Okay, I admit I can’t remember why, but why did Russia not help the Allies fight Japan in the Pacific Campaign?
Perhaps because was facing the menace to be destroyed by the most powerful army in Europe in the other extreme of his geography.
The Soviets helped near the end in August.
Note:
Most histories of the Second World War, with their Eurocentric emphases, begin on 1 September 1939, and date the entrance of the United States and Japan into the war on 7 December 1941 with the attack on Pearl Harbor. In fact, the Pacific war began in June, 1937, when Imperial Japanese forces launched a massive invasion of China.
By 1938 it was clear to any Americans serving in the Far East that there would be war between Japan and the U.S. What was not known was where and when it would begin.
Factor in the capitulation of Japan
Usually given short shrift in accounts of the Pacific war is the Soviet invasion of China and North Korea in early August of 1945, and its importance in convincing the Japanese to surrender. Indeed, some historians have viewed the loss of Manchuria - and the implicit threat of a total collapse of Japanese power in China as a whole - as a decisive factor in the Japanese surrender, perhaps more important than the atomic bombings. In particular, it is said that the Japanese were eager to surrender to the United States before they were occupied by the Soviet Union.
As the following excerpts from Lt. Col. Glantz’s work show, in terms of men and equipment, this brilliant surprise attack, codenamed Operation August Storm, was one of the largest campaigns of World War II. The operation was carried out as a classic double pincer envelopment over an area the size of Western Europe.
In brief, the Soviet Order of Battle comprised three Fronts (Army Groups); the Trans-Baikaal Front, the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the 2nd Far Eastern Front. These Army Groups included ten armies, one mechanized corps, one cavalry-mechanized corps, and one detached rifle corps.
Soviet Union
1,577,225 men,
26,137 artillery,
1,852 sup. artillery,
3,704 tanks,
5,368 aircraft
Japan
1,040,000 men,
6,700 artillery,
1,000 tanks,
1,800 aircraft,
1,215 vehicles
August Storm: The Soviet Strategic
Offensive in Manchuria
Lt. Col. David M. Glantz
Leavenworth Papers
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1983.
Preface
Westerners have concluded that little worthy of meaningful study occurred in the Asian theaters of war. These impressions reflect a distinct German bias in the analyses of operations on the eastern front and an anti-Asian front bias concerning World War II in general. Both impressions are false. Yet, over the decades since World War II, they have perpetuated an inaccurate view of the war, particularly of Soviet performance in that war.
Our view of the war in the east derives from the German experiences of 1941 and 1942, when blitzkrieg exploited the benefits of surprise against a desperate and crudely fashioned Soviet defense. It is the view of a Guderian, a Mellenthin, a Balck, and a Manstein, all heroes of Western military history, but heroes whose operational and tactical successes partially blinded them to strategic realities.
This imbalanced view of German operations in the east imparts a reassuring, though inaccurate, image of the Soviets. We have gazed in awe at the exploits of those Germans who later wrote their personal apologies, and in doing so we have forgotten the larger truth: their nation lost the war - and lost it primarily in the east against what they portrayed as the “artless” Soviets.
Our second bias, so conspicuous in our historical neglect of the Pacific Theater of World War II, has combined with our acceptance of the German interpretation of the eastern front so as to blind us to what was the pre-eminent Soviet military effort in World War II - the Soviet strategic offensive of 1945 in Manchuria.
For the Soviets, the Manchurian offensive was the logical by-product of their war experience, a surgically conducted offensive with almost predestined results. The fact that Japan was a seriously weakened nation by the summer of 1945 was clear. What was not clear was the prospect of an immediate Japanese surrender. The likelihood of a Japanese Götterdämmerung on the scale of Germany’s loomed large in the eyes of American and Soviet planners. The potential cost in Allied manpower of reducing Japan could be deduced from the fanatical Japanese resistance on Okinawa as late as April-June 1945, when Americans suffered more than 49,000 casualties (12,500 dead) in battle against about 117,000 Japanese troops. And the Home Islands still had more than 2.3 million Japanese soldiers; Manchuria, more than 1 million. So Allied planners expected the worst and designed operations in deadly earnest for what they believed would be prolonged, complicated campaigns against the remaining Japanese strongholds.
