RE: The British report: The numbers of aircraft available to the “west” is much lower than during the last stages of the war, about 1/3rd tactical. The number seems somewhat “de-mobilised”, but then again, they can´t have considered to attack USSR with less than all they got. The Soviets couldn´t have gone to the Atlantic against any spirited defense, for logistical reasons, but I haven´t seen anybody here really consider the “western” situation. One thing is bringing US gear across the Atlantic, another bringing it to eastern europe through damaged infrastructure. Advancing east would eventually mean advancing into thrice scorthed earth territory, with whatever underdeveloped infrastructure available severely damaged.
The Soviets estimated it would take about 100 (one hundred) Hiroshima-sized nukes to do them the same damage as the Germans had done in 1941 (sorry, can´t remember the source).
(For the debate on casuallities of west-strategic aircraft in a 1945/46 conflict: USSR had no fighters in service able to fight on equal terms with the west´s at USAF cruise altitudes (the (195?) P-47´s lend leased being an exception. (There would have been no MIG-15´s, the first couple of years).
(Another beginning of this scenario could be Patton continuing east in May 1945 -begun as his private enterprise. Not a Patton expert in any way, but it seems he would have very much liked to :D)