Was Australia really that good?

Other Wars World War 1
#1

I haven’t heard this before but, according to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Australia had only one serious engagement in France in WWI with no success. Maybe it depends upon how one measures success, or no success.

On the morning of 19 July 1916, after a preliminary bombardment, the 5th Australian and 61st (South Midland) Divisions undertook what is officially known as the Attack at Fromelles. The 61st Division attack failed in the end, with the loss of over 1,000 officers and men out of 3,410 who took part in it. The Australian left and centre reached the German trenches and held their second line during the day and night, but the right was held off by a fierce machine-gun barrage and only reached the front line in isolated groups. The action was broken off on the morning of 20 July, after the 5th Australian Division had lost over 5,000 officers and men. It was the first serious engagement of the Australian forces in France, and the only one to achieve no success. V.C. Corner Cemetery was made after the Armistice. It contains the graves of over 400 Australian soldiers who died in the Attack at Fromelles and whose bodies were found on the battlefield, but not a single body could be identified. It was therefore decided not to mark the individual graves, but to record on a memorial the names of all the Australian soldiers who were killed in the engagement and whose graves were not known. The memorial, designed by Sir Herbert Baker, commemorates almost 1,300 Australian casualties.
My emphasis. http://www.cwgc.org/search/cemetery_details.aspx?cemetery=78900&mode=1

#2

I think “no success” = “stopped dead” (if you’ll forgive the unfortunate choice of language). While the Australian and Canadian corps were better than average troops (with the real achievement being that the Australians and Canadians were uniformly good), they weren’t spectacularly good compared to others - for every battle of Mont St Quentin, there was a counter-example like the storming of the St Quentin Canal by the British 46th Division.

#3

I’m wondering also whether the ‘success’ factor mentioned was temporary or permanent.

It’s one thing to take a position, which is a success, but it’s another to hold it, which is a different type of success.

If Australia had successes taking and holding positions in the many actions in which it engaged in France 1916 onwards then I’d expect that the front line wouldn’t have been so static.

#4

Simple - there were never enough Australians or Canadians to make a difference in a defensive role. That job was overwhemingly done by the French and British.

#5

Was it not the Canucks who perfected techniques of fire and movement and the use of artillery to take out battlefield obstacles that enabled WWI to leave behind the stalemate of trench warfare and break out into open warfare? Forget the battle, I’ll look it up again.

#6

I know nothing about Canadian operations in WWII, so I’d be interested to learn about their contribution to breaking the trench warfare stalemate, which might correspond in a different way with Australia’s contribution to breaking that stalement by a ‘new’, but really only largely a properly planned and properly co-ordinated ‘all arms’ operation at Hamel.

XV. Originality and Success: Lieutenant General Monash
and the Battle of Hamel, July 1918

Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. W. Silverstone, Australian Army

In ninety-three minutes on 4 July 1918, the Australian Corps, under its recently appointed commander, Lieutenant General Sir John Monash, advanced more than 2,000 yards in the vicinity of the villages of Ville and Hamel on the Somme River in France. At a cost of 1,400 casualties, it captured more than 1,600 Germans and 176 machine guns.1 Combining Mark V tanks from the British Tank Corps and supporting aircraft from the British Flying Corps, the attack employed brigades from a number of Australian divisions and four American rifle companies.

The effective integration of infantry, artillery, tanks, and aircraft characterized this battle as a noteworthy example of a successful. joint and combined offensive operation. It represented a dramatic shift from the gridlock battles of minimal gains and massive casualties typical of the earlier years of the war on the Western Front. Monash’s intellect, combined with his command style, allowed him to plan and execute complex tactical plans in an innovative manner. Monash’s vision of the enemy, his own forces, and the terrain allowed him to plan, prepare, and deploy his corps in a fashion ensuring battlefield success at an acceptable cost. Monash’s performance, his command style, and planning method significantly contributed to his capacity for originality and led to his battlefield success. His capacity for effective battle command was based on an intellect developed through a broad, rigorous education.

Planning and Preparation

After the German spring offensive of 1918, the Western Front stabilized and the Allies sought to take the initiative and maintain pressure on the Germans. In support of this policy, brigades from two Australian divisions attacked and captured the village of Morlancourt to the north of the Somme River in mid-June 1918. This attack, however, left a German salient in the Australian line in the vicinity of the village of Hamel, Hamel Wood, and Vaire Wood south of the Somme. Consequently, the German guns near Hamel were “uncomfortably enfilading” the Australian’s flank around Morlancourt.2 At this time, Marshal Foch, Allied supreme commander, requested minor offensives to disrupt the Germans’ defensive organization.

