Tadpole-like in shape, Corregidor Island dominates the entrance to Manila Bay and, therefore, its possession is essential to any force considering using Manila Harbour. To attack the island, the first obstacle that any attacking force would have to consider, would be the strong, racing tide which rake against the entrance of the bay. The islands defences were considered so strong that it had been given the ‘monica’ of the ‘Impregnable Rock’. The eastern end of the island forms the tadpole’s tail, which consisted of sandy wooded terrain rising to a maximum height of 150 feet above sea level. On this height an airstrip known as Kindley Field, had been constructed before the Japanese invasion. At the base of the tail lies a prominence known as Mantilla Hill which rises to an elevation of 350 feet. Mantilla Hill was festooned with tunnels known as the Mantilla Tunnel complex. Beneath the western slopes of the hill lies the waist of the island, named Bottomside and from here the ground rises gradually through Middleside to the much steeper Topside, which forms the tadpoles head. Topside offers defenders the opportunity to enfilade the whole of the island and its approaches with defensive fire. Indeed when the Japanese invaded the island, the U.S. troops took a shocking toll of them. However, the Japanese finally forced the surrender on 6 May 1942. General Wainwright, not wanting to cause any more unnecessary casualties and to spare women, civilians and his wounded from the barbarism of massacre and rape which had been a hallmark of recent Japanese victories, ordered the white flag to be run up and began negotiations for surrender. Wainwright insisted that he would only surrender Corregidor, but General Homma said that hostilities would continue until Wainwright surrendered all American troops sill active in the Phillipines. Wainwright complied with Homma’s terms.
The resulting bitter taste of humiliation and sunken pride was felt by both the American military and the American public. So much so, that when McArthur’s forces returned to Luzon in January 1945, the capture of Corregidor held much more significance than pure strategic necessity.
The staff of General Walter Kreuger’s Sixth Army had been occupied for some time with the planning of the operation to take Corregidor, and had reached the conclusion that the cost of a conventional amphibious attack would be too costly and, therefore, opted for an airborne landing. When warned to expect an American airborne attack in 1945 the Japanese chose to discount this warning, as they had themselves considered an airborne attack of their own to be too risky on account of the terrain, in 1942.
The assault on Corregidor was scheduled for 16 February 1945. The assault group included 503 Parachute Infantry, 3Bn 34 Infantry Regiment, 46 Parachute Field Artillery Bn, one company of the 161 Parachute Engineer Battalion and supporting units. Overall command of the assault force was 33 year old Colonel George M. Jones. Jones accompanied a bombing raid on 6 February to reconnoitre the terrain. He saw little enemy activity, which stood to confirm that much of the enemy force was underground in the enlarged tunnel complex. The terrain had littel to offer for an airborne assault, other than the overgrown Kindley airstrip, but the General ruled out this option as it could be enfiladed from higher ground, and would be no less dangerous than an amphibious assault. This left only two minute areas on the Topside itself, one a parade ground 325 yards long and 250 yards wide and, the other, a sloping golf course 350 yards long and 185 yards wide. Each of these potential drop zones(D.Z.) were already cratered from bombing and shelling and surrounded by tangled scrub, shattered trees, demolished buildings and general debris. To top it all, the ground fell away sharply to steep sided cliffs. Then there was the wind to consider. A steady Easterly blew between 15 to 25 M.P.H with sudden, stronger gusts. Each of the transports would be over its D.Z. for as little s 6 seconds, and as the drop would be made from an altitude of four hundred feet, it was calculated that each paratrooper would drift 250 feet westward, leaving a margin of safety of 100 yards. Human error, and/or fluctuations in wind speed and direction, would, and did, result in paratroopers being dragged over the surrounding cliffs.
Sorry folks, time for a break! 32B