Received the most materiel support for the least result?
Did the least fighting commensurate with that support?
Made the greatest contribution to victory?
In my assessment.
China (Chiang / Nationalist) - Ridiculous amount of fuel, ammunition and general supplies delivered, often with little to show for it, not to mention disappearing money. The Nationalists were at heart a bunch of crooks run by a calculating crook who often spent more time and effort on dealing with problems among, and threats to his power from, his warlords than fighting the Japanese
China (Chiang / Nationalist) Ditto. No matter how much was delivered in the way of supplies, the Nationalists were often in virtual truce with the Japanese for much of the war.
China (Chiang / Nationalist) - The bulk of the IJA remained in China for the whole of the war, even if neither side was fighting much. If even half of Japan’s forces could have been released to start an eastern front against the USSR or diverted to other theatres in the Pacific or South East Asia the result might have been very different, and not just in the Pacific. Depending upon when those forces could have been released.
So, whatever their failings, the Chinese were the most important factor in enabling Japan’s defeat, which isn’t quite the same thing as saying in contributing to Japan’s defeat.
I’m not so sure about (3) - IIRC when the Soviets hit Manchuria right at the end of the war they encountered far less resistance than they were expecting, and considered it to be almost a hollow army.
I’m not saying they didn’t have to fight hard, but rather that the force in China was much more powerful on paper than in reality. Too much had been destroyed elsewhere, with the China divisions cadred to death to make up numbers. IIRC Japanese practice at the time was to fit whatever division they were raising at the time with the newest kit, then keep it in service with that kit until damaged enough that it was no longer effective, or it was the oldest one there. If this was the case, the China divisions would not only have the fewest men but also the oldest kit.
In fact I got to like all, or almost all, my Chinese very much. They are likeable people and as solders they have a high degree of the fighting man’s basic qualities – courage, endurance, cheerfulness, and an eye for country. In dealing with them I soon discovered that we got on very well, if I remembered three things about our allies:
Time meant nothing to them. No plan based on accurate timing had a hope of success. Whether it was attacking the enemy or coming to dinner, eight o’clock might mean four or just as likely twelve.
They would steal anything that came near them: stores, rations, lorries, railway trains, even the notice-boards from our headquarters. It was no good getting fussed about this or even finding it extraordinary. After all, if I had belonged to an army that had been campaigning for four or five years without any supply, transport, or medical organisation worth the name and had only kept myself alive by collecting things from other people, I should either have had much the same ideas on property or have been dead.
True, but the Soviets also had overwhelming superiority in infantry, armour, artillery, and in the air to the extent that they probably would have defeated first-rate Japanese troops anyway, along with other advantages relating to unpreparedness by the Japanese who were reorganising. Probably the biggest Soviet advantage was the complete surprise of its attack and the overwhelming forces it had marshalled without Japan being aware of them.
The Japanese defeat by the Soviets is in marked contrast to the run of victories by the Japanese from mid-1944 against the Nationalists in the south.
Maybe I should revise 3 for another reason, as I was thinking originally about the Chinese only, but the Soviets held large Japanese forces against them for the whole of the war and, in fact, from 1939. If that wasn’t the case the Japanese would have been able to use those forces against the Chinese, and probably win, or redeploy them in Asia or the Pacific. The bigger risk might have been using them in China to push into Burma and India, which avoided the critical shipping and fuel oil problems that hampered sea borne operations. I don’t have details of the deployment of forces against the Chinese Nationalists and Soviets respectively. Might be interesting figures.
Just in case my original post might be misinterpreted, I didn’t mean to imply that the rank and file Chinese soldiers were poor soldiers. When properly led and adequately supplied (and even when indadequately supplied) they were as good as anyone on the planet.
Nor were all the Chinese commanders crooks, or incompetent. Some were as good as any in any other army. But there was too much corruption and internal politicking to allow the Nationalists to operate as a cohesive force with a single aim like the Japanese facing them, which gave the Japanese a significant advantage before they even fired a shot.
