So… yes or no ?
You might wish to post a brief account of what Op Zitadelle was. For those who can’t be bothered to google it, it was the Battle of Kursk.
In my opinion a clear no, hitler should’ve allowed manstein to exploit his success at kharkov as early as possible, then there might have been a fair chance. Allowing such a long buildup of forces usually favors the defense and given the overall circumstances between the two opponents by that time it was stupid on epic proportions.
I think if it had gone ahead in Mar 43 then it would have worked. Otherwise it was just a ww1 style battle attacking fixed defences… Not very innovative for the much vaunted German Panzer force, and definately not Blitzkrieg.
A reverse Zitadelle where the Germans took up defensive positions and awaited a Soviet attack had supporters amongst some of Hitler’s generals. As a bonus question did the German high command know of Soviet preparations for an attack out of the salient?
Digger
I do not think that it would have been successful. The German attack had been blunted and the Russians were counter attacking. To continue would have been a waste.
I think that you are right Digger. Von Manstein wanted to lure the Russians out and entrap him. The Germans would have been better off adopting something like what Von Manstein wanted to do. Allow the Russians to attack the 6th army in the south, leading them into the Donets Basin and attack from Kharkov and trap the Russians against the Sea of Azov near Rostov.
I think the problem would have been tricking the Russian into attacking in the south and Hitler’s obession with not giving ground.
The question mark is this-if the Soviets were indeed going to launch their own offensive, rather than role with the German punch, when would they have launched the attack.
And yes von Manstein was convinced he could defeat any Soviet offensive.
Digger
One initial problem for germans was that position of every single division was revealed by spies.
Manstein was already near the last Russian defence line, and there weren’t that much unengaged Russian forces in the southern sector. Pavel Rotmistrov writes in his memoirs that Russian troops facing Manstein were in “very difficult position”. Considering that German attack plan was completely revealed to Russians, it’s amazing how Manstein beat the defence line after defence line in the southern sector.
But of course the german northern part was doing badly, and Russian counterattack was threatening the german northern sector… So it’s impossible to say how that would have played out had germans continued to push forward.
_
I think the reason of initial Manstein success was the fact the he used the Heavy tank Tiger battalion. That was firstly widely used in Kursk.It was a Hitler plan - to surprise the soviets by the newest Germans Wearponry- Panthers, Tigers and Elephants.
While the Elephant as was proved was a too weak agains infantry becouze of lack of mashingan, Panther has a lot of “Children lacks”- the Tiger was a very good.
It has been already tested in the outhumn-winter 1942 near the Eastern front.
In fact the soviet basic 76-mm anti-tank gun was unable to penetrate the Tiger armor espesially on front side. I/ve read the memours of the some of Soviet generals too , they wrote that the meeting of the Tigers was very hard for the soviet artillery. Some of them has got 10-15 hits of the shells - and still was fighting.
I think the reason of initial Manstein success was the fact the he used the Heavy tank Tiger battalion. That was firstly widely used in Kursk
Agreed, the Tiger forward push was too much for some russian defenses.
NO, never
New evidence suggests that the Germans may have been closer to victory at Kursk than previously recognized.
…while historians have categorized Prochorovka as a victory of improved Soviet tactics over German firepower and heavy tanks, new evidence casts the struggle at the “gully of death” in a very different light.
+
On the southern flank… By July 11 Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army was in position to capture the town of Prochorovka, secure a bridgehead over the Psel River and advance on Oboyan. The Psel was the last natural barrier between Manstein’s panzers and Kursk.
+
Opposing Hausser at Prochorovka was the newly arrived and reinforced Fifth Guards Tank Army, commanded by Lt. Gen. Pavel A. Rotmistrov. The Fifth Guards was the Soviet strategic armored reserve in the south, the last significant uncommitted armored formation in the sector. The Soviet operational armored reserve, General Mikhail E. Katukov’s First Tank Army, was already in action against Hoth’s Fourth Panzer Army south of the Psel. Katukov’s army had been unable to prevent the Germans from reaching the river, however. His VI Tank Corps, originally equipped with more than 200 tanks, had only 50 left by July 10 and 11, and the other two corps of Katukov’s army also had sustained serious losses.
+
Careful study of the daily tank strength reports and combat records of II SS Panzer Corps–available on microfilm at the National Archives in Washington, D.C.–provides information that forces a historical reappraisal of the battle. These records show, that Hausser’s corps suffered only moderate losses on July 12, 1943. Considering that information, it seems that the Germans may have been near a limited success on the southern flank of the salient.
+
The fighting, characterized by massive losses of Soviet armor, continued throughout July 12 without a decisive success by either side–contrary to the accounts given in many well-known studies of the Eastern Front. These authors describe the battlefield as littered with hundreds of destroyed German tanks. In fact, the fighting continued around Prochorovka for several more days. Das Reich continued to push slowly eastward in the area south of the town until July 16.
