The Battle for Gazala. May/june 1942.

A topic to examinate the causes and consecuenses of the Axis greatest victories in Afrika.

[COLOR=black][FONT=Verdana]Rommel advances from El Agheila again[/COLOR][/FONT]

[COLOR=black][FONT=Verdana]Following the narrowly successful [COLOR=black]Operation Crusader, in late 1941, the Eighth Army had driven the Axis forces out of Cyrenaica and forced Rommel to withdraw to strong defensive positions he had prepared at El Agheila. However, their 500+ mile advance had over-stretched their lines of supply and during January 1942 they had thinned out their front line troops to work on building lines of communications and supply dumps to enable a further thrust west to be made against Tripolitania. Meanwhile, Rommel had received reinforcements in men and tanks, and on 21 January sent out three strong armoured columns to make a tactical reconnaissance. Finding only the thinnest of screens in front of him he rapidly changed his reconnaissance into an offensive. He recaptured Benghazi on 28 January, and Timimi on 3 February and pressed on towards the fortified port of Tobruk on the Mediterranean coast.[/COLOR]

Eighth Army digs in on the Gazala line

Between Gazala and [COLOR=black]Timimi (just west of Tobruk) the Eighth Army was able to concentrate its forces sufficiently to turn and fight. By 4 February Rommel’s advance had been halted and the front line had been stabilised running from Gazala on the coast (30 miles west of Tobruk) to the town of Bir Hacheim, 50 miles to the south.[/COLOR]
The “Gazala Line” was a series of occupied “boxes” each of brigade strength set out across the desert with minefields and wire watched by regular patrols between the boxes. The Free French were to the south at the Bir Hacheim box. The line was not equally staffed with a greater number of troops covering the coast leaving the south less protected. However every “box” was well equipped with artillery and had strong support of infantry tanks.

Several months passed with every side amassing recources for the next offensive, finally would be the axis who struck first.

A view on the opposing commanders ( Osprey campaign 196)


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Certainly a weird battle with many turnarounds and an uncertain outcome until the very end.


http://www.bild.bundesarchiv.de/archives/barchpic/search/_1250845651/?search[view]=detail&search[focus]=1

Indeed, but unlike the “Crusader” operation in late 1941 in this one the british could never fully achieve the iniciative against Rommel.

In my opinion the battle could be divided in the following well differenced stages.

1- Panzerarmee Afrika fake advance to Gazala. Attack to the south.
Rommel repulsed by british armored forces equipped with Grants tank.
"…the new american tank opened big holes in our units…" wrote the General in his memoirs.

2- Rommel tactical withdrawn to the west, clash with the well defended “box” of 150 Brigade.

3- Panzerarmy nearly trapped, the famous “Cauldron” as it is know in british literature ( even the axis never felt really sorrounded) Purely defensive battle by part of the axis in this stage, setting a screen a 50, 75mm, and 88mm guns and no-gas tanks to fend off attacks by British armored forces with indian infantry and artillery support, wich they did succesfully 3 times.

Axis supplies nearly exhausted but the italian Brescia and Trieste divisions managed to open 2 gaps in the thick wire and mines in the north and south of the 150 Brigade box saving Rommel ( the only time they did it, usually was in the other way :mrgreen:)
PanzerArmee Afrika resupplied, axis launched a massive air, infantry and panzer attack against the 150th Brigade box, the british position was destroyed, survivors surrended.

4- Rommel deals with Bir hacheim in the south-east corner of allied emplacements, the french fortress was in siege by italian armored divisions and german 90 Light division since 27th may, but gave the most stubborn resistance ever achieved by a France combat group the emplacement did not fell until the 11th June, the legionaries were well dug in and had 75mm AT guns wich blew up several of the weak italian armor before they could even manage to get through the thick defensive wire and minefield.

Rommel summoned to the Luftwaffe for heavy bombers attacks. French General Koenig and 1100 legionaries managed to escape.

5- The remains of the Panzer Armee broke into the open heading northwest towards Gazala and Acroma, in the way the were attacked by strong British armored Forces superior in number, but again a wise combination of
88mm and tanks destroyed the enemy. The Tommies tried again a day later but were beaten off with even heavier tank casualties. General Auchinlenk recognized that 8th army Gazala positions are endangered and order the withdrawn.

Next day PanzerArmee Afrika units arrived to the coast cutting down the scape line of several australian and indian infantry units.

6- Rommel headed for Tobruk, the fortress is surrounded and attacked by Afrika Korps in its south east side the 20th june, the germans inmediately managed to get trough, the italians attacking at their left broke into the perimeter also. Bitter resistance by part of heavily scattered british armored formations but the axis advance is unstoppable.

Tobruk fell the afternoon 21th June.