In this period, Australian offensive operations were constrained by insufficient troop strength due to a decline in recruiting. Thus, commanders had to balance the need for offensive operations against the effect of casualties on operational readiness. The previous Australian Corps commander, General Birdwood, had resisted proposals for limited offensive operations since he wished to nurture Australian strength for future major offensives. Significant casualties incurred in small operations could result in the dissolution and amalgamation of the already understrength Australian divisions. Nevertheless, the pressure of the enfilading guns at Hamel in the north, combined with a perceived. threat of a German offensive in the south against Villiers-Bretonneux, threatened Amiens and focused interest on an Australian offensive around Hamel.3

Given the need to maintain offensive pressure on the Germans while minimizing casualties, a potential solution arrived in the form of the new Mark V tank. In mid-June, both the commander of the Fourth Army, General Henry Rawlinson, and Monash observed demonstrations of this new, more mobile, and effective tank. They concluded that it had the potential to minimize casualties in an attack on Hamel.4

On 21 June, Monash submitted a plan. to Rawlinson for approval. The plan envisaged employing one or two tank battalions supported by ten battalions of infantry. The assaulting infantry would be relieved immediately after the battle by two other brigades. In this way, and by building the force from three divisions, Monash hoped to avoid heavy casualties in any one division.5 The plan incorporated the latest tank doctrine.

As a result of the success at Cambrai, contemporary British tank doctrine conceived of using tanks to capture ground, with a large element of infantry and artillery assigned to support them by "overcoming strong-points, ‘mopping-up’ trenches, and consolidating the position."6 With the tanks advancing in three lines, however, there would be "no rigid creeping barrage to serve as a screen for the infantry."7 Due to the tanks vulnerability, an artillery-laid smokescreen at Hamel would conceal them from German artillery observers while aircraft harassed German antitank guns and neutralized their aircraft. As early as practicable after the attack, the tanks would withdraw to the rear.8

The prospect of an operation in cooperation with the tanks was greeted with skepticism by Monash’s subordinates. The Australian experience with tanks was limited to an earlier operation at Bullecourt in April 1917. During that battle, the tanks had failed to arrive and the Australian 4th Division’s infantry sustained heavy casualties while pressing the attack without tank and artillery support.9 Monash selected Major General MacLagan and his staff from the 4th Division for the attack on Hamel and took action to address the apprehensions prevalent among the Australian troops.

Monash, in association with the British Tank Corps, established a program of demonstrations and familiarization training for the tanks and infantry comprising the attack formations.10 Additionally, as the planning process continued, Monash advocated a departure from tank doctrine. He planned to use increased amounts of firepower, incorporating artillery, tanks, Lewis guns, and machine guns to reduce the numbers of infantry committed.11

As planning for the attack continued, Monash instituted within his new command the practice of detailed conferences. For example, at the final conference for the Battle of Hamel on 30 June 250 officers attended a four-and-one-half-hour meeting with 133 agenda items.12 These conferences incorporated an exhaustive discussion of a detailed draft plan that Monash was prepared to alter and adapt. By the end of the conference, he expected all major participants to understand the plan in detail. Once the battle plan was agreed to, no subsequent alterations were allowed. Monash believed that this

fixity of plan engendered a confidence throughout the whole command which facilitated the work of every commander and staff officer … it obviated the vicious habit of postponing action until the last possible moment lest counter orders should necessitate some alternative action. It was a powerful factor in the gaining of time, usually all too short, for the extensive preparations necessary.13
During the conferences before the battle, opposition to the Tank Corps’ doctrine emerged among Monash’s subordinates. Thus, the draft plan was modified to include a creeping barrage, close behind which the infantry and tanks would advance.14 This approach required that the Tank Corps accept the risk attached to the vulnerability of their tall vehicles to friendly artillery fire that might fall short. Another aspect of armor-infantry cooperation to emerge from this planning process was Monash’s insistence on placing the tanks under the command of local infantry commanders; this ensured tactical unity of command and cooperation.15 Through the conference process, Monash developed a plan that adapted existing doctrine to suit his operational intent, ameliorated his subordinates’ skepticism, and ensured that all major participants were intimately familiar with the plan.

