[quote=“redcoat,post:271,topic:253”]
Total production of the King Tiger was only 487[/QUOTE]
…and at least half of them have been sended to the Eastern front where they fought:)
Really , the allies found all of the King Tigers in Western Front in the Munich;)?
As far as i know the USAAF in the Italia has not been involved into the Bombing of GErmany and France at all.
Besides the Luftwaffe had a separate fighters groups for AA-defence, that did not include the other missions.
Although they use the flexible tactic of operational subordination, that let to use the other fighters in AA-defence.
The tables above just demonstrates the the Aviation that has been primary used for the AA-defence and for tactical missions in the fronts.
Those are certainly the other groups.
Actually, it was better than any variant of the Me109, and comparisons to the FW190 is subjective, since they were few in number, and the last generation of P-51H models (and L and M for that matter) would have been the fastest piston engined fighters of the War! But they weren’t needed. In any case, as there were no more German pilots to fly them, they were pretty much irrelevant directly corresponding with US long range fighter escorts and the P-51 could be produced in much higher numbers. Also, the final variants of the P-51H were more than a match for any German piston engined fighter. The US was also on the verge to deploying the P-80 Shooting Star, which was superior to the Me262 in air to air performance and in production simplicity…
The P-51 even far could not reach the last hgh altitude modification of FW-190( Ta-152H1) indeed Nick:)
Niether in speed not in altitude.
Ask the Panzerknacker, he wrote a tonns of material about it in other threads:)
Germans , having the lack of everything, could prodused just about 60 of those unique piston fighters. However even the middle-altitude FW-190D9 was the superior of Mustang, especially in maneuverability.
The the British Spitfire XII was better fighter then the P-51 in sense of reliability and maneuverability.
The single advantage of P-51 was the great fuel stock.But accurate due to it - the Mustang often blowed up right in the sky , beeing hited by the short burst of gun Fw or Me.
Don’t believe me, watch the guncameras films.
Even the P-47 was much safe and reliable firgher.
You don’t play in WW2 simulators, i do play it…
The Me109 was also water cooled, and the FW190 suffered from many reliability problems not least of which being it having to use synthetic gasoline which inherently effected its performance, which had to be overcome using complex turbochargers. And then, most of Germany’s best pilots were dead or captured, and the slow Luftwaffe training and replacement system prevented many more from being trained…The Luftwaffe, even while trying to avoid direct contact with US escort fighters, still suffered high losses of pilots in 1944. These tactics also hindered their effectiveness at attacking bombers. And by mid-1944, USAAF pilots adopted more aggressive tactics and took the War to Luftwaffe fields destroying many of the Fw190s and Me109s on the ground which all but spelled the end of the ability of the Luftwaffe to inflict casualties on US bombers…
I was meaning not the initial pure technical lack ( any engine has it) ,but the behaviour it during the battles.
So the engine of P-51 could be stoped or fired up im much nore cases by the single burst.
And the ability of Allies pilots to destroy the Germans on the ground HAS NO Relation to the strategic bombings at all.
This was direct resault of total numerical superiority of allies in the sky.
With the Strategical bombers, or without it - the Alllies could reach the air superiority finally to the end of war.Without strategic bombings.
That is incorrect. The number of missions wasn’t high for Germany proper, but attacks were conducted from both North Africa and later Italy against Eastern European targets such as Ploesti. Targets in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Germany were also attacked…
Besides the Luftwaffe had a separate fighters groups for AA-defence, that did not include the other missions.
I think you may be unaware that the Allies shifted emphasis of bombing operations to directly support the D-Day in early 1944, so the dispersed fighters of the Luftwaffe were indeed attacking bombers over France, and again, were part of a comprehensive German early warning and interdiction system that virtually stretched to Britain itself. I’m not even sure what else they would have been attacking as the Allies had complete air superiority. The famous “two FW-190s” over Juno Beach comes to mind. Although, the Luftwaffe did attempt night strikes against the fleets, which were ineffective, using He-111s I think…
Although they use the flexible tactic of operational subordination, that let to use the other fighters in AA-defence.
