I note the references to the Charge of the Light Brigade. Is it suggested that this was a “turning point” in the Crimean War ? Hardly. It was, of course. a very stupid blunder made by very stupid people. However, the British/French alliance still overcame Russia, in the end. Turning point ? No. Best regards, JR.
Duhh…How did the “not winning BoB/or invading UK” automatically led to a two front war ?
If Hitler or OKH decided to postpone or cancel the invasion of Russia (is very comfortable to have no totalwar even for the Nazis…hence the Molotov-Ribb Pact…also comprising goods exchanges), then there wld have been no two front war…(stating the obvious)…
UK wld NEVER be able to stage a successfull invasion in europe on its own…so an end of the war from UK alone wld NEVER happen. and so NEVER wld there be a turning point.
whereas Hitler still wld have that opportunity to invade UK. If he’d put ALL his effort and men that was put in the war in the east (that is MILLIONS of soldiers, a magnitude factor of 8 to 10 more in the east than ever in 1944 in the west) to an invasion on UK, he’d succeed…but at relatively unacceptable costs…and which wld entice Stalin to invade Germany…there wld have been no doubt with Hitler about that risk.
So he, hitler, obviously, wanted rather an invasion in Russia, and expected from the british to go his way there (as Uk and SU were not exactly friends).
A sequence of events, doesn’t mean a causality per sé.
A lot of birds lay their eggs and hatch it in May… a lot of children are also born more than average in the same period may-june; that doesn’t make egg laying influencing the birth rates of humans.
Also having “half a million” troops on the west wall, still means having a reserve being capable of getting moved to fire brands, if need be.
A destroyed army of half a million (0,3 mill) in Stalingrad, really means the end of capabilities and initiatives in that sector.
There is simply no comparison between destroying an army and celebrating that you have bypassed a number of reserves.
That’s like claiming the germans with their 3 Uboat raids near the US coast managed to hold 10 million american service men on their stations in the US for a year or two. What a terrific strategic feature.
That certainly turned the US war effort…not.
I am no expert in the 19th c wars, and after looking it up the crimeanwar did not end to Russia’s 100% satisfaction…but also not 100% dissatisfaction.
However, this is clear : “As the legend of the “Charge of the Light Brigade” demonstrates, the war quickly became an iconic symbol of logistical, medical and tactical failures and mismanagement.”
I wanted to use an example that shows that a turning point (in this case thus tactical in stead of strategical) is not a turning point until something is “in the bag” and that “all get to realise it”.
Hindsighting and tracing the earliest seeds for the future demise is not enough to point to a turning point.
For all the events that led to a disaster/turning point, there are equally factors of events that could have avoided it, and made it not into a turning point.
Like the Nat Geo “seconds to disaster” series mindset; had Paulus evacuated his troops from the Kessel (or realised about the risk of surrounding forces), then Stalingrad wld have been a simple tactical retreat…no big celebrations on the allied side …and the nazi troops wld have been deployed elsewhere. Slowing down the soviet advance, or making a succes of the Kursk battle…or making the Kursk battles the first turning point. who knows.
Regarding the outcome of the Crimean War … well, to paraphrase an English music hall song of the time, “The Russians did not have Constantinople”.
I think I am going to retire from this thread - it is doing my head … Yours from the Lines at Sebastopol, JR.
But that never happened did it (the US had a lot more concerns at the time like building an army, it did not have one [1939, 334,473, service personnel] and definitely not 10 million men in 1942 [3,915,507 all services] end of 1943 it was still just under 10 million [9,195,912] Army, Navy, Marines, Coastguard)
The U boats tried to interdict the shipping, they never stopped it, all they did was sink some ships and tonnage - the allies were building more tonnage than the Germans could sink. The US never stopped sending troops or equipment to the UK because of them (it was slow due to lack of ships and camps to place the troops).
Hitler stopped all plans at invading the UK and left it - Britain though kept hitting back - constantly. Not the same at all
I have no idea.
You’re the only one saying it did.
Everybody else probably accepts the historical fact that Hitler decided, contrary to all good military sense, to celebrate his failure to defeat Britain by advancing east against a greater enemy while leaving an undefeated Britain in his western rear.
All of this is ‘what if’ alternative history.
