Bomber Harris, Criminal or Hero?

World War II British Military
#261

I doubt it.
According my source( german historian Friz Gun :“Loses of Wermach” http://history-afr.fatal.ru/luftwaffe.shtml
Table 15 )
The distribution of Luftwaffe in the all fronts
fro instance in the june of 1944 ( when the operation Overlord have been started)
Eastern front - 3267
Western Europe- 1450
Italian front - 353
Balcans - 567
Norway -204
AA-defence of Germany - 1572

So indeed ( according germans datas) the AA-defence has NEVER been exceed the 20& of Luftwaffe.
But … this is all the fighters
I wrote about 350 , becouse due to from the 1520 they could use just a part of its total park of fighter.
For instance during the bombing of Gamburg in 1943 the Luftwaffe never used more then 400 fighter all of tipes.
Besides …( table 18)
the total loses of the Luftwaffe since the sep 1943 - oct 1944 were:

Italy/Balcans - 4468
Western/Nothern Europe - 9775
AA-defence over Germany-12807
Eastern front-8600

So from 35 660 overal loses of the Luftwaffe for one year- loses in the Union AA-defence was no more 34%
But it was due to actions of the escort fighters.
Starategical bombers have been used as a … “bait”

The attacks in the winter of 1944 were escorted by P-51’s and P-47’s and with the appearance of these planes in force a sharp change had been ordered in escort tactics. Previously the escort planes had to protect the bomber force as their primary responsibility. They were now instructed to invite opposition from German fighter forces and to engage them at every opportunity. As a result, German fighter losses mounted sharply. The claimed losses in January were 1,115 German fighters, in February 1,118 and in March 1,217. The losses in planes were accompanied by losses in experienced pilots and disorganization and loss of the combat strength of squadrons and groups. By the spring of 1944 opposition of the Luftwaffe had ceased to be effective.

Well according the Fritz Gun the maximum fighters in A-defence has been lost in May of 1944 - 1460.
Besides if we look at the table of loses of RAF that has been presented to us honorable mst Amrit in this thread http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=5862&highlight=Strategic+Survivey&page=5

We could observe that the ONLY RAF lost in 1944 even more pilots than in the 1943 - 18 237 over Germany.
Don’t look like they had creased to be effective , right:)
Whole 1944 allies lossed the increasing casualties.

And once the right formula was reached, P-51 + destruction of fuel Industry + transportation Network, it’s amazing how quickly Germany was brought to it’s knees by the bombing offensive.

Yea especially if to keep in mind how many peoples died on the ground to bring them to knees.
P.S. the P-51 wasn’t even superior firghter over the last Germans fighters like fw-190D or Bf-109K
In fact the long-range firghter need a great mass of fuel , so its manoeuverability suffered.Beside the water-cooled engine was still very unreliable.
Right formula actually have been reaced when the Me-262 has appeared in scene…
It could destroy the entire strategic bombers by he one single burst of monstrous 4x30 mm guns.Plus the RM4 rockets.
Thank for the God ( and our Allies brave Ground Forces )that the GErmany in since 1944 have lost its resources and war has been ended soon.

#262

This was not just a strategic bombings that make germans face the chortage of fuel.
In the September 1944 the Romanian , the last oil fields of Reich has been captured by the Red Army, so after that , the GErmans lost over 25% or their fuel production instantly.
And Luftwaffe con’t bomb the new soviet Tankograd on definition…Becouse Chelyabinsk city , Ural region, not Syberia was OUT of range of action Germans Tactical bombers (U-88/87 that usially have been used in Eastern front…)
As you remember Germans had no the Strategical ones at all:)

#263

Um, firstly, all fighters deployed on the Western and Italian fronts have to be considered as part of Germany’s air defense against RAF and USAAF bombers, especially since in April and May of 1944, both organizations shifted much of their focus away from bombing German cities to hit French rail centers and other depots (much to the chagrin of Bomber Harris and Gen. Spaatz), which puts the numbers at over 3200. And it should be noted that the Luftwaffe air defense line began in France…

Well according the Fritz Gun the maximum fighters in A-defence has been lost in May of 1944 - 1460.
Besides if we look at the table of loses of RAF that has been presented to us honorable mst Amrit in this thread http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=5862&highlight=Strategic+Survivey&page=5

We could observe that the ONLY RAF lost in 1944 even more pilots than in the 1943 - 18 237 over Germany.
Don’t look like they had creased to be effective , right:)
Whole 1944 allies lossed the increasing casualties.

