They wouldn’t be allowed to do it these days. All we hear about is OH&S, Duty Of Care, Manual of Military Safety, etc. Those are terrific shots, PK - well done.
Cheers,
Cliff
What I really meant to write (except I was so amazed at Panzerknacker’s photos) was that the Churchill really did everything it was asked to do. You design a tank for a specific purpose, then you task it accordingly. The confused thinking which put the 2pdr on this tank, was soon overcome by some very bright British REME officers, who found a way to fit the desired 75mm weapon into the Churchill. I’ll post the link at some later stage, but Operation Whitehot was a triumph.
Cheers,
Cliff
I’ve no doubt some board members have seen it before, but - I hope the foregoing provides some good reading on the subject.
Cheers,
Cliff
I believe I’ve read in the past that mounting of the 2 pdr. was the result of a shortage of any other guns being available after the Fall of France…
Must have been a bumpy ride…
They wouldn’t be allowed to do it these days. All we hear about is OH&S, Duty Of Care, Manual of Military Safety, etc. Those are terrific shots, PK - well done.
Thank you, the Churchill despite being slow was quite acrobatic, its climbing capabilities ( thanks to a a very good engine torque and gear relation) was superb.
What I really meant to write (except I was so amazed at Panzerknacker’s photos) was that the Churchill really did everything it was asked to do. You design a tank for a specific purpose, then you task it accordingly.
After 1943, in earlier dates it was pretty much troubled like everyother british tank.
Have a read through
Through Mud And Blood
Infantry/Tank Operations in World War II
1975
ISBN 0 7091 4822 4
By Bryan Perrett
This goes some way to explaining the tactics and thinking behind the Matilda I and II, Valentine and Churchill as well as why they and the thinking behind them lasted so long.
It may surprise and inform some detractors from the I Tanks. It gives the plus and minus points of the vehicles and the crews and Troops who relied on them, including when attempts were made to use other tanks in the I tank role.
Hello, does the armour of the churchill not get bolted onto a 13mm or 15mm steel frame and thus would it not gain up to that 15mm in overall armour protection?/!
Have been to Gayle Mill in Hawes (Wensleydale) and they used to be a testing area for the churchill tanks, prior to D-Day landings. Aparently 20 to 30 tanks would be tested at a time and they climed over the wall into the lake and slowly worked their way out to the shallow end as they would at Normandy, shoot a few rounds off into the hillside and off, ready for action.
Have you any info or any more pictures of the tanks ‘waterproofed’ for dropping off the main landing craft into the sea to attack the Normandy beaches.
Paul C
Excellent Footage of the Churchill Flamethrower, yes in my video channel, who else ?
I have read accounts by Churchill AVRE crews on D Day where they worked in conjunction with the Crocodiles to knock out the bunkers.
The AVRE would use its Petard to crack open the bunker and the Croc would then flame it to kill the crew. (Some accounts had them following a flail to get near enough).
For an armoured vehicle with many failings the Churchill managed to serve until near then end of the 60’s in the RE Armoured regiments.
The framework of the chassis was 13 to 15 mm thick, yes. However: it was in mild steel, or face-hardened at best meaning it was useless, as armour and is therefore never calculated as being more than part of the over-all weight of the vehicle.
The use of homogenous armour for the Churchill did reach the point of developmental discussion, but never** took place either in prototype development or further. Part of the reason for this is that the research on homogenous armour for the Churchill saw it’s fruition in the Tortoise, 6 of which were built and saw some testing post-war.
**Slight qualification, here: “never took place” in the sense of the Churchill was “Clad in” Armour, not “Built from” as the Tortoise later was, and to which process the data from the Churchill research contributed heavily.
Kind and Respectful Regards, Uyraell.
I have read accounts by Churchill AVRE crews on D Day where they worked in conjunction with the Crocodiles to knock out the bunkers. The AVRE would use its Petard to crack open the bunker and the Croc would then flame it to kill the crew. (Some accounts had them following a flail to get near enough). For an armoured vehicle with many failings the Churchill managed to serve until near then end of the 60’s in the RE Armoured regiments.