The real plan was indeed a well kept secret. When the German infantry units managed to break into the first British positions they kept on demanding immediate tank support which was -of course- never given since the tanks were already on their way to the south. It should be mentioned that Rommel used a little trick here that is normally known of the Allied…fake tanks and trucks with aircraft engines/props mounted to produce a cloud of dust, pretending that entire armoured divisions were on their way for a frontal attack. British Gen. Ritchie however knew that there was more up to it than just a simple frontal attack, so -in spite of his officers’ requests he did not reinforce the northern and central sector of the Gazala line.

Rommel repulsed by british armored forces equipped with Grants tank.
"…the new american tank opened big holes in our fomations…" wrote the General in his memoirs.

The Grant tanks were a bad surprise for the Germans, yes. They did not know about the GRant’s existence until a lot of Panzer III’s were blown up. Panzer IV’s could keep up but were rare and there were only a few ones with the new 7,5-cm-KwK 40 L/43 in each regiment. Furthermore the new Panzer IV’s with “Langrohr” were equipped with HE grenades only by that time and place.
It was General Nehring’s idea to handle the situation by culling every 88mm AA gun he could get to build a line of Flak guns, two miles wide.

Nice addition Flamm, the Panzer IV business is still not clear to me, I ve seen a wochenschau dated june 16th that shows briefly a panzer IV F2 marching to the Tobruk area, probably as Rommel wrote at the beginning of the battle they have no proper ammunition but it arrived some days later.

Woth to mention that PanzerArmy afrika had 560 tanks in total ( both italian and german) facing the Allied 842 in frontline plus 130 in reserve.

I’ve always thought that Gen. Auchinleck was a bit underrated and began the turn around of the 8th Army that helped Montgomery become successful. He made mistakes, but he did defeat Rommel towards the end of his tenure.

Does anyone disagree or agree on this?

I will agree that in the first battle of Alamein he was a good performer, always putting pressure in Rommels weakest point, but in this particular combat he left so much to desire.

I think the main criticisms are that while Auk was himself a competent commander, be was not a very good manager of people and tended to appoint subordinate commanders that were often lackluster at best…

He held Rommel, which was a tactical victory for Britain, but he didn’t defeat him in the 1st Battle of El Alamein.
It should be noted that this battle cost the British 13,000 casualties, just a few hundred less than it cost Monty to defeat him in the 2nd Battle of El Alamein.

Auchinleck wasn’t a bad general, but he wasn’t a good one either.
When he left the command of the Eight Army, it was in the words of Churchill, " Brave but baffled", it needed someone like Monty to show them how to fight on terms that suited them, not the enemy.
When Monty took control, Rommel suddenly found that the war was no longer a great game, he was now fighting according to someone elses rules.

As we know supplies have always been one of the main problems of the DAK. The literature says that Hitler kind of neglected the DAK also concerning supplies…maybe all the good stuff went predominantly to the Eastern Front (OP Blau).

The French offered stiff resistance at Bir Hacheim. But it should be mentioned that there was also (among other troops) a Jewish battalion with them, these guys -for obvious reasons- fought like devils as well.

Yup, probably they believe Rommel going to waste them. Here and extract of “The trail of the Fox” dealing with Bir hacheim.

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Here a photo from the German Federal Archives showing the Bir Hacheim POW’s (unfortunately no version without watermark available):


http://www.bild.bundesarchiv.de/archives/barchpic/search/_1235674917/?search[view]=detail&search[focus]=14

The original (biased) caption:
“The captured of Bir Hacheim, a colourful mix of peoples. Musgum-Negroes, Grasfield, Sara, Annamite, Syrians, two French from New Caledonia and a half breed from the New Hebrides.”

Well the german propaganda barely could control himself when saw black soldiers in service with Allied forces. :rolleyes:

Kinda small picture, let you asking for more.

Yup, for whatever reason this one does not belong to the donation (app. 10000 photos) from the Federal Archives to Wikimedia Commons.

Thanks guys, this has been an interesting read so far.

I once read about another possible explanation for the exceptional French resistance at Bir Hacheim. The French knew that the DAK still had a score to settle with them and they wanted to avoid German capture at any cost.
When the besieged German troops under Major Wilhelm Bach (who was originally a priest from Mannheim) had to surrender at Halfaya Pass on January 17, 1942 they were put up in columns for transport by the victorious South Africans as suddenly a heavy artillery battery started firing upon the disarmed German POW column. The shells detonated amidst the Germans causing many dead and wounded. The rest of the Germans along with their South African guards took cover. After the rampage an arriving British runner reported that the French opened fire on the POW’s in contrary to the existing orders, this was translated to Major Bach by the commanding South African officer.

That may be true to an extent. But Monty wasn’t Churchill’s first choice, and if I’m not mistaken, many historians thought his chosen successor was also lackluster at best before he was killed in a plane crash. While I think Monty had his good points and was a solid commander, he also began to enjoy and overwhelming logistical advantage over the Afrika Korp thanks to the RAF and RN winning the battle in the Mediterranean, ever growing numbers of US supplied equipment, and the RAF gradually gaining local air superiority…