I often hear people say that Admiral Yamamoto is the best admiral Japanese Navy had during WWII. However, as I read more books on the Pacific War, it seems to me that he is way overratedl. True that he won a great attack at Pearl but I don’t see any other good strategic planning from him since then. Even for Pearl, he lacked long term vision and failed to plan the destruction of Naval infrastrutures vital to America’s comeback. And Midway was such a disaster. Janpan had overwhelming superiority in ships yet he failed to concentrate (one of the basic priinciple of warefare) and send his elite carrier on their own in the vanguard while he and the battleships stayed too far behind. Any thoughts?
Hi.
I don´t think he is overrated.
He had a clear view of the avaliable ressources of Japan and USA. And so he was one of the few leaders who was against the attack on the USA.
His strategic plan behind Pearl Habour was to take out the US Pacific Fleet for more than 6 months. During these 6 months the japanese armed forces should gather as much land as possible forcing the western allies to accept a peace offer in mid 1942. He knew that a longer war wasn´t possible with the avaliable ressources.
At Midway the US Navy had a lot luck catching the japanese carriers reparing to refuel and rearm their returning aircraft of the first attack wave with open fuel systems and bombs on the flying decks. Placing the battleships near the carriers would have made no differece as the japanese shipbourne air defence would not have been able to fight off the attacking US aircraft. Any large vessel would have only been another target. And the heavy ships were more needed to cover the attack forces at a certain distance to prevent enemy ships to reach fighting distance.
Yours
tom! 
Tom:
Yamamoto used 11 battleships, 8 carriers, 23 cruisers, 65 destroyers, ~90 auxiliary ships for the Midway operation. US Navy had only 3 carriers, 8 cruisers and 17 destroyers to fight with. However, at the cruicial moment of battle only 4 carriers, 2 battleships, 1 cruiser, and 11 destroyers are in the battle area. All other ships were either too far behind or diverted to 2ndary targets that bear no consequence on the main battle. Yes the Americans got lucky and caught the Japanese carriers loading bombs but if the Japanese had brought the whole fleet in the vincinity while splitting the 8carriers into 3 or 4 battle groups the disaster would be limited to only one group and there is no way Japan could have lost the battle with such overwhelming force. Nimitz himself did not expect to win the battle but to inflict maximum lost on the Japanese so US can gain time to rebuild and navy and save Hawaii. Anyway, I can’t see how an admiral who lost with such favorable odds can be a “Great” one.
i’m currently reading a book called “Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway” and its really changing the way I viewed Yamamoto. I still think he was rather talented and was a smart man…but his planning for Midway makes me wonder why he held in such high regard. Although I believe over confidence may have had a big deal to do it…I guess wining battle after battle for 6months can do that though.
Zuikaku and Shokaku really should have been at midway…but got stuck being sent to the Coral Sea…and even then, if they really wanted, they could have gotten Zuikaku ready in time for Midway…
The Americans also had a clear intelligence advantage at Midway (unlike at Pearl Harbor).
I think the evaluation of Yamamoto was one of a realist that knew that Japan was going to lose in a battle of attrition and industrial production with the US. He was also one ofthe few Japanese commanders that had a true understanding to the US and of the West in general…
Tom & Nickdfresh:
I totally agree with you guys that Y is one of the few Japanese admiral who understood the power of US and the eventual lost of Japan just because of the difference in industrial power. However, this is also precisely one of the main reasons why I think is overrated. If Y had such a good understanding and respect for US power, then his plan for forcing the US to negotiate for peace should include a much heavier blow to US when Japan has the superiority. Hawaii should have been plan for take over from the beginning. I don’t understand how could you provoke a bigger and stronger man by just slapping him and hope he would beg for peace.
I used to think Y is a great admiral also because he was praised for warning that Japan could not defeat US in a total war. However, thinking more makes me realized that this only makes Yamamoto a realistic admiral.
Yes the intelligence advantage was crucial for the US victory but also because of Japanese dispersion.
Later in the war, Japan knew most of the island invasions ahead of time yet they could never repel any one of them, why is that? The answer is fairly simple, US always concentrated overwhelming force and although Japan fought back hard but could never won.
If Japan had done the same at Midway, I don’t see how US could have won.
I read the ‘miracle of midway’ sometimes back, it was also luck plays part in favor to US side, both side were looking for the flat tops over the horizon,. it was the USN who spotted first the IJN flat tops and got the advantage being the first to initiate.
Didn’t a lot of the “luck” have something to do with the Americans breaking the Japanese Navy codes?
Exactly!
If the Japanese leadership had taken more notice of his pre-war advice, Japan wouldn’t have committed itself to such a disaster.
Yamamoto is over rated only by people who confine themselves to the naval actions he carried out in pursuance of a strategy and orders he disagreed with.
Still, he should have destroyed the oil tanks at Pearl.
