Yes, basically because Germany had difficulty keeping its own forces supplied with weapons and transport. And her conquests of the Gauls and Low Countries really did little to remedy the situation at the end. I believe after the initial bonanza of captured French trucks and the like, there was little in the way of significant production of lorries and other vehicles from the occupied countries…
Is this the main reason why Hitler’s generals were reluctant to invade France and the Low Countries in 1940?
Some were reluctant - they thought they would lose - some thought it would be a long fight as at the time France had what was widely thought to be the best army in Europe and the best equipped (although they were more a hard shell, too many things wrong underneath)
Mainly, there was absolutely no credible war plan. The Heer OKW had a “Fall Blau” plan that was both purely defensive and also very nebulous as to how it was to actually be carried out. There was no major offensive plan to knock France out until General Halder came up with the first draft of Fall Gelb - which was almost as abysmal as it foresaw a limited advance through Belgium into France to largely set up a staging area for further offensive operations and air bases to be used against Britain in what would be a long war of attrition. Such a war was strategically dubious for a Germany susceptible to blockade and without direct access to most resources. The fundamental assumption --by both sides-- early on was that Germany would need to rely on the sophisticated Belgian road and rail networks and population centers to maintain their mechanized advances as well as seize production. The first plans were grim, even for Hitler, with casualty projections of somewhere in the 600,000 neighborhood for rather modest gains.
Then some unknown general named Manstein managed to get an audience with Hitler to show his his rather revolutionary (or actually evolutionary) plan for Fall Gelb, which envisioned a deep thrust using armor through the Ardennes to rush the rather nearby French coast cutting off a mechanized French Army and BEF springing into Belgium. A series of unfortunate events took place for the French, such as the infamous plane crash of German officers with the first drafts of Fall Gelb forever preventing any possible advance through Belgium by even the most conservative German generals and opening the possibilities of what would become “Sichelschnitt”, or sickle-cut, in Churchill’s words actually. The plan was taken over by Halder (after Manstein was sent to an outpost to shut him up) and was reshaped and rolled back and its previous ambitious envisioning of a deep armored thrust and was severally curtailed. However, the quickly unfolding actions on the ground allowed commanders like Gurderian to push well past their mandates in order to ensure a total French collapse in the Sedan, and effectively bring Manstein’s vision to fruition. But it should be noted that even the audacious plans never envisioned the complete and rapid strategic breakthrough that occurred and projected the war to last at least for a few months, IIRC…
Some of the major things wrong were a French high command detached from its troops; disdainful of then modern communications and related command and control and therefore the ability to respond rapidly to what turned out to be a much more rapid war than they expected; and a largely conscript and often resentful army with little will or ability to fight.
At the risk of being the Minister for Stating the Bleeding Obvious, good equipment in the hands of poorly led, or poorly trained, or poorly motivated troops, or any combination of the above, is frequently of little or no benefit, and more so when confronted by well led, or well trained, or well motivated troops, or any combination of the above.
Throw in other advantages for the well led etc, such as air superiority or ground mobility or tactical advantages in weapons, and it’s not surprising that they will prevail.
Once a force establishes its overwhelming superiority and starts rolling back the other force with enough battlefield and psychological momentum to become unstoppable except by a military miracle, as happened in France, Greece, the Philippines and Malaya, the end is pretty much only a question of time. Sure, there were exceptions such as the see saw war in North Africa and Germany’s seemingly unstoppable advance into the USSR and the war in China before and during WWII, but viewed as entire campaigns the rapid steamroller advances such as France, Greece etc were short and sharp campaigns with steady advances by the superior force and no meaningful counter-attacks by the defender.
“Reluctant” covers a lot of ground. People also tend to forget that in 1940, it was widely believed that France, rather than Germany, had the best army in the world (as leccy also said). Moreover, while Germany did manage to blood its army in Poland, and though Poland was not an insignificant power, the Germans realized they were lucky on several fronts (e.g., “Hitler Weather,” terrain, limited (60%?) mobilization because of Allied pressure, etc.). And the Poles themselves had known that unaided, even at full strength they stood no chance against a German invasion. As Nickdfresh points out, the Germans were not expecting what happened anymore than the French were. The Great War was still “fresh” in everybody’s mind, and war is always a crap shoot, so I’d say all these concerns (Nickdfresh’s comments included) and more were together their “main reason” for reluctance.
