European Theater - What was the turning point?

World War II General WWII Discussion
#21

My comment about Rommel was in the context of challenging 383man’s comments about Britain having advantages as an island nation and in particular his comment that:

They may have been one of the only ones fighting the Germans for a year or so but they were getting beat almost everywhere on land as they got kicked out of France and Greece and were getting banged around in North Africa for a while and it was mostly Itialians they were fighting in the desert as Germany only had 2 divisions in the desert.

Your comments about British air and naval power restricting Rommel’s supply lines, or more accurately keeping open British supply lines, confirm my view that Britain did very well to support its land forces in North Africa some considerable distance from the island advantage 383man put forward, and in the Mediterranean where the Axis powers should have had at least equality if not superiority.

I accept your position that Rommel had to be audacious in the circumstances, but the fact remains that his audacity exceeded his logistics. This was as fatal to him as it was in WWII to, among others, the Japanese on a very much larger scale.

The SAS and other special forces have as their motto “Who dares wins”, but none of them have ever been or ever will be in a position to decide a major or long campaign by their audacity and other skills.

In the end, all other things being equal, major and long campaigns and long wars are more likely to be decided by logistics supporting competent leadership and soldiering, rather than audacity without the necessary logistical support.

Then again, they can also be decided by indecision, confusion, incompetence and timidity at high command levels compounded by failing to utilise to the best advantage the available logistical assets, as Britain managed in Malaya in WWII.

Separate issue. I just noticed that it is implicit in 383man’s comment that the British “were getting banged around in North Africa for a while and it was mostly Itialians they were fighting in the desert as Germany only had 2 divisions in the desert” that the Italians were lesser troops than the Germans.

While it is certainly true that many Italian troops had the good sense not to waste their lives fighting to the death for a fascist regime which offered them no benefit, those Italian units which fought hard fought as well as the Germans and the British. The failure of Italian troops was not a personal failure of their courage or potential as soldiers but of the regime which conscripted them and its failure to convince them that they should die in pursuit of that regime’s aims. It’s a pity that Germans and Japanese weren’t equally sceptical of, and unwilling to waste their lives for, their equally unworthy regimes in WWII.

#22

[
It was far easier for the Axis to resupply their forces than it was for the Allies - much shorter routes and able to be protected better with air and sea forces - not the Allies fault the Axis failed - but Germany when it was in a worse state for manpower, shipping and resources still managed to send over several fully equipped Divisions with all their supplies in 1942 in Tunisia - men and material it had been telling Rommel it could not provide when requested earlier so the claimed inability to supply or reinforce Rommel seems a bit off - as they did it when the axis had lost but not when they had a chance of vctory.

Most of the supplies sent to north Africa from Italy and Germany were landed successfully (return convoys were heavily hit though so reducing available shipping for later dates), Rommel’s inability to capture Tobruk early enough (besieging it for 8 months) used up much of what was landed as it was used up just getting resources to the front (as well as costing him men and equipment). It was not just the Axis never sent him enough supplies - he failed to take a major port in time that would have eased his logistical problems hugely.[/QUOTE]

I cant agree with that as the Brits got much better supplied then the Germans in North Africa. Thats why Monty had so many more tanks then Rommel most of the time in North Africa. All Generals do make some mistakes but I would say Rommel was a good fighting general as even the British respected him enough to call him the “Desert Fox”. If Rommel would have had as many supplies and tanks as Monty things may have been different in North Africa. Ron

#23

not having read all the followup comments; but i disagree with the BoB affectionados…no doubt British Imperialist dreamers:

First you’d have to define a “Turning point” more clearly.
Most of the above people mistake it for “when is it clear in hindsight that Hitler would never win “the” war”. Well, effectively you could go as far back as invading Poland1939 for pointing out “when is the moment it would turn out badly for Hitler”. Or perhaps the time that most german opponents were put away in KZ lager or driven out of Germany from 1936…