In developing the plan, Monash focused on numerous details, including tactical surprise and operational security. He took stringent care to deceive the enemy. In the days prior to the attack, he established routine artillery fires replicating the coming attack barrage. He also incorporated the use of gas mixed with smoke to condition the enemy to don his gas masks at the first sign of smoke. Gas was omitted from the smoke barrage on the day of the attack; this increased the fighting efficiency of the Australians while hindering that of the Germans, who, encumbered by their masks, were captured in large numbers. In addition, Monash had aircraft flights conceal the sound of the approaching tanks.16 Surprised by the tanks, many Germans surrendered on sighting them.17 Finally, Monash ordered two feints and a supporting attack on Ville to deceive the Germans as to the extent and strength of the attack.18

The incorporation of the American platoons in the operation also occurred during the planning phase. Units from the American Expeditionary Forces were attached to British units. Ten companies of the U.S. 65th Brigade were "sent to Monash for use in the Hamel attack."19 Their use would relieve the pressure of casualties on the Australians but was contrary to the policies of the American commander, General John Pershing. On 2 July, Pershing became aware of their imminent employment at Hamel, and withdrew six of the ten U.S. companies from Monash’s corps on 3 July. He also threatened to withdraw the remaining four companies.20

#7

The Battle of Hamel
As the battle approached, uncertainty spread through Monash’s headquarters. Pershing directed the exclusion of all American troops from the attack, and Monash was notified of this just eight hours before H-hour. Under pressure from Rawlinson to conduct the attack without the American troops, Monash informed him that it was too late to comply and that the attack would have to be abandoned if the Americans withdrew. Rawlinson requested guidance from Haig and was directed to retain the Americans in the attack.21

At 0310 on 4 July, the attack started with the battlefield obscured by heavy ground mist that impeded observation, hindered movement, but aided surprise. The attack was a complete success. The tanks, moving with the infantry, quickly neutralized resistance, with only three of the sixty tanks becoming disabled. The presence of tanks demoralized many of the enemy.22 Meanwhile, the tanks prcltected the infantry, which consolidated its position and dug in. During the consolidation, four tanks were specifically tasked to provide logistic support. These tanks delivered loads that would have required 1,200 men acting as carrying parties, Some junior commanders asserted that this was the outstanding lesson of the battle.23

During the consolidation, aircraft continued to support the ground troops overflying and mapping the new position to aid command and control. By 0600, most of the tanks had left the battlefield, and aircraft began dropping ammunition supplies to the forward troops. Additional aircraft attacked German artillery and infantry forward of the new position.24
As a result of tactical surprise and the rapid consolidation of the new position, no concerted German counterattack occurred until dusk on 4 July. Then, incorporating mustard and phosgene gas, the Germans counterattacked with only three rifle companies supported by a heavy artillery barrage. They were initially successful in penetrating the new line. However, an Australian counterattack, including some American volunteers,25 overwhelmed the enemy, capturing fifty-six men and ten machine guns.26

General Pershing, nonetheless, was not enthusiastic over the success at Hamel and the resulting 146 American casualties. He was surprised to learn "that four American companies of the 33rd Division had taken part in the attack."27 He quickly took action to prevent further circumvention of his intentions.

The Australians received congratulations from a range of higher headquarters, General Elles of the British Tank Corps later asserted that Hamel represented "the most successfully executed small battle of all arms."28 Additionally, France’s President Clemenceau visited and congratulated the Australians.29

Monash as Battle Commander

After the war, Monash’s capacity as a military commander was acclaimed by many. Field Marshal, Bernard Montgomery identified Monash "as the best general on the Western Front in Europe."30 In his war memoirs, Lloyd George alluded to Monash as "the only soldier thrown up by the British side, who possessed the necessary qualities for the position of commander-in-chief…"31 While the purpose of Lloyd George’s remarks should be viewed with some skepticism, Monash’s, emergence to prominence as a corps commander is especially significant given his background. Monash, who was Jewish, was a lieutenant colonel in the Intelligence Corps in the Australian Militia at the start of the war.
…

#8

The reasons for Monash’s emergence lies in his experiences as a civilian. As a prominent civil engineer, he had a reputation for adopting innovative engineering techniques and had extensive experience in planning and supervising complex engineering projects. Additionally, he had a remarkably broad. education in the arts, sciences, and the law.32 These experiences and his well-developed organizational skills contributed to his capacity for critical thinking and innovation.