Based on proven capabilities of the Japanese High Command and the individual Japanese soldier, Soviet plans were as innovative as any in the war. Superb execution of those plans produced victory in only two weeks of combat. Although Soviet planners had overestimated the capabilities of the Japanese High Command, the tenacious Japanese soldier met Soviet expectations. He lived up to his reputation as a brave, self-sacrificing samurai who, though poorly employed, inflicted 32,000 casualties on the Soviets and won their grudging respect. Had Japanese planners been bolder - and Soviet planners less audacious - the price of Soviet victory could well have been significantly higher.
Scope, magnitude, complexity, timing, and marked success have made the Manchurian offensive a continuing topic of study for the Soviets, who see it as a textbook case of how to begin war and quickly bring it to a successful conclusion. They pay attention to the Manchurian offensive because it was an impressive and decisive campaign.
Our neglect of Soviet operations in World War II in general - and in Manchuria in particular - testifies not only to our apathy toward history and the past in general, but also to our particular blindness to the Soviet experience. That blindness, born of the biases we bring to the study of World War II, is a dangerous phenomenon. How can we learn if we refuse to see the lessons of our past for our future?
The Battle
Shortly after midnight on 9 August 1945, assault parties of Soviet troops crossed the Soviet-Manchurian border and attacked Japanese positions in Manchuria. This was the vanguard of a force of more than 1.5 million men that was to advance along multiple axes on a frontage of more than 4,400 kilometers, traversing in its course virtually every type of terrain from the deserts of Inner Mongolia to the shores of the Sea of Japan. Thus began one of the most significant campaigns of World War II.
For the Soviets, the Manchurian offensive marked the culmination of four years of bitter conflict with Germany in the west and a similar period of worried attentiveness to Japanese intentions in the east. The Soviets had absorbed the potent attacks of the Germans in 1941, 1942, and 1943 and had rebounded with their own 1944 and 1945 offensives, which finally crushed the military machine of Germany. While the Soviets waged a war of survival with the Germans, precious Soviet units remained in the Far East to forestall a possible Japanese attack in support of its Axis partner. Because of the combination of Soviet victories in the west and Japanese defeats in the Pacific, the potential for Japanese attack on the Soviet Far East diminished. Conversely, as Allied victory over Germany approached in 1945, Allied leaders continued to press Stalin to commit his forces against Japan in order to complete the destruction of the Axis combination.
Moved by Allied appeals for support and wishing to cement the Soviet Union’s postwar position in the Far East, Soviet leaders began planning a final campaign to wrest from Japan Manchuria, northern Korea, southern Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. The enormity of the task of conquering the vast expanse of Manchuria before a Japanese surrender rivaled the challenges of earlier operations. More than 10,000 kilometers separated Manchuria from the main area of Soviet operations in Europe. Forces and equipment destined for deployment to Manchuria had to move along a transportation network limited in capacity and fragile in its composition. Soviet estimates of force requirements necessary to undertake such an extensive campaign were correspondingly large. Thus, the anticipated campaign involved extensive planning and preparations stretching over a five-month period from April to August 1945. The results of the campaign attested to the success of the planning and the thoroughness of preparations.
In nine days Soviet forces penetrated from 500 to 950 kilometers into Manchuria, secured major population centers, and forced the Japanese Kwantung Army and its Manchukuoan and Inner Mongolian auxiliaries to surrender. Thus, Soviet forces achieved their territorial objectives within a limited period of time, despite severe terrain obstacles and significant Japanese resistance. The campaign validated the experience Soviet forces had gained in the war against Germany. The Red Army applied the advanced tactical and operational techniques it had learned in the brutal school of war in the west. It also displayed the requisite degree of audacious leadership Soviet commanders had laboriously developed during the western campaigns. The Manchurian campaign represented the highest state of military art in Soviet World War II operations. Contemporary officers and any serious student of twentieth century warfare can benefit greatly from an understanding of the nature of this campaign.
The Soviets helped near the end in August.
PART I
Note:
Most histories of the Second World War, with their Eurocentric emphases, begin on 1 September 1939, and date the entrance of the United States and Japan into the war on 7 December 1941 with the attack on Pearl Harbor. In fact, the Pacific war began in June, 1937, when Imperial Japanese forces launched a massive invasion of China.
By 1938 it was clear to any Americans serving in the Far East that there would be war between Japan and the U.S. What was not known was where and when it would begin.
