Bomber Harris, Criminal or Hero?

Yes, but the fields and their transport facilities, were vulnerable too, and hindered by, bombing nonetheless…

And Luftwaffe con’t bomb the new soviet Tankograd on definition…Becouse Chelyabinsk city , Ural region, not Syberia was OUT of range of action Germans Tactical bombers (U-88/87 that usially have been used in Eastern front…)
As you remember Germans had no the Strategical ones at all:)

That was the point I was trying to make. A Luftwaffe strategic bomber may have had some impact on the War. But we’ll never know…

Most of those in defense of Germany would probably be night fighters [which were giving bomber command a very hard time] because by June '44, the German day fighters were swept from the sky, mainly by the ‘‘Cadillac of the skies’’ the P-51 Mustang.

Your figures of 12,807 fighters destroyed over Germany sep 1943 - oct 1944, are slightly higher then mine, but close enough.

Have you got a breakdown of German aircraft types lost in the East, mainly fighters in the West, but probably more various types in the East, such as
the G, version of the Ju-87, armed with a pair of 37mm Flak 18 cannon, slung outboard of the main landing gear, it took a fearful toll of Sov armour, Hans-Ulrich Rudel claimed over 800 vehicles destroyed, including 519 tanks.

That would be right, and 1,115 in Jan. 1,118 in Feb. and 1,217 March, that’s
almost 5,000 fighters destroyed in just four months.

Good stats, although it’s a bit tough reading your link,[your English is better then my Russian.]:slight_smile:

Yep, tragic figures aren’t they, [don’t think a smiley face for more Brit casualties in '44 is the way to go]:slight_smile: plus, if you add the Americans, it doubles to about 110,000.

Total Allied casualties of all types of air combat in the West was about 175,000.

On the other hand irrevocable losses for the Red army in '44 was almost 1.8 million, and totaled about 9.5 million for the war.:frowning:

Yep, it was the poor old foot slogger that had to slug it out mile by mile on the ground, and the Red army thoroughly deserved to take Berlin in the end, after the utter carnage it suffered, and bravery it showed in coming back from the dead, was one of the most remarkable efforts in military history.

By wars end P-51’s claimed over 9,000 victims.

Losses were about 840 aircraft.

Another case of the kiss of death by Hitler, Me-262 would have been in production earlier, but Hitler decided it was to be used as a ‘‘blitz bomber’’ so alterations had to be made [strengthening of undercarriage, bomb racks etc] making it’s entry into the war to late to have any significance.

Germany was always living on a knives edge when it came to oil production, any serious reduction would have them in trouble, and Ploesti was almost 80% of Germany’s crude output, and by the time the Red army over ran it, it was down by 80% because of bombing raids. Synthetic oil was also down by almost 80%.

In early 1944, strategic targets were attacked (rail heads, rail lines, bridges etc.) The destruction of such targets effectively paralysed Germany. In 1945, Germany had mined much coal but had no way of moving it from the mines to where it was needed. When the war ended, the Allies found several hundred King Tiger tanks at a Munich rail yard ready to be taken to the war front - but the Germans had no way of getting them there.

The destruction of oil production, oil refineries and tank farms plus the transportation network, was decisive, but as this occurred sufficiently late in the war and that Germany was due to be defeated it’s often overlooked.

The defense of Normandy and of France in general were catastrophically effected by Allied air power, as few tanks could be brought from Germany. And few vehicles could escape to Germany. Probably one of the main reasons why comparatively few armored vehicles were encountered by the Western Allies after the Battle of the Bulge…

Uhm, no. That would have been the Do-335.

Nope! They only made 11 of those. And we can split hairs, perhaps the Do335 had a higher cruising speed, but the Mustang H was capable of sustained bursts of 487mph (or 784 kph) and could produce 1,655 kw on “war emergency power.”

Hawker Tempest V would do similar speeds when over-boosted (to 2200kW).

One caveat to numbers like these - indicated airspeed is entirely irrelevant at speeds like this, and true airspeed only barely more so. Unless you know ambient air temperature and hence can calculate Mach number you just can’t do a proper comparison.

The magic word is claimed.
In the only official study done on ground attack fighters effectiveness against armour (by the Allies in Normandy) they found they over claimed by a factor of ten, and if you add in the fact that Rudel was a poster boy for Nazi propaganda, any sensible person would realise that Rudels score is actually far less than claimed

By wars end P-51’s claimed over 9,000 victims.