Hamel represented a small, even undramatic, battle and did not change the course of the war nor prefigure any great innovation. Nevertheless, in this battle, Monash innovatively synchronized the actions of four independent arms. His approach marked a shift from infantry-heavy attacks (apparent even at Cambrai) to the use of firepower to support and supplement the infantry, thus allowing a reduction in the number of infantry exposed in offensive operations. His conduct of this operation became a model for other British offensives.33 Monash demonstrated what his military biographer describes as a capacity for creative originality.34 This originality enabled him to solve tactical problems and avoid the overemphasis on will alone as a principal battle factor that had resulted in overwhelming casualties in the past and no meaningful gains. Monash asserted that the Battle of Hamel represented an example of how a "perfected modern battle plan is like nothing so much as a score for an orchestral composition."35 In asserting this, Monash brought to bear his extensive experience as a civil engineer. He valued detailed planning, immersing himself in the planning process in order to prepare and deploy his corps so that success was assured before H-hour. He accepted responsibility for ensuring that his subordinate commanders understood and were committed to the plan’s successful execution. In this, he demonstrated aspects of Taylorism,36 a theory of “scientific management” prevalent in this period, and an attitude to planning reminiscent of Moltke the Elder.

In applying his method, Monash was well served by the tools at his disposal. By 1918, the Australian Corps was a superb fighting force. It possessed very high morale and a reputation for competence and aggressive action. Its commanders, at all levels, trained by years of war, were accustomed to exercising initiative. Monash’s centralized planning process was complemented by an effective fighting force capable of decentralized execution.

Monash’s performance, his command style, and planning method provide an example of how intellect, tempered by an extensive and disciplined education, can contribute to originality and success on the battlefield.
NOTES

C. E. W. Bean, Anzac to Amiens: A Shorter History of the Australian Fighting Services in the First World War (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1961), 462.

C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-18, Vol. 6, The AIF in France: May 1918-The Armistice (St. Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press, 1983), 242.

Ibid., 243-44,

Bean, Anzac to Amiens, 459; P. A. Pedersen, Monash as Military Commander (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1985), 225; and Bean, The Official History, 246.

Bean, The Official History, 251

Ibid., 247.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Bean, Anzac to Amiens, 325-28.

Sir John Monash, The Australian Victories in France in 1918 (New York: E. P. Dutton & Coy, 1920), 49-50; and Bean, The Official History, 267.

R. Prior and T. Wilson, Command on the Western Front: The Military Career of Sir Henry Rawlinson, 1914-18 (Oxford, England: Blackwell, 1922), 297.

Pedersen, 230.

B. Callinan, Sir John Monash (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1981), 13-14.

Prior and Wilson, 247; and Pedersen, 227.

Pedersen, 229; and Bean, The Official History, 269.

Bean, The Official History, 28.

Monash, 56-57.

Bean, 318-19.

Pedersen, 230.

Pedersen, 231; and Monash, 52-55.

Monash, 53-54.

Monash, 56-57.

Bean, The Official History, 305.

Ibid., 308.

Corporal R. H. Powell (Joliet), 131st Infantry; and his section volunteered. Corporal T. A. Pope (Chicago) rushed and seized a machine gun single-handedly. Pope received the Distinguished Conduct Medal and the U.S. Medal of Honor, while Powell received the Military Medal. In Bean, 316-17.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 334.

Ibid., 234-35; and Monash, 61-62.

Callinan, 18.

Callinan, 17.

G. Serle, John Monash: A Biography (Melbourne, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1982); and Pedersen.

Bean, Anzac to Amiens, 462.

Pedersen, 5, 301. J. F. C. Fuller and others have also expressed concern with this notion of creativity and originality. For example, see J. F. C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Co.), 32.

Monash, 56.

The term “Taylorism” describes aspects of Frederick Taylor’s (1856-1915) principles of scientific management which theorized that improved work practices were achievable through the scientific analysis of organizations.
http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/battles/battles.asp#XV

#9

I think the critical point to note here is the use of the phrase “all arms”. What broke the stalemate in the West (and Lone Ranger, it only broke into something approaching open warfare in the last few weeks of the war - by which time the German army had been virtually destroyed as a fighting force) was the huge attrition inflicted on the German army by the all-arms battles it fought through the latter half of 1917 and 1918, combined with the sheer battering it took from the British and French (at horrendous cost) earlier in the war.

