Blitzkrieg Fact or Fiction?

World War II German Military
#21

The Origins of the Term BLITZKREIG…(From Forty & Duncan’s book, “The Fall of France”, 1990…a Spellmount Military Publication)…

Page 25-26, paragraph 2…

"In order to put things in perspective it is as well to appreciate that in 1939-40 the mechanised portion of the German Army which was responsible for carrying out these new tactics represented only a tiny fraction of the whole. In general terms, as we shall see in the next chapter, the Wehrmacht was still predominantly comprised of foot soldiers who marched into battle, supported by artillery that was still horse drawn. As General Heinz Guderian, the “Father of the Panzers” and chief architect of the build-up of the panzer arm later wrote…“The development of tracked vehicles for the tank supporting arm never went as far as we wished. It was clear that the effectiveness of the tanks would gain in proportion to the ability of the infantry, artillery and other divisional arms to follow them across country.”

The Origins of Blitzkrieg.
[i]As Mathew Cooper explains in his “History of the German Army(1933-45)”, the basic tactics of ‘lightning war’ go back to much earlier times. He quotes an example of a 14th Century Sultan who was known as the “Thunderbolt” because of his method of rapid attack. The need for “war in a hurry” had been an essential part of Prussian military thinking since well before Bismark; however, it is now indissolubly linked to the German Panzertruppe of the Second World War.
It is not entirely clear how the word BLITZKREIG originated. Some Historians say it was invented by Hitler, yet Len Deighton in his book entitled “Blitzkreig” states that General Walther Nehring was sure that it was not of German origin. This would add credence to the claim that it was used for the forst time by an American “Time” Magazine correspondent who, when describing the events which had taken place in Poland in 1939 wrote of them as being “…no war of occupation but a war of quick penetration and obliteration - Blitzkreig - lightning war”. Cooper goes on to explain how even Guderian agreed that,“Our enemies coined the word Blitzkreig…”

While we’re at it, German victory in France and Poland can ce ascribed to a single factor among others that dominated proceedings…the high quality of field junior officers and NCOs, able to change their plans QUICKLY and ON THE SPOT to meet opportunities that presented themselves at the time…good example is Rommel’s 7th Division crossing the Muese River at a small unguarded weir, and turning this minor crossing into a major bridgehead…INITIATIVE at the mid and lower mid levels of infantry command…that edge was eroded as losses started to bite, and it gradually slipped away as the war dragged on, until it was non-existent…better communications also enabled German tactical precepts to actually be possible of being put into action in the manner envisaged, and the Ju-87 was the ONLY ARMY CO-OPERATION weapon that could make pin-point attacks, albeit at high cost with a firm defence manned by soldiers already attuned to frontline conditions…

#22

The point is made by Forty and Duncan that these tactical pioneers in all of the Armed Services experimenting with tracked mobility were very much out of the mainstream, and the German Army was simply more willing to accept the new ideas. Guderian did not have it all his own way, and he encountered opposition to the new doctrine from the “Old Order” in the Wehrmacht, and had to fight to overcome it…

#23

I haven’t read Mr Mosier’s book but as you describe it, it does not make a lot of sense to me. For a start, Poland was a largely Agricultural country that had only been in existance for a very short time i.e. between the End of WW1 and 1939, considering that they were attacked by both the Third Reich and the USSR, the fact that they were able to hold out as as long they did was a very creditable achievement. Holland was admittedly a catastrophe, certainly one could not expect Holland to fight for long without Allied support given the relatively low level of equipment available to the Dutch military but it is not that difficult to stop enemy troop trains entering one’s territory when they have to cross a bridge under one’s control, which the Dutch failed to do. As for France, France did suffer a major defeat at the hands of the invading German armies but the issue with France was that defeat triggered a political collapse, had not France collapsed politically, she still had extensive forces in metropolitan France and the colonies which were untouched by the fighting. Even had the French forces been driven out of Metropolitan France, they still could have moved to North Africa and England. Given what the Royal Navy was able to do in the Mediterranean even during the darkest days of the War [ post the fall of France ] a seaborne invasion by the Axis of French North Africa defended by the French and British fleets would likely have been a suicide run for the Axis. All that said, the reality is France surrendered and the Blitzkrieg tactics worked perfectly in collapsing France. The fact of the matter was that Blitzkrieg was designed to have a strong psychological element to it and it worked spectularly well in France in that regard. Well if the US was ready for blitzkrieg War, what about Pearl Harbor? Military tactics can have both a limited shelf life and a limitation as to the Geographic arena they can be employed in, Blitzkrieg had much the same effect in Russia as it did in France but both the State and its territory were too large for the German forces to deliver the knockout psychological blow.