The tables above just demonstrates the the Aviation that has been primary used for the AA-defence and for tactical missions in the fronts.
Those are certainly the other groups.
Yet, there as no tactical aviation to speak of, certainly not in the West after late 1943. Remember Chevan, the German soldier had a saying in Normandy: “If (the plane overhead) is camouflage, then it is British. If it is reflective or metallic, then it’s American. If the plane is invisible, then it’s the Luftwaffe!”
In fact, the only major air operations the Luftwaffe attempted, other than using Stukas in a few strikes against Bridges, was the operations during the “Battle of the Bulge,” in which the Luftwaffe inflicted losses a little better than what they received --only the AAF and the RAF could easily make good their losses. The Germans could not…
The P-51 even far could not reach the last hgh altitude modification of FW-190( Ta-152H1) indeed Nick:)
Niether in speed not in altitude.
Ask the Panzerknacker, he wrote a tonns of material about it in other threads:)
Germans , having the lack of everything, could prodused just about 60 of those unique piston fighters. However even the middle-altitude FW-190D9 was the superior of Mustang, especially in maneuverability.
Okay, you’ve got me Chevan. Sixty-seven FW190s made were superior than the P-51D. And I am well aware of the web-wide discussion of German “what-ifs” and “wonder-weapons” that were produced in small numbers, only at blueprint stage, or were in programs that were so divergent and redundant that they stretched the German research and development into a hugely inefficient waste of resources. However, the rest of the 20,000 plus certainly were NOT more maneuverable at combat altitudes as the P-51 had the advantage. And their performance was hindered by poor quality synthetic gasoline (synthetic is great as lubricating oils, not so good in aviation fuels) and pilots that were routinely killed simply because the Luftwaffe lacked a proper training program to produce adequate pilots after the elites were overwhelmed…
Secondly, the ceiling is largely a moot point, since it was the FW190s that had to meet the P-51s to get through to the bombers, not the other way around, so in a sense, it was the USAAF that dictated the terms of battle. Not too mention that the typical German tactics were to avoid fighter dogfights all together since their primary focus was knocking down bombers…
You might ask why if the FW-190 was such a great aircraft, did most of the German aces prefer Me109s?
The the British Spitfire XII was better fighter then the P-51 in sense of reliability and maneuverability.
The Spitfire is a beautiful, agile aircraft that I shall never speak ill of. But I can’t see how it was “more reliable” since I thought the engines were similar or identical. I could be wrong about that. But remember, the Mark VII version came out as a counter to the FW190 after the RAF noticed them in 1942. In a sense, until the P-51H model that never saw combat in the ETO, the Mustang wasn’t really specifically modified nor earmarked to engage a specific aircraft. It didn’t have to be. And I’m not even sure the later Spitfires could escort bombers to Berlin and back – the IVs certainly couldn’t…
The single advantage of P-51 was the great fuel stock.But accurate due to it - the Mustang often blowed up right in the sky , beeing hited by the short burst of gun Fw or Me.
Don’t believe me, watch the guncameras films.
Except apparently it didn’t happen all that often, it was the Luftwaffe that began to suffer irreplaceable losses that the Luftwaffe pilot training could not make good. Not the Americans.
Even the P-47 was much safe and reliable firgher.
You don’t play in WW2 simulators, i do play it…
The P-47 was a heavy barrel with a huge engine. It was great for tactical air support, but only barely competent against Luftwaffe fighters (until perhaps the last versions) and then only because it was rugged. Although, I believe the later versions were comparable, but were already superseded by, newer fighters such as the Mustang and FW-190. But it was still heavy and need a very powerful engine to compensate, making if a poor long range fighter and not all that agile…
And basing your history on video game developers? :lol:
I was meaning not the initial pure technical lack ( any engine has it) ,but the behaviour it during the battles.