Yea especially if to keep in mind how many peoples died on the ground to bring them to knees.
P.S. the P-51 wasn’t even superior firghter over the last Germans fighters like fw-190D or Bf-109K

Actually, it was better than any variant of the Me109, and comparisons to the FW190 is subjective, since they were few in number, and the last generation of P-51H models (and L and M for that matter) would have been the fastest piston engined fighters of the War! But they weren’t needed. In any case, as there were no more German pilots to fly them, they were pretty much irrelevant directly corresponding with US long range fighter escorts and the P-51 could be produced in much higher numbers. Also, the final variants of the P-51H were more than a match for any German piston engined fighter. The US was also on the verge to deploying the P-80 Shooting Star, which was superior to the Me262 in air to air performance and in production simplicity…

In fact the long-range firghter need a great mass of fuel , so its manoeuverability suffered.Beside the water-cooled engine was still very unreliable.

The Me109 was also water cooled, and the FW190 suffered from many reliability problems not least of which being it having to use synthetic gasoline which inherently effected its performance, which had to be overcome using complex turbochargers. And then, most of Germany’s best pilots were dead or captured, and the slow Luftwaffe training and replacement system prevented many more from being trained…The Luftwaffe, even while trying to avoid direct contact with US escort fighters, still suffered high losses of pilots in 1944. These tactics also hindered their effectiveness at attacking bombers. And by mid-1944, USAAF pilots adopted more aggressive tactics and took the War to Luftwaffe fields destroying many of the Fw190s and Me109s on the ground which all but spelled the end of the ability of the Luftwaffe to inflict casualties on US bombers…

Right formula actually have been reaced when the Me-262 has appeared in scene…
It could destroy the entire strategic bombers by he one single burst of monstrous 4x30 mm guns.Plus the RM4 rockets.
Thank for the God ( and our Allies brave Ground Forces )that the GErmany in since 1944 have lost its resources and war has been ended soon.

Why? All Allied fighters did was wait around Luftwaffe Aerodromes where the Me262s were stationed, and shot them down as they took off or landed because their poor performance at lower speeds made them sitting ducks…

#264

Yes, but the fields and their transport facilities, were vulnerable too, and hindered by, bombing nonetheless…

And Luftwaffe con’t bomb the new soviet Tankograd on definition…Becouse Chelyabinsk city , Ural region, not Syberia was OUT of range of action Germans Tactical bombers (U-88/87 that usially have been used in Eastern front…)
As you remember Germans had no the Strategical ones at all:)

That was the point I was trying to make. A Luftwaffe strategic bomber may have had some impact on the War. But we’ll never know…

#265

Most of those in defense of Germany would probably be night fighters [which were giving bomber command a very hard time] because by June '44, the German day fighters were swept from the sky, mainly by the ‘‘Cadillac of the skies’’ the P-51 Mustang.

Your figures of 12,807 fighters destroyed over Germany sep 1943 - oct 1944, are slightly higher then mine, but close enough.

Have you got a breakdown of German aircraft types lost in the East, mainly fighters in the West, but probably more various types in the East, such as
the G, version of the Ju-87, armed with a pair of 37mm Flak 18 cannon, slung outboard of the main landing gear, it took a fearful toll of Sov armour, Hans-Ulrich Rudel claimed over 800 vehicles destroyed, including 519 tanks.

That would be right, and 1,115 in Jan. 1,118 in Feb. and 1,217 March, that’s
almost 5,000 fighters destroyed in just four months.