Yes, but I think there are some misconceptions. I don’t believe that the US had completely broken the IJN codes and they were still using code words for objectives. I can’t remember the exact code acronym, but the Japanese had a specific two-letter designation for Midway. The US code breakers were not sure, but strongly suspected that the target was Midway; so they ordered the Marine garrison to send a fake, uncoded radio message about needing fresh water because of the desalinization machines breaking down. The Japanese message traffic then relayed that their target was low on fresh water and the IJN objective became clear…
Was that his call though? I thought the tactical strike commander (Nagumo?) called off the third wave because of fears of the US carriers were lurking nearby…
Hihi, I heard that before and always wondered how stupid they were to fall for that. Maybe it’s just my mistrusting character, but if I had been the Japanese guy in charge, the US Naval Intelligence would’ve been in for a surprise. Of course it’s easy to say that in hindsight, but a plaintextmessage about the single commodity that could decisively identify midway cause it was the only island that had no fresh water source would’ve caught my attention. But I guess it was only some bloke who wasn’t briefed and just had the order to forward all messages and didn’t know about the upcoming attack. But if that was the case they just could’ve ordered to use the islands name, not the code name.
Hello,
The designation for Midway was “AF”—
That’s something I’ve never understood.
Even less with the attack on Port Moresby being Operation MO and the advance to Fiji and Samoa being Operation FS, which is consistent with the English words.
The Japanese didn’t use the English alphabet, so how were these designations translated into English?
This is about what I know about it. http://www.iwm.org.uk/upload/package/25/pearl_harbour/ph_3rdwave.htm
I’d like to see any detailed orders Yamamoto and Nagumo issued.
I’ve seen a high command order in the usual generalised terms about destroying the US fleet in the eastern Pacific ( p. 2/7 http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/pt_12/x12-p431.html ) but I don’t know about specific orders getting down to what that meant at an operational level and how it might bear on destroying the oil tanks etc.
Nagumo’s decision not to launch the third wave was perfectly sound in the circumstances, but a more adventurous commander might have improved Japan’s position significantly if they’d gone back for the third wave. Then again, if he’d hung around for that and the USN carriers pounded the Japanese fleet as they did at Midway, he’d be viewed as an idiot for losing Japanese naval control on the first day of the war by not scooting when he didn’t know where the US carriers were.
The Wiki article on Pearl Harbor also adds a couple things I didn’t know. Nagumo was concerned about being caught with a flight deck full of bomb racks and refueling apparatus (a situation that happened at Midway) if the US carriers showed up, or even a counterattack from the islands was launched, and the Japanese planes (after refitting and carrying out the third strike) may not have returned until after dusk, making their carrier landings very hazardous for the tail end of the formations…
Found the orders for the attack on Pearl.
The third wave was optional and dependent upon circumstances.
Note that battleships were priority targets over aircraft carriers, which I suppose reflects the contemporary naval obsession with battleships as the queen of the seas. Somewhat ironic orders when it was a carrier force that was going to destroy battleships from well outside the range of their targets.
- The Operation of the Air Attack Forces
The force will be 700 nautical miles due north of point Z (set at the western extremity of the Island of Lanai) at 0600 hours X-1 Day and advance on a course of 180 degrees from 0700 hours X-1 Day at an increased speed of 24 knots.
Air attacks will be carried out by launching the first attack units 230 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0130 hours X Day, and the second attack unit at 200 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0245 hours.
After the launching of the second attack units is completed, the task force will withdraw northward at a speed of about 24 knots. The first attack units are scheduled to return between 0530 and 0600 hours and the second attack units are scheduled to return between 0645 and 0715 hours.
Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.
[7]. General outline.
[Page 14]If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progresses favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will be achieved.
In the event that a powerful enemy surface fleet appears, it will be attacked.
- Organization of the Air Attack Units
(see Chart 2)
[b]3. Targets
a. The First Attack Units
The targets for the first group will be limited to about four battleships and four aircraft carriers; the order of targets will be battleships and then aircraft carriers.
The second group will attack the enemy land-based air strength according to the following assignment:
The 15 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Ford Island
The 16 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Wheeler Field
The targets of Fighter Combat Units will be enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.
b. The Second Attack Units
The first group will attack the enemy air bases according to the following assignment:
The 5 Attack Unit: Aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island and Barbers Point.
The 6 Attack Unit: Hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field.