Best and Warm Regards
Adrian Wainer

#24

“The French always knew they could not hold out against the german army of 1940.” Well that point is at least debateable. France had a very large Army, the coastal areas were secure from an amphibious landing due to the superiority of the French and British fleets. They had plenty of tanks and certain of them had advantages as compared to their German opposition. Their Airforce though much it was composed of fighter aircraft of somewhat dubious quality, was vastly superior to anything the Poles had and even they had been able to make an impression on the supposedly invulnerable Luftwaffe, with the obsolete PZL-11. Furthermore, the Maginot line was an exceedingly good idea and forced the Third Reich in to attacking through Belgium and thus reduced the line mobile forces would need to defend, [ also there was no technical reason that the Maginot line could not have been extended to the coast, though it would have meant steping it back from the frontier for much of extra mileage to the coast, though I am not including that in the equation since the line was obviously not extended to the coast ]. The British did not have a standing conscript Army, that France maintained and with that in mind, the French military posture was based on holding the line until Britain could fully gear up for War. Since the contribution of Britain to France in 1940 in the shape of the BEF was pretty much the bulk of the entire British Army in the United Kingdom and Europe but too small to fight the invading German forces without the French at least making a fighting retreat, it would have been both pointless and suicidal for Britain to have tried to fight on using the BEF in the light of a French collapse. Given the equipment and manpower that the French Armed forces had in 1940, there is no reason they could not have halted the Nazi blitzkrieg in its tracks, all they needed was better tactics and a more resolute will at a senior military and political level.

Best and Warm Regards
Adrian Wainer

#25

For those interested by the fall of France and a more in depth analysis than “surrendering monkeys” comments, I would suggest “to lose a battle,France 1940” by Alistair Horne.
An excellent book cleverly written and well documented in my humble opinion.

#26

Unfortunately it is so long ago, since I read that book I have forgotten its main points but I do remember it as an excelent analysis of the French defeat.

The first battle of the resistance

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Saumur_(1940)

Really anybody who would see the the French as “surrender monkeys” would also do well to read Roy MacNab’s book

http://www.amazon.ca/Honour-Alone-Roy-Macnab/dp/0709033311

as it shows a rather different side of France to that exampled by Pierre Laval in response to Nazism or to Jacques Chirac to more recent developments along similar lines.

The Intafada in France as reported in “The Independent” also known as Der Sturmer

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/sarkozy-blames-french-model-for-riots-chiracs-riot-speech-criticised-as-timid-515514.html

Best and Warm Regards
Adrian Wainer

#27

And the Germans studied him, Guderian in depth, if I remember correctly.

If I remember rightly, when the Germans invaded Poland, they had four fully-mechanized divisions. Some 80% of their divisions weren’t motorized at all. Along with them all went something like 225,000 horses.

In the larger sense, that doesn’t sound very blitzy.

best,

Rhenisch

#28

I’ll have to pick that up as I’m slightly obsessed with that episode of WWII. Especially all of its “what-ifs?”…

As much as it pains me, I have to say that the Wiki page on it is very extensive and well written. I’ve read Len Deighton’s Blitzkrieg and have to say he’s one of the historians that’s a tad unfair to the French, but it’s a nice read anyways…

#29

Horne can be harsh but it’s always fair comments with its share of good documentation to back it up.
I thought his book was simply enlightning.

#30

Chapmans ‘Why France Fell’ is becoming obscure. While not in the same style as Horne or Shirer it is a excellent refrence for the details of the campaign and its background.

Mays ‘Strange Victory’ is more of a analysis of the differeences in thinking between the German and French high command. He takes a particualry close look at the development of the Sickle Cut plan. for that alone his book is worth a read.

Doughty ‘Seeds of Disaster’ reviews and analysis the developments withing the French army that led to its failures in 1940.

