Post: Battle of the coral sea is the most spectacular battle in ww2
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Original Post:
Prelude to battle
Three Japanese task forces set sail. Two invasion forces headed for the Solomons and Port Moresby, accompanied by a covering force. This force consisted of two large, modern aircraft carriers, Shōkaku and Zuikaku (both veterans of the attack on Pearl Harbor), a smaller carrier, Shōhō, two heavy cruisers, and supporting craft.Alerted by radio intercepts, the Allies knew Japanese land-based aircraft were being moved south and that an operation was impending. Three main groups opposed the Japanese: Yorktown, which was already in the Coral Sea, Lexington, which was en route (both of which would come under the overall command of Admiral Frank Fletcher) and a joint Allied surface force, Task Force 44, under Australian Rear Admiral John Crace, made up of the cruisers HMAS Australia, HMAS Hobart, and USS Chicago, and destroyers USS Perkins, USS Walke, and USS Farragut. United States carriers Hornet and Enterprise were heading south after the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo, but arrived too late to take part in the battle.
Battle
TULAGI
Lexington joined Yorktown on May 1. The Japanese occupied Tulagi without incident on May 3, and began construction of a seaplane base. After fueling, Yorktown closed on Tulagi and on May 4 launched three successful strikes against Japanese ships and aircraft there, revealing her presence, yet sinking the destroyer Kikuzuki and five merchantmen, crippling the island’s seaplane reconnaissance capability, and damaging other vessels. Yorktown then retired south to rendezvous with the Lexington and the newly-arrived cruisers.Land-based B-17s attacked the approaching Port Moresby invasion fleet on May 6 with the usual lack of success. Almost another year would pass before the USAAF realized high-altitude bombing attacks against moving naval targets were pointless. Although both carrier groups flew extensive searches on May 6, cloudy weather kept them hidden from each other, and the two sides spent the night only 110 kilometres (70 mi) apart. Other Allied aircraft joined the battle, from airbases at Cooktown and Mareeba on Cape York Peninsula, Australia.
That night, Fletcher, whose role was to protect Port Moresby, made the difficult decision to detach Crace to block the probable course of an invasion. Fletcher and Crace knew exposing surface ships to attack by land-based aircraft without air cover risked a repeat of the loss of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse five months before. Their fears were nearly realized when the cruisers were spotted and came under an intense air attack from a squadron of torpedo bombers on the afternoon of May 7. The ships escaped with few casualties and little damage. Only minutes after the Japanese raid Crace’s force was inadvertently attacked by friendly B-17s. Farragut and Perkins once again had to endure near misses.
On May 7, both fleets launched all available aircraft, but neither found the main body of the other, mistakenly attacking subsidiary enemy forces instead. Japanese aircraft found and attacked the U.S. fleet oiler Neosho and her escorting destroyer Sims, mistaking them for a carrier and a cruiser. Two waves of torpedo and dive bombers swarmed over both ships resulting in Sims being sunk and Neosho crippled.
Meanwhile, U.S. aircraft, sent in the wrong direction by a miscoded contact report, had missed Shōkaku and Zuikaku but found the invasion fleet, escorted by the small carrier Shōhō, which was soon sunk with heavy casualties. In the previous five months, the Allies had lost numerous major warships and had been unable to sink a single major Japanese combatant in return. Shōhō was small by carrier standards, but the laconic phrase “scratch one flattop,” radioed back to Lexington by then-Lieutenant Commander Robert E. Dixon,[12] announced the first Allied naval success of the Pacific War. Dixon’s phrase was quoted by Chicago Tribune war correspondent Stanley Johnston in a June 1942 article and subsequently requoted in most accounts of the Pacific War.[13] Lexington’s commanding officer, Captain Frederick C. Sherman, USN, credited Dixon with coining the word “flattop” which became standard slang for an aircraft carrier.[13]
Finally, with dawn searches on May 8, the main carrier forces located one another and launched maximum effort raids, which passed each other in the air. Hidden by rain, Zuikaku escaped detection, but Shōkaku was hit three times by bombs. Her deck damaged, Shōkaku was unable to land her aircraft and effectively put out of action.
Lexingtons CXAM-1 radar detected the inbound Japanese aircraft at a range of 68 mi (126 km),[14] but the Americans underestimated the performance of the Nakajima B5N and positioned their fighters too low to intercept.[15] Both American carriers were hit: Yorktown by a bomb; the larger, less maneuverable Lexington by both bombs and torpedoes. Although the latter survived the immediate damage and was thought to be repairable, leaking aviation fuel exploded a little over an hour later. Lexington had to be abandoned and scuttled to prevent her capture.
Crace continued to stand between the invasion force and Port Moresby. Inoue was misled by returning fliers’ reports as to the strength of the Allied cruiser and destroyer force, and he recalled the invasion fleet. With Shōkaku damaged and Zuikaku short of aircraft, neither was able to take part in the crucial Battle of Midway a month later. The damaged Yorktown returned to Pearl Harbor for repairs.
Aftermath
Tactical analysis
Despite heavier personnel casualties due to the quick sinking of Shōhō, the Japanese had achieved a narrow tactical victory. One small carrier was lost and a large carrier severely damaged against the Americans’ loss of a large carrier and significant damage to another.Strategic analysis
In strategic terms, the Allies had won because the seaborne invasion of Port Moresby was averted. Port Moresby was vital to Allied strategy and could not have been defended by the ground forces stationed there. This was the first time that a Japanese invasion force had been turned back without achieving its objective. In addition, it was a moral victory. From the Allied point of view, after five months of continuous defeat in the Pacific, a battle that came out almost even was a victory.The battle had a substantial effect on the morale and the strategic planning of both sides. Without a hold in New Guinea the subsequent Allied advance, difficult though it was, would have been much harder still. Because their seaborne invasion had failed, the Japanese chose instead to attack Moresby overland. The consequent delay was just long enough to permit the arrival of the veteran Second Australian Imperial Force to fight the Kokoda Track campaign and the Battle of Milne Bay, which in turn relieved pressure on U.S. forces at Guadalcanal.
Carriers
Although Zuikaku was only slightly damaged, with only 40 aircraft left she was in no condition to fight and had to return to Japan to replenish her air wings. Shōkaku was severely damaged, unable to operate aircraft, and took six months to repair. Despite the likely availability of sufficient aircraft between the two ships to re-equip Zuikaku with a composite air group, the Japanese made no serious attempt to get her ready for Midway.[16]The loss of Lexington was a severe blow, as she was one of the Navy’s largest carriers. Yorktown was still able to operate aircraft. Though her damage was estimated to require 90 days of repairs when she arrived at Pearl Harbor on May 27, the Navy Yard worked around the clock and she sailed for Midway on the morning of May 30.[17] Even as she sailed, repair crews remained aboard Yorktown, working to make her more or less battle-worthy.[18]
Responses
The U.S. Navy learned a great deal from the Battle of the Coral Sea. Following the loss of Lexington, better ways to contain aviation fuel and control defensive fighter aircraft were developed. After the costly attacks on the Japanese carriers, it was clear that coordination of dive- and torpedo bombers had to be improved. Most importantly of all, the battle provided a significant morale boost because it showed that the Japanese could be beaten.Admiral Fletcher continued to command carrier forces and served as the senior USN officer at Midway. Admiral Takagi was relegated to less important assignments in the aftermath of Coral Sea.