Well, you see Nicholas, I am by no means a competent historian or have excellent command of details, but I do remember that sometime in 1936, weeks before the Rhineland crisis, there was preliminary talk amongst the General Staff that France might, after all, declare war on Germany, as German’s actions in the demilitarized zone constituted a violation of International law and England, provoked by her treaty duties, might respond by enacting an economic embargo on Germany, which she didn’t need, as her weak foreign currency reserve was already unable to afford the massive armament imports. Is it completely incorrect for me to write in this tiny reply box that the Germans might have been planning for an aggressive war against France even before 1939 because Germany could no longer rely on its brief strategic alliance with the Soviet Union or win its submarine war in the Channel and Atlantic and, therefore, could no longer rely on the “false neutrals,” like Belgium, who were secretly stymieing Germany’s lebensraum, which must be used to validate Fall Gelb’s defensive posture? I suppose that the French government knew much of what I have already wrote above, but the French army decided against acting on its knowledge in 1936–possibly because the French were not completely confident in Great Britain’s political/military support, a reasonable belief. Forgive me if I’m wrong, (and I often am), but I thought you suggested that the Halder plan was a modernized version of the discarded Schlieffen Plan. The Manstein plan seems to visualize defensive-counter attacks in the eventuality that Britain would enter the war, as she probably would after the Rhineland crisis, which may explain the 600,000 or more expected causalities in the Fall Gelb and Blau plans.
But how much did the French really know? Did the French know that Germany began rearming in the 1920s, and clandestinely avoiding the military and reparations clauses in the Versailles Treaty in order to prepare itself for aggressive warfare against the new states to the East? (The “Lohmann” Affair comes to mind, as I am still impressed by how deftly Germany managed to extricate herself out of that embarrassing international situation.) Did the French have reason to believe that the demilitarized zone was secure, or that the Powers’ treaty obligations to her rested on shaky foundations of international goodwill, a reasonable belief, as the Powers’ subjects were not willing to enforce the obligations? It seems possible that the French military knew the date of the scheduled invasion but, for some reason, refused to act accordingly to changed events on the ground. I
Kregs, my quote (the one you are responding to above) was about the Germans in May 1940 not expecting the collapse of France in 43 days any more than the French did. Maybe I’m just tired, but what you are talking about here seems to be “something else.”
With the benefit of hindsight, which is the critical ingredient in all ‘what if’s’ as distinct from the limited information and clouded foresight available to the people who actually had to run a battle or war, Germany’s best prospects of winning the war were around the middle of 1942 had it and Japan cooperated in the same sort of combined fashion the Allies did from December 1941. Paradoxically, this probably would have accelerated Japan’s defeat, without the use of nuclear weapons.
By the end of March 1942 Japan had achieved its primary and critical strategic aim of taking the oil rich Netherlands East Indies. The IJN wanted to press on to take Australia, but the IJA didn’t, not least because the IJA couldn’t spare the necessary forces and the shipping wasn’t available to land and supply the necessary IJA force. The compromise was to press on to the east towards Fiji etc to cut Australia off from America and a potential American base to strike back at Japan. This eastward movement resulted in Guadalcanal, the Battle of the Coral Sea, Kokoda, and a severe strain on Japanese land and naval resources which, together with Midway and the IJA’s major naval losses, became the turning point against Japan. Meanwhile, by the end of March the IJA had expelled the British from Burma and was poised to enter India.
