Number of Tigers present for the entire SS Panzer Corps at the beginning of Kursk…35.
It is suggessted by authors Rothwell, Desch and Kutta that the Russians were suffering from a phenomenon known as TIGER FEVER, something Western Allied tank crews also experienced…to quote…
“On the morning of 12 July 1943, the 5th Guards Tank Army had nearly 800 tanks and assault guns on line. About 600 of those were divided among the Army’s own 18th and 29th Tank and 5th Guards Mechanized Corps; the remaining 200 were with the 2nd Guards Tank and 2nd Tank Corps, which had been placed under command of the army especially for the counterattack.
Oft quoted Soviet sources claim there were nearly 1,000 German tanks and assault guns ranged against them, 600 of them with the 2nd SS Panzer Corps and the balance belonging to the 3rd Panzer Corps. Further, of those 600 machines, the Soviets claimed more than 100 were heavies; Tiger tanks and Elephant assault guns.
In actuality, 3rd Panzer Corps began Operation Citadel on 5 July with about 290 tanks and assault guns of all types, but by the 12th they had been reduced to somewhere between 150 to 200 operating machines. On the main sector, in front of Prokhorovka, 2nd SS Panzer Corps had 273 working tanks and assault guns, many of which had already been damaged and repaired. Of that total, fewer than 20 were Tigers and none were Elephants. Excluding an additional 50 or so self-propelled anti-guns, useful mainly for defense, the 2nd SS Panzer Corps armor strength was therefore less than half of that claimed by the Soviets.
In relation to their claims about the number of Tigers present, it seems the Soviets were afflicted with the same malady subsequently experienced by the Western Allies in Normandy; in the eyes of the allied tank crews, most German panzers were considered to be, and were reported as, “Tigers” until proven otherwise. But with only one Tiger company in each of the 2nd SS Divisions, the total available to at the start of Citadel was only 35, and by the morning of the 12th, fewer than 20 were operating. All 90 Elephants had been deployed in Citadel’s northern pincer, and it’s therefore certain none were to be found on the field of Prokhorovka.”
This discussion of numbers in relation to Soviet claims reveals Soviet figures to be highly unreliable. Voroshilov even went so far as to claim that “500,000” German soldiers were killed or captured in Citadel entire!
If this is the figure from the largest engagement of the war, how reliable can we feel Russian sources to be for the rest of it? Continually playing up German losses and playing down their own, postwar analysis seems to bear out the propaganda fiction of Soviet sources. Writers of general histories of the conflict in the East should bear this in mind, but I have read page after page of history using Soviet sources that are frankly self serveing at best, or just plain and utter TRIPE at worst.
It is my contention that Soviet generals badly mismanaged their victory, and cost the lives of literally millions of uniformed soldiers through incompetance, sloppy planning, and plain old butchery…These guys would be out of a job in any other military. Zukhov was famous for wearing down forward units to almost nothing, whilst carefully husbanded fresh troops would wait for “the moment” when German forces were most worn down, and strike before their defensive positions could harden into a thicker crust. Even the battle of Moscow was fought in this manner, although admittedly fine staff work from Zukhov managed to keep Soviet units out of pockets, and falling back to prepared positions time after time.
What do you knowlegable ones feel about this?
I’m suggesting nothing more than without a bottomless pit of fresh troops to draw from, the Soviet Union would have ceased to exist as a national entity somewhere around the summer of 1942…
What do you think…comments from both sides of this debate welcome…CHEVAN, where are you?