Factor in the capitulation of Japan
Usually given short shrift in accounts of the Pacific war is the Soviet invasion of China and North Korea in early August of 1945, and its importance in convincing the Japanese to surrender. Indeed, some historians have viewed the loss of Manchuria - and the implicit threat of a total collapse of Japanese power in China as a whole - as a decisive factor in the Japanese surrender, perhaps more important than the atomic bombings. In particular, it is said that the Japanese were eager to surrender to the United States before they were occupied by the Soviet Union.
As the following excerpts from Lt. Col. Glantz’s work show, in terms of men and equipment, this brilliant surprise attack, codenamed Operation August Storm, was one of the largest campaigns of World War II. The operation was carried out as a classic double pincer envelopment over an area the size of Western Europe.
In brief, the Soviet Order of Battle comprised three Fronts (Army Groups); the Trans-Baikaal Front, the 1st Far Eastern Front, and the 2nd Far Eastern Front. These Army Groups included ten armies, one mechanized corps, one cavalry-mechanized corps, and one detached rifle corps.
Soviet Union
1,577,225 men,
26,137 artillery,
1,852 sup. artillery,
3,704 tanks,
5,368 aircraft
Japan
1,040,000 men,
6,700 artillery,
1,000 tanks,
1,800 aircraft,
1,215 vehicles
August Storm: The Soviet Strategic
Offensive in Manchuria
Lt. Col. David M. Glantz
Leavenworth Papers
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1983.
Preface
Westerners have concluded that little worthy of meaningful study occurred in the Asian theaters of war. These impressions reflect a distinct German bias in the analyses of operations on the eastern front and an anti-Asian front bias concerning World War II in general. Both impressions are false. Yet, over the decades since World War II, they have perpetuated an inaccurate view of the war, particularly of Soviet performance in that war.
Our view of the war in the east derives from the German experiences of 1941 and 1942, when blitzkrieg exploited the benefits of surprise against a desperate and crudely fashioned Soviet defense. It is the view of a Guderian, a Mellenthin, a Balck, and a Manstein, all heroes of Western military history, but heroes whose operational and tactical successes partially blinded them to strategic realities.
This imbalanced view of German operations in the east imparts a reassuring, though inaccurate, image of the Soviets. We have gazed in awe at the exploits of those Germans who later wrote their personal apologies, and in doing so we have forgotten the larger truth: their nation lost the war - and lost it primarily in the east against what they portrayed as the “artless” Soviets.
Our second bias, so conspicuous in our historical neglect of the Pacific Theater of World War II, has combined with our acceptance of the German interpretation of the eastern front so as to blind us to what was the pre-eminent Soviet military effort in World War II - the Soviet strategic offensive of 1945 in Manchuria.
For the Soviets, the Manchurian offensive was the logical by-product of their war experience, a surgically conducted offensive with almost predestined results. The fact that Japan was a seriously weakened nation by the summer of 1945 was clear. What was not clear was the prospect of an immediate Japanese surrender. The likelihood of a Japanese Götterdämmerung on the scale of Germany’s loomed large in the eyes of American and Soviet planners. The potential cost in Allied manpower of reducing Japan could be deduced from the fanatical Japanese resistance on Okinawa as late as April-June 1945, when Americans suffered more than 49,000 casualties (12,500 dead) in battle against about 117,000 Japanese troops. And the Home Islands still had more than 2.3 million Japanese soldiers; Manchuria, more than 1 million. So Allied planners expected the worst and designed operations in deadly earnest for what they believed would be prolonged, complicated campaigns against the remaining Japanese strongholds.
Based on proven capabilities of the Japanese High Command and the individual Japanese soldier, Soviet plans were as innovative as any in the war. Superb execution of those plans produced victory in only two weeks of combat. Although Soviet planners had overestimated the capabilities of the Japanese High Command, the tenacious Japanese soldier met Soviet expectations. He lived up to his reputation as a brave, self-sacrificing samurai who, though poorly employed, inflicted 32,000 casualties on the Soviets and won their grudging respect. Had Japanese planners been bolder - and Soviet planners less audacious - the price of Soviet victory could well have been significantly higher.
Scope, magnitude, complexity, timing, and marked success have made the Manchurian offensive a continuing topic of study for the Soviets, who see it as a textbook case of how to begin war and quickly bring it to a successful conclusion. They pay attention to the Manchurian offensive because it was an impressive and decisive campaign.