Had Germany and Japan had a combined aim to defeat the USSR, which would have aided Japan’s desire to move into Siberia, then after taking the NEI Japan would have devoted its forces to pressing west towards the Persian and Iraqi oilfields. The IJN forces used in the Coral Sea and Midway and other resources spent to no advantage to Japan on Guadalcanal and in Papua would have been available to support Japan’s westward thrust, and would have overwhelmed the scant RN forces in the Indian Ocean while the USN would have been unable to do much or anything to alter Japan’s supremacy in the Indian Ocean.
Japan bypasses a land war in India and presses on to Iraq and Persia where it lands the IJA and or IJN marines to take oilfields in those countries, and ultimately links up with Germany which instead of devoting its effort to taking Moscow concentrates its forces in its thrust for the Caucasus oilfields, which in fact it commenced in June 1942 but failed to achieve as losses at Stalingrad etc forced Germany to withdraw.
Had Germany and Japan linked up, they then control the bulk of Soviet oil production as well as denying Britain its oil from the Middle East; most of the tin and rubber in the world; and various other resources in which each was deficient but together were able to make up much of the other’s deficiencies. This enables them to continue their war in better condition than they actually managed by their separate wars.
Worse for the Allies, Britain has lost access to its forces in North Africa as the IJN controls access to the Suez Canal. The USSR has lost the bulk of its oil supply and is unable to prosecute its war while faced by Germany and Japan to its west and east respectively, which leads to a Soviet surrender; or a grinding war by Germany and Japan against the USSR; or just a war of containment and gradual advance against the Soviets, who have vastly reduced military and industrial capacity through losing the bulk of their oil resources. Britain has now lost vast forces in North Africa which can be left to wither on the vine as at best only limited supplies can reach them, and certainly none sufficient to sustain them as a fighting force. Germany can withdraw from North Africa and use those forces to support the combined effort with Japan to open the corridor through Persia etc.
Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway don’t occur under this scenario, so the IJN still has the forces it used against Pearl Harbor to control the Indian Ocean and southern approaches to the Suez Canal.
The Mediterranean is closed to Britain while its forces there are largely lost. There will not be an invasion of Sicily and Italy. Britain cannot launch a land invasion on continental Europe.
Although US Gen Marshall was sufficiently ambitious, and inexperienced, to propose a doomed invasion through France in September 1942, there is no prospect this or the real D Day would happen under the altered circumstances of a combined German Japanese thrust to the Middle East oilfields etc. Europe is closed to a Western Front once the USSR surrenders or, through loss of oil, is severely reduced in its ability to fight, which in turn allows Germany to place stronger forces to resist any invasion from the West.
America, accepting that there is no realistic prospect of defeating Germany through what became the Italian and Normandy invasions, devotes it forces to defeating Japan, which accords with strong public and political opinion in the US. Instead of applying at most 15% of its resources to Japan, America devotes almost all of them. Japan is defeated before the atom bomb is brought to fruition.
Germany, however, holds what it has and nobody can see how to dislodge it.
Except Germany declares war on the US anyway, following the same Hitler logic (of whatever nature). The hypothesized collapse of Japan changes the nature of the Pacific run of Lend-Lease materiel; so the USSR does still holds on with its capacity admittedly diminished.
Hitler’s hubris drives him to invade China, so he can “get at” the US and British forces there (much larger than historically accurate, because they’re not able to open the Western fronts as you mentioned). Removing them from the Asian continent, after all, will remove Stalin’s last hope, and finally bring Stalin to surrender (sound familiar?). China replaces the USSR as a logistical nightmare for Hitler, compounded by China’s vast (if technologically unadvanced) manpower (getting skill upgrades from the US and UK). Hitler’s resources are even more strained if he uncharacteristically tries to help arm and supply the remnants of Japanese forces in China. The Chinese quagmire eventually makes a western front possible after all… Meanwhile, The US continues to develop nuclear weapons, which, if I recall correctly, where developed initially for use against Germany anyway…
If Japan avoided Pearl Harbor and invaded the USSR instead, to cooperate with Germany and leaving the US out of the war, what would have happened when the two expansionist regimes meet in the middle? How long before one turned on the other, and they fought themselves to exhaustion and the breaking point of the technology and manpower? Maybe Japan is on the right track in its atomic research program, but Germany was historically not (though that might change over time).