For me, a TURNING point, is the moment after which it is clear and obvious to all belligerents (Fascists, Allies, Occupied civilians, Soviets, the whole spectrum, from Top brass, politicians down to the lowest trench soldier) that the power, momentum, war chances , have shifted. That moment when the “ball” is labile before it rolls back.
That moment CERTAINLY was not at end of BoB.
Also not at EL Alamein (yes, it cld be foretold that the role of the DAK and Italy in N Africa was over…but uncertain still was how a jump to S Europe wld take place…)

The invasion of Russia would IN HINDSIGHT count as a turning point if ALL the production data would have been on the table (Hitler was surprised to learn of the Soviet production capacity and numbers of -old type- tanks) but becoz it was unkown it doesn’t count.
In 1942 you’d EXPECT the germans to get a rough beating now that the soviets are able to MASS produce the BETTER tanks and airplanes…BUT, through a stroke of luck, Hitler pointed his troops in another direction away from Moscow into the Kaukasus…and AGAIN pulled off large victories.
SO , obviously, not until the Kessel of Stalingrad and the clear for all belligerents to notice capture of 300.000 german troops you can truely speak of a turning point.

The declaration of war of Hitler on the USA is diplomatically countable as “a turning point” as it would effectively result in amassing the US massproduction against the Nazis…HOWEVER, effectively it is only a paper text, and it means nothing if it isn’t followed up by effective actual troops and material.
So, I , and most of the unbiased world stick to Stalingrad.

#24

A few comments. Regarding Rommel - it may seem harsh, but for all his merits, he comes across, ultimately, as an absolutely splendid junior infantry officer. He showed this in his outstanding performance at Caporetto (WW1). However, his promotion to a high level of command came about as a result of vigorous self-promotion, exceptional luck, and political contacts. It may be impressive to picture him jumping into French rivers to help his engineers build bridges, or advancing with the panzer vanguard in Libya, but these were not actions appropriate for someone at his high level of command. He came very close to death or capture in France on a number of occasions, generally for no good reason. Many of his fellow generals - and even some of his subordinates - regarded his performance in France as crazy. In North Africa, his approach was facilitated by the nature of the operational area - a relatively thin line of contestable territory hemmed in on one side by the trackless desert, and on the other by the sea. It ultimately failed because of deficiencies in supply and logistics - and because of the fact that the only approach to Egypt was via a narrow gap (too narrow this time) between Tobruk and the virtually impassable Quattara Depression that allowed the British and Imperial forces to establish a “block” that would not be overcome by sheer dash and courage. Rommel was certainly a good soldier - but no strategist. It is interesting to note that, while he retained the confidence of Hitler and Goebbels almost to the end, most of his professional peers begged to differ.

I am also puzzled by the assertion that, because the superior material and technical resources of the Soviet Union were not fully known to the Germans, the fact “did not count”. Of course, taken objectively, it did count. The objective fact cannot be dismissed as “hindsight”.

Finally, I am puzzled by the assertion that I figure among the ranks of “British Imperialist dreamers”. That is certainly a first for me … Yours from Mount Street Bridge, 1916, JR.

#25

Which somewhat limits your understanding of, and ability to give a balanced reply to, this thread.

The Battle of Britain was a fight for the survival of Britain, not its distant empire. At that time the survival of the empire depended upon the survival of Britain, not the other way around.

As one who sees the Battle of Britain as one of the turning points in WWII, and as one who lives in what was in WWII a British dominion still treated as a colony by Churchill & Co who through strategic and military arrogance and incompetence in relation to Japan were prepared to and went close to sacrificing my country and my ancestors to preserve Britain and its greater imperial interests elsewhere, I can assure you I am not a “British Imperialist”. To the extent that Australia relied on external support, Australia was saved in WWII by America. This was recognised by our government at the time, much to Churchill & Co’s chagrin, and is recognised now by me and other Australians who are moderately well informed on WWII history. We are very much the opposite of ‘British Imperialists’, and very much realists rather than dreamers.