Losses were about 840 aircraft.
According to the official USAAF figures, the figure for P-51’s lost in combat is 2,520 (all combat causes), and is credited with 4,950 air combat kills and 4,131 ground kills (ETO/MTO theaters)

Another case of the kiss of death by Hitler, Me-262 would have been in production earlier, but Hitler decided it was to be used as a ‘‘blitz bomber’’ so alterations had to be made [strengthening of undercarriage, bomb racks etc] making it’s entry into the war to late to have any significance.
Hitlers ‘bomber’ Me 262 had little effect on the introduction into service of this aircraft, the unreliability of the engines ensured it didn’t enter service sooner

http://www.vectorsite.net/avme262.html#m10

Total production of the King Tiger was only 487

Yup. But the it is undeniable that the Wehrmacht was rail-bound and horse laden, and that Allied destruction of the French rail system largely doomed them in Normandy from prolonging the War in the West, no matter the type of tank or APC…

From Wiki…

The Eighth, Ninth and Fifteenth Air Forces’ P-51 groups, all but three of which flew another type before converting to the Mustang, claimed some 4,950 aircraft shot down (about half of all USAAF claims in the European theater) and 4,131 destroyed on the ground. Losses were about 840 aircraft.

One of these groups, the Eighth Air Force’s 4th Fighter Group, was the overall top-scoring fighter group in Europe with 1,016 enemy aircraft destroyed, 550 in aerial combat and 466 on the ground.

In aerial combat, the top-scoring P-51 units (both of which exclusively flew Mustangs) were the 357th Fighter Group of the Eighth Air Force with 595 air-to-air combat victories, and the Ninth Air Force’s 354th Fighter Group with 701, which made it the top scoring outfit in aerial combat of all fighter groups of any type. Martin Bowman reports that in the ETO Mustangs flew 213,873 sorties and lost 2,520 aircraft to all causes.

Development problems (particularly its temperamental engines), Allied bombings and cautious Luftwaffe leadership and Hitler, all probably contributed to delays in quantity production.
http://www.2worldwar2.com/me-262.htm

Albert Speer, in his book “Inside the Third Reich” commented after the war that there were about 300 King Tiger tanks at Munich rail station waiting to be moved to the front – but the Germans had neither the railways nor the fuel needed to move these tanks around; both targets of Allied bombing.

Think about 100 were available for the Ardennes Offensive, which would leave only 87 others to see action.

Perhaps Speer’s not good at counting. :slight_smile:

Interesting… in the first part of your post its states losses of 820 and then it agrees with my source* and gives a figure of 2,520 :roll:

*Ray Wagner’s, “American Combat Planes: Third Enlarged Edition,”

Development problems (particularly its temperamental engines), Allied bombings and cautious Luftwaffe leadership and Hitler, all probably contributed to delays in quantity production.
http://www.2worldwar2.com/me-262.htm

"…the simple fact remains that Junkers failed to resolve the problems poised by series manufacture of the turbojet powering the Me 262 until mid-1944, and thus could not commence volume deliveries to Messerschmitt until the following September/October. Furthermore, the consensus of opinion of those actually engaged in the design development and testing of the Me 262 was to be that the fighter was introduced to service at the earliest practicable stage in its evolution; that any earlier deployment of the warplane on a large scale would have been entirely premature”

William Green, "Warplanes of the Second World War:”

:wink:

All I can put it down to is the 820 figure ‘‘may’’ be the loses in the Mustang offensive ending May, and the latter figure is for total losses in the ETO for the length of the war.:shock:

…The project of Me-262 was started in 1938. In July 1943, the fifth type of the Me-262 succeeded in the test flight. The next step was mass production for urgent deliveries to the military service. This could maintain the air defense in Europe. The air defense of Europe could prevent air superiority, which was preparing the conditions of Operation Overlord. Hitler’s “illogical” directions postponed Me-262’s first deliveries to the air service until April 1944. By March, the first outputs actually appeared, but training of the pilots began in April. Until the end of July the production exceeded 100 aircraft. In this last year, Allied forces marched on Rome; on another front, they prepared the aerial conditions for the landings on the Normandy coasts in France. Suddenly, Hitler ordered the Me-262 fighter to be converted to a bomber…

http://www.academical.org/dergi/MAKALE/9_10sayi/s9cinar1.htm;):wink:

So, is the 840 (actually) figure to be taken as P-51s lost in air-to-air combat, while the rest were lost to accidents or shot down by AAA?

