continued - parts 3 and 4 :
3- NKVD’s role
There is a big difference between the Soviet army and the NKVD. The soviet army fight on exterior fronts, and the NKVD used to fight in internal fronts, or behind the main forces.
The great purges ended in december 1938. They split NKVD’s command in to 6 different independent groups : border troops, escort, protection, railway , supply and building.
At the start of 1939, their numbers expanded considerably, and their role was
Changed by re-equiping them with trains, armored cars, field guns, tanks and aviation.
Those forces in 1939 had no use in the Soviet territory, there was no new purge and no repression to do.
In 1939, the Blocking divisions were created to increase the combativity of the Red Army, by being deployed behind the troops and stopping any retreat. In august 1939, the “Osnaz” units were created from border troops, to be used as shock troops.
These were the first to enter Poland, Baltic republics, Bessarabia, Bukovine and Finland. Their role was to neutralize border outposts, capture bridges, cut communications, destroy and terrorize just before the offensive, and get rid of the “unwanted elements” once the army had gone through.
From may 1940 to february 1941, 99 000 political commissar reservists have been re-examined before party commissions. This preparation was followed by the order for 3700 of those reservists to report to the army on june 17, 1941. Numbers from the “cleansing” of the annexed territorys in 1940 have never been published, to get an idea on the NKVD’s activities, one must examine actions similar the the Katyn massacre of Polish officers and elites. That also happened in Lithuania, Lettonia, Estonia.
In february 1941, there is a change in NKVD’s activities, since they start to secretly move on the occidental border.
Communist historians have never exlained why NKVD troops were still at the occidental border , as the terror and repression in occupied territories was considerably reduced in february 1941. If Staline really wanted to protect himself from German invasion, he would have slowed down the creation of repression units and created instead defense units like sapers to blow bridges and mine roads, dig anti-tank ditches, etc. Defense was not his concern.
Those troops, equiped with heavy weapons, were stationed behind the army to destroy resistance pockets once the army had crossed the border and rapidly advance in ennemy territory. Once the German attacked, the Central command of the operational NKVD was useless and was dissolved, the troops were incorporated in the Red Army. ( as an exemple : the NKVD 21 div. Motorized Rifles, commanded by Col. Pantchenko became 109 div. Infantry of the Red Army)
4 -The suppression of the forward defensive zone
A country that prepares for defense doesn’t concentrate his forces on the borders.
He disperse them deep in the potential combat area and create a zone filled with obstacles and mine fields. The soviet army knew perfectly this concept, as it had to deal with it when it attacked Poland in 1920, and later in Finland.
At the end of 1929, only in the Kiev military region, there was 60 demolition commandos totalling 1400 men, with 1640 explosive charges and 10000 fuses ready to use. This forward soviet defensive zone was constantly improved with new obstacles and artificial lakes. During the thirties, the occidental borders of the S.U. was separated in 13 fortified sectors (UR). This was officialy called The Staline Line.
Each UR had brigade stenght effectives, medium and heavy artillery, AA, tanks, transmission and others. It covered 100 to 180 km frontlines 30 to 50 km deep,
with an elaborate bunker system including depots, electrical plants, hospital, command posts and transmission. Each of these was autonomous and was equiped to deal with a prolonged fight. Col.-General A.I Chebounine recalls that during 3 years, only in the Proskourov UR, they built more than a thousand defensive bunkers with many protected by artificial lakes.
The Staline line was not like the Maginot Line, it was not located on the border. It was constructed in total discretion. In cas of a surprize attack, soldiers would have many days to prepare themselves. It was not continuous, large open spaces was left between them that could be mined or used as the starting point for a conteroffensive.
The construction of the Staline line represents huge efforts and gigantic expenses during the first two quinquennial plans. It was decided to reinforce it in 1938 with heavy atrillery and 8 new Urs. There was more than 1000 new bunkers built. Then the Ribentropp-Molotov pact was signed.
In such a tensed context, Staline could have taken mesures to reinforce border security and assure S.U.’s neutrality in the conflict by:
- accelerate weapons production for URs
- augment troop numbers manning them
- augment production of all defensive weapons, especially anti-tank guns and rifles
- mobilize all ressources to accelerate the line’s construction
- build a new line behind it
- order the red army to dig trenches and anti-tank ditches to use the bunker network as a backbone for defense.
That is not what happened. As early as fall 1939, all work stopped on the Staline line. Troop numbers were reduced, then units were dissolved. Factorys stopped producing fortification materials. The existing UR were disarmed and the weapons and ammunition were stored. Some bunkers were given to kolkhozes, for use as grain storage, the majority was burried.
In spring 1941, the agony of the Staline line is achieved. Gen. Grigorenko write :
“ I don’t know how future historians will explain this crime against our people. The soviet government has pumped billions of roubles from the people to built this incrossable fortification line, from Baltic sea to Black sea. And now, at the eave of war in spring 1941, on all the length of this 1200 km, we hear deafening explosions. Everything is blown up on direct orders from Staline himself.”
That’s it for now ! I keep the end for dessert :
part 5 - soviet buildup
part 6 - the attack that didn’t happen
