Churchill Infantry Tank.

World War II British Military
#81

A little bit of info about Kingforce and the Churchills second Battle (1st being Dieppe)

Churchill III tanks armed with 6 pdr’s.

7th Motor Brigade, led by the Queen’s Bays went into action as soon as the Northern Corridor had been cleared of mines. Good progress was made until coming under fire from enemy tanks, some of which were dug-in, defending a line located south of Kidney Ridge given the name Snipe. So effective was the defender’s fire, the number of the Bay’s tanks was reduced to just a dozen Shermans and Crusaders. The time had come for KingForce to go into action!

Led by Major King, Churchills went into action for the first time since the Raid on Dieppe. Everything considered, they acquitted themselves well despite Cpl Kelly Appleby’s tank having to leave the field when its 6-pdr gun failed to return from the recoil position. Major King’s tank, although it had been hit eight times without being penetrated, claimed hits on four Panzers. Of the six Churchills engaged, 2nd Lt. Appleby’s tank (see photograph below) was destroyed after being hit in excess of fifty times, eight of which coming from “friendly fire.” Later examination showed that the Churchill, despite all the hits, was only penetrated three times. Sadly, Appleby and three of his crew were killed, the one survivor being wounded. By day’s end, the enemy having withdrawn their forces from the Kidney Ridge area, KingForce withdrew in order get the remaining five Churchills ready for whatever may lie ahead.

While Kingforce was refitting, on 27th October, the Germans launched an attack, by 21st Panzers, in an attempt to recapture their lost positions. Stoutly defended, Kidney Ridge stayed in 8th Army’s possession. The attack having failed, Field Marshal Rommel, who had returned from Germany, ordered his troops to take up defensive positions in and around the village of Tell el Aqqaqir. Removing the enemy from these positions proved to be KingForce’s next task.
Once again, KingForce was called upon to assist Shermans of 7th Motor Brigade which had run into difficulty attacking the German defences. The Churchills ran into heavy fire, particularly from A/T guns. However, despite numerous hits none was destroyed. During the action Lt. Howard’s tank was hit over thirty times but suffered nothing greater than a broken track. Two other Churchills were hit multiple times jamming their turrets, again without any penetration.

During the two actions Churchills of KingForce perfomed well, destroying five Panzers and three anti-tank guns, but its Churchills were no longer needed. With the enemy defences being overrun and the long Axis retreat westwards beginning, as it was obvious that the slow I-Tanks could not keep up. As a result, KingForce was ordered to makes its way back to Alexandria, which they accomplished on their own tracks, there to be disbanded.

Hopefully this action report gives a few people an idea of why the I tank idea was kept up for so long by the British, pity the main armament was not changed to 75mm earlier. The NA75 conversion proved that it could be done.

Uyrael I was almost going to comment that the meteor may not have had the torque to drive the heavy Churchill ‘Doh it managed quite well the on heavier Centurion’s’

#82

With the Meteor it’s origin should be born in mind. The original had been a (by the time it was finalised) 1450 HP Merlin, de-rated to 600 HP as first applied to the Comet, and (from memory) initially 620, later 650 HP as applied to the Centurion.
As the M120 that same motor, now 680HP, is applied to the Conqueror, which at 65 tons dry weight has to be one of the heaviest-ever British vehicles to be actually fielded.
So, despite the initial impression one is almost seduced into taking regard the topic of torque, it is reasonably plain that the torque was sufficiently available, though at somewhat disproportionate cost in fuel economy in the later models of Meteor derivative, as compared to the original Comet/Centurion Meteor.

Returning briefly to the Merlin at 1450 HP for a moment, it should perhaps also be borne in mind that as the Merlin 66 it had had sufficient available torque to power JK535, a Spitfire contraprop prototype. This has relevance, because running a contraprop is demanding of far more torque than a plain prop.
Thus, the ancestry of the Meteor rather clearly demonstrates and foretells the torque issue.
Of somewhat more esoteric interest in the same vein is that the Merlin 66, a high-altitude engine, contributed rather more heavily to the Meteor than did the Merlin 46, or Merlin 32, both low-altitude Merlins, in theory more suited to a tank.
Again, the torque available from the Merlin 66 must have justified the preference over the other two, seemingly more logical choices.

Now, I admit I’m going by memory with a lot of this info, but I have some of it at first-hand, from an ex RAF Merlin mechanic, who clued-me-in that the Merlin 66 was in large part one of the parents of the Meteor, and that another heavy contributor was in fact the Merlin 23, as employed in the Lancaster.