Our neglect of Soviet operations in World War II in general - and in Manchuria in particular - testifies not only to our apathy toward history and the past in general, but also to our particular blindness to the Soviet experience. That blindness, born of the biases we bring to the study of World War II, is a dangerous phenomenon. How can we learn if we refuse to see the lessons of our past for our future?
The Battle
Shortly after midnight on 9 August 1945, assault parties of Soviet troops crossed the Soviet-Manchurian border and attacked Japanese positions in Manchuria. This was the vanguard of a force of more than 1.5 million men that was to advance along multiple axes on a frontage of more than 4,400 kilometers, traversing in its course virtually every type of terrain from the deserts of Inner Mongolia to the shores of the Sea of Japan. Thus began one of the most significant campaigns of World War II.
For the Soviets, the Manchurian offensive marked the culmination of four years of bitter conflict with Germany in the west and a similar period of worried attentiveness to Japanese intentions in the east. The Soviets had absorbed the potent attacks of the Germans in 1941, 1942, and 1943 and had rebounded with their own 1944 and 1945 offensives, which finally crushed the military machine of Germany. While the Soviets waged a war of survival with the Germans, precious Soviet units remained in the Far East to forestall a possible Japanese attack in support of its Axis partner. Because of the combination of Soviet victories in the west and Japanese defeats in the Pacific, the potential for Japanese attack on the Soviet Far East diminished. Conversely, as Allied victory over Germany approached in 1945, Allied leaders continued to press Stalin to commit his forces against Japan in order to complete the destruction of the Axis combination.
Moved by Allied appeals for support and wishing to cement the Soviet Union’s postwar position in the Far East, Soviet leaders began planning a final campaign to wrest from Japan Manchuria, northern Korea, southern Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. The enormity of the task of conquering the vast expanse of Manchuria before a Japanese surrender rivaled the challenges of earlier operations. More than 10,000 kilometers separated Manchuria from the main area of Soviet operations in Europe. Forces and equipment destined for deployment to Manchuria had to move along a transportation network limited in capacity and fragile in its composition. Soviet estimates of force requirements necessary to undertake such an extensive campaign were correspondingly large. Thus, the anticipated campaign involved extensive planning and preparations stretching over a five-month period from April to August 1945. The results of the campaign attested to the success of the planning and the thoroughness of preparations.
In nine days Soviet forces penetrated from 500 to 950 kilometers into Manchuria, secured major population centers, and forced the Japanese Kwantung Army and its Manchukuoan and Inner Mongolian auxiliaries to surrender. Thus, Soviet forces achieved their territorial objectives within a limited period of time, despite severe terrain obstacles and significant Japanese resistance. The campaign validated the experience Soviet forces had gained in the war against Germany. The Red Army applied the advanced tactical and operational techniques it had learned in the brutal school of war in the west. It also displayed the requisite degree of audacious leadership Soviet commanders had laboriously developed during the western campaigns. The Manchurian campaign represented the highest state of military art in Soviet World War II operations. Contemporary officers and any serious student of twentieth century warfare can benefit greatly from an understanding of the nature of this campaign.
PART II
Conclusions
The Soviet High Command projected that operations in Manchuria would last about one month and prepared accordingly. Preparations for a short, victorious campaign involved massive redeployments of forces in limited time under conditions of secrecy. Carefully selected commanders manned a unified command structure to control the massive forces operating on such a wide front. Commanders at all levels selected strategic, operational, and tactical objectives and tailored their forces to secure them in the shortest possible time. A vast array of support units of all types prepared to support the combat forces. As planned, operations exploited terrain and dynamically used all elements of combat power, especially armor. Flexibility and audacity characterized the operation. Commanders at all levels displayed initiative to achieve success.
Challenging the Soviets in Manchuria were stringent time requirements, terrain obstacles, and Japanese resistance. The Soviet Army met the first two challenges itself, while Japanese dispositions and plans helped it meet the third. Essentially, the Soviets completed the operation in seven days (by 16 August). Subsequent engagements and movements were pro forma. The Soviets exceeded their timetable by three weeks, suffered light casualties, and overwhelmed the Kwantung Army.
Why the Soviet victory? In essence, ultimate Soviet victory was inevitable. The preponderance of Soviet forces, the crumbling Japanese strategic posture in the western Pacific, the devastating bombing offensive against Japan (including the atomic bomb), and the weakened condition of the Kwantung Army all spelled inevitable defeat for Japan. So the real question then becomes why did the Soviet victory come so quickly? Although it is convenient to use the oversimplifications cited above, they mask other reasons for quick Japanese defeat.
The Soviets expected a difficult campaign when they entered Manchuria, so they prepared accordingly. The result was a bold plan of operations. The Soviets apparently had a fairly good knowledge of Japanese defensive plans and adjusted forces accordingly. Nevertheless, they probably over-assessed the strength of Japanese covering units on the border, hence the massiveness of initial Soviet attacks. The Soviets also expected greater Japanese resistance in the redoubt area of southern Manchuria. Soviet planning reflected this overestimation in several decisions: to gain the central Manchurian plain, to inflict piecemeal defeat on Japanese forces, and to divide them before they could consolidate. Thus, the attack occurred on many axes, including the thrusts into Korea. But even Soviet commanders were surprised at the scope and speed of their own successes.
In terms of leadership, equipment, and manpower, the Kwantung Army of 1945 certainly was not the same army as it was in 1941, but it was also not as ineffective as some analysts have claimed. In many instances, the marginal replacements of 1945 performed well on the battlefield, whenever they were permitted to fight. Even in reduced state, Japanese divisions outmanned their Soviet equivalents and fought well. Thus, the Japanese 80th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 119th Infantry Division did a remarkable job at Hailar and on the road through the Grand Khingan Mountains to Pokotu. The 135th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 123d Infantry Division acquitted themselves well at Aihun and Sunwu. Many border garrisons, holed up in fortified regions against overwhelming numbers, performed heroic defenses and earned the respect of their adversaries, who perhaps thought of similar Soviet sacrifices at Brest and Sevastopol. The Soviets viewed with awe the Japanese “death units,” which threw their explosive-laden bodies at Soviet tanks. In fact, where Japanese forces stood and fought under competent leadership, they did a credible job and gave the Soviets the opposition they had expected. In reality, it was the higher echelon leadership of the Kwantung Army who engineered the army’s overall mediocre performance.
Unquestionably, the cease-fire rumors and the ultimate surrender decision disrupted Japanese operations and forestalled possibly greater Japanese resistance in southern Manchuria. Yet much of the damage had already been done and could not be undone. Setting aside Soviet actions, the Japanese High Command reacted sloppily and indecisively, whether because of overconfidence, complacency, confusion, or pessimism. Japanese overconfidence and complacency regarding the Soviets had persisted for years, if not decades, before the Manchurian campaign. The Khalkhin-Gol defeat at the hands of the Soviets was surprising to Japanese commanders in 1939, but even more surprising was how little they had learned from it. Perhaps the Soviet defeats of 1939 and 1940 in Finland and in 1941 at the hands of the Germans gave rebirth to that Japanese complacency and overconfidence.
Yet, five years later, by 1945, little had been done to modernize the Japanese infantry division to make it capable of engaging a modern Soviet rifle division, much less a tank or mechanized unit. Antitank weapons were lacking, and although the division was heavy in manpower, it was lighter in firepower than the Soviet equivalent. In mechanized and tank forces, the Japanese also compared badly: they had no tank comparable to the Soviet medium T-34. The Kwantung Army was scarcely better equipped to conduct mobile war in 1945 than it had been in 1939. At least in part, this deficiency was a measure of complacency and overconfidence. Japanese plans forgot or ignored another lesson from 1939: the Soviets had a penchant for doing the seemingly impossible, such as using the arid wastes of eastern Mongolia as a launching pad for a major invasion of Manchuria. Whether through complacency or overconfidence, the Japanese demonstrated a traditional tendency to underestimate the Soviets. That underestimation spelled doom for the Kwantung Army. For whatever reasons, Japanese commanders failed their army. Confusion reigned at the top, and area army and army orders conflicted. Thus, many units withdrew from combat, while others were swallowed up by it.
Compounding the Japanese difficulties was the nature of the Soviet offensive. Japanese plans might have succeeded to a greater degree against a lesser foe. Unfortunately, the Japanese High Command faced a highly professional force led by the cream of the Soviet officer corps, blooded and educated in four years of war. Far East Command units were among the best in the Soviet Army, and their equipment had been tested against the best weaponry European arsenals could produce. For the Soviet Army, this was the last campaign in a long war, quite literally one last opportunity to excel. And excel it did. The Manchurian operation qualified as a postgraduate exercise for Soviet forces, the culmination of a rigorous quality education in combat begun in western Russia in June 1941.
Historians must exercise care when projecting lessons from the study of any military campaign, for the value of such a study derives from viewing that campaign against the concrete conditions that affected its conduct. The Manchurian campaign may hold tactical lessons to be learned and applied in similar contemporary situations, basic techniques that transcend the technological changes that have occurred since 1945. If in fact such constants, or tactical techniques derived from battle that apply to any period, do exist, then Manchuria is worthy of study.
The concrete conditions Soviet forces faced in Manchuria presented Soviet planners a unique set of problems associated with how to attack and win quickly in the beginning period of war. The Soviets adopted techniques formulated to solve those precise problems. For example, speedy advance would preempt initial or subsequent Japanese establishment of a solid defense and would secure strategically critical territory before the Japanese could decide to abandon the war effort. Speedy advance, of course, required the Soviets to crush any opposition that might threaten their ability to adhere to that timetable.
PART III
Thus, the Soviets structured their forces to squelch the opposition and to generate the requisite speed. They also adopted tactical methods to maintain that momentum. Using cover and deception, they assembled and deployed their forces in secret. These precautions bolstered the effectiveness of other combat techniques. Soviet forces attacked on multiple axes - in fact along every possible axis - with a majority of forces well forward in the first echelon as a means of bringing maximum pressure to bear on an already overextended foe. On each axis, the Soviets massed at the critical point and artfully maneuvered those massed forces over terrain considered impassable, much less suitable for maneuver.
In order to generate initial success and to maintain offensive momentum, the Soviets carefully timed application of their offensive power by attacking with assault units, advanced units, and then main force elements. Consequently, from the very beginning, Japanese forces were off balance, and they remained off balance throughout the short campaign. These creative Soviet methods sowed confusion in the Japanese command structure, and that, in turn, ruled out effective Japanese response.
In order to exploit these initial efforts and to preempt Japanese plans, the Soviets used armor-heavy forward detachments of every size to drive deep into Japanese positions. With limited combat power forward, Soviet main force units could advance almost unhindered. Each detachment worked in a manner similar to an awl, boring a hole into hard wood and preparing the wood for subsequent penetration by a screw. Punctured in numerous sectors, the Japanese defense lost all coherence and never regained it. Soviet main force units and the forward detachments were tailored combined arms entities suited to the terrain over which they operated. They tore into the disrupted defense, fragmented it, left it paralyzed, and raced on to their next objective. Soviet success in the campaign underscored the effectiveness of their strategic, operational, and tactical techniques.
JT
As already mentioned, they invaded Manchuria once Germany had been safely destroyed. Given the sheer scale of ops going on it made more sense for all the Soviet effort to be against Germany (where they had a prayer of providing enough logistic support) while the US forces displaced from the fight against Germany by the Russian ones were sent to the Pacific. That way each country played to it’s strengths.
Besides, Japan never declared war on the Russians so why should they?
Russia was a contributor to the allied victory very much. With being invaded by the Germans and taking heavy losses the Soviet Union was being overtaken. The Germans were taking Russia day by day. That all changed in the battle of Stalingrad when the Russians won. By the time they were attacking Berlin they had very severe casualties. Then when they took Berlin the fighting in Europe was over.
The Soviet Union Military had the most reported dead soldiers in World War 2. The Soviet Union had too much casualties for them to continue another war on a different front. Around the 1943’s the Soviet Union probably didn’t help America in the Pacific because they were worried about not getting took over by the Germans. They had more things to worry about.
They assisted at the end, after the Japanese had been nuked, as they were vying for position in the Pacific theatre i.e. they got their hands on Korea.
Bravo, do you sugest Stalin knew about the comming nuclear attack on the 6th of August? 
As you may know USSR entered the war in pacific exactly according the agreement between Allies, that is exactly 90 days after the German capitulation. Check out the info about he Yalta conference.
And as for the threads topic… USSR did not start before because we had non-agression pact with Japan. And USSR never breaks the agreements! :roll:
Wohahahahahahahaaa
.
01
History of the Second World War
Part 93, The War: An Overview
BPC Publishing Ltd. 1966
First Edition 1966
Second Edition 1972
Published by Marshall Cavendish Promotions Ltd. 1975, pp 2577-2582.
Colonel Nikolay Vasilievich Yeronin, p 2577
Colonel Nikolay Vasilievich Yeronin, p 2578
Malcomb Mackintosh, p 2579
Malcomb Mackintosh, p 2580
(CONTINUED BELOW)
(CONTINUED FROM ABOVE)
02
History of the Second World War
Part 93, The War: An Overview
BPC Publishing Ltd. 1966
First Edition 1966
Second Edition 1972
Published by Marshall Cavendish Promotions Ltd. 1975, pp 2577-2582.
Malcomb Mackintosh, p 2581
Malcomb Mackintosh, p 2582
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2691
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2692
(CONTINUED BELOW)
(CONTINUED FROM ABOVE)
03
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2693
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2694
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2695
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2696
(CONTINUED BELOW)
(CONTINUED FROM ABOVE)
04
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2697
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2698
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2699
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2700
(CONTINUED BELOW)
(CONTINUED FROM ABOVE)
05
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2701
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2702
Illustrated World War II Encyclopedia, Lt Col Eddy Bauer and Brigadier Peter Young, H.S. Stuttman Inc., 1978, Vol 20, p 2703
Atlas of World War II, David Jordan and Andrew Wiest, Barnes & Noble Books, 2004, pp 236-237
Because the US and UK had agreed on the ‘Germany First’ policy long before the Soviets came in, and the Soviets conformed with that policy as it was also much more in their interests to do so rather than open an unnecessary war on two fronts.
From a purely domestic strategic viewpoint, apart from requiring troops in the east which would be better employed in the west against Germany, in 1941-42 the USSR would have been stupid to start a war in its east which could result in Japanese forces pushing it westward when it needed all the room it could get to withdraw forces and industry east if the German advance kept up. The eastward withdrawal would draw Germany’s lines of communication out and shorten the USSR’s giving it a steadily increasing advantage.
From memory, something like 60 to 70% of Japan’s army was in China for the whole war against Japan (about 80% in December 1941), but much of it was engaged against the Chinese in southern China rather than active apart from garrisons at the Russian border. The risk to the USSR in joining the war against Japan was that the Japanese might decide to disengage or fight a holding war in the south and divert forces to the north. This could then deplete Soviet forces against the Germans or force a retreat. This would draw forces away from the Chinese Allies but they weren’t a priority in US, USSR, UK planning except as holding Japanese forces against them so they couldn’t be employed elsewhere.
If the USSR had engaged Japan it would only have reduced its ability to fight Germany without contributing anything worthwhile to the defeat of Japan; put the USSR at a much greater disadvantage; and delayed the defeat of Germany and therefore Japan.
Oh thanks guys for a lot of infor.
I/m fully agree with Rising Sun if the the USSR-Japane had began not after downfall of the Germany in 1945 but early in the 1941-1942 this could be catastrophical for the USSR.
If during the fiercing battles for the Moscow the Japanes attacked the Far East - there is no doubt the Moscow could be lost and perhaps Turkey could joined to the Axis in Caucaus. This fact inevitable led to defeat of USSR in the WW2.
Don’t need to repeat for you guys - WITHOUT USSR the allies could NEVER win this war.
Cheers.
But Red Army helped them to creat the communist China
THis is great info, thanks George for posting those articles. I did not read them all yet, but I’ll have to come back and read it later today.
Not entirely sure about that - the size of the US population was such that they could probably have fielded forces the same size as the Soviets, given time. However, they would also have had to take casualties on a similar scale to the Soviets.
The other side of things is that the US was practically invulnerable to Germany at home, and by 1948 would have been in a position to produce enough nuclear devices to destroy Germany in an afternoon. It would also have been able to produce enough uninterceptable long-range bombers (Convair B-36s - prototypes flew during WW2 and they were virtually immune to intercept until the MiG-17 entered service) to deliver these nuclear devices. So if you call destroying Germany “victory”, then the Allies could have won without the Soviets.
The price - both for the rest of the Allies and the whole world - would have been a great deal higher, and thus I am and remain deeply grateful that the Soviets were on the same side as us during WW2.