The targets for the second group will be limited to four [/b]
[Page 15]
Chart 2
Organization of the Air Attack Units
1st Attack Units CO Commander Fuchida
1st Group CO do
1st Attack Unit CO do 15 Kates each fitted with a 800-kg Armor Piercing Bomb for level (high altitude) bombing. 2nd Attack Unit CO Lt Cmdr Hashiguchi 15 Kates-Same bombs as 1st Attack Unit. 3rd Attack Unit CO Lt Abe 10 Kates-Same bombs as 1st Attack Unit. 4th Attack Unit CO Lt Cmdr Kusmi 10 Kates-Same bombs as 1st Attack Unit. 1st Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Cmdr Murata 12 Kates each fitted with an Aerial Torpedo, Mark 91. 2nd Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Kitajima 12 Kates-Same torpedoes as 1st Torpedo Attack Unit. 3rd Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Nagai 8 Kates-Same torpedoes as 1st Torpedo Attack Unit. 4th Torpedo Attack Unit CO Lt Matsumura 8 Kates-Same torpedoes as 1st Torpedo Attack Unit.2nd Group CO Lt Cmdr Takahashi
15th Attack Unit CO do 27 Vals each fitted with a 250-kg Anti-ground (general purpose) bomb for dive bombing. 16th Attack Unit CO Lt Sakamoto 27 Vals-Same bomb as 15th Attack Unit.3rd Group CO Lt Cmdr Itaya
1st Fighter Combat Unit CO do 9 Zekes for air control and strafing 2nd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Shiga 9 Zekes-Same Mission 3rd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Suganami 9 Zekes-Same Mission 4th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Okajima 6 Zekes-Same Mission 5th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Sato 6 Zekes-Same Mission 6th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Kaneko 6 Zekes-Same Mission2nd Attack Units
1st Group CO Lt Cmdr Shimazaki
6th Attack Unit CO do 27 Kates each fitted with a 250-kg Anti-ground (general purpose bomb and six 60-kg Ordinary bombs for level (high altitude) bombing. 5th Attack Unit CO Lt Ichihara 27 Kates-Same bombs as 6th Attack Unit[Page 16]
Chart 2 (Cont’d)
2nd Group CO Lt Cmdr Egusa
13th Attack Unit CO do 18 Vals each fitted with a 250-kg Ordinary bomb for dive bombing. 14th Attack Unit CO Lt Kobayashi 18 Vals-Same bombs as 13th Attack Unit 11th Attack Unit CO Lt Chihaya 18 Vals-Same bombs as 13th Attack Unit 12th Attack Unit CO Lt Makino 18 Vals-Same bombs as 13th Attack Unit3rd Group CO Lt Shindo
1st Fighter Combat Unit CO do 9 Zekes for air control and strafing 2nd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Nikaido 9 Zekes-Same Mission 3rd Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Iida 9 Zekes-Same Mission 4th Fighter Combat Unit CO Lt Kumano 9 Zekes-Same Mission[Page 17]
or five enemy aircraft carriers. If the number of targets is insufficient, they will select targets in the order of cruisers and battleships.
The Fighter Combat Units will attack the enemy aircraft in the air and on the ground.
- Attack Procedure
a. The First Attack Units
(1) With the element of surprise as the principle, attacks will be carried out by the torpedo unit and bomber unit of the First Group, and then the Second Group.
(2) During the initial phase of the attack, the Fighter Combat Units will, in one formation, storm the enemy skies about the same time as the First Group, and contact and destroy chiefly the enemy interceptor planes.
In the event that no enemy aircraft are encountered in the air, the units will immediately shift to the strafing of parked aircraft as follows:
1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units: Ford Island and Hickam Field.
3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units: Wheeler Field and Barbers Point.
5th and 6th Fighter Combat Units: Kaneohe
(3) In the event that the advantage of surprise attack cannot be expected due to strict enemy security, the
[Page 18]
approach and attack will be made in the order of the Fighter Combat Units, Dive Bombing Units, Horizontal Bombing Units and the Torpedo Attacking Units.
b. The Second Attack Units
All units will storm the enemy skies almost simultaneously and launch the attacks.
Although the general outline of the operations of the Fighter Combat Units corresponds to that of the First Attack Units, the strafing will be carried out according to the following in case there are no enemy aircraft in the air.
1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units: Ford Island and Hickam Field
3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units: Wheeler Field and Kaneohe
c. The general outline of attack in the event that enemy aircraft carriers and the main body of the U.S. Fleet are in anchorages outside Pearl Harbor are:
(1) The organization and targets are the same as mentioned above. The First Attack Units of the First Group, however, will increase the number of torpedo bombers as much as possible.
(2) Escorted by the Fighter Combat Units, the Air Attack Units will proceed in a group and attack the designated targets in the order of the enemy fleet anchorages and the Island of Oahu. If attacks on
[Page 19]
the enemy fleet anchorages progress favorably, however, the Fighter Combat Units and the 2nd Group of the First Air Attack Unit will immediately proceed to the Island of Oahu. Upon completion of the attacks, the anchorage attack unit will return directly to the carriers.
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/monos/097/index.html
my understanding is that during the war, the Japanese were unable to type hiragana and katakana, let alone kanji, so they were forced to use the Roman Alpahabet.
Thanks for that.
Can you expand on it?
Was it a consequence of transmitting signals by machines using the Roman alphabet?