Good stats, although it’s a bit tough reading your link,[your English is better then my Russian.]:slight_smile:

Yep, tragic figures aren’t they, [don’t think a smiley face for more Brit casualties in '44 is the way to go]:slight_smile: plus, if you add the Americans, it doubles to about 110,000.

Total Allied casualties of all types of air combat in the West was about 175,000.

On the other hand irrevocable losses for the Red army in '44 was almost 1.8 million, and totaled about 9.5 million for the war.:frowning:

Yep, it was the poor old foot slogger that had to slug it out mile by mile on the ground, and the Red army thoroughly deserved to take Berlin in the end, after the utter carnage it suffered, and bravery it showed in coming back from the dead, was one of the most remarkable efforts in military history.

By wars end P-51’s claimed over 9,000 victims.

Losses were about 840 aircraft.

Another case of the kiss of death by Hitler, Me-262 would have been in production earlier, but Hitler decided it was to be used as a ‘‘blitz bomber’’ so alterations had to be made [strengthening of undercarriage, bomb racks etc] making it’s entry into the war to late to have any significance.

Germany was always living on a knives edge when it came to oil production, any serious reduction would have them in trouble, and Ploesti was almost 80% of Germany’s crude output, and by the time the Red army over ran it, it was down by 80% because of bombing raids. Synthetic oil was also down by almost 80%.

In early 1944, strategic targets were attacked (rail heads, rail lines, bridges etc.) The destruction of such targets effectively paralysed Germany. In 1945, Germany had mined much coal but had no way of moving it from the mines to where it was needed. When the war ended, the Allies found several hundred King Tiger tanks at a Munich rail yard ready to be taken to the war front - but the Germans had no way of getting them there.

The destruction of oil production, oil refineries and tank farms plus the transportation network, was decisive, but as this occurred sufficiently late in the war and that Germany was due to be defeated it’s often overlooked.

#266

The defense of Normandy and of France in general were catastrophically effected by Allied air power, as few tanks could be brought from Germany. And few vehicles could escape to Germany. Probably one of the main reasons why comparatively few armored vehicles were encountered by the Western Allies after the Battle of the Bulge…

#267

Uhm, no. That would have been the Do-335.

#268

Nope! They only made 11 of those. And we can split hairs, perhaps the Do335 had a higher cruising speed, but the Mustang H was capable of sustained bursts of 487mph (or 784 kph) and could produce 1,655 kw on “war emergency power.”

#269

Hawker Tempest V would do similar speeds when over-boosted (to 2200kW).

One caveat to numbers like these - indicated airspeed is entirely irrelevant at speeds like this, and true airspeed only barely more so. Unless you know ambient air temperature and hence can calculate Mach number you just can’t do a proper comparison.

#270

The magic word is claimed.
In the only official study done on ground attack fighters effectiveness against armour (by the Allies in Normandy) they found they over claimed by a factor of ten, and if you add in the fact that Rudel was a poster boy for Nazi propaganda, any sensible person would realise that Rudels score is actually far less than claimed

By wars end P-51’s claimed over 9,000 victims.

Losses were about 840 aircraft.
According to the official USAAF figures, the figure for P-51’s lost in combat is 2,520 (all combat causes), and is credited with 4,950 air combat kills and 4,131 ground kills (ETO/MTO theaters)

Another case of the kiss of death by Hitler, Me-262 would have been in production earlier, but Hitler decided it was to be used as a ‘‘blitz bomber’’ so alterations had to be made [strengthening of undercarriage, bomb racks etc] making it’s entry into the war to late to have any significance.
Hitlers ‘bomber’ Me 262 had little effect on the introduction into service of this aircraft, the unreliability of the engines ensured it didn’t enter service sooner

http://www.vectorsite.net/avme262.html#m10

#271

Total production of the King Tiger was only 487

#272

Yup. But the it is undeniable that the Wehrmacht was rail-bound and horse laden, and that Allied destruction of the French rail system largely doomed them in Normandy from prolonging the War in the West, no matter the type of tank or APC…

#273

From Wiki…

The Eighth, Ninth and Fifteenth Air Forces’ P-51 groups, all but three of which flew another type before converting to the Mustang, claimed some 4,950 aircraft shot down (about half of all USAAF claims in the European theater) and 4,131 destroyed on the ground. Losses were about 840 aircraft.