Basically: Italy wanted to re-establish the Roman Empire, including vast swaths currently occupied by the Germans. Germans were the master race, destined to rule everybody. Japanese culture also carried themes of racial superiority and world dominion. With such mutually exclusive long-term goals, how can the Axis powers truly cooperate beyond a fleeting momentary advantage? At least with hindsight, it seems the leadership of the major Axis powers always had an appetite bigger than their stomachs and human/other resources. The more they expand, the greater their mutual distrust, while external resistance becomes more rigid (e.g., Hitler’s attack on the USSR setting a poor precedent for trust by third parties). If you posit Axis strategic unity, how is that unity to be achieved in a credible fashion that will last longer than a year or so?
I do apologize. I thought you were referring to what the French knew prior to 1940.
The German General Staff were following the orders of a deranged habitual gambler as they were bound to do by their oath. I think it also has to be noted that Hitler calculated the Reoccupation of the Rhineland with a blend of a bit of genius for calculated bluffing, blind luck, and the knowledge that Germany had already violated the terms of Versailles with its ambitious but infant rearmament program that included conscription in 1935 --draft that was expressly forboden-- and yet the Allies did nothing. Did Hitler guess that the British were not willing to send their boys to their deaths’ over a piece of real estate that probably should have been part of Germany anyways? After all, was there not a referendum held that clearly showed the vast majority of the residents of the Rhineland wanted to rejoin their Fatherland? Perhaps the greatest target of Heer military aggression had the French fired on them, might not have been the French, but Hitler and his Nazi Party?
Is it completely incorrect for me to write in this tiny reply box that the Germans might have been planning for an aggressive war against France even before 1939 because Germany could no longer rely on its brief strategic alliance with the Soviet Union or win its submarine war in the Channel and Atlantic and, therefore, could no longer rely on the “false neutrals,” like Belgium, who were secretly stymieing Germany’s lebensraum, which must be used to validate Fall Gelb’s defensive posture?
In short: I think so. If Germany couldn’t rely on “false neutrals” like Belgium, neither could the French! They may have been secretly stymieing Germany’s greater glory, but the Belgians were also stymieing any sort of cohesive, unified response to German aggression and thus creating a vacuum of communication and decaying it to what was little more than a guessing game and a nudge and wink approach to liaison between the militaries of France and Belgium. In fact, Hitler was so reckless that he went to war against Poland --knowing the possibility of war with the Allies would result-- with NO strategic war plan against the Western Powers! The Bohemian Corporal had also assured his Wehrmacht that he would seek no confrontation with the Western Powers prior to 1944. Many in the High Command balked at his orders to invade France, only three weeks after the fall of Poland, based on critical ammunition shortages alone. Heer commanders were also very aware that the Army was still reconstituting itself, lacked training in many parts, was still staffed by large numbers of overage and hopelessly anachronistically trained WWI veterans that were often in their 40’s. This is not to mention the critical shortages in the strategic reserve of 23 of 30 precious raw materials that German war industry faced in the Fall of 1939.
So no, there was absolutely no real plan to aggressively invade France in 1939 prior to Halder’s first draft of Fall Gelb. One that was so awful and dreary in its outlook that it is said he wrote it to deflate Hitler from invading France and instead to seek peace. I’m not sure there is any real evidence of that though. But the casualty projections, dire warnings of critical ammunition shortages that might have even marred the Polish Campaign had the Soviets not shortened the war as co-belligerents, and frankly bad late autumn and winter weather stopped any campaign until the fateful May of 1940. And only after the infamous plane crash of two German officers who happened to be carrying that very version of Fall Gelb that confirmed the Allies’ suspicions, but conversely also confirmed the German fears regarding the Dyle Plan and telegraphing the deployments of Allied units that their planning for entering Belgium should the Germans do so first. So even when the Germans were unlucky, they were lucky.