So the engine of P-51 could be stoped or fired up im much nore cases by the single burst.
Except it really didn’t happen all that often, and you could say that about any fighter, including the FW-190. One burst of HE incendiary will pretty much take care of any fighter whether it is air cooled or liquid cooled!
And the ability of Allies pilots to destroy the Germans on the ground HAS NO Relation to the strategic bombings at all.
Au contraire! It was part of the battle of attrition that strategic bombing represented!
This was direct resault of total numerical superiority of allies in the sky.
With the Strategical bombers, or without it - the Alllies could reach the air superiority finally to the end of war.Without strategic bombings.
Maybe, but then, the Luftwaffe would have had plenty of fuel, wouldn’t they? I would also argue that the emphasis of strategic bombing was largely mislayed from the beginning. But there is little doubt that strategic bombing did in fact sap much of Germany’s resources --both aerial and otherwise-- that could have been put to good (or bad) use elsewhere…
Well, there’s you and Hitler? 
IF, (and it’s a big If) it was ready as a ground attack plane by D-Day in worthy numbers, it could have done huge damage on the beaches and then been fairly impervious, (compared to Bf 109s and Fw 190s) to Allied fighters after they’d done their high speed bomb runs and cannon straffing over the beaches. Also, think about how the poor Heer and Waffen-SS ground forces on the Eastern Front could have benefited from reliable Me 262s in ground attack mode, hammering the hordes of T-34s sweeping all before them on the way to Berlin, again, fairly impervious to the Red Air Forces air superiority. Pretty sound thinking IMHO!
The aircraft was most suited as a fighter, and Hitler wanted it converted to a bomber only so he could hit back a London, which was completely irrational and he wasted valuable time in doing so. The plane’s greatest contribution would have been as an interceptor inflicting heavy losses on bombers to give the Reich breathing room in fuel production and transport. Everyone realized this except Hitler in his mania and waffling, which is why deception had to used to keep the program on track, but delaying it in the process. Even attacking shipping, there would have been a wall of AAA fire over the invasion fleets, not too mention the aircraft was vulnerable when taking off and landing. It would have been mincemeat at forward airfields…
Define ceiling - and no, that isn’t a silly question. The US defined ceiling as the maximum height at which a specified rate of climb could still be achieved, while the German definition was the absolute maximum height possible with both forms of boost going (Water-Methanol and Nitrous Oxide - one lasted 5 minutes, the other 10, and combined they wrecked the engine in short order). Unless you can show me reports on both aircraft done by the same flight test centre (i.e. Boscome Down or Edwards AFB), I’m going to be very sceptical of claims that one outperforms the other I’m afraid.
The speed margin available at that height is also very important - i.e. the gap between stalling speed and Vne (Velocity Never Exceed - i.e. the speed at which structural failure is imminent). This gap reduces radically with altitude and indeed on some aircraft defines the absolute ceiling. IIRC for the U-2 spyplane this gap is only about 10 km/hr.
Meh, I didn’t say “silly question.” I said moot point. Mainly because, neither the P-51Ds nor the FW-190 were in an aerobatics competition or race. From what I’ve gathered and have always read, the P-51 had a clear advantage at higher altitudes over the earlier FW-190s, which is why the Dora variant was developed as well as fears of a B-29 deployment to the ETO. The ceiling advantages the FW-190 might or might not have had are largely irrelevant when speaking in terms of the air war over Germany in 1944-45…
The speed margin available at that height is also very important - i.e. the gap between stalling speed and Vne (Velocity Never Exceed - i.e. the speed at which structural failure is imminent). This gap reduces radically with altitude and indeed on some aircraft defines the absolute ceiling. IIRC for the U-2 spyplane this gap is only about 10 km/hr.