When I and other realists who are opposed to British imperialism in WWII consider the Battle of Britain to be a turning point, it cannot be dismissed as “no doubt British Imperialist dreamers’.

Perhaps you would like to support your dismissive attitude to the Battle of Britain with a more incisive analysis using, for example, facts rather than empty, inaccurate and irrelevant opinions.

Could you specify the posts where most of the above people said this, and the points they specified “when is it clear in hindsight that Hitler would never win “the” war”?

Then how is it that the Italian fascists came to the conclusion that the war had reached a turning point, requiring their surrender, considerably earlier than the German fascists?

Churchill, at the time, correctly thought El Alamein was a turning point, being the “end of the beginning” in the war against the Axis powers. http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1941-1945-war-leader/the-end-of-the-beginning

But you objected above to posters in this thread allegedly using hindsight and put forward instead your view that a turning point was one when everyone involved had a blinding flash of cosmic insight and realised at the time that “the power, momentum, war chances , have shifted”.

Now you’re not requiring hindsight or foresight or insight, but mind reading.

Are you channelling Donald Rumsfeld?

“There are known knowns. These are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns. That is to say, there are things that we know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we don’t know we don’t know.”

Care to expand on that, relating it to development of the war in Europe to that point and how the efforts of the British, British Commonwealth and American forces elsewhere had absolutely no effect on Germany’s ability to wage war against the Soviets? For example, Stalingrad would have played out exactly as it did if Britain had surrendered before, or after, the Battle of Britain and Germany had been free to deploy poor occupation forces in occupied Britain and good frontline troops against the USSR without the distractions of North Africa, Greece, Crete and the logistical demands associated with those campaigns, along with minor annoyances such as the air war, and the merchant and naval sea war?

In those circumstances, I’m inclined to think that Stalingrad, and Moscow, would have been turning points more favourable to the Germans, and the Italian forces also not lost in North Africa, along with the great logistical drains on the Axis in campaigns before Germany attacked the USSR.

But it was followed up, quite considerably, by effective actual American troops and material, wasn’t it?

Or was D Day and the following roll up of Germany just the dreaming of British imperialists?

You expose your bias, and lack of understanding of the breadth of contribution to various turning points by all the Allies to victory over the Axis, in that comment.

#26

Possibly a coded allusion to the Bax/O’Byrne English/Irish duality, which produced these Wilfred Owenish lines referring to your Bridge.

And stare at gaps of grey and blue
Where Lower Mount Street used to be,
And where flies hum round muck we knew
As Abbey Street and Eden Quay.

And when the devil made us wise
Each in his own peculiar hell,
With desert hearts and drunken eyes
We’re free to sentimentalize
By corners where the martyrs fell.

Nah, probably not. :wink: :smiley:

#27

Let’s just say that I was surprised to read after the 4th comment that all of them (up to then) agreed “yes, the BoB was indeed “the” turning point”. Despite all the books and historians in the world (east and west) always pointing to Stalingrad.
One pro-BoB statement is acceptable and one can chuckle it away, but a couple of different individuals (including supposedly Americans) in a row , all vowing for BoB ? That is peculiar.

Even dear old Churchill is not on your side with his “this is not the end, not even the beginning of end, etc…” speech (on nov 1942 ?..on even later moment, on another occasion).*****

Naahh…Just accept the truth: Stalingrad is the evident and only proper turning point.
And I am not pro russian at all.

**** looks like we disagree on the meaning of his words wrt turning points.

But the end of a beginning is really different than a beginning of an end.
Imagine the Nazis wld have produced a few atomic bombs by 1944 ? In 1942 the west saw it still as a dangerous possibility.

#28

a simple other example: Charge of light brigade, Crimea:
When is the turning point that all is waisted/lost for the British ?

Logistically , in Hindsight, you could say the invasion of Crimea as such is a bad move and thus a "turning " point. But none of the French and British decision makers realised it.

The moment Cardigan got his order to attack “a” artillery position might be assessed as a “turning” point. But how was he or his superior to know he’d go in the wrong direction ?