I suppose that the French government knew much of what I have already wrote above, but the French army decided against acting on its knowledge in 1936–possibly because the French were not completely confident in Great Britain’s political/military support, a reasonable belief.
I agree. But one must also conclude that the French Army was a “peoples’ army!” of reservists with only a relatively small cadre of active duty elite troops manning the Maginot Line and serving as training cadre for the potential of a vastly expanding war time mobilization. It wasn’t that easy for the French to respond in force at the drop of the hat --politically or militarily. I would like to know if the French had any sort of strategic “rapid reaction force” in this period. But some of the best works on it are rare and far above my little budget at the moment…
Forgive me if I’m wrong, (and I often am), but I thought you suggested that the Halder plan was a modernized version of the discarded Schlieffen Plan. The Manstein plan seems to visualize defensive-counter attacks in the eventuality that Britain would enter the war, as she probably would after the Rhineland crisis, which may explain the 600,000 or more expected causalities in the Fall Gelb and Blau plans.
I forgive and you are wrong. :mrgreen:
The initial Case Yellow plan by Halder was so uninspiring and horrid that it is offensive to compare it to the Schlieffen Plan, which envisioned a flanking and encounter battle that would destroy the French Army and seize Paris. Halder’s plan was vastly more humble and only was to set the preliminary stage for the sort of long war Germany faced in WWI, but one hopefully more advantageous to the Wehrmacht. I believe the plan was in many respects the antithesis of Schlieffen, because Halder was trying to avoid the overreach of WWI and the specter of exhausted men marching towards fresh French troops driven forward in mechanized taxi cabs. Both plans shared the logistical premise of using the Belgian roads and rails, but little else. Fall Gelb was far more limited.
It was in fact the Fall Gelb “Sickle Cut” plan initially birthed by Manstein, and raised to manhood by Halder, that was the true equivalent to the “Schwerpunkt” encounter battle of annihilation the original Schlieffen Plan envisioned. Halder and the General Staff saw the 600,000 causalities as an extension of the bloodletting of WWI and inability to engage in a battle of annihilation such as Verdun without annihilating one’s own army in the process. I think he was just trying to be realistic in his casualty projections based on the past war where no one saw the death tolls that modern weapons could inflict on attacking soldiers. It should also be stated that what eventually became the breakthrough that was Sickle Cut was vastly more scaled down in planning than actual execution. The unfolding battle and the complete collapse of second-rate French solders guarding the ignored Sedan sector took on a life of its own and local German commanders abused the leeway of their “Mission to Tactics” to ignore the overcautious command of OKW’s fear of a severed “Panzer Corridor” and reached the Channel in a far shorter time than was ever hoped…
But, Nicholas, if we are to take Nuremberg Trials’ Criminal International Laws seriously, wouldn’t we have to say that following orders is no excuse, or that following orders does not erase the culpability of the OKW, which knowingly committed the international violations in the name of Germany? My main criticism about the International Criminal Laws at Nuremberg is that the Laws are derived exclusively from Anglo-American criminal and common law. It seems that the Laws imply criminal responsibility for men who did not issue orders but followed his Officers without question. If I remember correctly, one of the American attorneys equated the culpability of non-commissioned officers to a passive fellow burglar, who, although not actively committing a crime, lends his services as a look-out for the other burglars who are committing a crime. Thus, the German General Staff are still to blame despite the oath. And I agree because what the German army did in my country far exceeded the bounds of an oath.
Also, as I am a retiree, and have lots of time on my hands, I discovered an interesting article about the General Staff, entitled, 'Black Marks: Hitler’s Bribery of Senior Officers during World War II." The article’s thesis is that historians have long ignored the monetary incentives behind the General Staff’s reticence. I strongly recommend everyone to read it, as I found the article by chance in a collection of essays edited by Emmanuel Kreike.
In all due respect, how do we know how the Rhineland plebiscite was conducted and under what conditions? Granted, I have not studied the issue, but if the Rhineland plebiscite was conducted like the Saar’s plebiscite a year earlier, I would suggest that that referendum is not a valid or fair measure of support.