I’m grateful that man took the time to talk to me when he did: much of what he told me has not been seen in print since, and probably never will be.

Kind and Respectful Regards Leccy my friend, Uyraell.

#83

I was at RAF Conningsby when they aquired some surplus Meteor engines for the BBMF. They assumed that since the Meteor was a modified Merlin development that they would be able to use them (merlin engines were getting very scarce and the Lancaster had chewed through a few).
I was told they were the wrong profile?? but that some parts were common enough to allow componants to be used to repair the merlins.

Our Cent 105 and 165 AVRE’s used to be the bane of the fuel points with those thirsty meteor engines at a time when the brit army was trying to change to completely diesel. At least the Cents had a longer range than the Churchills they replaced in the 60’s and 70’s.

#84

This is where it gets very damned complicated, very damned fast, as regards the RR Meteor.
As I recall being told it: the casing of the Meteor is essentially Merlin 23, but the guts it holds is essentially Merlin 66.
Now, I’m no expert in this arcanae, but as I was told it: the combustion hemisphere of the Meteor, and the piston profile differ considerably in the early models, and vastly in the later models, from the respective Merlin antecedents.
The tank pistons would be next to useless, as would the major bearings: too heavy, wrong alloys in each case.
The crankshafts would be “tolerable” to employ, as would the upper scavenger rings, and the top piston ring.
The major nasty would be the heads. Again, different hemisphere contours relating to different piston head contours.

However: take a Packard Merlin head, and copy the contours from that, replace the Meteor piston with the Packard piston or close analogue, and a workable solution is devisable, though at considerable cost and effort.

Granted, one has then to almost undo the American production method related changes to the Packard Merlin to return it to being close to its’ RR parent (then to cast and forge the “new-original” heads themselves), but ironcally that is a simpler task than undoing the changes made to the RR Merlin to enable production by Rover as the Meteor tank engine. Further irony: RR likely still have accurate records regarding the design changes to Merlin from RR to Packard. Neither Rover nor RR are likely to have accurate records of the changes as relate to Meteor. My ex RAF friend had in fact been one of a group of some 60 RAF personnel seconded temporarily to Rover to help establish Meteor production, get it underweigh. He describes Rover as having horrid record-keeping habits, the exact same criticism levelled at Rover by none other than Frank Whittle.

I don’t know how much if any of this information would be of help to BBMF, but it might be simpler to obtain Packard Merlins, and re-jig the engine mounts to accept the Packard, as there were adapter kits issued for precisely that purpose.
Find or reproduce the mounting adapters and employ the Packards is by far the simpler solution.

Regardless all the above, it would be more than tragedy to see the day the BBMF Lancaster never flew again.
In light of this, I sincerely hope they do find a way to keep her airborne.

I’m somewhat surprised it was the 70’s before the Churchill vehicles were replaced: I’d always read that took place in the early 60’s at the latest.
As regards fuel economy: I don’t think it could be argued that the Brits ever really worried about fuel economy in Tanks until the oil-price shocks in the early 70’s.

Kind and Respectful Regards Leccy my friend, Uyraell.

Post-Script: Panzerknacker, My profound apology to you for having gone so very far off-topic.

#85

In the main they were replaced by the mid 60’s with the bridgelayers (the last to go) starting in 1965.

The reason some served till the early 70’s was the old nostalgia that happens, senior officers seem to think keeping an old bit of kit around adds character to the unit ‘they don’t have to work on the kit though lol’.

#86

… Ah, much is now understood.
Which begs me to ask: was the Churchill chassis that much of a pig/bastard to work on as has frequently been stated, or was that “bad press” the long-drawn out echo of the legacy of the early days of the Churchill when it acquired the reputation in the first place?

That the vehicle was rushed into service somewhat before it’s early problems were ironed out is often mentioned.
However: that Vauxhall’s had achieved in the 11 months they had had available remarkable things regarding the Churchill is totally overlooked.
Yes, the hydraulic tappets were initially unreliable on the Bedford Twin-Six. Yes, the fuel pump driveshaft was fragile and badly located, yes, the bearings in the transfer case were overworked and insufficiently robust, yes, the cooling fans were inadequate as was (iIrc) the fuel pump. Yes, as a result of all this, the vehicle frequently broke down and acquired a reputation for being fragile and unreliable.
A reputation from which it never really recovered.