Gurkhas mightn’t be allies in the sense that Nepal is a British ally, but they’re not British soldiers in the same sense as any other British soldiers, either.
Nepal is not a member of the Commonwealth, nor have Gurkhas ever been subjects of the British Crown. Gurkhas are the only non-British citizens of UK, the Commonwealth or the Republic of Ireland currently permitted to serve in our Armed Forces.
Gurkhas have served the British Crown since 1815, under arrangements made with sovereign Nepalese governments based on mutual trust and respect. The most recent arrangement was made after Indian Independence in 1947. This “TriPartite” Agreement between Nepal, the UK and India is the basis for Gurkha service in the British Army. It assumed that Gurkhas would be recruited as Nepalese citizens, remain citizens of Nepal throughout their service and be discharged as such, and this arrangement has been honoured ever since.
I suppose that, arguably, the finer point is that the Ghurkas represent a body of men, as opposed to a front-line nation, and all that a front-line nation might commit as an ally?
Some might call them mercenaries, but they serve by agreement between sovereign states, and not state and individual.
Perhaps the definition of ‘Ally’ in the context of the question, will be the solution?
If I might be permitted to ‘get the ball rolling’ with defining ‘Ally’ in the context of this thread, there are two points that spring to mind:
An allied nation, would be a sovereign state, fully capable of formulating its own independant foreign policiy;
The forces of said state be capable of fielding their own chain of command including general staff etc.
Obviously, states occupied by Axis Forces were no longer able to formulate independant foreign policy, but unless they declared otherwise (such as Vichy France), I feel they ought to be considered allies if they met the above criteria before becoming occupied.
Your general principles make sense, but like many sensible general principles they may encounter some difficulties with particular cases.
The position of the British dominions raises some difficulties about whether they would be allies or just part of the British forces. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa, among others, were originally British colonies. They became self-governing dominions before the Statute of Westminster of 1931 and, for practical purposes, independent nations within the British Empire after it. Constitutionally, each then had the British King as King of each nation exercising a function independent of his British monarchical function. This was the position throughout WWII.
Nonetheless, at least as far as Australia was concerned, it was assumed that Australia automatically followed Britain in the war against Germany. This was expressed in our Prime Minister’s ‘declaration’ of war
Fellow Australians,
It is my melancholy duty to inform you officially that in consequence of a persistence by Germany and her invasion of Poland, Great Britain has declared war upon her and that, as a result, Australia is also at war.
This was not the action of a sovereign and independent government.
Despite that, the terms of Australia’s military participation were that Australian troops would be under Australian military control subject to Australian government control. This led to repeated conflicts between British and Australian commanders in the Middle East as the British assumed that they had control of the Australian forces. The Australian commander, Gen Thomas Blamey, was also Deputy Commander of British Forces in the Middle East. Nothing can really be inferred from ‘British’ in this context as the British, with their imperial forces, were then fighting alone so there was no need to designate anything as ‘allied’, unlike the later titles descending from Eisenhower as Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force. Australian government control of its own forces was the action of a sovereign and independent government.
After Japan advanced towards Australia, in early 1942 Australia removed two of its three divisions from the Middle East, despite Churchill’s objections and unilateral attempts to divert them to Burma en route to Australia. These were the actions of an independent sovereign government (of a different and more independent political complexion than the more Anglophile one which followed Britain into the war).
After America entered the war, Roosevelt and Churchill both dealt with the Australian Prime Minister as the head of an independent nation, although they certainly didn’t treat him as an equal, nor would anyone expect them to. Nonetheless, this implies that both of those major allied partners regarded Australia as an ally rather than being subject to their control.
To complicate matters, Australians as individuals were British subjects until 1948, so how could they be allies of Britain if all members of their forces were British subjects?