Yep, in 213,873 sorties, all causes. Flak the highest and mechanical/coolant about the same as air losses, weather and accidents the rest.

By all accounts the first Mustang shot down was at Dieppe Aug.'42…

Flight Officer Hollis “Holly” Hills, an American serving with No. 414 Sqn of the RCAF, took off from Gatwick in the pre-dawn darkness, as “weaver” (wingman) to Flt. Lt. Freddie Clarke. Flying at wavetop level, the glow from the searchlights and AA fire at Dieppe permitted him to stay with his leader. Once over the target, they were promptly separated; both returned safely. On the second mission that morning, they saw a huge dogfight filling the sky over Dieppe, and Hills spotted four Fw 190s off to their right. With his radio out and unaware of the German fighters, Flt. Lt. Clarke left himself open and was hit. Then Hollis caught one of the FW’s with a deflection burst. It started smoking and flaming, then the canopy popped off. Hollis fired again, and the plane fell to ground. He headed for home, shepherding Clarke as he went, dueling another Fw 190 for miles. In his fight with the Fw’s, he lost sight of Clarke. After that, Hollis flew home uneventfully, to a dinner made rather somber by Clarke’s apparent loss. But next morning, Clarke re-appeared over Hollis’ bunk, smelling of seaweed; he had ditched off Dieppe and been rescued. He had witnessed and could officially confirm Hollis’ victory over the Focke-Wulf, the first of many aerial victories for the Mustang. And Clarke had the dubious honor of being the first combat Mustang to be shot down in the war by the Germans.

Would it have been a good idea to replace Harris after the Normandy invasion?

Even though the decision to bomb cities for morale effect was made long before Harris became Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, Harris was completely obsessed with area bombing even to the extent that he argued vehemently against releasing any of his bombers for Overlord, and even threatened to resign when given a directive, dated 25 September 1944, recommending that Bomber Command concentrate against oil and communications targets.

Think Portal [and probably others] were coming around by then on concentrating on oil, and in the end he got Harris to play along [to a certain extent] although at any opportunity Harris would revert to type.

'‘If’'Bomber command, like the Americans, concentrated on oil and transportation targets after Normandy, the war may have ended sooner.

Am I the only one who thinks that the Me 262 as a ground attack plane wasn’t a bad idea? IF, (and it’s a big If) it was ready as a ground attack plane by D-Day in worthy numbers, it could have done huge damage on the beaches and then been fairly impervious, (compared to Bf 109s and Fw 190s) to Allied fighters after they’d done their high speed bomb runs and cannon straffing over the beaches. Also, think about how the poor Heer and Waffen-SS ground forces on the Eastern Front could have benefited from reliable Me 262s in ground attack mode, hammering the hordes of T-34s sweeping all before them on the way to Berlin, again, fairly impervious to the Red Air Forces air superiority. Pretty sound thinking IMHO! :smiley:

Well have you any realible evidence of that?
Becouse the 8 AF still survived the heavy day casualties during the entire 1944.

That would be right, and 1,115 in Jan. 1,118 in Feb. and 1,217 March, that’s
almost 5,000 fighters destroyed in just four months.

Good stats, although it’s a bit tough reading your link,[your English is better then my Russian.]:slight_smile:

Oh i know my english is very ugly sometimes:)

Yep, tragic figures aren’t they, [don’t think a smiley face for more Brit casualties in '44 is the way to go]:slight_smile: plus, if you add the Americans, it doubles to about 110,000.

Total Allied casualties of all types of air combat in the West was about 175,000.

On the other hand irrevocable losses for the Red army in '44 was almost 1.8 million, and totaled about 9.5 million for the war.:frowning:

Sorry this is not my point:(
We saw the statistic of RAF casualties, that clearly demonstrates - the Luftwaffe still been the very effective almost till the end of war.

By wars end P-51’s claimed over 9,000 victims.

Losses were about 840 aircraft.

You see , we should be very carefull with “official” datas:)
Besides that statistic 1520x4950 ( when allies had 10x1 superiority in fighters) absolutly does not reflect the effectiveness of the fighters, for instance Fw-190D9 against P-51.

