Trained, untrained and untried.

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#1

I was looking at ‘Battleplan’ on one of the cable channels this evening. It featured the Tet Offensive and the Battle for Stalingrad. A point which came out of it, was that as things were going really badly for the Soviets, quite ruthlessly, Stalin, through in some hundred and thirty thousand fresh troops. Many of these had had absolutely no training whatsoever. What was interesting was that it was reported that the Soviets benefited from this in a “Darwinian” way, as the troops which survived, had been those which had adapted best to their environment and became first class Urban-warfare soldiers. It makes sense when one thinks about it, but what a way to become adept…talk about on-the-job training!

Does anyone have any further knowledge of this or of similar situations?

#2

I would say theres about 500,000 Iraqis doing this right now.

#3

They have pretty enough experience nowadays in the leading the civil war and terrorists attacks.
What are they needing more?

#4

I would wager that most of the originals are long dead now and the ones that are left have become much more capable. Still the new recruits are the cannon foder.

#5

The same applied with trained troops in WWII, and undoubtedly still would. Reinforcements sent into established infantry units didn’t last long compared with battle-hardened troops. Green infantry units generally did worse than battle-hardened units.

Experienced leadership counted for a lot with green troops. A famous example is two more or less equal militia battalions on Kokoda where one, the 39th, was strongly reinforced with battle-hardened 2nd AIF officers and NCO’s from the Middle East and the other, the 53rd, wasn’t. Guess which one fought well above expectations, and which one fought well below?

It was notorious with fighter pilots that the new boys were much more likely to get shot down than the experienced ones. Survive a few combats and the chances of longer term survival went up dramatically.

Japan lost the naval air war in the Pacific in large part because after the first year its pilots were green or of limited experience compared with the American naval pilots who generally had much more experience, because the American pilots weren’t getting killed at the same rate as they were killing the Japanese pilots.

The biggest problem for trained or untrained troops is getting over the hump of the initial combat experiences, no matter how good their training. After a few serious battles those who have the necessary qualities learn to control their fear and remain effective, to varying degrees. Those who don’t either become battle casualties or, as in the Pacific Island campaigns, more likely join the huge number who don’t figure in most military history books but who were removed because they couldn’t cope. This isn’t a condemnation of the man because a lot of people just can’t handle battle.

So-called guerillas like some elements in Iraq or the IRA and countless others can’t really be compared with combat troops. Kneecapping or beheading someone is just gang thuggery, whatever the motive, while planting bombs in roads and using hit and run tactics and so-on doesn’t involve real combat. Put these sorts of guerillas into battle in any terrain with competently trained troops and they’ll get the tripe shot out of them. Which is why they wisely avoid such engagements, regardless of issues of numbers and weapons.

#6

Agree.
But they have enough human materials to led this endless guerrillas war for a long time.
This is the simular situation like was in Vietnam - even if 10 guerrillas : 1 coalition soldier - and the coalition will lose it war. Today the rate of loses about 30:1 becouse the civil war.

#7

A much smaller scale and not quite the same, but the 53rd Bn Australian Military Forces (Militia) embarked for Papua in late December 1941, going into action on Kokoda in July 1942.

About 100 men were dragooned from the military depots around Sydney in the day before embarkation and put on the ship without embarkation leave or being able to farewell anyone, unlike the other troops. Those who turned up, that is, as an awful lot of the unit went AWL because they didn’t get Xmas leave or didn’t feel like returning from it. The 100 were generally teenagers who had received no military training and at best handled a rifle for the first time on the ship on the way to Port Moresby. Once there they were used mostly as fortification and wharf labourers, so they were still quite poorly trained when they went into battle. As previously mentioned they weren’t reinforced to the same extent as the 39th Bn with battle-hardened 2nd AIF troops who’d been fighting the Italians, Germans and Vichy French in the Middle East. The 39th were also used as labourers but their new leadership improved their military training before going into action.

The 53rd didn’t hold together, and didn’t hold or reach positions, on a number of critical occasions during the Kokoda retreat, while the 39th performed heroically in all respects. The 53rd were regarded as having run from battle by some 39th Bn, and other, unit members.

There were other reasons for the different performances, including the 39th being a more cohesive unit from the start and lacking the solid core of resentment of the 53rd’s 100.

After Kokoda the 53rd Bn was amalgamated with the 55th Bn and, as the 55/53rd Bn, fought very well in subsequent campaigns. There is a view that the 53rd component fought extra well to extinguish their shame on Kokoda.

Unfortunately, I don’t think there is any record of how the 100 dragooned and untrained troops of the 53rd went. I checked the battalion history and official history and a few other books a few months back on another aspect of the 100, but they don’t rate more than few lines to a paragraph in any work.

#8

The Russian veteran Bessonov (in WW2 lieutenant and platoon leader in a motorised rifle unit with Koniev’s first Ukrainian front) describes how they would get pulled out of the line after a while of combat duty for rest and to train replacements, who often came to the unit quite green. They would have a few weeks though to tech them the basics in a camp behind the frontline.

(Evgeni Bessonov: Tank Rider, Into the Reich with the Red Army, ISBN 1-85367-554-7)

Jan

#9

Yes, that’s similar to what happened in many theatres. My original point was that those in Stalingrad were thrown into the cauldron, and that those that became the best in this battle were the ones that were simply able to learn on the job, usually because of something within themselves which enabled them to adapt to and excel at this type of warfare.