Doughty ‘The Breaking Point’ provides a chronological account of the attack of Guderians mechanized corps at Sedan, and analyzes the background of the attack. This book makes it clear just how risky and near failure the German attack at Sedan was on 13 May.

Shirers book on the collapse of the Third Republic is usefull for understanding why the problem came from the top and was much less a failure from within the ranks of the French army. The idea of a 'moral failure of the French soldier seems to have originated with French leaders who could not accept that they had made some very bad decisions.

#31

It has always been my impression that the Blitzkrieg had been blown out of proportion by the Allies and I agree that Mosier’s is not bringing anything new in that sense. The German use of motorized units was certainly efficient, but the fact remains that the great majority were foot soldiers and artillery moved by horses. During Barabarossa, definite mistakes by the Russians, that they were in transition, plus the fact that the Red Army’s leadership had been harmed greatly by Stalin’s own decisions had a lot to do with the quickness by which the Germans moved in. The Germans weren’t dumb. They knew exactly that this would be the best time to strike first…when the Russians weren’t ready and were in transition.

The Germans took great risks, especially in the West, which paid off for them and I think it became evident that there was a superiority of the German soldier over others in Europe at the time. While France may have had a large Army, I have always questioned the efficiency of a conscript Army. Sometimes superiority in numbers is not enough. The German leadership in the field and in the rear was probably one of the most disciplined and well trained in modern history, and so was the average German soldier. The French leadership collapsed and without leadership, there isn’t much more to do but to raise the white flag. The political promises made to Poland drove France and Britain to declare war and I think that the French underestimated the Third Reich’s resolve.

In analyzing battles I think that we sometimes forget the impact of one’s view of the enemy and what morale can accomplish. It is not all about tanks, artillery and guns. Low morale and fear, whether based on facts or simple perceptions, has great influence on decisions made and the way orders are executed. The Germans were certain of their superiority in the first two years of the war (1939 to end of 1941). They charged ahead with great leadership and confidence. Their enemies became doubtful about their ability to stop them. When one fights with doubts, it doesn’t matter how many tanks you have available because one then tends not to use the materiel available wisely, something that the Germans were rather efficient doing. When the winter in the Eastern Front proved that they had become handicapped and that they weren’t quite ready to fight a long war, the Soviets had time to gather themselves and come back at them.

Due to the problems in the Eastern Front, the great loss of life, and untimely intervention from a leader that was too arrogant to see the truth, the German Army and the Waffen SS were forced to draw live bodies from whereever they could. The advantage of having superior soldiers was hampered.

So, I think that the Allies spoke so adamantly about Blitzkrieg in order to minimize their own shortcomings, their lack of leadership. It is easier to say that the Germans “came at us with a form of attack that took us by surprise” than saying “we screwed up and they had better soldiers than we did.”

#32

That’s out of question the Germans did invite and used the blitzkrieg , but Hitler failed the idea of the blitzkrieg with his strange arrogant decisions. Of course i support what Krad42 said about the Soviet Union and Stalin , but that’s their problem actually i seriously doubt that if there weren’t some Allied mistakes as well as soviet one , the germans would make such a winning campaign 1939-1941 .

#33

Guess someone forgot to tell that to the German troops surrounding the American 101st Airborne at Bastogne :wink:

#34

well, this is surely true, but you have to keep other factors in mind, too.

As I see it, that 1.2:1 ratio would best be applied when talking about comparably sized armies. but this late in the war, the Allied armies hugely outnumbered the Germans, and the Allies had total air superiority.

According to these stats, an army of 100,000 Germans might be able to defeat an army of 120,000 Americans, but when it’s 400,000 Americans, this just demoralizes and of course lowers the ratio.

Just think about how 5 jocks might be able to beat up 6 or 7 nerds, but when there’s 10 or 12 nerds, with some distracting while the others can beat them up from behind, the jocks lose anyway.

[this might be a somewhat oversimplified , but i think it brings my point across pretty well]

Also keep in mind that the Allied troops (generally) were better supplied than the Germans and had more resources available.

#35

This thread seems to be slightly dead, so I hope nobody minds me posting in it.