Another case of the kiss of death by Hitler, Me-262 would have been in production earlier, but Hitler decided it was to be used as a ‘‘blitz bomber’’ so alterations had to be made [strengthening of undercarriage, bomb racks etc] making it’s entry into the war to late to have any significance.

I think mr Redcoat right- the troubles with engine Jumo004 was the mean reason with delay of mass production of Me262.

Germany was always living on a knives edge when it came to oil production, any serious reduction would have them in trouble, and Ploesti was almost 80% of Germany’s crude output, and by the time the Red army over ran it, it was down by 80% because of bombing raids. Synthetic oil was also down by almost 80%.

I wrote the 25% becouse the natural oil was just the 25% of total oil production in Germany.
So losing the Romania , reich automatically lose the 25% of its production.
BTW where did you get the figures that the Suynntetic oil was dpown by 80?
This is very disputable.

In early 1944, strategic targets were attacked (rail heads, rail lines, bridges etc.) The destruction of such targets effectively paralysed Germany.

Well lets look at your post #18
http://www.ww2incolor.com/forum/showthread.php?t=6758&page=2

Some production stats…

Aircraft production

1940 10.247…
1942 15.409…
1944 39.807…

Fighter production

1940 3.106…
1942 5.213…
1944 28.926…

Artillery production (over 37mm)

1940 5.000…
1942 12.000…
1944 41.000 …

Automatic weapons production

1940 171.000…
1942 317.000…
1944 787.000…

Munitions production

1940 865.000…
1942 1.270.000…
1944 3.350.000…
(tons)

Don’t look like the GErmany have been paralysed in the 1944:)
Becouse if the Strategical bombings attacked the Railway stations- how could Germans delivered such great sum of materials for productions to their plantsto produce of so big figures of wearpons?

The destruction of oil production, oil refineries and tank farms plus the transportation network, was decisive, but as this occurred sufficiently late in the war and that Germany was due to be defeated it’s often overlooked.

Decisive?
May be in the eyes of Bombers Hight command it looks decisived:)
But according the memours of Albert Speer (Inside the Third Reich, recollections)
he wrote ( sorry i found out only it in russian)http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/speer_a/index.html

Через два с половиной года, несмотря на только сейчас по-настоящему начавшиеся бомбардировки, мы подняли наше производство вооружений до рекордного уровня — от среднегодового индекса 98 за 1941 г. до 322 в июне 1944 г. При этом занятая рабочая сила возросла всего лишь примерно на 30%. Удалось наполовину сократить расход живого труда на единицу продукции.


Though two years after beginning of stategical bombings , we increase our military production since 98 in 1941 till the 322 in the june of 1944.At the same time the manpower has been increasing ONLY 30%.
The such great resault has been reached due to the rise of effectiveness of production.

As you could see no word about Strategic Bombings , that was “decisived”:slight_smile:
Moreover in his memours Speer described, WHY the Allies Bombing stategy WAS far from really effective

Следующий тяжелый удар должен был постичь нас 17 августа 1943 г., две недели спустя после Гамбурга. В воздух поднялся американский воздушный флот для первой своей стратегической воздушной операции. Ее целью были крупные заводы шарикоподшипников в Швейнфурте. Их производство и без того было узким местом, сковывавшим наши усилия по наращиванию вооружений.

Однако уже при этом первом налете противник допустил просчет. Вместо того, чтобы сосредоточиться на шарикоподшипниковых заводах, соединение из 376 «летающих крепостей» разделилось, и 146 самолетов атаковали одновременно сборочный авиационный завод в Регенсбурге, вполне удачно, но с последствиями, довольно малозначащими. Нас продолжало спасать то, что английская авиация по-прежнему беспорядочно бомбила другие города.

After the bombing of Hamburd two weekslater, the 8 AF attaked the Ball bearings plan in Shweinfurt.
They , however, admited a serious mistake- instead of the concentration all of Bombers against the Ball plans, they have been seperated to attack the different targets.
Our Ball industry have been finally saved by Brits , who continie to fritter away by bombing the GErmans cities

So indeed thee were no even a hint to a “decisived” role of strategic bombings.
On the contrary, Speer described the failure of Strategic command to destroy the Ball Bearings industry of GErmany vy the elementary lack of operative and strategical interaction between the USSAF and RAF:(

[quote=“redcoat,post:271,topic:253”]

Total production of the King Tiger was only 487[/QUOTE]
…and at least half of them have been sended to the Eastern front where they fought:)
Really , the allies found all of the King Tigers in Western Front in the Munich;)?