The moment Cardigan and his cavalry faced the enemy artillery position at the end of the run ? the “uh-oh” moment ? Not quite: if for some strange reason the gun powder of the russians didnot work, or the russians panicked…then Cardigan wld have won his attack…or perhaps with a lot of gunpowder smoke and blasts the cavalry would have steered away in some safe direction; then not so much casualties…; no turning point.

No, only when his cavalry got decimated, on the spot, THEN it becomes clear for the russians, the british , the french, the newsreporters, the world reading the papers; a turning point !

#29

Given your confidence in the superabundance of this opinion in east and west, specify 20 books by qualified western historians, with usual author, title, publication details, page, references and specific quotes supporting this. And another 20 from the east.

#30

Why not a few hundred Nazi atomic weapons by 1933?

Or a few squadrons of Nazi spaceships with geostationary satellite death rays by 1940?

Or squillions of hovercraft with endless divisions of robot soldiers to invade Britain by a sneak attack in 1938? Or any year between 1933 and 1945?

Whatever it is you’re smoking, inhaling, injecting or swallowing, it’s not helping you make rational or useful contributions to a fact based historical discussion.

#31

@Rising Sun* - yes, that Arthur Bax/Dermot O’Brien chap was quite a mixed-up puppy, English/Irish-wise. But you could say the same for W.B. Yeats, Irish/English-wise. I have on more than one occasion suggested that our two peoples have “grown up together”. There have been many resulting “misunderstandings” and, as the Queen put it when visiting us, regrets. I am very glad that relations are so good at the moment (actually could be better on some points but … nonetheless). Bax/O’Brien’s poem, “A Dublin Ballad: 1916” has a pronounced sub-Yeatsian character, but is not at all without its power. This Mount Street Bridge business must be confusing for some; perhaps I should post on it ?

@FDR - maybe this “turning point” discussion is too closely approaching the dimensions of the head of a pin ? Yours from the GPO, returning fire, JR.

#32

Turning point - a point at which something changes direction -

Hitlers wish to conquer Western Europe and knock Britain out of the war so he could concentrate on the east - Well the BoB was a turning point - he had to change his aims - that change led to the later downfall. It led to something he wished to avoid - a two front war

Diverted huge amounts of men and material away from the East - you mention Stalingrad and the Germans losing 300,000 troops - Britain with small raids like Vaasgo kept nearly half a million German troops waiting for an invasion in Scandinavia - they sat out the war from 1940 - 1945 pretty much wasted.

So many just look for a big battle and want to claim that is the point of no return - well its rarely like that - British Commonwealth and sponsored Forces drained resources away from the East.

Stalingrad is seen by some as the point at which it was considered militarily Germany could not win the war - although some already believed that Germany could not win the war long before then - including members of the german high command - in 1945 there were still german leaders who believed they could win.

#33

Exactly.

Another example is that the USSR held many divisions of Japanese troops against the Soviets in Manchuria for the duration of the 1941-45 Pacific war. Had those troops and their logistical support been available for Japan’s southern thrust it quite probably would have produced different results in the turning points favourable to the Allies of Guadalcanal and Papua in the second half of 1942, not least because the Japanese retreat when in sight of their goal of Port Moresby after the hard fought Kokoda campaign was ordered because of the demands being made on Japan in the larger campaign on Guadalcanal and Japan couldn’t sustain both. This simplistic “what if” ignores Japan’s basic problem in WWII that it might not have had sufficient merchant shipping available to transport and sustain the extra troops, but if that problem was overcome there would have been vastly more Japanese troops available for those campaigns.

The turning point for the Japanese decision to hold troops against the Soviets was Japan’s defeat by the Soviets (led by Zhukov) in 1939, well before Japan had decided on its southern thrust.

As with your example of the Norway situation, the Soviet / Japan situation involved hundreds of thousands of Axis troops doing nothing and, in so doing, deprived the Axis powers of their firepower and burdened the Axis powers with logistical drains to no advantage.

