A few thoughts on this interesting thread. Regarding Churchill’s reinforcement of failure in France, it is worth noting that he was under very heavy pressure from the pro-war leaders of the French government - who, in turn, were under increasing threat from a defeatist element that could not, for political reasons, be excluded from government - to supply ever-more help to the failing French army, and was (as has been commented) most anxious to secure this group by helping as much as possible so as to keep France in the war, both in Europe and overseas. It could actually have been worse - one factor in his refusal to send even more fighter assistance to France was the adamantine resistance of Fighter Command chief Sir Hugh Dowding to such a move; without this, the RAF advance expeditionary force might easily have been further reinforced. He made other serious mistakes - easy, again, to say in hindsight, but there is a strong argument that he would have been better to allow Wavell to employ the main force of his Middle Eastern Command to crush the Italians in North Africa when he had the chance, rather than diverting resources from North Africa to Greece and the Balkans. There were others.
In general, I have a sense that his strategic sense, throughout his life, was very much informed by his experiences early in life as a junior officer, and a cavalry officer at that. He had a rather old-fashioned attachment to a particular concept of securing and attacking on the flanks, the latter tendency of which may be in large responsibility for the WW1 Gallipoli fiasco, and the less obvious, but perhaps even more disastrous, diversion of forces from the Western Desert to Greece and the Balkans. Of course, political considerations would also have played their part in both instances and, as has been said, Churchill was essentially a politician. The business about downplaying the possibility of war with Japan in the context of implementing cuts in military spending was very much what a Chancellor of the Exchequer could be expected to do, particularly in a government tied to the old-fashioned concept of achieving a strictly balanced Budget.
The comparison with Lincoln is interesting. Lincoln was little given to interfering with the detailed running of the Union forces in the Civil War - although he did display very sound strategic sense when he did express views on such matters. His great problem for much of the early part of the war was that of persuading his “military experts” actually to fight, and to do so in a manner reflective of their alleged skills and of the substantial material advantages enjoyed by the Union. This was complicated by the problem that, because of the very rapid expansion of the Union Army early in the war, and of the defection of a disproportionate number of the more skilled professional officers to the Confederacy, the cadre of Union Army generals were often pure “political” generals, or by generals as interested in their political constituencies and/or political prospects as they were in fighting. That complex figure of McClellan is a notable case. McClellan clearly disliked Lincoln; saw himself, indeed, as a political rival to Lincoln with Presidential prospects; and enjoyed a degree of political support even within Lincoln’s cabinet. Also, while he was widely perceived as a person possessing great military skills, he appears to have been an innately cautious commander, a caution perhaps amplified by a desire to avoid embarrassing defeats that might undermine his political prospects. Whatever about the latter, his innate caution can hardly be doubted. I recall the story from the Peninsula, where McClellan and his staff were holding a serious and lengthy column as to whether they could transport their army across a particular river - was it too deep ? Eventually, presumably impatient with the whole proceeding, a cavalry officer and protégé of McClellan rode his horse into the middle of the ford, the water rising only half-way up the horse’s legs. “There, General,” shouted the officer, “that’s how deep it is !” That officer, typically, was George Armstrong Custer.
While McClellan may have posed an exceptional problem for Lincoln in the matter of “encouraging” or firing, the same problem recurred to a greater or lesser extent with other “professional” commanders of the Union armies, several of whom seemed to Lincoln to be lacking in aggression and/or prone to attack in the wrong circumstances and/or to win or lose largely through accidents. Then along came Grant who, pre-war, was a military has-been with serious cigar and alcohol problems. Small victories led to greater opportunities the early highlight of which was the Union’s “victory in the West” culminating in the capture of Vicksburg (a masterly campaign on Grant’s part; I wonder if Manstein was thinking of it in the Crimea in 1942). Lincoln’s attitude to his high commanders very much comes out in his attitude to Grant; he was quite happy to let the General get on with it, provided that he fought and generally won - even if the body count sometimes proved rather high. I like the story about the delegation of “good people” (one of many) that met Lincoln to complain, among other things, about Grant’s affection for the Demon Drink, and demanding the dismissal of such a “disreputable” officer. Tiring of this, Lincoln interrupted one of the “good people” in full flow with the question, “Sir, do you know which brand of whisky General Grant favours ?” The flustered delegate had to deny knowledge, prompting Lincoln to remark, “Well Sir, that is a pity. If I knew, I would send some cases of it to all my generals. It might persuade them to fight. All I care about is that General Grant fights and that generally, Sir, he wins…”. He had a point. Whatever about his love of whisky and cigars, Grant (and his protégés Sherman, Sheridan etc.) certainly fought, and generally won, and took the leading part in finally securing the Union victory.
Lincoln and Churchill both came to symbolize and embody the will to victory of their peoples. How well would the militarily semi-skilled but “interventionist” Churchill have dealt with, say, the McClellan situation ? How well would the militarily unskilled and “non-interventionist” Lincoln have dealt with Britain’s WW2 military dilemmas ? Now, there is a huge but distinctly unhistorical question ! Best regards, JR.