I believe this was a key advantage that the Mustang had throughout the War, its ability to maintain its performance to a greater degree than most of its competition did at high altitudes. The later versions of the FW-190s were meant to challenge that, and although they were excellent aircraft certainly capable of keeping pace with the P-51Ds, it seems that many Luftwaffe fanbois on the Internet make some of the latter German piston engined fighters into super-weapons that would have destroyed the P-51 if issued earlier or in greater numbers, all while ignoring the fact that the Mustang was easy to produce and relatively simple to maintain as well as being an excellent all around fighter aircraft with unmatched range…
Not more reliable, but the P-51 was more prone to unknown structural failures than the Spitfire, and safety limits were advised on certain maneuvers
And I’m not even sure the later Spitfires could escort bombers to Berlin and back – the IVs certainly couldn’t…
They couldn’t, but that was mainly due to there was never a requirement issued by the RAF for a long range Spitfire. There is little doubt a longer ranged Spitfire could have been developed if they had done so, a unarmed photo-recon Spitfire was the first Allied single seat fighter design to overfly Berlin in ww2
Except apparently it didn’t happen all that often, it was the Luftwaffe that began to suffer irreplaceable losses that the Luftwaffe pilot training could not make good.
Luftwaffe pilot training was failing as soon as the Battle of Britain. The air battles over Germany in late 43-4 was the last stand of the Luftwaffe fighter arm, it had already lost control over the Russian and Mediterranean battlefields
A guy named Murray wrote an interesting (imho) essay on those issues. It’s called strategy for defeat - the luftwaffe 1933-1945.
As dangerous as the fighters were once Allied long range fighters became available
they were nothing compared to the Flak defenses. In 1944 Flak accounted for 3,501 American planes destroyed. More flak guns gradually appeared, mainly the 128mm (5 in) German Flak accounted for 50 of the 72 RAF bombers lost over Berlin on the night of March 24th, 1944. An incredible 56 bombers were destroyed or crippled by flak during a B-17 raid on Merseburg in November of 1944. (Data from Flak History Page)
Suffice to say on D-day there were only 300 Luftwaffe fighters to oppose the Allied landings in France and IIRC, 500 on the Eastern front.
See post above, plus a relatively few night fighters were still extracting a toll.
It was more like better trained American pilots. A perfect example of this was the amount of aviation fuel allotted to the training of pilots. Toward the last nine months of the war, they were sent into combat with only one-third of the training hours actually required because of… fuel shortage.
AND Herr Schicklegruber.
From the U.S. Strategic bombing survey…
…Production from the synthetic plants declined steadily and by July 1944 every major plant had been hit. These plants were producing an average of 316,000 tons per month when the attacks began. Their production fell to 107,000 tons in June and 17,000 tons in September. Output of aviation gasoline from synthetic plants dropped from 175,000 tons in April to 30,000 tons in July and 5,000 tons in September. Production recovered somewhat in November and December, but for the rest of the war was but a fraction of pre-attack output… Consumption of oil exceeded production from May 1944 on. Accumulated stocks were rapidly used up, and in six months were practically exhausted. The loss of oil production was sharply felt by the armed forces. In August the final run-in-time for aircraft engines was cut from two hours to one-half hour. For lack of fuel, pilot training, previously cut down, was further curtailed. Through the summer, the movement of German Panzer Divisions in the field was hampered more and more seriously as a result of losses in combat and mounting transportation difficulties, together with the fall in fuel production. By December, according to Speer, the fuel shortage had reached catastrophic proportions. When the Germans launched their counter-offensive on December 16, 1944, their reserves of fuel were insufficient to support the operation. They counted on capturing Allied stocks. Failing in this, many panzer units were lost when they ran out of gasoline. In February and March of 1945 the Germans massed 1,200 tanks on the Baranov bridgehead at the Vistula to check the Russians. They were immobilized for lack of gasoline and overrun…
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm#taoo
And Speer’s report to Hitler…
The first massive raids on synthetic plants was flown on 12 May 1944 and directed against five plants. Other raids followed successively and continued into the spring of 1945. The severity of the raids was immediately recognized by the Germans. Between 30 June 1944 and 19 January 1945, Albert Speer directed five memoranda to Hitler which left no doubt about the increasingly serious situation. Speer pointed out that the attacks in May and June had reduced the output of aviation fuel by 90 percent. It would require six to eight weeks to make minimal repairs to resume production, but unless the refineries were protected by all possible means, coverage of the most urgent requirements of the armed forces could no longer be assured. An unbridgeable gap would be opened that must perforce have tragic consequences.
