insufficient fuel to rejoin the Task Force, so the pilot flew to the Chilean mainland and dropped off the SAS team, before setting fire to his helicopter and surrendering to the Chilean authorities.
At Hereford, the commander of B Squadron suggested that, with the element of surprise almost certainly lost, the original plan should be scrapped in favour of an operation overland via Chile.
But the suggestion was turned down and the original mission was ordered to go ahead.
At that point the tempers of senior members of the squadron almost boiled over. Rehearsals had shown that a surprise attack by Hercules was almost impossible - the aircraft being detected by radar well before landing.
One sergeant decided that the only way to make his point was to resign. Informing Brig de la Billiere of the resignation, shortly before the team was due to fly out to Ascension, the squadron commander added that he too considered the operation unviable. He was immediately relieved of his command and replaced by the regiment’s second-in-command.
But by the time B Squadron arrived at Ascension Island, the staging post for the attack, British intelligence had discovered that the Argentines enjoyed far better radar coverage than previously thought. The operation, one of the most audacious in British military history, was postponed.