Yet these were faults of design immaturity and time constraints rather than of the vehicle itself.

But, as one who (presumably) worked on the vehicle itself, I have to ask you Leccy:
Was that reputation unfounded?

What was your experience of working on the Churchill?

Kind and Respectful Regards Leccy my friend, Uyraell.

#87

Uyrael

Not quite my era I joined as a young sapper when the blokes that did work on the last Churchills were the Squadron Senior NCO’s, WO’s and the odd Commissioned Officer.

If we complained about working on our old vehicles (Centurion 165 AVRE as we had not got the 105 version at the time) we had the talk about how much of a pig the Churchill was to keep up with a Cent or Cheiftan equipped battle group. 60 mile range, 12mph top speed, heavy maintenance workload, lack of spares and to count ourselves lucky.

I was present to see the Cent 165 AVRE, the aquisition of ex RA FCO 105 gun tanks (classed as 105 AVRE), Cheiftan AVRE and left during the dawn of the Trojan AVRE. Although for most of the time I was but a Combat Engineer and not an Armoured Farmer.

#88

Many many Thanks Leccy, for your info above. :slight_smile:

I have to say, I’ve very greatly enjoyed our conversation in this thread, and several others.

Again, you have rare info about the vehicles you did work with, Cent165, eg, and that too would be well worth a thread and read.

Kind and Respectful Regards Leccy my friend, Uyraell.

#89
  1. North Africa derailed British tank development to some extent because it was seen as ideal Cruiser tank country. All that was missing, was the ideal Cruiser tank.

Well, I think the britons were close to the ideal cruiser desing, at list for 1941-43, that would be the Crusader with a reliable engine and a 50mm gun ( or 6 pounder for that matter) Unfortunately it had neither to face the panzerarmee afrika in that time.

#90

Good evening, Panzerknacker. I couldn’t agree more with your opinion re. the “perfect cruiser tank”. Even with all its shortcomings, the Crusader was such a cool-looking tank to begin with - with its elegant lines, it looked fast even when parked. Unfortunately, the 330hp Liberty was a faulty engine, with its exposed radiator drive chain plagued by sprocket-jumping due to buildup of dust and grit. Apparently, troopers took to suspending a watering-can over the chain to wash it clean of contamination. AFAIK, the Meteor was too big to fit the Crusader, so along came the Cromwell. The apotheosis of cruiser tank design, in my opinion, was the Comet. The Centurion was actually the British Army’s first MBT, so I wouldn’t class it as a cruiser. Sorry if all this is a bit OT - but it is a fascinating discussion nonetheless.

Cheers,
Cliff

#91

The cromwell was a good candidate but as you know it came too late, the panzers were no longer the mark III and IV but teh Panther and Tiger. The Churchill at list had some heavy armor, cromwell not even that.

#92

The issue I have with the Crusader is that it was, in essence, under armoured and under-gunned.
Such armour as it did have was brittle-faced, and not that well shaped.

The Meteor was never fitted to the Crusader because the Crusader had been designed long before the Meteor came into existence, as had the Churchill. This is a common failing of any British tank of the same design era.
In essence, the only “almost usable” engine was the Liberty V8/V12 series, or something cobbled together as in the Bedford Twin Six of the Churchill. And the Liberty was not always suitable.

Recognition of this is reflected in the Cromwell/Centaur series, designed ab initio to accept the Meteor once that engine became available.

Expressed in the easiest way, Crusader was too early for that cycle of development, its’ faults made it unworthy of further re-development, especially as its’ successors were already under development and in prototype production.
The Crusader hull was sufficiently useful to be rebuilt and employed in lesser combat roles: as witness we have the Anti-Air versions, the various gun tractors, various Engineer vehicles.

I don’t regard the Crusader as being close to the ideal Cruiser tank: the tank was simply the best (of a then very poor bunch of choices) they had available to use (in the cruiser role), and so saw use despite its’ inadequacies, rather than because of its’ qualities, which were at best marginal.

As a design philosophy, yes, the Crusader certainly headed in the right direction for use as a cruiser, but like it’s predecessors, was badly shaped, inadequately armed, and had only speed to save it from these failings.
It had to be used in the cruiser role, but it was very, very far from completely suited to the tasks it performed therein.

Kind and Respectful Regards my friends, Uyraell.

#93

I guess the side turret armor deflected shots towards the turret ring…Is that you mean with “not well shaped” ?