One of these groups, the Eighth Air Force’s 4th Fighter Group, was the overall top-scoring fighter group in Europe with 1,016 enemy aircraft destroyed, 550 in aerial combat and 466 on the ground.

In aerial combat, the top-scoring P-51 units (both of which exclusively flew Mustangs) were the 357th Fighter Group of the Eighth Air Force with 595 air-to-air combat victories, and the Ninth Air Force’s 354th Fighter Group with 701, which made it the top scoring outfit in aerial combat of all fighter groups of any type. Martin Bowman reports that in the ETO Mustangs flew 213,873 sorties and lost 2,520 aircraft to all causes.

Development problems (particularly its temperamental engines), Allied bombings and cautious Luftwaffe leadership and Hitler, all probably contributed to delays in quantity production.
http://www.2worldwar2.com/me-262.htm

Albert Speer, in his book “Inside the Third Reich” commented after the war that there were about 300 King Tiger tanks at Munich rail station waiting to be moved to the front – but the Germans had neither the railways nor the fuel needed to move these tanks around; both targets of Allied bombing.

Think about 100 were available for the Ardennes Offensive, which would leave only 87 others to see action.

Perhaps Speer’s not good at counting. :slight_smile:

#274

Interesting… in the first part of your post its states losses of 820 and then it agrees with my source* and gives a figure of 2,520 :roll:

*Ray Wagner’s, “American Combat Planes: Third Enlarged Edition,”

Development problems (particularly its temperamental engines), Allied bombings and cautious Luftwaffe leadership and Hitler, all probably contributed to delays in quantity production.
http://www.2worldwar2.com/me-262.htm

"…the simple fact remains that Junkers failed to resolve the problems poised by series manufacture of the turbojet powering the Me 262 until mid-1944, and thus could not commence volume deliveries to Messerschmitt until the following September/October. Furthermore, the consensus of opinion of those actually engaged in the design development and testing of the Me 262 was to be that the fighter was introduced to service at the earliest practicable stage in its evolution; that any earlier deployment of the warplane on a large scale would have been entirely premature”

William Green, "Warplanes of the Second World War:”

:wink:

#275

All I can put it down to is the 820 figure ‘‘may’’ be the loses in the Mustang offensive ending May, and the latter figure is for total losses in the ETO for the length of the war.:shock:

…The project of Me-262 was started in 1938. In July 1943, the fifth type of the Me-262 succeeded in the test flight. The next step was mass production for urgent deliveries to the military service. This could maintain the air defense in Europe. The air defense of Europe could prevent air superiority, which was preparing the conditions of Operation Overlord. Hitler’s “illogical” directions postponed Me-262’s first deliveries to the air service until April 1944. By March, the first outputs actually appeared, but training of the pilots began in April. Until the end of July the production exceeded 100 aircraft. In this last year, Allied forces marched on Rome; on another front, they prepared the aerial conditions for the landings on the Normandy coasts in France. Suddenly, Hitler ordered the Me-262 fighter to be converted to a bomber…

http://www.academical.org/dergi/MAKALE/9_10sayi/s9cinar1.htm;):wink:

#276

So, is the 840 (actually) figure to be taken as P-51s lost in air-to-air combat, while the rest were lost to accidents or shot down by AAA?

#277

Yep, in 213,873 sorties, all causes. Flak the highest and mechanical/coolant about the same as air losses, weather and accidents the rest.