Continued attacks also negatively influenced the output of automotive gasoline, diesel fuel, Buna, and methanol, the last an essential ingredient in the production of powder and explosives. If, Speer warned, the attacks were sustained, production would sink further, the last remaining reserve stocks would be consumed, and the essential materials for the prosecution of a modern technological war would be lacking in the most important areas.
In his final report, Speer noted that the undisturbed repair and operation of the plants were essential prerequisites for further supply, but the experience of recent months had shown that this was impossible under existing conditions. Behind Speer’s warnings was his awareness that once production of fuels was substantially curtailed, once reserves and the fuel in the distribution system were depleted, the Germans would be finished and the end could be predicted with almost mathematical accuracy. In a way, Speer was merely echoing the prophetic utterance of Field Marshal Erhard Milch from the summer of 1943:
The hydrogenation plants are our most vulnerable spots; with them stands and falls our entire ability to wage war. Not only will planes no longer fly, but tanks and submarines also will stop running if the hydrogenation plants should actually be attacked.
A perfect example of this was the amount of aviation fuel allotted to the training of pilots. Toward the last nine months of the war, they were sent into combat with only one-third of the training hours actually required.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-aug/becker.htm
Again from the Strategic bombing survey…
“Before the Combined Bomber Offensive the German aircraft industry had at least a 100% excess capacity of plant and equipment. This is indicated by the fact that single-shift operation of most facilities was normal procedure prior to 1944.”
In 1944 the Speer Ministry reported to Hitler that 39,000 aircraft were produced, of which 26,000 were fighters. There are 17,000 German aircraft (8,000 fighters) which the USSBS could not account for based on the number of aircraft delivered and the number destroyed. It was known that Hitler demanded miracles from his subordinates. Under these circumstances it is not entirely impossible that Messrs Speer and Seur, controlling aircraft production, “rigged” their accounting to make a satisfactory showing. The conclusion is than nowhere near 39,000 aircraft were produced in 1944.
“Strategic bombing forced the dispersal of the aircraft industry. This disruption alone paid the cost of Allied bombing. Disruption of production was caused by the physical movement of goods and machinery, the loss of efficiency due to the dilution of management, an increased load on the already overtaxed transportation system were all factors in the final result. In the end dispersal defeated itself, because once the transportation system failed, it became impossible to keep final assembly points fed with the necessary component parts and sub-assemblies to produce finished aircraft. It was largely after that system failed that they decided to re-centralize the plants underground, for efficient and economical operation. This decision came too late to be effective in the German war programs but the cost of the effort added tremendously to the strain on the national economy.”
“Until early 1943 less than half the available capacity was utilized in the German aircraft industry. The industry was coasting along on a one-shift per day basis. The big push for expansion started in 1943 when the German High Command realized the potentialities of the Allied air attack. The realization came too late. The weight of attack that was delivered late in 1943 and early in 1944 set back production plans by many months and denied the German Air force some thousands of aircraft at a time when it needed them most.”
And…
“By the end of 1944 disintegration of the entire economy had set in. Transportation was disorganized to the point that essential materials could not be delivered to the manufacturers, nor could finished products be taken away. Airframe assembly plants, although relatively invulnerable to direct attack because of dispersal and underground installations, could not get deliveries of engines, accessories or sub-assemblies. Centralized planning broke down completely. Production of aircraft fell precipitously to a point far below the normal requirements of the German Air Force. By war’s end the manufacture of aircraft was at a standstill.”