So, were Australians, and possibly other Dominion forces like New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa about whose relevant history I am ignorant, Allies or British forces? I have absolutely no idea!
The forces of said state be capable of fielding their own chain of command including general staff etc.
The reference to an ally having its own general staff implies a commitment of at least a division, or maybe only a brigade depending upon the interpretation of “general staff”. Ignoring for the moment the fact that it was a British colony during WWII, what about a smaller commitment like Fiji’s 1 Battalion? http://www.nzetc.org/tm/scholarly/tei-WH2Paci-_N87490.html (click on next section at bottom of each page for more history) 1 Bn fought well and was about the size of force commensurate with Fiji’s size.
What about Newfoundland, with a population of about 320,000, which didn’t raise its own fighting force but had Newfoundland units in other nation’s forces. http://www.warmuseum.ca/cwm/disp/dis004_e.html On the other hand, it raised the non-combatant Newfoundland Overseas Forestry Unit and sent it to Britain. http://www.mgl.ca/~cpike/NOFU.html (On the earlier point about national independence, Newfoundland was covered by the Statute of Westminster but, as the Canadian War Museum link shows, gave up self-government before WWII and, unlike the dominions, was automatically at war with Germany when Britain declared war.)
Does Argentina qualify as an Ally because, after being pro-Axis, it declared war on Germany in late March 1945?
What about Nepal, which declared war on Germany at the beginning and offered Ghurkas to Britain? This relates to an earlier post about the Ghurkas and raises another situation with its own special features.
Obviously, states occupied by Axis Forces were no longer able to formulate independant foreign policy, but unless they declared otherwise (such as Vichy France), I feel they ought to be considered allies if they met the above criteria before becoming occupied.
What about the Netherlands? They were occupied in Europe but had a government in exile and a huge colony in the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) until Japan took it. After that the Netherlands transferred naval, army, and air forces to Australia as a base and continued to fight as an Ally. The Dutch naval forces in particular continued to make a useful contribution during the remainder of the war. http://www.geocities.com/dutcheastindies/ From 1942 the Dutch homeland and main colony were occupied by Axis powers but the government, or at least the monarch and a cabinet, were in exile; able to forumulate foreign policy; and still in control of their armed forces which were fighting with the Allies.
Your post highlights the complexities of Allied Forces, and the myriad difficulties that can come with commanding such a force. Many have said that in order to become a good leader of an alliance one must, in the first instance, be a good diplomat. Of course, one of the pre-requisites of being a good diplomat is flexibility.
Aware of my own ignorance regarding the constitutions and governments of other countries, I added the point of Foreign Policy. I had a sudden vision of some place such as the ‘The Big Sky Country’ proclaiming UDI and didn’t want to be held responsible.
I rather anticipated your point on size of forces. I had in mind the Canadian Division, commanded by Byng, at Vimy Ridge. The reason for a Brtish General commding the Canadians, was that prior to WW1 the Canadians had had a much smaller force than that of a Division. Therefore, they had no General with the experiance to command a force of the size of a Division. However, I was, as I said, trying to get the ball rolling. Now that it is rolling, I’d be interested in hearing others’ comments…who knows, we might come up with marketable model?
Avoiding responsibility is always a good idea. It’s saved countless politicians from the fate they deserve, and not a few generals.
I rather anticipated your point on size of forces. I had in mind the Canadian Division, commanded by Byng, at Vimy Ridge. The reason for a Brtish General commding the Canadians, was that prior to WW1 the Canadians had had a much smaller force than that of a Division. Therefore, they had no General with the experiance to command a force of the size of a Division.
I don’t know anything about this. However, I expect that the Canadians, being uncouth and unruly men wrested from frosty logging camps where it’s okay to be a lumberjack (Monty Python lumberjack song ), needed that bit of couth which a British general could introduce. A bit like the old comment about the cavalry being a force which, in battle, introduces tone into what would otherwise be an unseemly brawl.