…
_
Yes soviets suffered more tank loses.Nobody dispute it.
But this fact did not help the Nazy…and its fascist allies;)
Coz they losed in tactic. Althouth the Southern flank had a limited succes - the Nothern was stopped by the Red Army. As the resaul the main tactical aim of Germans ( to surround the Soviet positions) WAS not reached and they had no other shoice except of retreating.
SO tactically the the Soviet had a absolute victory. Beside we had and a total strategical victory in summer of t 1943.
After losing in Kurst the “Group army South” was forced to retreat from Ukraine and Crimea.
While reappraisal of losses and the battle is always welcome the plain fact is that the German Army threw away its last big reserve of forces into an attrition battle that even if they could win would have been a phyrric victory. They should have gone with holding in the East in 1943 while building up their armoured reserves and dealing with any Soviet attacks by manouvre warfare. However, Hitler was never going to allow this and so once again played God with well trained soldiers lives that should have been better conserved and employed.
Yep…
I just have to point out three things with this common claim:
-
Wehrmacht’s static defence in the northern sector did great and stopped Soviet attacks year after year.
-
There really wasn’t any extra fuel in Third Reich economy for any massive manoeuvering.
-
It took months and months (often year or more) to get those mines etc behind southern-sector frontline working and producing (natural) resources for Germany. With manoeuvering soviets could have get a hold of those areas and destroyed everything - again - causing months/years of setback - and that would have not been worth handful of destroyed soviet divisions - especially since static defence often worked well (see point #1).
And don’t get me wrong - I’m all pro manoeuvrable warfare 
_
I can’t agree.
Indeed the most amazing succesfull tactical defence of Germans was in zone of Group Armies Centre.
When the Mainstain in the 1943 after the collapce in Stalingrad had reached the great succes to prevent the soviet offencive ( operation Uran) it was a one of the best case of manoeuvrering defence.
Later in Eastern Europe Germans army Southern Ukraine also tryed to use it - however it had only limited succes due to the increase of soviet mahanized mobility in the 1944-45.
To the contrast in the nothern sector where the natural conditions and the relief of land was favorable for the defence - the role of manoeuvrering defence falls to the zero.
While the Group armies North together with Finns in the 1941-43 had very limited succes ( they were blocked near the Leningrad by the Red Army) the Group armies Centre and South were much more achievements firsly due the possibility to widely use the manoeuvrering defence.
Later finns hold succesfull resisted in 1944 due to the relief of the land and manies marsh - but not due to the mobility or manevrability of finns army.
Indeed, it’s one of the greatest operations of WWII.
But it do not change the fact that he consumed a lot priceless fuel doing so. And the progress in the rear areas were badly damaged.
Agree. Increased soviet mobility was a big factor in their favor - against any kind of defence.
Yes, more north you go, less the tanks can be used. But trucks still moved pretty well and enabled fast-paced operations (exluding the very northmost of eastern front, where the very few roads tend to run from north-to-south direction making offensives west-to-east pretty useless).
You have to remember, attacker moves slower, but so does the defender.
And in doing so they consumed Germany’s precious fuel-reserves. Which was stupid if you look at the bigger picture, considering that you could have done the same with static defence - the fuel could have been used to train pilots, tank-crews, increase production, etc.
Not true: Finns lost all the land during the first week or two of the attack. After that Finland formed static defence line (Tali-Ihantala) in open solid ground - excellent tank terrain (no forests, no marsh) - and beat the hell out of the attacking Red Army.
Which exactly points out that even in 1944 it was possible to completely stop superior mobilized Soviet tank attack in open terrain filled with roads with static infantry defence.
_
Just do not think i wish touch you national proudness;)
However this is rather strange to hear that the Red Army meeted the "hell ’ in Finland in 1944.
It seems for me you rather overestimate the finns front.
Actually the fins STATIC defence was a great however the Red Army did not even try to do a hell like they did in for instance in a Berlin.
Besides do not forget that finns were practiclly fully demoralized and crashed too :already 25 august the Finns ASKED the condition of Soviet peace.
Which exactly points out that even in 1944 it was possible to completely stop superior mobilized Soviet tank attack in open terrain filled with roads with static infantry defence.
_
No alephh.
This just prove that you could stop the Red Army TEMPORARY to ask the peace.
You could not stop it if the USSR,Britain and USA have devided the sphears of “liberations”.
If you doubt - look for instance to the Hungary, or Chehoslovakia that fought further even then the Germany.
The Red Army cupruted the Buidapest 3 month and finally took it.
So if the Finns did not ask a piece for the Soviet conditions - they inevitably was “liberated” soon or later;)
But finns are not hungurians - they did not played under Germans rules. They were relatively independent.
Thus the clever finns saved its country.Very resonable. moreover after war they were really neitral.
One question - if Red Army didn’t really try to capture Finland, why Tali-Ihantala was THE BIGGEST BATTLE in the history of Nordic countries?
_