As far as i know the USAAF in the Italia has not been involved into the Bombing of GErmany and France at all.
Besides the Luftwaffe had a separate fighters groups for AA-defence, that did not include the other missions.
Although they use the flexible tactic of operational subordination, that let to use the other fighters in AA-defence.
The tables above just demonstrates the the Aviation that has been primary used for the AA-defence and for tactical missions in the fronts.
Those are certainly the other groups.

Actually, it was better than any variant of the Me109, and comparisons to the FW190 is subjective, since they were few in number, and the last generation of P-51H models (and L and M for that matter) would have been the fastest piston engined fighters of the War! But they weren’t needed. In any case, as there were no more German pilots to fly them, they were pretty much irrelevant directly corresponding with US long range fighter escorts and the P-51 could be produced in much higher numbers. Also, the final variants of the P-51H were more than a match for any German piston engined fighter. The US was also on the verge to deploying the P-80 Shooting Star, which was superior to the Me262 in air to air performance and in production simplicity…

The P-51 even far could not reach the last hgh altitude modification of FW-190( Ta-152H1) indeed Nick:)
Niether in speed not in altitude.
Ask the Panzerknacker, he wrote a tonns of material about it in other threads:)
Germans , having the lack of everything, could prodused just about 60 of those unique piston fighters. However even the middle-altitude FW-190D9 was the superior of Mustang, especially in maneuverability.
The the British Spitfire XII was better fighter then the P-51 in sense of reliability and maneuverability.
The single advantage of P-51 was the great fuel stock.But accurate due to it - the Mustang often blowed up right in the sky , beeing hited by the short burst of gun Fw or Me.
Don’t believe me, watch the guncameras films.
Even the P-47 was much safe and reliable firgher.
You don’t play in WW2 simulators, i do play it…

The Me109 was also water cooled, and the FW190 suffered from many reliability problems not least of which being it having to use synthetic gasoline which inherently effected its performance, which had to be overcome using complex turbochargers. And then, most of Germany’s best pilots were dead or captured, and the slow Luftwaffe training and replacement system prevented many more from being trained…The Luftwaffe, even while trying to avoid direct contact with US escort fighters, still suffered high losses of pilots in 1944. These tactics also hindered their effectiveness at attacking bombers. And by mid-1944, USAAF pilots adopted more aggressive tactics and took the War to Luftwaffe fields destroying many of the Fw190s and Me109s on the ground which all but spelled the end of the ability of the Luftwaffe to inflict casualties on US bombers…

I was meaning not the initial pure technical lack ( any engine has it) ,but the behaviour it during the battles.
So the engine of P-51 could be stoped or fired up im much nore cases by the single burst.
And the ability of Allies pilots to destroy the Germans on the ground HAS NO Relation to the strategic bombings at all.
This was direct resault of total numerical superiority of allies in the sky.
With the Strategical bombers, or without it - the Alllies could reach the air superiority finally to the end of war.Without strategic bombings.

That is incorrect. The number of missions wasn’t high for Germany proper, but attacks were conducted from both North Africa and later Italy against Eastern European targets such as Ploesti. Targets in Austria, Czechoslovakia and Germany were also attacked…

Besides the Luftwaffe had a separate fighters groups for AA-defence, that did not include the other missions.

I think you may be unaware that the Allies shifted emphasis of bombing operations to directly support the D-Day in early 1944, so the dispersed fighters of the Luftwaffe were indeed attacking bombers over France, and again, were part of a comprehensive German early warning and interdiction system that virtually stretched to Britain itself. I’m not even sure what else they would have been attacking as the Allies had complete air superiority. The famous “two FW-190s” over Juno Beach comes to mind. Although, the Luftwaffe did attempt night strikes against the fleets, which were ineffective, using He-111s I think…

Although they use the flexible tactic of operational subordination, that let to use the other fighters in AA-defence.
The tables above just demonstrates the the Aviation that has been primary used for the AA-defence and for tactical missions in the fronts.
Those are certainly the other groups.

Yet, there as no tactical aviation to speak of, certainly not in the West after late 1943. Remember Chevan, the German soldier had a saying in Normandy: “If (the plane overhead) is camouflage, then it is British. If it is reflective or metallic, then it’s American. If the plane is invisible, then it’s the Luftwaffe!”