That is correct but the Crocodile seems devastating enough even by itself, teh flaming liquid coudl penetrate bunkers by gun/ machinegun apertures.
Beside the psichological effect on the bunker crew of being surrounded by flames…hmmm, nasty.
Churchill tank can’t go toe-to-toe with Strong German Tank Hunters and Heavy Tanks in my opinion. The Jagdpanther can destroy it in 1 Hit. It’s because it’s easy-to flank the Churchill. Good thing it remains an Infantry Tank only.
It was never meant too, at least not after 1942…
The I tanks were never meant to fight other tanks. Their role was to support the infantry by taking out strong points as a result a fast speed was not needed but strong armour was.
An initial failing was the 2 pounders fitted to the second generation I tanks (Matilda II, early Valentines and Churchills) had no HE round so relied on the machine guns, or special close support variants. (Matilda I’s had a .303 vickers only or a 0.5 vickers in the ‘Troop Leaders’ supposedly to give it some sort of armour penetrating ability).
The ability to take a huge punishment and still keep going made them a very welcome asset for the infantry. The Churchills ability to go where other tanks could not surprised quite a few German soldiers. Later tactics included the I tanks towing forward the Infantrys 6 and 17 pounder AT guns so they could be ready to repel the inevitable counter attack.
The tactics of the hunting panzers was not to stalk an enemy tank but to lie in wait and ambush. Due to their weight and size they were not actually that much more maneuverable in combat than the I tanks if at all. Likewise with the German Heavy Tanks some of which did fall prey to Churchills with their puny 6 pounder.
You make a good point, which itself raises the ways in which the opposing forces employed their armour.
Essentially, after 1942 the Germans tend to adopt “wait and snipe, then run and snipe again” tactics, and much of their post 1942 armour (certainly pretty much everything from 1943 onwards, with the exception of the self-propelled artillery) reflects plainly this tactical policy.
By stark contrast, the Russians were employing what amounted to swarm tactics, and crushing by weight of numbers.
Not a great surprise, it being that the Russians chose a few useful designs and simply kept producing vast numbers of them, having sufficient manpower reserves to be able to afford mass tactics.
The British and Americans essentially set themselves between the extremes of the Germans and Russians, neither fearing to seek out the enemy to bring him to battle, nor fearing to mass on focal points and attack with weight of numbers (augmented, it has to be admitted, by sumptuous reserves of Tactical Airpower, which was usually not available to the Germans) when necessary.
Similarly, Allied production of armour and the crews to man it reflects this tactical policy, for all that the Official Field Manuals and various other official documents laid-down policy that differed from the way things were done on the battlefield.
Kind and Respectful Regards Leccy, Uyraell.
By stark contrast, the Russians were employing what amounted to swarm tactics, and crushing by weight of numbers.
Not a great surprise, it being that the Russians chose a few useful designs and simply kept producing vast numbers of them, having sufficient manpower reserves to be able to afford mass tactics.
That was the “deep battle” concept.
With some reservations, I’m inclined to agree.
The issue I have is that elsewhere on this forum the very existence of “Deep Battle” as a concept has come into debate, notwithstanding the many historical references to it. Reference the “Tukachevsky Affair” thread.
That “Deep Battle” or a modified form thereof came into employment in the RKKA after 1942 is not in debate, as far as I’m concerned.
I’m interested in where the concept as it came to be used might well depart from the concept as originally promulgated.
That the Russians took a very wise strategic decision in choosing a few simple, reliable designs and maintaining the production of them, operating tactically according to what those designs could achieve on the battlefield, is an admirable thing.
It also stands in sharp contrast to the UK maintaining a policy of diversity of purpose in its’ armoured vehicles, which policy the Churchill Tank represents in so many ways.
It was simple good fortune that the basic Churchill chassis was so adaptable to the large number of roles it was later to fulfill: I would argue that despite the vehicle having successes in combat, it was in fact largely a failure as a battle tank, as was much of the British armour until the very late arrival of the Comet, which even then was inadequate by the time it was deployed.
Kind and Respectful Regards Panzerknacker my friend, Uyraell.