Cambrai was the first of the All-Arms battles fought by the British/Imperial forces (and I think it is pretty misleading to single out one single national origin over another - the troops were trained and fought according to the same model, were equipped almost identically and the supporting arms were totally shared), and the stunning success owed more to the new artillery techniques than to the generous tank support.
The really critical thing about Cambrai was that it demonstrated that the British could now blow through just about any defensive line, with acceptable casualties and could cause the Germans more attrition than they suffered. This - combined with the threat of massive reinforcements from the US - caused the Germans to undertake the massive gamble of their spring/summer offensive in 1918, and led to the destruction of the German Army from the battle of Amiens onwards.

It should also be noted here that the Canadians/Australians produced some very good infantry, but they really didn’t contribute many of the other decisive implements of modern war. The air support, artillery, tanks, logistics, sea power, etc. were all provided by the British, with the artillery in particular being critical to the maintenence of the offensive. The artillery doctrine the British finally worked out (essentially a hurricane bombardment of light shells to force the enemy into dugouts and allow the attacking infantry to cross the enemy killing area unmolested, then lifting at preplanned intervals to allow a continued advance) was certainly in place at the start of WW2, explaining why the British artillery was rather lighter than everyone else’s - and appears to have been highly successful.

#10

What? Sorry, but the Canadians were considered the Shock Troops and very much the best the ‘British’ had to offer. The Anzac forces also hit far harder than their numbers (especially compared to the French!) and the adaptive tactics leading to a much higher success rate applies equally well to the Aussies as it does for Canadians…and since both countries were founded by a self-reliant breed of men who weren’t inclined to sit back and do nothing just because no one passed them an order…and so the Aussies were also considered Shock Troops who were sent to the areas that really needed to be taken.

Re: Canada in WWI…Somebody needs a history lesson:

Canada didn’t lose a single battle since 1916 and this was not lost on the British High Command.

In fact, after months of dreadful attrition in Passchendaele, Haig insisted, that the Canadians go in to deliver a victory. And they did, thereby saving Haig’s career.

(Aside: Currie, the Canadian Commander, protested fiercely against wasting his men to revive Haig’s already stalled offensive and even predicted the exact number of losses…16, 000, to hold this bit of mud. )

It wasn’t just the British who considered Canadian troops elite. The Germans tracked Canadian troop movements and consistantly placed some of their best units opposite them.

The fact is, the Canadians perfected advancing under a creeping barrage and developed advanced counter battery techniques coupled with innovative artillery gunnery that took took artillery into the modern era. Their coordinated attacks utilized infantry, air recon, artillery with detailed plans for supporting and holding objectives after they had been won.

They also practiced using decentralized command (as opposed to the British) allowing infantry the freedom to decide how to overcome obstacles as best as they saw fit becasue commanders at the rear were too far away and out of communication. Their training methods reflected this with Sgt’s and Lt.'s & higher being removed as ‘casualties’ during elaborate training excercises. This doctrine of individuated structure was a key to their consistant success, along with meticulous planning that ensured that they never lost a battle in the last 2 years of the war. No other Corps had the same unbroken series of successes.

The Canadians definitely punched way harder than their weight.

Currie reshaped his units so they advanced with Lewis guns embedded in them, along with 3-inch mortars and heavier machineguns. He reshaped the machinegun companies into machinegun battalions, making them 3 times larger, per division, than the British. And commanders on the field were allowed to allocate these battalions to suppress resistance as they encountered it. The practices of suppressing enemy fire with Lewis guns and rifle fire while other units flanked them…was a doctrine that the Canadians were the first to adopt into formalized traing across all their Corps.

I think you’ll agree that these tactics are the backbone of infantry in the modern era…as is firing artillery from map coordinates and crash bombardments.

Logistics? While the British were using 700 engineers to support each division, the Canadians prioritized the rapid delivery of ammunition, fresh troops and supplies to the newly captured areas with 3000 strong engineers per division to build the all important logistical system of roads, pontoons, and railways that allowed the infantry to move rapidly during the preparation phase as well as exploiting their success. (See The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers, Vol. 1, for way more on this.) This added logistical support freed up the infantry from work parties and allowed them to focus on training for the upcoming battles.

The Canadians also passed out surveys to men to in the winters to do post battle reviews to see where improvements could be made (along with sending researchers to the British and French to assess their lessons learned as well.) But the their real skill was in rapidly implimenting the lessons learned across all their Divisions: resulting in flexible tactics and attack doctrines.