But I doubt Hitler would have known this information, or believed it, in 1940. Hitler used the “false neutrals” phrase to Ribbentrop and others in order to describe countries he was quite willing to invade on the false assumption that those countries were, in fact, helping Germany’s enemies and could not be trusted to support the Axis. The situation you accurately described above might easily fit the chaotic situation of the “Little Entente” countries in the 1920s, who could not agree to form a common defense against Germany (although I assume France wanted the Little Entente to work because she had hoped to curtail German expansion in the East).
Forgive me. I did not know this. In the 1970s, I remember having a conversation with a gentleman from the French Army at the dinner table. We were discussing World War II, and eventually, we started to discuss the so-called “phoney war.” He remembers watching the German army rehearsing military maneuvers at the Maginot Line through a set of binoculars. I asked him, “Well, you were at war with the Germans, why didn’t you shoot at them?” He said, “They did not shoot at us, so we thought it convenient that we not shoot at them.” At the time, I thought it a peculiar way of thinking, but, of course, I didn’t know what I know now.
I do apologize. It seems that I have mistaken the two plans.
Which is largely symbolic as America’s focus is on the Pacific and Germany is limited to relatively unimportant attacks on America’s Atlantic shipping and nuisance shelling of the east coast, with no prospect of engaging America on its own turf and vastly less chance of defeating it. Germany is at worst a nuisance to America in its war against Japan.
Perhaps, but it’s more likely that America doesn’t waste shipping on costly transatlantic support to the USSR when that doesn’t aid its war against Japan, particularly as the Soviets are holding sufficient forces in the east to stop Japan invading the USSR, which also prevents Japan removing its forces for fears of a Soviet advance into the vacuum Japan leaves, so the forces on both sides are, and actually were, taken out of the war without firing a shot at each other, at least until the last few days of the actual war.
Can’t see that.
German logistics alone are against it. Far too much land to cover.
Also, there won’t be any British forces in China because Britain is now unable to support its now marooned troops in North Africa and can’t do much in India, and nothing in Burma after the China road is cut by the Japanese, as Japan has the ascendancy in the Indian Ocean.
As for the Americans, they don’t need to be in China as they now have about six times the forces actually used in WWII to drive across the central Pacific and from the SWPA.
In the actual war, there is a slight window of opportunity when the Japanese fleet is damaged sufficiently by the British in defending Ceylon in mid-1942 to force the IJN to return to Japan to refit, but in this ‘what if’ war that might not have been necessary or important as Japan would have had greater forces available in the Indian Ocean.
The intention was to use them on Germany, but in this war America isn’t going to attack Germany and Japan will be defeated well before the first nuclear weapon is tested.
That wasn’t going to happen. The Japanese learned at Nomonhan in 1939 that the Soviets could defeat them, which led to the debate in Japanese circles about whether to go into Siberia or south deciding , in mid-1941, in favour of going south.
RS*’, re German declaration of war on US: Which is largely symbolic as America’s focus is on the Pacific and Germany is limited to relatively unimportant attacks on America’s Atlantic shipping and nuisance shelling of the east coast, with no prospect of engaging America on its own turf and vastly less chance of defeating it. Germany is at worst a nuisance to America in its war against Japan.
As per my comment about America continuing to develop the atomic bomb, and Lend-lease, and perhaps others, I think you’re forgetting part of your own scenario – as Japan is quickly defeated, and a state of war still exists between the US (and the Allies). Germany may not have the resources to reach the US mainland, but history showed the US was capable of building naval, air, and land forces where capable of reaching fighting fronts pretty much anywhere in the world. Where would Germany draw a line and say “stop here, we have enough real estate” – allowing Allies to concentrate against them? Why wouldn’t the Allies go through Africa, and up through the Middle East or Europe’s underbelly? Or are you positing the collapse of Allied will to fight?
And whether Hitler declares war on Germany or not, FDR clearly wanted to defeat Germany. Once at war (and perhaps especially if there is a “quick” victory against Japan), I suspect one way or another the US would end up at war with Germany.