At the time that bluster didnt really mean anything and I think that Churchil may have come to regret it later. He could have got the men of Bomber Command a campaign medal but seemed to shy away from it.
Could you expand on that?
What would be the significance of a campaign medal over whatever they got?
What did they get?
The Allied Bomber campaign over Europe is a classic case of British attitudes. Quite OK to do your worst, as long as the enemy does it first.
Bomber command, and Harris in particular, suffered from the Douhet inspired delusion that they could win the war singlehandedly by bombing alone. Speer actually agreed with them after Hamburg (“Six more raids like that one will finish us”), but Allied capacity was just not that strong. WW2 airwar was a process in development, with nobody actually sure of the results until the Third Reich fell. Morale is such an intangible factor when it’s applied to civilians. “The Blitz” did more to bring Londoners and British people TOGETHER…same for Germany.
The plain fact of it is that when you attack a city, whether you are aiming at industry or not, you are attacking civilians with service people in uniform.
Whether modern war can ever get past this abberration is anyone’s guess. Maybe we should put politicians in an arena, with the very best equipment of course, and watch them finish what they begin on our behalf, while we all watch and make ironic cheers or groans as they bite the dust. The winners of this contest could then preen themselves as “heroic”, hand out medals to eachother, and then get back to the business of enacting state policy, rather than dragging everybody in to their churlish squabbles.
Story of Harris from wartime…
Policeman stops Arthur’s car. It has been speeding along with no lights. Advising Harris to slow down or “you might kill someone”, Harris brusquely replies…
“My dear fellow…I am PAID to kill people.”
Bomber Command aircrew did receive a special campaign medal, the Aircrew Europe Star.
The Great War cost Britain 51,000 junior officers, said at the time to be the “flower of our best youth”. The British emphasis on airpower, and bombing in particular, was specifically to prevent this same wastage of the country’s best and brightest. 54,000 were killed flying British aircraft, many of them the very junior officers this policy was supposed to protect…
Rather ironic…eh old boy?
someone up top of the post stated that Germany had…
“invented bombing of cities on a large scale”
I challenge this assertion. This is hardly an “invention”. It was a concept, based on the theory advocated by an Italian (Douhet) that modern mass land armys were obselete, and that the bombing of cities would result in such an outcry that nations would not have to go to war in the same grand old style, but would rise up and surrender before this became necessary. Douhet’s book, “Command of the Air” was fiction, but it certainly got the theorists talking in EVERY country in Europe. The Royal Air Force was the only service that had designed specific aircraft for this task right from the beginning. The German Luftwaffe was an arm of the Army, a tactical tool designed to co-operate with the land forces far more closely than any other air-force of it’s day. The fact that it was used against large towns and cities was more a product of circumstance. The British continued their Great War propaganda ideas with the policy that “once it’s been done to us, we can do it too.” The theorists did not really get a chance to see what airpower could do vis-a-vis Douhet’s theory in Poland or France. The Russians attempted to bomb Finland out of the contest, but found they could not control the airspace above. So it was left to the Luftwaffe to be the arm of decision in bringing the war to a successful conclusion against England. The Kriegsmarine was definately half-hearted about it’s chances of a crosschannel invasion, and with the new Churchill government rejecting any and all peace overtures, there was really only one policy left to successfully prosecute the war against England.
