Sorry for my late reply, leccy. I finally got my daughter’s husband off my computer, a minor irritation, but I’ll survive. Anyway back to the topic of Poland.
Churchill and Eden wanted to appease Stalin on most territorial issues, namely the border between Poland and Russia, because those issues would seriously divide the Allied Coalition and disrupt relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. Eden, therefore, was prepared to settle the Polish border issue on the Curzon line, mostly to the dismay of the exiled government because they were not consulted on the matter; despite this occurrence, the British Foreign Office secretly redrew the Polish borders between Germany and Russia, giving Poland control over Danzig, the Silesia coal mines and Lwow (see Professor Toynbee’s map of the region). The entire eastern half of Poland was handed over to Stalin with only minor changes to the agreement made between the Soviet Union and Great Britain at Tehran.
I enjoyed your quotes from the “Big Three,” especially these:
Stalin is not that kind of man. . . He doesn’t want anything but security for his country, and I think that if I give him everything I possibly can, and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won’t try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace.
I wonder if Roosevelt remembers the speech he made in 1940 condemning the Soviet Union’s “totalitarian dictatorship” and invasion of Finland, where he said: “the Soviet Union, as everyone who has the courage to face the fact knows, is run by a dictatorship as absolute as any other dictatorship, and it has invaded a neighbor so infinitesimally small that it could do no conceivable possible harm to the Soviet Union, a neighbor which seeks only to live at peace as a democracy, and a liberal, forward-looking democracy at that.” (World War II Behind Closed Doors, page 78)
This war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes his own social system on it. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.
I’ll leave this quote alone because the point is so obvious. Stalin wanted two things from the conferences: servile Communist regimes in eastern Europe that could not conceivably pose a threat to Russia, and a host of “friendly, pro-Soviet” countries that could serve as reliable buffer states against western Europe’s possible “military intrusions.”