Re German invasion of China, I agree I was being somewhat spurious, my point being more that Hitler was likely to do something irrational. China? It still might have happened, depending on how far into the USSR he had been able to advance, etc.
Japan invading the USSR? Certainly Stalin was worrying about it until he had confidence in the agreement allowing him to draw units from Siberia to defend Moscow. (What a beautiful moment for Japan to have then struck if there was no Pearl Harbor?) Just a continued threat of Japanese invasion would have been a critical aid to Germany at a time when it was still at high tide. Admittedly, as in chess, it may be that the threat is mightier than the deed. On the other hand, the Red Army was not the same Army as had victorious in 1939, thanks to Stalin and his purges, the potential psychological effect of a two-front war, etc. Japanese armor was certainly not a match for the Soviets’, etc., but how would the Soviets balance the drain on their resources between east and west? If Japan and Germany are truly cooperating, what lessons and advice might Germany provide that would increase the effectiveness and confidence of Japan?
Which of course raises again the final and most important question I raised about any “Axis United” scenario: how is their unity to be achieved in a credible fashion that will last longer than a year or so? What is the nature and the strength of the glue that holds them together when there is so much to drive them apart as they pursue their own expansionist policies? Without knowing what their joint strategic aims are, how can you reasonably project any probable course of their actions, or Allied response?
And if Japan is driven out of the war quickly, that leaves Italy and Germany and the minor Axis powers against the world, while also dealing with restive populations in occupied territories. How long could they hold on given the constant drain on their manpower, even under favorable circumstances?
I remember an exercise in which we maneuvered along one of the routes we would likely take in heading off the Warsaw Pact were they to come through the Fulda Gap. Along the way, we heard similar things, though ours were 50% in the first 24 hrs, and 75% in 48 hrs. (IIRC )This assumed the contributions of air assets, and our own organic Red Eye missile teams, and the light bridge over the Donau Kanal still being there when we got to it.
Our heaviest assets would the the Scorpions and Scimitars - the infantry had their Blowpipe and Milans (at the time they were still equipped with 432 and L37 turrets, they had a few Fox armoured cars as well), we had 4 x LMG and 3 x GPMG for air defence and one Charlie G 84mm as our sole AT weapon (apart from Barmines). If we were lucky we would get our assigned Cent AVRE (for us it was a 165mm version, but often it would be taken from us as it was more important as a surviving asset for the later main battle).
We were a speed bump, a very small speed bump.
We were regular Armored forces, having in each Company 17 M-60 series Tanks, one with a dozer blade, an M-88 retriever, and M-113 APC, a couple Jeeps, a Gama Goat, and a Deuce an a half or two. Each Battalion had 3 line companies, and an H.Q Company containing supply, intel, maintenance, and all of the household stuff, a bridge layer, and the Red Eye guys. Each Armor Brigade had 3 Armor Bn’s, and 2 infantry Bn’s IIRC. The Grunt BN’s were kept on the other side of the post from the tread heads, they didn’t want the dogs to quarrel. Our Delaying mission was pretty much expected in worse case to be a speed bump, but then, as now, Russia had limited avenues of approach to Germany (then W. Germany. ) The Fulda Gap was our ambush site, and at the time NATO had far superior fire control in Tanks, and could engage at greater ranges than could the Warsaw Pact. If our Artillery, and air cover was intact (this was a huge concern for us) and the Red Eyes and Cobras did their part, we stood a good chance of keeping them hemmed into the confines of the Gap, or at least slowing them enough to allow the follow up forces to check them. This is also one reason that (at that time) Tactical nuclear weapons were integrated into operations, and training. NATO had no desire to see the ravening hoards escape the Gap. At the end of the Viet Nam War, it was felt that NATO strength in Western Europe would be questionable for some time, and thought the Warsaw Pact might decide to take advantage of that condition. I am thankful to this day that no one got to feeling Froggy.
Okay. So what does this have to do with me or anything I’ve stated?