By all accounts the first Mustang shot down was at Dieppe Aug.'42…

Flight Officer Hollis “Holly” Hills, an American serving with No. 414 Sqn of the RCAF, took off from Gatwick in the pre-dawn darkness, as “weaver” (wingman) to Flt. Lt. Freddie Clarke. Flying at wavetop level, the glow from the searchlights and AA fire at Dieppe permitted him to stay with his leader. Once over the target, they were promptly separated; both returned safely. On the second mission that morning, they saw a huge dogfight filling the sky over Dieppe, and Hills spotted four Fw 190s off to their right. With his radio out and unaware of the German fighters, Flt. Lt. Clarke left himself open and was hit. Then Hollis caught one of the FW’s with a deflection burst. It started smoking and flaming, then the canopy popped off. Hollis fired again, and the plane fell to ground. He headed for home, shepherding Clarke as he went, dueling another Fw 190 for miles. In his fight with the Fw’s, he lost sight of Clarke. After that, Hollis flew home uneventfully, to a dinner made rather somber by Clarke’s apparent loss. But next morning, Clarke re-appeared over Hollis’ bunk, smelling of seaweed; he had ditched off Dieppe and been rescued. He had witnessed and could officially confirm Hollis’ victory over the Focke-Wulf, the first of many aerial victories for the Mustang. And Clarke had the dubious honor of being the first combat Mustang to be shot down in the war by the Germans.

#278

Would it have been a good idea to replace Harris after the Normandy invasion?

Even though the decision to bomb cities for morale effect was made long before Harris became Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, Harris was completely obsessed with area bombing even to the extent that he argued vehemently against releasing any of his bombers for Overlord, and even threatened to resign when given a directive, dated 25 September 1944, recommending that Bomber Command concentrate against oil and communications targets.

Think Portal [and probably others] were coming around by then on concentrating on oil, and in the end he got Harris to play along [to a certain extent] although at any opportunity Harris would revert to type.

'‘If’'Bomber command, like the Americans, concentrated on oil and transportation targets after Normandy, the war may have ended sooner.

#279

Am I the only one who thinks that the Me 262 as a ground attack plane wasn’t a bad idea? IF, (and it’s a big If) it was ready as a ground attack plane by D-Day in worthy numbers, it could have done huge damage on the beaches and then been fairly impervious, (compared to Bf 109s and Fw 190s) to Allied fighters after they’d done their high speed bomb runs and cannon straffing over the beaches. Also, think about how the poor Heer and Waffen-SS ground forces on the Eastern Front could have benefited from reliable Me 262s in ground attack mode, hammering the hordes of T-34s sweeping all before them on the way to Berlin, again, fairly impervious to the Red Air Forces air superiority. Pretty sound thinking IMHO! :smiley:

#280

Well have you any realible evidence of that?
Becouse the 8 AF still survived the heavy day casualties during the entire 1944.

That would be right, and 1,115 in Jan. 1,118 in Feb. and 1,217 March, that’s
almost 5,000 fighters destroyed in just four months.

Good stats, although it’s a bit tough reading your link,[your English is better then my Russian.]:slight_smile:

Oh i know my english is very ugly sometimes:)

Yep, tragic figures aren’t they, [don’t think a smiley face for more Brit casualties in '44 is the way to go]:slight_smile: plus, if you add the Americans, it doubles to about 110,000.

Total Allied casualties of all types of air combat in the West was about 175,000.

On the other hand irrevocable losses for the Red army in '44 was almost 1.8 million, and totaled about 9.5 million for the war.:frowning:

Sorry this is not my point:(
We saw the statistic of RAF casualties, that clearly demonstrates - the Luftwaffe still been the very effective almost till the end of war.

By wars end P-51’s claimed over 9,000 victims.

Losses were about 840 aircraft.

You see , we should be very carefull with “official” datas:)
Besides that statistic 1520x4950 ( when allies had 10x1 superiority in fighters) absolutly does not reflect the effectiveness of the fighters, for instance Fw-190D9 against P-51.

Another case of the kiss of death by Hitler, Me-262 would have been in production earlier, but Hitler decided it was to be used as a ‘‘blitz bomber’’ so alterations had to be made [strengthening of undercarriage, bomb racks etc] making it’s entry into the war to late to have any significance.