In fact, the only major air operations the Luftwaffe attempted, other than using Stukas in a few strikes against Bridges, was the operations during the “Battle of the Bulge,” in which the Luftwaffe inflicted losses a little better than what they received --only the AAF and the RAF could easily make good their losses. The Germans could not…

The P-51 even far could not reach the last hgh altitude modification of FW-190( Ta-152H1) indeed Nick:)
Niether in speed not in altitude.
Ask the Panzerknacker, he wrote a tonns of material about it in other threads:)
Germans , having the lack of everything, could prodused just about 60 of those unique piston fighters. However even the middle-altitude FW-190D9 was the superior of Mustang, especially in maneuverability.

Okay, you’ve got me Chevan. Sixty-seven FW190s made were superior than the P-51D. And I am well aware of the web-wide discussion of German “what-ifs” and “wonder-weapons” that were produced in small numbers, only at blueprint stage, or were in programs that were so divergent and redundant that they stretched the German research and development into a hugely inefficient waste of resources. However, the rest of the 20,000 plus certainly were NOT more maneuverable at combat altitudes as the P-51 had the advantage. And their performance was hindered by poor quality synthetic gasoline (synthetic is great as lubricating oils, not so good in aviation fuels) and pilots that were routinely killed simply because the Luftwaffe lacked a proper training program to produce adequate pilots after the elites were overwhelmed…

Secondly, the ceiling is largely a moot point, since it was the FW190s that had to meet the P-51s to get through to the bombers, not the other way around, so in a sense, it was the USAAF that dictated the terms of battle. Not too mention that the typical German tactics were to avoid fighter dogfights all together since their primary focus was knocking down bombers…

You might ask why if the FW-190 was such a great aircraft, did most of the German aces prefer Me109s?

The the British Spitfire XII was better fighter then the P-51 in sense of reliability and maneuverability.

The Spitfire is a beautiful, agile aircraft that I shall never speak ill of. But I can’t see how it was “more reliable” since I thought the engines were similar or identical. I could be wrong about that. But remember, the Mark VII version came out as a counter to the FW190 after the RAF noticed them in 1942. In a sense, until the P-51H model that never saw combat in the ETO, the Mustang wasn’t really specifically modified nor earmarked to engage a specific aircraft. It didn’t have to be. And I’m not even sure the later Spitfires could escort bombers to Berlin and back – the IVs certainly couldn’t…

The single advantage of P-51 was the great fuel stock.But accurate due to it - the Mustang often blowed up right in the sky , beeing hited by the short burst of gun Fw or Me.
Don’t believe me, watch the guncameras films.

Except apparently it didn’t happen all that often, it was the Luftwaffe that began to suffer irreplaceable losses that the Luftwaffe pilot training could not make good. Not the Americans.

Even the P-47 was much safe and reliable firgher.
You don’t play in WW2 simulators, i do play it…

The P-47 was a heavy barrel with a huge engine. It was great for tactical air support, but only barely competent against Luftwaffe fighters (until perhaps the last versions) and then only because it was rugged. Although, I believe the later versions were comparable, but were already superseded by, newer fighters such as the Mustang and FW-190. But it was still heavy and need a very powerful engine to compensate, making if a poor long range fighter and not all that agile…

And basing your history on video game developers? :lol:

I was meaning not the initial pure technical lack ( any engine has it) ,but the behaviour it during the battles.
So the engine of P-51 could be stoped or fired up im much nore cases by the single burst.

Except it really didn’t happen all that often, and you could say that about any fighter, including the FW-190. One burst of HE incendiary will pretty much take care of any fighter whether it is air cooled or liquid cooled!

And the ability of Allies pilots to destroy the Germans on the ground HAS NO Relation to the strategic bombings at all.

Au contraire! It was part of the battle of attrition that strategic bombing represented!

This was direct resault of total numerical superiority of allies in the sky.
With the Strategical bombers, or without it - the Alllies could reach the air superiority finally to the end of war.Without strategic bombings.

Maybe, but then, the Luftwaffe would have had plenty of fuel, wouldn’t they? I would also argue that the emphasis of strategic bombing was largely mislayed from the beginning. But there is little doubt that strategic bombing did in fact sap much of Germany’s resources --both aerial and otherwise-- that could have been put to good (or bad) use elsewhere…