The most spectacular or largest battles or campaigns aren’t necessarily the most important events viewed against the whole course of a war.

As for Stalingrad, it’s well known in popular culture and military history circles, but the much longer and more vicious siege of Leningrad also made a major contribution to draining German troops and resources but for some reason seems to be largely unknown in popular culture and commonly overlooked in many amateur military history circles.

#34

And in ways less spectacular than Stalingrad or other battles, such as the increasing diversion of 88 mm gun production to defensive anti-aircraft roles to meet Allied air raids on continental Europe rather than those guns, and their profligate use of ammunition in anti-aircraft roles, and their crews being used in anti-tank and other ground roles on battlefields.

WWII was as much, if not more, a war of grinding attrition between the industrial / logistical / shipping capacities of the combatants as between their fighting forces. It was the factors behind and consequent upon some of the seemingly crucial battles which determined the course of the war much more than the battlefield actions of the forces involved, no matter how large or spectacular the battlefield.

For example, the Heer was heavily dependent upon horse drawn transport for all of WWII compared with the British Army which was relatively already a mechanized army before WWII began, although much of that advantage was lost in the short term by leaving much of its transport in France in 1940.

Add in various factors such as Germany’s relative scarcity of petroleum sources compared with the Western Allies, and Japan’s relative inability to replace merchant and naval losses compared with America’s seemingly endless ability to keep ramping up production, and it was the ‘off battlefield’ factors which contributed as much or more to victory than the ‘on battlefield’ factors. Similarly, it was often the ‘off battlefield’ factors consequent upon ‘on battlefield’ events which had greater significance than the battlefield clash.

A good example is Frankly Dude Really’s view that the capture of 300,000 German troops on the battlefield made it a significant event and a turning point in the war. The loss of those troops was insignificant for both Germany and the USSR compared with the failure of Germany to gain the Soviet oilfields and cut off the southern Lend Lease supply lines to the USSR, which resulted in Germany’s ability to wage a sustained war being further curtailed by a shortage of oil products (not to mention the oil expended in the failed campaign to capture Soviet oilfields) and the USSR’s ability to wage a sustained war enhanced by retaining the oilfields and keeping open the Lend Lease supply lines.

A good example of the opposite, being no great battle but countless small actions depriving a nation of its great battlefield gains, is Japan’s inability to exploit its acquisition of the critical oil fields in the Netherlands East Indies in a brilliant advance down the south east Asian land chain. The acquisition of those oil fields was Japan’s primary aim in a war it commenced from fear of inability to wage war because of oil embargoes imposed by America and Britain. As the war progressed, Japan’s idiocy in starting a war dependent upon shipping it didn’t have to maintain and exploit its gains was compounded by the Allies steadily sinking Japanese shipping at a much greater rate than it could be replaced. Japan’s great and brilliant advances in 1941 – early 1942 increasingly came to nought as the Allies strangled its shipping by sinking increasing tonnages. By the end of the war Japan still occupied most of the Netherlands East Indies, but to no advantage as it couldn’t ship anything out of them as its merchant fleet had been pretty much wiped out. Unlike the naval battles of the Coral Sea and especially Midway which were turning points in the naval war with Japan, there was no turning point in the sinking of its merchant fleet – just a steady increase in reducing Japan’s merchant tonnage and capability. In the long term of the war, the reduction of Japan’s merchant tonnage in countless individual sinkings was in some respects about as significant in defeating Japan as the major naval battles, but it attracts no attention compared with the major and decisive naval conflict at Midway and the various amphibious assaults on Japanese held islands.

It is ultimately pointless trying to identify any one or even several major battles or campaigns as the turning points which inevitably led to eventual victory or defeat by any nation in WWII as there are too many factors off the battlefield, which could exist independently of the battlefield and battles such as the relative industrial capacity of combatant nations, which also contributed to victory or defeat.