I think mr Redcoat right- the troubles with engine Jumo004 was the mean reason with delay of mass production of Me262.

Germany was always living on a knives edge when it came to oil production, any serious reduction would have them in trouble, and Ploesti was almost 80% of Germany’s crude output, and by the time the Red army over ran it, it was down by 80% because of bombing raids. Synthetic oil was also down by almost 80%.

I wrote the 25% becouse the natural oil was just the 25% of total oil production in Germany.
So losing the Romania , reich automatically lose the 25% of its production.
BTW where did you get the figures that the Suynntetic oil was dpown by 80?
This is very disputable.

In early 1944, strategic targets were attacked (rail heads, rail lines, bridges etc.) The destruction of such targets effectively paralysed Germany.

Well lets look at your post #18
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=6758&page=2

Some production stats…

Aircraft production

1940 10.247…
1942 15.409…
1944 39.807…

Fighter production

1940 3.106…
1942 5.213…
1944 28.926…

Artillery production (over 37mm)

1940 5.000…
1942 12.000…
1944 41.000 …

Automatic weapons production

1940 171.000…
1942 317.000…
1944 787.000…

Munitions production

1940 865.000…
1942 1.270.000…
1944 3.350.000…
(tons)

Don’t look like the GErmany have been paralysed in the 1944:)
Becouse if the Strategical bombings attacked the Railway stations- how could Germans delivered such great sum of materials for productions to their plantsto produce of so big figures of wearpons?

The destruction of oil production, oil refineries and tank farms plus the transportation network, was decisive, but as this occurred sufficiently late in the war and that Germany was due to be defeated it’s often overlooked.

Decisive?
May be in the eyes of Bombers Hight command it looks decisived:)
But according the memours of Albert Speer (Inside the Third Reich, recollections)
he wrote ( sorry i found out only it in russian)http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/speer_a/index.html

Через два с половиной года, несмотря на только сейчас по-настоящему начавшиеся бомбардировки, мы подняли наше производство вооружений до рекордного уровня — от среднегодового индекса 98 за 1941 г. до 322 в июне 1944 г. При этом занятая рабочая сила возросла всего лишь примерно на 30%. Удалось наполовину сократить расход живого труда на единицу продукции.

Though two years after beginning of stategical bombings , we increase our military production since 98 in 1941 till the 322 in the june of 1944.At the same time the manpower has been increasing ONLY 30%.
The such great resault has been reached due to the rise of effectiveness of production.

As you could see no word about Strategic Bombings , that was “decisived”:slight_smile:
Moreover in his memours Speer described, WHY the Allies Bombing stategy WAS far from really effective

Следующий тяжелый удар должен был постичь нас 17 августа 1943 г., две недели спустя после Гамбурга. В воздух поднялся американский воздушный флот для первой своей стратегической воздушной операции. Ее целью были крупные заводы шарикоподшипников в Швейнфурте. Их производство и без того было узким местом, сковывавшим наши усилия по наращиванию вооружений.

Однако уже при этом первом налете противник допустил просчет. Вместо того, чтобы сосредоточиться на шарикоподшипниковых заводах, соединение из 376 «летающих крепостей» разделилось, и 146 самолетов атаковали одновременно сборочный авиационный завод в Регенсбурге, вполне удачно, но с последствиями, довольно малозначащими. Нас продолжало спасать то, что английская авиация по-прежнему беспорядочно бомбила другие города.
…
After the bombing of Hamburd two weekslater, the 8 AF attaked the Ball bearings plan in Shweinfurt.
They , however, admited a serious mistake- instead of the concentration all of Bombers against the Ball plans, they have been seperated to attack the different targets.
Our Ball industry have been finally saved by Brits , who continie to fritter away by bombing the GErmans cities

So indeed thee were no even a hint to a “decisived” role of strategic bombings.
On the contrary, Speer described the failure of Strategic command to destroy the Ball Bearings industry of GErmany vy the elementary lack of operative and strategical interaction between the USSAF and RAF:(