After reading the various comments above, I decided to buy Mosier’s book (The Blitzkrieg Myth) and have just started reading it. Only up to page 18, but it seems pretty good so far.

I read Mosier’s previous book (Myths of the Great War) a few months ago, and although I disagreed with some (a lot?) of his conclusions, I found his theories about the German army’s more efficient use of artillery to consistently squash allied offensives into the mud very interesting.

So this time, I am interested in Mosier’s views about what Blitzkrieg really was (and what it wasn’t), and I hope to learn a lot about the Battle of France in particular.

I think I probably have a lot to learn. I remember reading a very good ‘based-on-a-true-story’ type of novel called ‘Tramp in Armour’ many years ago and being surprised to learn that the BEF’s Matilda tank had better armour and armament than the Panzers it faced.

It seemed odd to me at the time, as I presumed (without any real analysis) that everything the Germans had was better than everything the BEF and the French had. It made me wonder why the Franco-British forces (or should that be Anglo-French forces? :slight_smile: ) did so poorly in 1940.

My parents (who both lived through the war) explained that they found the psychological aspect of Blitzkrieg overwhelming at the time. My mother was 10 years old in 1940, my father was 14, and they both remembered being scared that the German army was unstoppable and that Britain would be invaded and subdued.

I hope I can contribute a proper opinion when I finish reading the book.
Cheers
Pete

#36

Except for at the Battle of the Bulge, where the Wehrmacht and SS suffered huge infantry losses due to tactics that were comprised of seemingly blundering into American lines making them moving targets easily mowed down by machine guns and self-loading weapons…

This all very much depends on “when” in the War we were talking about. By late 1944, the US/British transport and logistics alone meant they could actually FIELD 400,000 men in a given area where Germany could only due so sparingly. Also, German soldiers lacked training in conducting offensive operations later in the War which cost them dearly when they actually went on the attack…

#37

Don’t forget that the actual Blitzkrieg was a succes of strategic and psychological gamble along with great insight. The german HQ simply used as the first one an ideal combination of air support, mobility and splendid communication.
A large portion of a succesful “panzer home run” was determined by the way they could bypass enemy resistance, rather than killing it. That’s the tactical catch of the blitzkrieg.

#38

Well I’m no General (just a Buck Sgt. when I was in) but I believe that Gen. Patton was
right on the money when he said, "You don’t win wars by dying for your country. They are won by making the other poor dumb b _ _ _ _ _ d die for his country. So the bottom line is that more Germans died in WWII than Americans in Europe. Also I might add that Stalin used a system of defense whereby the first line fell back into the second
line and the second line into the third etc. By the time of Stalingrad and Moscow the Russian line of defense was so deep that there was no way Germany could penetrate it.
Also General “Winter” helped Russia immensely.

#39

Well, the most casualties in WWII were … Russian…
the Americans fought along with Canadians and English, which would lead to sum them up.
I don’t believe in this oneliner. Usual I dislike oneliners, with an exception to Von Clausewitz…
Did you know in war today mainstream doctrine is close to disabling (perhaps even wounding) your enemy as much as possible, rather than “make them die”?
I recall notably Patton as well saying: “we can still lose this war…”:neutral:

Also I might add that Stalin used a system of defense whereby the first line fell back into the second
line and the second line into the third etc. By the time of Stalingrad and Moscow the Russian line of defense was so deep that there was no way Germany could penetrate it.

If France would have been as big as Russia, it’s battle would have been the same. Every army pulling back … pulls back!

Also General “Winter” helped Russia immensely.

It helped the Germans in the Ardennes as well.
I mean: it’s very true, yet it doesn’t explain the defeat of Germany, nor does it includes or excludes Blitzkrieg.

#40

What defeated Germany was Hitler. He was a greedo. Hitler won the war in Europe and then lost it. He just had to ignore history and invade Russia. He was an ego maniac sold on knowledge he did not possess. As the German losses mounted he got worse and
became “the greatest general” of all time. The German officer corps was also to blame,
mabye more so. Once a dictator takes over there is no controlling him. Germany was
destined to lose WWII because there is a much greater war coming that will involve the
whole European Union.
As for oneliners I couldn’t care less what anyone thinks of them. Last time I looked we still have freedom of speech. I for one intend to use it until Komrade Obama takes my life.