#35

I also believe the the RAF and the US 8th and 15th air force bombing raids on Germany just about everyday and night tied up a good 1 million German troops. Many times I see a figure for the Germans air force from 1.5 to 2 million and I know they did not have an air force that needed anything over 1 million to keep all of the planes flying and maintained since Britian had a larger air force late in the war and I believe Britian had about 950,000 in in the RAF. So you know if the German air force was around 2 million I am sure 1 to 1.5 million were manning anti-aircraft guns all around the country because of the RAF and USAAF’s bombing campaigns. To many times you here how the USSR complained about the allies not opening a second front in France soon enough but the USSR seemed to forget how many men and planes bombed Germany everyday and night and just how many troops it tied up. I know between the USAAF and the RAF about 140,000 men died bombing Germany through the war. It ending up being a huge campaing by the time it ended. Heck in late 1944 the RAF could put 1500 bombers up each night and the USAAF could put 3000 heavy bombers (B-17’s and B-24’s) up every day between the 8th and 15th air forces. And thats not to mention all the medium & light bombers and over 6000 fighters that were going up dailey. Heck the allies had 28,000 combat aircraft (most were American and British) in the European campaign in 1945 that did alot to help end the war and tie up German troops. Even in the Battle of the Buldge the Germans were running out of gas and you can thank the bombing campaign for that as it was seen hurting the Germans in many ways that many did not realize. Ron

#36

The Germans themselves had nearly 1 million personnel in home defence Flak units, due to manpower shortages they were increasingly manned by sick and wounded (declared unfit for even the ‘stomach type’ battalions), women and Hitler youth. This decreased the reliance on militarily fit males to serve in frontal combat units but had a negative effect on production in factories.

#37

I would add to that it wasn’t just the men and as RS* pointed out, the 88-mm (and many other calibers of) guns, hindering the German victories in other theatres, but also the massive resources infused into R&D. Creating an integrated air defense network that was so massive and sophisticated drained divisions worth of resources over the duration of the war and forced dispersion of of production facilities and the rail hubs and transport networks that sapped much energy fracturing the German effort…

#38

I think Tooze pointed out that German women were also near full employment when one takes into account the reliance on them for agriculture, IIRC…

#39

Tooze does make the point that in pre war more German women were employed (as a percentage of the workforce) than in the USA or UK at their highest points (in 1944). Most though as you say was to do with their agriculture system - the UK had largely modernised and mechanised theirs while Germany was still heavily reliant on manpower. Even before the war there were calls for ‘volunteers’ to go to the farms and help bring in the harvest.

In 1940 part of the German army was demobbed along with a large number of horses to help ease the struggling farms manpower and transport/motive force shortage - often overlooked when trying to work out why Germany was defeated - it could not feed itself and so had to strip resources from occupied nations (the British blockade worked for many essential goods - goods that had a long term effect not instant).

Seems most people equate Germany not mobilising women with them not being in the factories - but have little knowledge of how big a part they already played in the farms and workplace pre war.

#40

It is clear that manpower, and horsepower, were issues even before the war. With the wartime mobilization of men, a huge burden was placed on women (and children) to keep German agriculture running. The exhortation for women in the farming sector to “endure” was a specific subject of German wartime propaganda. This, however, was no mere wartime issue; Germany had suffered a number of indifferent harvests in the years leading up to 1939, something not helped by its relatively backward technology.

Regarding horses - this was a complex problem for wartime planners. Whatever about “sparing” horses from Army duties in Germany, there was an undoubted shortage of horses critically required for the use of army transport. In a way, this paralleled the situation in agriculture; establishing a balance was very difficult. It is a tribute to German organization that it managed to satisfy both requirements for so long. Even then, an adequate supply of horses (both for German military use and for German agriculture) required the effective requisition of farm horses from occupied countries on a large scale - which in turn reduced the potentially vast agricultural capacity of, say, France, to grow food for the Reich. How about the birthrate for draught horses in western Europe as a sort of “turning factor” ?

Yours from the Barn, JR.