I grant that tanks were not a favorite of the Canadians…but the surveys and overal effectiveness of tanks in WWI showed that tanks were not really all that powerful a weapon, easily bogged down and destroyed by defending artillery. But these same surveys said, give out lots of rifle grenades…we can clear MG nests with them.

Sure, there were only 4 Canadian Divisions (the 5th being broken up to replace casualties) out of the 61 Divisions in the BEF --which included 5 Aussie and 1 NZ, but the Aussies and the Canadians were considered the best and used as shock troops because they had adapted more quickly to this new format of warfare. Sure, there were powerful British Divisions too, very worthy of note (9th, 29th, 50th & 51st + the Guards) but the adaptive doctrines employed by the colonials greatly increased their striking power well beyond their size.

And finally, defensively: who do you think held Vimy Ridge or Hill 70? The Canadians who took it. Canada didn’t make a difference in defence, you say? During the major German offensives of March and April 1918, Canada held one-fifth of the entire British line!!!

#11

My understanding is that as well as being used as shock troops the Dominion troops were often held in the line much longer than most British troops when in attack, as they were more ‘durable’ in attack than many British troops.

Thanks for your exposition on Canadian actions and tactical developments, which isn’t something I knew about before.

#12

Not trying to steal Canadian thunder, but I have seen various references to Germans being disconcerted when opposed to Australian units as the Australians had a well-deserved reputation for brutal trench raids even outside major offensives.

#13

You’re absolutely correct about the Austrialian reputation for raiding. To paraphrase one German Sgt. who was stationed across from the Aussies, “They were frickin’ ninjas! Ass kickin’ ninjas. Coming over over every cloudy night, slipping into our trenches, beating the crap outta us with homemade weapons of brutalization, throwing and melting into the dark before we knew what hit us.”

The Aussies had a sort of competition going on between units, each trying for more kills, more daring raids and the biggest trophies of all: prisoners. There was a major disadvantage to this, which was, since they were so agressive, the raids lost the element of surprise as they were, in my opinion, too regular. However, the lack of surprise I’m sure didn’t make it that much easier on the Germans. I mean, can you imagine trying to sleep knowing that the past two nights had terrible raids? Or if you had 2 nights with no raids…would you be able to sleep the 3rd?

The Aussies had a tremendous reputation but they earned it. The raids were risky and cost thousands of lives.

FYI, the Canadians didn’t on well with the Aussies --at all. Being rivals as the best and most elite corps, with similar frontiersman initiative and a rough and tumble reputation to uphold…they fought constantly. (I’m talking about on leave!)

#14

You’re referring to “peaceful penetration” - the Australians started it, but everyone else used it by the end of the war.

#15

I’ve think I’ve posted this somewhere else on the forum, but it’s a lovely story apposite to your post.

Can’t recall the source but I think it comes from a bemused British unit which was encountered by a drunken Aussie, voluntarily heading back to his unit after a bit of self-approved leave. The Aussie asked to borrow, from memory, a bayonet and a cosh or truncheon, which were duly supplied. He then headed off into no man’s land and eventually returned with a dazed German prisoner, then headed back to his unit with prisoner in tow. He informed his British hosts that he figured he’d be in less trouble for being AWL if he returned to his unit with a prisoner.

#16

For those people interested in the story of the ANZACS without trolling through the numerous books on the subject try and get your hands on the 1985 five part mini series ANZACS.

Starring Paul Hogan of Crocodile Dundee infamy, this series while not entirely accurate does tell the story reasonably well if you ignore the useless romantic theme of one of the major characters.

digger

#17

WOW, I love Hulk Hogan! i hope I can find this series. I bet he rips them apart and shows it how it really was. They should have more history related stuff with famous people starring in them. thanks!

#18

Uhh… Paul Hogan and Hulk Hogan are not the same person, as suggested by the fact that they don’t have the same name!

#19

So Sorry, for some reason I was thinking of Hulk Hogan cause I thought how cool he’d be in a war show ripping the enemy apart with his big brute muscles. I guess I need glass’s. But just the same Hulk Hogan would fit in real good, especially when he turns green and starts ripping his clothes off. I mean Bill Bixby could be the war reporter and when someone pisses him off, he turns into Hulk:D Hogan!

#20

Wasn’t that Lou Ferigno playing the Hulk?