#94

Yes, that and the flat faced armour behind the neatly sloped glacis.
The driver’s position always seemed to my eye to be horribly “flat-plated”, and the flat plate really should not have been retained: it should have been designed sloped in the first place.

The tank gives a stunningly good impression of being a mobile shot-trap, which fault it shares with its’ predecessors, and indeed its’ successors until the arrival of the Centurion, which is effectively in a different class in any case.
The armour was brittle and thin, and not readily able to be enhanced, due to weight considerations straining the already overburdened engine.

The only truly redeeming features of the Crusader were its’ suspension system, and reasonably high speed.
Again though, part of that high speed is due to the thin armour. And part is due to the drivers opening up the engine governors to get more speed from the tank.
I can’t say I blame them for doing so: I’d have done exactly the same, for the same reason.
Better to have the speed available, in order to have the chance of getting the deathtrap you’re driving out of danger and into safety.

Kind and Respectful Regards Panzerknacker my friend, Uyraell.

#95

Yes - despite it being one of the prettiest tanks ever made, the armour in sensitive places of the Crusader was either too thin or too square. Not that there’s anything wrong with square plating, as long as it’ s thick enough. The Tiger I attests to that theory.
And I have a book with a quite interesting photo of a troop of Comets driving through Halle in 1947. The driver’s vision port in the leading tank, in the swung-open position, is ~100mm thick. And the tank itself was fast, reliable and relatively well-armed (the truncated breech of the so-called 77mm gave a slight reduction in MV of the standard 17pdr). By war’s end, the Comet was judged to be about on par with the Panther.
What one shouldn’t forget is that, by the time these opposing designs came within reach of each other on the battlefield, the Allied supporting logistics train was excellent, and the German tail was drooping, so to speak. This meant a much higher return-to-service rate of recovered tanks on the Allied side. Formations could be brought back up to strength far quicker than the Germans could manage, and the advance kept its momentum. Also, with air superiority, the Allies had no need to engage in armoured slogging-matches.
And the Churchill, in its various guises, thrived in this environment. Still required on numerous occasions as a “battering ram” traditional Infantry tank, it absorbed punishment and kept on going. The Croc/AVRE combination would have been devastating for the defenders to face.

Cheers,
Cliff

#96

The tank gives a stunningly good impression of being a mobile shot-trap, which fault it shares with its’ predecessors, and indeed its’ successors until the arrival of the Centurion, which is effectively in a different class in any case.
The armour was brittle and thin, and not readily able to be enhanced, due to weight considerations straining the already overburdened engine.

Interesting, never before I had read that remark on british armor: is alkways a subjet of hot discussion between armor fanatics the brittleness of teh german plates of late war, but that issue with british steel is never bring to the table. Thanks for the reply.

#97

You are more than welcome Panzerknacker my friend. :slight_smile:

Generally, the best quality of British-produced heavy steel was used in naval construction.
Mechanical armour (tanks etc.) came a very poor second to ship-building.
The sad and sorry story of inadequate armament in British tanks is well-known, but the steel quality issue is far less-so.

And such steel as was produced for use in manufacturing tanks was generally not high quality homogenous plate as other nations were by then employing. Face-hardened steel plate was employed for the British vehicles for somewhat longer than the German and Russian counterparts, with America rapidly shifting to employing homogenous plate in tanks after the introduction of the M3 Medium, tank family.

Few British tanks had adequate steel in their armour, with the notable exceptions of the Centurion and the Churchill.
(We can leave aside interesting constructions such as the Tortoise.)
This tends to be overlooked, largely because the inadequacies of various British vehicles tends to be overshadowed by the availability of the American vehicles.

In post-war documents, the quality of British steel is not often mentioned, whereas that of German steel (or Russian, for that matter) is highlighted with great frequency.

Kind and Respectful Regards Panzerknacker my friend, Uyraell.

#98

I think that is a common “mistake” in history study. Also Italian tanks uses a poor quality armor while ship armor is better, but is hard to find.

#99

In the end all the base metal is the same carbon steel, but how many and in wich way you combine the chrome, molibdenum and nickel, that is the key. Of course if you havent enough alloy to enrich your steel you are forced to increase the level of carbon inside , that create hardness, not precisely resistance.

#100

It’s not only the composition of armor. It depends also on the way you assemble it (inclination of armored plates and how you connect them, poor types of soldering means that italian tanks can be breaked in two parts with only a anti-tank rifle round in the right spot).