None of it disproves, or even addresses, that the Battle of Britain was a turning point in the real war.
And thus leaving open Germany’s rear as it advanced east? Even Hitler wasn’t that deranged. Anyway, they weren’t first rate troops and would have been of lesser value than the same number of first rate troops, assuming they could instantly and magically have been transported around Europe as a massive mobile reserve.
To be consistent with that opinion, it follows that you have to accept that the defeat of the Luftwaffe as the spearhead of the proposed invasion of Britain “really means the end of capabilities and initiatives in that sector” which, as you apply it to Stalingrad, means Britain’s success in defeating Germany in the BoB was a turning point in preventing the invasion of Britain of which the German air war was the most important part.
OKW DIRECTIVES FOR THE INVASION OF U.K.
OPERATION SEELOWE
SUMMER AND AUTUMN 1940
O.K.W. F.H.Q. 2.7.40
Prosecution of the war against England
The Fuhrer and Supreme Commander has decided:
- Invasion of England is quite possible under certain conditions of which the most important is the gaining of air superiority.
A couple of weeks after this preliminary planning document was issued, Hitler issued Directive No 16 (text at last link) in which he confirmed that the invasion was to take place and that
The aim of this operation will be to eliminate England as a base for carrying on the war against Germany and, should it be requisite, completely to occupy it.
It requires rare strategic idiocy to recognise Britain as a base for carrying on the war against Germany and then, having failed to achieve the stated aim of eliminating that base and recognised risk, to embark on a bigger campaign against the USSR.
Given the future significance of Britain as the base for the air, sea and land wars against Germany and support for the Soviet effort, the failure to eliminate it as recognised base for carrying on the war against Germany was a major turning point, and one which Hitler either did recognise or should have recognised at the time.
Not to mention German war production which, compared with America and even Britain, was, at least until Speer took over late in the war, relatively disorganised, fragmented and inefficient.
Except that Britain generally did not use the Suez Canal during WWII until the Axis was defeated in N. Africa (maybe even longer). Hard to believe, but they went around Soiuth Africa most of time because it was just too risky to run convoys through the Med unless they absolutely had to (such as the re-supply of Malta).
Leccy, I’m with you. I doubt the Germans could have carried off an invasion. There would have been grievous losses on both sides, but the biggest loss would have been a failed invasion which would have been not only a terrible PR disaster but a morale buzz-kill for the Wehrmacht. Hitler’s instinct to cancel the whole mis-begotten enterprise was right on target.
No one disputes the importance and valor of the British, but left-handed swipes at Henry Ford are really unnecessary. Americans familiar with history know that Ford was a terrible anti-semite and that Hitler even sent him a medal. He was a great, if limited idustrialist, but when push came to shove, he knuckled under and mass-produced B-24 Bombers at Willow Run. In total, he was but a cog in the war machine, however.
I do believe that the Battle of Britain was a turning point, not because it was a big militry victory, but because it denied the Germans the easy victory they were due. Those “shopkeepers” - how dare they? It was a close-run thing, but probably less close-run than most folks think. Germany just had the wrong air force for the job and by the time they realized it, it was too late.
Other than that, Stalingrad was a terrible blow to the Germans. Kursk sealed their fate. D-Day was hammering nails in the coffin. After Kursk, thoughtful Germans must have known how this was all going to end - badly.
Not so hard to believe really, supply’s and troops from India and the Far East could use the overland routes or the Suez to reach Egypt and the Eastern Med, the southern part of the Suez opens into the Red Sea and then into the Gulf of Aden, Italian Forces were had invaded Kenya as well as occupying Ethiopia, I do not know the naval strength of the Italians in the region but initially their airforce outclassed and outnumbered the Commonwealths.
Most supply’s to the UK were coming from North America after Italy declared war in June 1940 (suez was in constant use till then).
With the loss of France (who were to protect the Med) and Italy’s entry into the war the mediterranean was neutralised as a common transport route, coal and the added week or so to travel round the Cape were in plentiful supply, ships themselves were a more precious resource.