Churchill himself put it best when he came to power…
“I would say to the House, as I have said to those who joined this government: I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat…You ask, What is our policy? I will say; it is to wage war by sea, land and air, with all our might and all the strength that God can give us; to wage war against a monstrous tyranny, never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue of human crime. That is our policy…”
So, you see that by virtue of the swift victory in France, in combination with Churchill refusing any form of peace overture, and further combined with the theory of Colonel Douhet, Germany proceeded along the lines of bombing for lack of any other way to bring the war in the west to a successful conclusion…
Rather the same reason that Britain turned to bombing…for lack of any other way to strike at the homeland, and END the conflict with Britain, something that many wished to see, even ADOLF HITLER…
I’ve always found it funny that Churchill, rabid anti-communist that he was, found a way to let Hitler’s oft stated policy of “Drang Nach Osten” to work in his favour, playing off an enemy he considered to be “monstrous” (Germany), against another enemy he had spent much of his career warning us about (the Soviet Union), all the while lobbying Roosevelt to come into the war. He knew that once the Americans joined the fray it was all over…something he referred to after Pearl Harbour as
“merely the proper application of overwhelming force…”
I can’t help thinking that as a strategist, Churchill was not as big a buffon as he would have us believe. In fact, he went to great lengths to suggest as much himself. Harry Hopkins noted that Winston was
“very much in charge of strategy…”
and Hitler had opened his mouth about “expansion Eastward” and “lebensraum” many many times, so often as to be unmentionable…why not play one dictator off against the other? It was obvious even to the cartoonist, the Egyptian KEM, in his famous cartoon of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, that both Hitler and Stalin were tied together at the boot, and each with a hand on his gun. Any fool could see that Hitler was going to attempt a knockout-blow against Communism.
I think Churchill was absolutely willing to see him give it his best shot. Provoking Japan with an Oil Embargo was a quick way to get United States support in actuality. Funny how they embargoed Japan only in 1940, when they had been fighting in China for all of nine years…and funny how Pearl Harbor was bang on time after the failure of the Blitzkrieg…I don’t think Hitler’s declaration of war on the US is such a great mystery, he was simply supporting his allies, nothing more.
Churchill was not a strategic buffoon…he was simply the most influential politician of the 20th century…and thank GOD for that!
RIP WINSTON…
As far as grand strategy goes, Hopkin’s is a fair comment.
It doesn’t follow that just because he was in charge of it that Churchill was necessarily very good at it. The problem was that sometimes Churchill was too much in charge of strategy at levels below grand strategy, and too unwilling to listen to wiser counsel.
As far as military strategy goes, particularly at the campaign level such as Malaya and Greece, Churchill was seriously deficient.
He certainly wasn’t on top of Malaya. He said towards the end of or after the war something to the effect that he would have acted differently if he’d known how bad the situation was (I can’t recall the source or exact quote). Not the mark of someone who was sufficiently on top of things to be making decisions about Malaya’s defence. Or perhaps the mark of someone who was, but who later wanted to avoid blame for the shambles he presided over.
On the other hand, it could be argued that Churchill’s deficiencies over Malaya reflected his mastery of grand strategy and the recognition that putting the necessary resources into Malaya would take them away from the fight against Germany, which was contrary to his ‘Germany first’ focus.
Against that is Churchill’s unilateral diversion to Burma, after Australia refused to agree to such action, of the returning 7th Division shortly after the Singapore surrender. On a large scale strategic basis it makes a degree of sense as if Burma was held then the other Allies could keep supplying China through Burma to keep Japanese forces and LOC engaged there, as well as denying Burma’s oil and minerals to the Japanese. But there is a competing and equally compelling large scale strategic argument for returning the 7th Div to Australia to ensure the survival of Australia as a base for Australian and American action against Japan. This had the advantage of stringing out Japan’s forces and LOC. Allowing Australia to fall would enbable Japan to concentrate them in China and strike at Burma and India, or perhaps the USSR which was the last thing the Allies needed from the ‘Germany first’ viewpoint as it could assist a German victory. From a long term viewpoint, putting more troops into Burma and risking losing Australia was, at the time the decision was made, plainly the least effective way of dealing with Japan for the duration of the war once America marshalled its might. The one great advantage it offered Britain was preserving Britain’s colony of Burma and protecting India. So, from the viewpoint of British grand strategy it was a reasonable decision, but not from the overall Allied viewpoint of the war against Japan or the Axis powers, with the exception that denying India to Japan denied it that route to Middle Eastern oil.