I’m a great admirer of the scholarship of Panzerknacker and Uyraell. It’s an education to read their posts. Some personal thoughts of mine on the intricacies of British tank design and philosophy:
- The War Office didn’t want to know, so Churchill formed the Admiralty’s Landships Committee to push the project through. Hence the old naval 6pdrs in the “male” tanks.
- Once the tank became accepted as military hardware, the Cavalry wanted fast, light tanks to resume their earlier mounted reconnaissance role. Infantry wanted it to do exactly what it did in 1917, support them up to the enemy lines. To make the act even more entertaining, the Royal Artillery declared themselves the arbiter of tank armament, so that tank design went in three different directions at once, usually with inappropriate armament.
- The Infantry tanks in France vs. the early Panzers, and in North Africa vs. Italian armour, were very successful in the direct anti-armour role. The British policymakers failed to notice that the Germans used their armour to lure enemy vehicles onto the anti-tank screen, and the 88mm claimed many victims in this way.
- North Africa derailed British tank development to some extent because it was seen as ideal Cruiser tank country. All that was missing, was the ideal Cruiser tank.
- The excuse used for not widening British turrets and hulls to take heavier guns like the 17pdr, was the inability of the railway loading gauge to handle such loads. Such bureaucratic chicanery didn’t occur in Germany or the USSR, where people and their environment took second place to the war effort.
- The 79th Armoured Division was perhaps the most eccentric - and successful - collection of specialised armour in the world. Having essentially failed in mainstream tank design, the Brits exhibited world-beating ingenuity in the invention of mine-flails, flame-throwing Crocodile tanks, bridge-layers, AVREs and many more.
- Having arrived too late at the ideal Infantry tank in the Churchill, soon to be rendered obsolete by the Centurion, the Brits found the hull to be remarkably suited to all of the above specialised roles which played such a vital part after D-Day. So, on many levels, the Churchill can claim to have been a successful design. Fantasies such as “Churchill vs Panther/Tiger,etc”, ignore the fact that armoured warfare had moved on by that time. Obstinate defences were simply surrounded, bypassed, blasted with air-strikes, or cut-off from resupply until they ran out of ammunition. Doesn’t matter how good your tank is … if the enemy has more tanks than you have shells, he’s still going to be there and you can’t do a thing to stop him. Just my random musings on the subject. Sorry if I’ve repeated points made previously in the thread, but the narrative would be incomplete without them.
Cheers,
Cliff
My friend, your own scholarship is clearly not lacking.
Yours is a fine and erudite posting, which does add necessary and needed background to the topic.
It is a common failing of mine to think that information I have is similarly known to other people, and in fact I tend to expect that others know the same info I do. That can at times be a risky way to think, but `tis a habit I have to work to avoid.
I have books that very clearly show the (more often than not, extremely acrimonious) relationships between the various UK committees, Ministries and Commands.
The point most often made is that to the Armoured units on the battlefield, all was essentially in a state of fluxation, because (to over-simplfy a little) the state of Armoured vehicle Planned Procurment, Development, and research/trials essentially changed every 6 to 8 months, and by the time the word of said changes reached those on the battlefield, that word was already outdated by the latest policy decisions (which had yet to reach the by now jaded ears of the troops in the field).
The poor soldiers in effect never knew what they’d be given to go to war in, let alone when it would arrive, and knew it would most likely be inadequate in any case. No sooner would word reach the troops than another, often completely contradictory, decision would be made back in the UK.
Added to all this is the evil wrought by the Ministry of Supply, which in essence felt that whatever it gave the soldiers to go to battle with “would be good enough to do the job”, when experience in the field (and the vast amount of corroboratory reports supporting that experience, which voluminous documentation seems to have been all but ignored in the UK, apart from the R&D boffins, who had no influence to exert on events) was in essence ignored or categorised as “exaggeration” by those secure in Britain and who would never have to face the enemy in combat.
In short, one has to feel a certain amount of compassion, as well as admiration for the fortitude of UK Armoured troops, who endured all the foregoing while still taking the battle to the enemy as best they might, inadequate and often downright-deadly-to-its’-own-crew tanks notwithstanding.
Kind and Respectful Regards Cliff my friend, Uyraell.