I read an article in the WWII magazine that was waned in popularity here and it seemed that a slight majority of the major historians agreed that the turning point of the war was The Battle of Moscow. It was the first serious setback for The Third Reich on the ground and was the culmination of a growing fear in the Nazi war-machine that they had bitten off far more than they could chew in the vast steppes of the Soviet Union. There were set backs and casualties before, but an entire German army was thrown back and suffered severe casualties from a revitalized Red Army able to move well trained and equipped reinforcements from Siberia after being released from the threat of Japanese attack. It was also a stunning realization that Germany was now locked in the stalemate of a two-front war she so loathed and sought to avoid. Certainly the Battle of Britain was huge but the defeat after the tantalizing high water mark of reaching the Moscow suburbs must have been great as this was the first serious land reversal the Heer suffered whereas perhaps the OKW could rationalize the defeat in the air with the belief that Britain could be blockaded and starved. They couldn’t plausibly do either to the USSR…
Naaah…both the BoB and the Moscow block are similar in set-back for the Germans, and equally not perceived immediately negative destructive and at least manageable!
In both cases the Germans had to pull through and finish the job for attaining a proper military milestone/stepstone. To target the neutralisation of the heavy industries (material and men) far behind the front.
Only if british industry (incl sea transport) were neutralized (by occupation or cease fire), there would be no chance of expecting end of hostilities (by building and training more and more bombers, destroyers) or facilitating a stepping stone /aircraft carrier for the perhaps getting involved USA (in the eyes of Hitler, FDR was always frustrating the Nazis so ANY opportunity cld be used to get the US involved). By leaving UK unattended “for the time being” to focus on the East, the Germans may have expected to contain the striking capability of UK, but couldnot manage to defend themselves against the ever increasing penetrations (bombers, raids, resistance ) lateron.
The same goes for Moscow 41… The German HQ of course realised they were at their end of their stretch…for the moment. Yes, a fresh force of siberian troops with new tanks fell upon the front…but they didNOT crush through like an unstoppable tsunami. The front stabilized. And Leningrad was stable…and were getting starved…quite long time really.
And for the German HQ its experience is that the russian menace CAN be contained, and MANAGED…with a few more AT guns, few more fresh troops.
Following the next year with a batch of new "wunder"panzer, and 1000’s of new recruits, they may “easily” revive the 41 momentum and crash through the unique ,once deployed surplus of siberian troops (there can be only ONE time of administering the reserve of the Siberian troops…right?).
So both set backs are seen as manageable temporary problems and in no way the realisation of Nazi armageddon.
(one proof: the resistance of german officers against Hitler had not started in winter 1941…AT-ALL…).
Titanic metaphor:
BoB end = “watch out, Ice berg ahead!” ,
Moscow block = screeching past iceberg, many hear the noise and feel a shock…but NONE realise there is a gaping hole, or Titanic will ultimately sink.
Stalingrad = Crew learn too many watertight compartments flooded, life boats out, and ship listing at 20degrees.start of panic.
Kursk = systems out…30% already drowned . Titanic uncontrolled listing.
DDAY = realisation there are not enough life boats out there…and help ships are too far away.
Operation Bagration = Titanic breaks up…rats leave the sinking ship…
Hitler attentat = rats leave the sinking ship
I think the discussion so far was looking at turning points from an objective historical perspective, not the subjective German perspective you’re describing.
If we’re looking at a purely subjective German perspective, in the sense of the leadership not accepting that it was defeated, the turning point didn’t occur until late April / early May 1945.
This goes a long way to explaining why Hitler and his leadership failed to recognise the earlier turning points which doomed Germany, and certainly none later than the failure of the Ardennes offensive several months earlier.
If one focuses only on subjective German leadership turning points, then the turning point for Hitler was the realisation when Berlin was besieged that Roosevelt’s death in April 1945 was not, as he jubilantly hoped, a repetition of the salvation in similar circumstances nearly two centuries earlier of Frederick the Great by the death of the Russian Empress being succeeded by Peter who was sympathetic to Frederick.
Except their problem was now they were facing a war of attrition with an enemy that did not collapse at the “door” being kicked in. Even Hitler’s opponents on the General Staff thought that the Soviets would collapse once the Dniester River was reached. And any hope of the British suing for peace -no matter how delusional- was now never going to happen…
That was the turning point of the war in the sky but I would say the major turning point would be Stalingrad or D-Day
Now you hear it from an expert ! :rolleyes: