World War III scenario: mid-1946

Okay, it’s August 1946. After a couple of months of continuously worsening political situation, and for whatever reason, Stalin kicks off and moves against the Western allies in Europe in an effort to “liberate” the “proletariat” from the “imperialist occupying armies” of the “international bourgeoisie”, and thereby expand his empire to the Atlantic.

You are the supreme commander of the Allied expeditionary Force in Europe, and you have troop dispositions more or less what they were at the end of the war. You have also had a couple of months of worsening political situation to make preparations. To top it all off, you also have Five “Fat Man” type nuclear weapons and the aircraft to deliver them, with more bombs in the pipeline if necessary.

Further details:

Lend lease to the Soviets has stopped.
The Soviets no longer have the manpower to sustain their preferred tactic of human wave assaults for a particularly long time so will have to attempt to overwhelm the Western allies quickly.
You may deploy captured German equipment and even personnel if you choose to do so.

Other things to think about:

Would Spain play? The Soviets would certainly not stop at the Pyrenees.
Other theatres: Iran, India and the Far East? Would they play a part? (My initial thoughts are that they would be insignificant sideshows because the Soviets would have moved most of their manpower to Europe)

What I’m after here are two responses, one conventional and one nuclear, and an educated guess on whether the former would in fact work.

Here’s mine:

Conventional – the ground forces cannot hold the line in either the American or British sectors because neither country has sufficient firepower to deal with the weight of numbers, so conduct a defence in depth to roll with the punch while bomber command and the eighth air force carpet bomb the Russian logistic chain (Russian logistics are poor at the best of times, so this is the weak point, and the Soviets cannot respond in kind because they do not have strategic bombing capability). German units are reformed from prisoners of war under Allied leadership in Allied uniforms to add numbers. Moscow is carpet bombed by B29 squadrons for good measure.

Probable outcome – ultimate stalemate and Cold War, Soviet state remains, but the “Iron Curtain” is pushed back rather further east after the initial advance is reversed when the logistics dry up.

Nuclear – as above, except three nukes are dropped on Moscow to decapitate the command and control, one on Murmansk for the benefit of the Arctic fleet, and the last one on Vladivostok for the benefit of the Pacific Fleet.

Probable outcome – complete victory? Partial victory?

Your thoughts?

I doubt that the Allied forces would have had the time to develop the type of defense strategy that Nato developed later, and, therefore, would not have been able to contain the Soviet forces (presumably, the Soviets have transferreed their forces from the far east to what will become the western front?).

Solution: Use conventional bombing to destroy the Soviet lines of communtication. If this fails Nuke Moscow.

Another thing to consider: would the Allied high command/political leaders (Truman, Attlee, de Gaulle) have countenanced the use of nuclear weapons?

I’m sure that Lemay, Eisenhower, Truman, Harris, and de Gaulle would have had no qualms about it, but Attlee was, in my opinion, rather soft and fuzzy when it came to the Soviets. But frankly, amongst those great men, how much weight would the rather limp wristed (Socialist) prime minister of an emasculated United Kingdom have held? Probably (and hopefully) very little.

You’ve obviously put some considerable thought into this and, therefore, one should give it due consideration.

The element of surrise is essential. A pre-emptive strike against Soviet, forward airbases followed by a conventional bombing campaign against supply depots and lines of communication (as previously mentioned) ought to do the trick. It would require some serious planning, coordination, command and control, but the allies had been doing htis for some time.

Atlee might have been soft on the Socialists, as you have mentioned, but I doubt it was to the extent that he would have left Europe in jeopardy. Particularly if the allied plan was one of defense and not to gain any permanent, strategic hold on Soviet territory. That is not to say that the Eastern European countries would not been allowed to be freed.

Besides, if the U.K. was as emasculated and ineffective as you infer, then he would have had no choice but to go along with the U.S. and its allies.

I think your thoughts are pretty much my thoughts…

But I’m wondering if this belongs in the Cold War forum? I’ll await for another Mod’s thoughts…

I concur.

Why do need to develop the different pseudo-realistic versions if there was existed the whole MILITARy plan how to start the WW3.
It was “Operation Unthinkable” - the military plan of possible attack of the USSR 1 jule 1945 that was developed by order of Churchil in may 1945.
This is the recently declassified unique document
http://www.history.neu.edu/PRO2/
If we put aside the moral side of the problem of attacking of former ally- we could observe the excellent military research of ability of the Red Army to resist for the Union Allies forces.
And i have to say that the Hight British stuff has come to the conclusion - this was practically unpossible to bring thr red army the critical damage in this stage of the war.
Coz even the allies Strategic aviation ( about 2500 bombers) in Europe was unable to crush the soviet industry.
Themost interesting i think in entire this document is the analysys of the military ability of the all kinds of soviet troops( Aviation,Infantry and Navy)

So as it could be find out- the allies command did not build an illusions toward the Red Army.
The decisive victory of allies was simply unpossible during the initial period.
Vise verse - there were a great probability of initial defeat of the allies forced in Europe.
Moreover - if the allies attacked the USSR in 1945 the Japane could inevitably join into alliance with USSR and - hence the final ally victory over Japane has been considered as very problematic.

Sure this plan was developed untill the Nuclear wearpon was even tested- however i strongly sure that even the possible nuclear strike of the 4-9 nuclear bombs could not finally destroy the Soviets and would not lead to the fatal lose of war.

Operation Unthinkable was little different than any other hypothetical contingency war plan. But a contingency plan does not a blueprint for war make. I’m sure the Soviets had their own version…

It seems that operation unthinkable was a hypothetical offensive scenario against the Soviets. What we are discussing here is a response to a Soviet attack, and the best way to win against this.

If you, C hevan, can dig up the equivalent Soviet plan to operation unthinkable (don’t kid yourself that there wasn’t one), this would be particularly interesting.

What is worth noting is that, in western thinking, a successful attack usually requires three to one superiority in numbers. With the human wave assault tactic favoured by the Soviets, three to one just won’t cut it, so this evens the odds for a Soviet attack.

By 1945 the Allies had a massive air fleet which was well practised in both strategic and tactical operations. I doubt, given your scenario, that they would have sat back and allowed the Soviets to sieze the intiative, particularly as the Soviets had such a large advantage in numbers of ground forces.The operations against massed troops in Korea serve to demonstrate how well the Allies could make use of their airpower. Other examples would include the Six Day War and the Gulf Wars.

The British doctrine of a three-to-one advantage would not necessarily have been the norm in these circumstances. The Allies main objective would be to stop the Soviets as opposed taking and holding the oppositions territory (not unlike the German defensive operations of WW1).

As just an aside, I wonder if B-29s and later B-36s, would have been able to attack Soviet factories from Alaska/Canada’s Northwest Territory as well as from the West?

It seems to me that this would have put additional strain on their air defenses…

If it could be done, would it have been necessary and, if so, why not also, for example, launch them from China, India and Turkey?

It seems to me that this would have put additional strain on their air defenses…

Triple A can be attacked by long-range, low-level ground attack forces e.g. Mustangs, while, for example, B29’s take out strategic targets from high altitude. The aircraft available to the Western Alliance, were far more formidable than your average Stuka or Heinkel.

How would you see this scenario progressing?

The Soviets are supposedly invading the West and, in this scenario, it cannot be sustained. If the main supply routes are taken out, even if the battle was to drag on for such a time as to require reinforcement, how do they reinforce?

Where is the main thrust of the Soviet attack?

As well as the allied air fleet, the Soviets would have defendable, river obstacles to contend with. For example. If the main impetus of the thrust was to be accross the North-German plain, which, to some extent, lends itself to an armoured thrust, then there is the River Wesser to contend with, among others. These rivers would create delay and congestion along their lines of communication, which would leave them exposed to air attack.

The speed necessary for the Soviet advance would limit their abilIty to establish any effective air defense for the forward elements.

Anyone wanting to see what allied airpower can do to ground forces, take a look at the Battle of the Falaise Gap.

Oh MoS let me kid myself a bit:)
Sadly but you did not even look at the text of plan Unthinkable.
Coz if you would look - you should know that in the 1945 the Soviets were still strongly depended form a lend lise- particulary the soviets got about 50% of aviation petrol from the USA.And about the same of alluminium.
The Soveits had captured the enourmouse resources during the offensive in Eastern Europe ( even the oil fields of Romania) and the great industry of Upper Silesia -but they could not use it immediatelly.
There were needed a serious restoration for everything.
So according to the Plan Unthinkable they could not widely use untill mid 1946.
From the pure military sence the possible Allies-Soviet war should be Total war i.e war of resources.
Thus the Soviets were unable to win this war with the Union of states that controlled over the 70% of world resources at that time( i mean time befor the Soviet economical restoration in the 1950yy).
So from the pure strategical point the Soviet attack should be pure suicide for the soviet side.
I mean the possible military victory in Eastern Europe and occupation of it by thesoviet troops - will not lead to the war defest of Brritain and USA coz soviets had no fleet.
Therefore the Soviets had nothing simular plans like Unthinkable in that period… Simply coz they could not attack the enemy forces having the serious lack of resources.
The whole soviet strategy in Europe this period was strongly Protective.They could plann just the contr-offfensive as the strategy.As i know the soviet plann in Europe in that time was- after the first American nuclear strike the Red Army should attack the European Forces in aim to avoid the total nuclear destruction.
So the Western Europe was a hostage of the Red Army - in case if the WW3 would have been began from a nuclear strike.
In practice the Soviet strategy in that time was directed not in Europe but in Asia. While the Chinas communists succesfully beated the Gomindan - the soviet influence constantly increased.
Moreover the Stalin aslo look at the SouthernEast Asia where the Allies was aimed to restore the Colonian system after the war . Thus the many of Nalional-Liberational movenment was aimed for colloboration with the USSR.

Actually they could attack…but as it was noticed in Untinkable - the resualt of possible stratgic attack would be far not so effective as against Germans tight industrial areas and cities.
Coz the soviet plans were widely disributed in deistance over thoushands killometers- so the Stratgec bombers could not be effectively used agains the target in Syberia and Ural.
Besides Turkey as well as Uran should be the first targets to be occuped by the Red Army during soviet offensive.
So there is no any air fields for the strategic aviation near the soviet borders except the Far East: Japane and Alaska.But from here till the Ural and Eastern Syberia is about 3000-4000 km.
I even do not tell about China where the communists would never let the american army to land.
And Nick again Neither B-29 nor monstrouse ( in both sence: size and expensive) B-36 was not the ABSOLUTE thing that could win the war.
As it was clearly demonstrated in Korea the soviet jet aviation could easy neitralize the Strategic fleet .Beside the era of AAA-rockets has already come to in the mid -end of the 1950.

What is worth noting is that, in western thinking, a successful attack usually requires three to one superiority in numbers. With the human wave assault tactic favoured by the Soviets, three to one just won’t cut it, so this evens the odds for a Soviet attack.

You seem to have a fixation with the ‘Human Wave’. A tactic not really employed by the Soviet forces at all. Sure sometimes it may have been true, but a ‘Human Wave’ assault would have garnered the Soviets no more success than the ‘Human Wave’ assaults by the British. I think by 1945 the Soviets had developed a much more fluid system than just throwing hundreds of thousands of men at a line of troops. A disregard for the excessive casualties that the Soviets sufferred doesnt necissarily mean a ‘Human Wave’.

Now, given the Allies penchant for wanting to suffer no casualties at all its fairly easy to surmise what they would have done when faced by a Soviet attack. No doubt the Soviets would have quickly taken Western Europe [if a hundred German Divisions couldnt stop them in 44/45 then 15 Allied ones arent going to in 46]. The Soviet Government would be warned to step back of face consequences, wether or not they would have is pure what if? But I dont see the Allies as having any other option at all.

Could always nuke them, which is, arguably, why it never happened.

Personally, I find the non-nuke scenario unlikely, given that we had just demonstrated our willingness to use them on the Japanese.

I could even see them being used quasi-tactically on major troop concentrations.

They certainly could have. But then I see the United States getting directly embroiled in the Chinese Civil War…

Triple A can be attacked by long-range, low-level ground attack forces e.g. Mustangs, while, for example, B29’s take out strategic targets from high altitude. The aircraft available to the Western Alliance, were far more formidable than your average Stuka or Heinkel.

Certainly, but I think an inevitable shift would have taken place and the allies would have targeted primarily Soviet logistical centers, oil refineries, and rail marshaling yards…

How would you see this scenario progressing?

It’s almost impossible to say as the scenarios are boundless…

But I think the month time frame you gave to be a tad unrealistic, I think any open hostilities would have taken longer, probably at least three to six months. I think that what might have happened would most likely have been a gradual disintegration of cooperation punctuated by skirmishes. This might lead to larger scale “reconosense in force” operations (by the Soviets here) in order to probe the strengths and weaknesses of the Allies…

Such an operation would have undoubtedly been preceded with the infiltration of espionage, saboteurs, and special operations agents in an attempt to cause some havoc.

The Soviets are supposedly invading the West and, in this scenario, it cannot be sustained. If the main supply routes are taken out, even if the battle was to drag on for such a time as to require reinforcement, how do they reinforce?

Where is the main thrust of the Soviet attack?

Off hand, without knowing the exact geography of the final “halt positions” of the Allies with the exception of the “Elbe river,” the most sensible thing for the Soviets to do would be to attempt to “split” the UK and US forces by driving an armored spearhead wedge between them. This would maximize confusion and reduce Allied coordination. But to affect this, would the Soviets have to perform a hostile river crossing?

Their only chance of real success would be to mass artillery and tactical aircraft to saturate the area as a “fire sack.” But this would be challenging if not impossible due to the probably Allied advantage in local tactical air assets…

As well as the allied air fleet, the Soviets would have defendable, river obstacles to contend with. For example. If the main impetus of the thrust was to be accross the North-German plain, which, to some extent, lends itself to an armoured thrust, then there is the River Wesser to contend with, among others. These rivers would create delay and congestion along their lines of communication, which would leave them exposed to air attack.

Even without significant obstacles the Soviets may have had a hard time sustaining any initial successes. The Soviets would have to mass artillery and insure that it kept up with the tanks and infantry, if it didn’t, more than likely, I see Allied troops gradually attriting them down and inflicting losses that would be unsustainable and leading to a probably Allied counterattack, even where there are no rivers. I just don’t think the Red Air Force tactical aviation could sustain a Westward thrust with concerns of fuel and the tactical quality of the USAAF and RAF fighters. They heavily outnumbered the Luftwaffe which was fighting a two-front pincer battle of attrition. This might again come as a shock to Soviet air crews…

I think the question of Soviet morale might also be visited, since the average soldier, just like a GI or Tommy, might begin to seriously question the advancing on a former ally, especially when you are using much of his equipment he sent you…

The speed necessary for the Soviet advance would limit their abilIty to establish any effective air defense for the forward elements.

And of their ability to provide artillery and air support to their troops…

Anyone wanting to see what allied airpower can do to ground forces, take a look at the Battle of the Falaise Gap.

Little question. I think the only real Red Army trump card here is the quality of their tanks vs. the Sherman and the waste of time and resources know as the American “tank destroyers.” Still, even an M-10 or M-36 was essentially designed for defensive work, and both the US and the British were just starting to get better and better tank designs into the theater at the end. So, in a sustained conflict where the front was stabilized, I doubt even this would have been much of an advantage…

But this would mean a significant splitting of forces, not unlike their having to maintain large garrisons in the Far East until their nonaggression treaty with Japan freed up significant reinforcements for the West…

So there is no any air fields for the strategic aviation near the soviet borders except the Far East: Japane and Alaska.But from here till the Ural and Eastern Syberia is about 3000-4000 km.

Perhaps the range factor would have made air assets useless to put there then…

I even do not tell about China where the communists would never let the american army to land.

Well, since they didn’t really control the country until 1949, they didn’t have a choice. One could argue that any conflict with the Soviet Union by the West may have saved the Kuomintang regime?

And Nick again Neither B-29 nor monstrouse ( in both sence: size and expensive) B-36 was not the ABSOLUTE thing that could win the war.
As it was clearly demonstrated in Korea the soviet jet aviation could easy neitralize the Strategic fleet .Beside the era of AAA-rockets has already come to in the mid -end of the 1950.

I never said they were, however, I think post War studies showed that using strategic aircraft in essentially a tactical role could be highly successful (i.e. the pre-D-Day raids).

And by Korea, the USAF had modernized, or was in the process of doing so, its front line units with the newer B-36s and B-47s while using the leftovers from WWII (the B-29s and B-26s, which became a serious morale issue incidentally) to hit Korea. And I don’t think that anyone can claim that UN/US aviation was “neutralized” in Korea as they had air superiority and a severe handicap of not attacking over the Yalu River…There may not have been so many MIG-15s in the air if their bases had been pulverized.

I don’t know mate. Once the Red Army begins to again move forward, their logistical lines become lengthened. These supply lines were already strained to the brink by Berlin. Also, I’m not sure how long the Soviets could have kept their economy of a total war footing, and also we must consider that the US alone dwarfed Germany in the numbers of AFVs and aircraft, trucks, and just about everything else. In facing the US and British armies (and their allies of course, which could include a significant number of German troops already trained) it may not have been so easy for them.

Also, I’m not sure an out and out conflict with the Soviets (who suffered greatly and may have been at the end of their rope with the Polit Bureau had the hostilities been restarted) could have happened without a long series of events pointing towards total war…