So far as Greece is concerned, that campaign contradicts any notion that it was consistent with a clear eyed view of grand strategy focused on defeating Germany, Japan not yet having come into the war. Churchill ignored sound military advice about the need for air cover. The Commonwealth troops duly paid the price, to no military purpose. Except perhaps for delaying Barbarossa, but that wasn’t something that figured in Churchill’s thinking and was just an accidental by-product. It didn’t avoid the German occupation of Greece, which was one of its aims. Meanwhile it diverted troops, naval and air forces and LOC from North Africa, where they would have been better employed. From a grand strategy and from a military strategy viewpoint, it is difficult to see why the Greek campaign commended itself to Churchill, as usual over advice to the contrary from is military advisers, including Alan Brooke, the CIGS.
Still, Winston Churchill is the figure most often poked with Alanbrooke’s pen. There are at least three reasons for this. The first is bureaucratic: there was a civilian Secretary of State for War who outranked Alanbrooke, but this personage, Sir Percy James Grigg, appears remarkably uninfluential on war policy and was utterly ignored by war historians. Alanbrooke thought him a prince, but this could be in part because Grigg kindly left him alone.
That leaves Alanbrooke, Britain’s leading military adviser, with exactly two civilian bosses in direct line above him: Minister of Defense and Prime Minister, both of them with the same name: Winston S. Churchill.10
Another reason for the criticism of Churchill is high-minded and strategic, if not necessarily correct. Alanbrooke felt that this admittedly-great man had no strategy; as late as December 1941, when Alanbrooke became C.I.G.S., he remained “appalled” by the "lack of a definite policy…Planned strategy was not Winston’s strong card. He preferred to work by intuition and impulse."11
Proving he does possess a sense of humor, Alanbrooke twice formulates the problem as antithesis: “God knows where we would be without him, but God knows where we shall go with him,” says an entry for 1941. Three years hence he writes: "Without him England was lost for a certainty, with him England has been on the verge of disaster time and again."12
A third irritation Alanbrooke had with the Prime Minister was quite the opposite of strategic indecision: in certain narrow corridors, Churchill was focused to a fault, sinking his bulldog teeth into a particular idea or operation that appealed to him. Whenever anyone pointed out how much this laser-focus neglected or damaged other important military matters, the bulldog would shake his head fiercely and keep grinding. Examples include snatching Greek islands and liberating Norway.
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=284
Those aspects are balanced by the next paragraph from that source, which perhaps ignores the extent to which Churchill exerted influence over the military,
What Alanbrooke never adds to such accounts of conference room combat is that Churchill would never overrule the Chiefs of Staff when they agreed among themselves. Arguing, testing and debating were part of proper civilian oversight. Alanbrooke missed the point. He thought he was saving Britain from wild variants of hare-brained strategies.
Alan Brooke’s following opinion exemplifies the contradictions in Churchill’s strategic abilities and actions.
In fact, Brooke had withheld some of the more pointed criticisms of the Prime Minister, which he often wrote after late night arguments with Churchill. If anything, his anger at the Prime Minister grew as the war went on. On 10 September 1944 he wrote in his diary (an entry omitted in the published version):
[Churchill] has only got half the picture in his mind, talks absurdities and makes my blood boil to listen to his nonsense. I find it hard to remain civil. And the wonderful thing is that 3/4 of the population of this world imagine that Winston Churchill is one of the Strategists of History, a second Marlborough, and the other 1/4 have no conception what a public menace he is and has been throughout the war! It is far better that the world should never know and never suspect the feet of clay on that otherwise superhuman being. Without him England was lost for a certainty, with him England has been on the verge of disaster time and again … Never have I admired and despised a man simultaneously to the same extent.
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid=611
For me Harris is a mix of hero and pragmatic wartime leader. He had a difficult job to do and did it well. He was the right man for the job at the right time.
The words of the man himself - http://uk.youtube.com/watch?v=KhmRrTsv55Y