It is clear that you are married. 
Yes, but that didnât get in the way of me and the wifes love!:mrgreen:
All this man love is a touch disconcerting⊠are we all going to bum each other to death?
Iâm just waiting for the thread to pick back up again. I was in my early teen years when this happened and our news in the US didnât cover it much. So, I knew very little of this until reading on the threads here in this forum. No harm in a little fun in the meantime though!
Always thought that was the teritory of you seafaring types - perhaps no coincidence that Navyson responded? :lol: - but, take your point regarding the topic. :army:
Captain Freer - 2 Para
On Longdon, while we were fighting, no quarter was given. Once the fighting was over, we felt no more aggression against the Argentines. There were a lot of enemy wounded, which we looked after as well as we looked after our own. The Argentines that stayed and fought were extremely brave and one cannot help but admire them. They inflicted twenty killed and forty-plus wounded on us, putting the better part of a rifle company out of action that night, which was very much a testimony to their courage. The only thing they didnât do was counter-attacking us. You are always at your weakest when youâve taken an objective, but by that time theyâd all disappeared toward Stanley.
Magnanimous comments by Captain Freer.
Staff Sergeant Elliot - 3 Commando Brigade Air Squadron
Weâd moved our helicopters from Port San Carlos to the base of Mount Kent.
The Argentine prisoners didnât look too bad really - nothing like as dishevelled as weâd imagined they would be. They had lots of kit, and were wandering around with dry feet wearing wellington boots. Quite a few big ones didnât look defeated at all - marines or special forces, probably.
I watched 2 Para walking past us on their march to Mount Kent before their attack on Wireless Ridge. They looked in a much worse state than the Argentines. But it was their spirit that counted, rather than what they looked like, or the kit they had!
Contâd.
The reason I say this, is that the rule of thumb for the attacking force is that they should have a numerical superiority of at least 3:1 over those of the enemy.
The defending force will have sited its positions making full use of man-made (e.g. minefields), and natural, obstacles to funnel or channel the attacking force into its killing areas, which are normally covered by as much firepower as can be mustered. It is the expectation of the attacking force to take casualties and, usually, the best way of reducing them is by the element of surprise.
IIRC 3 Para had nothing like a 3:1 advantage and was attacking a battalion size formation, thus making the numbers about 1:1.
Taking this into consideration and, as I understand it, the majority of 3 Paraâs casualties were inflicted by Artillery fire, then Freer was, indeed, being magnanimous. Probably because he was impressed by the courage of those Argentines who did stand their ground and fight, and also to assist in repairing the damage in relations between our two nations which came about on account of this futile war.
IMHO there was a professional element among the defenders of Mount Longdon. The siting of the defendersâ positions are indicative of that.
Notwithstanding the fact that 3 Para took a well fortified position with huge tenacity and bravery, I think the tactics of a silent approach was wholly wrong. The approach was known to be heavily mined, the Argies were known to be using radar and there was a reasonable chance of being discovered. Because of this tactic B company were shot to f*** starting when Brian Milne trod on the mine.
All in 20/20 hindsight mind you.
I enjoyed your input.
Most students of military history use 20/20 hindsite, particularly those at Staff College. How else do we learn before making our own mistakes, if not from those of others? Training, theory and practise, and execution.
I was pinned down by a .50 cal browning and I clearly remember looking to my left at Longdon. It was just a mass of fire and bouncing tracer. It was the kind of sight that made you glad you werenât there.
That said I was kind of wishing I wasnât where I was too.
One can relate to that emotion.
Captain Freer, 3 Para, Mount London.
Longdon is about one kilometer long, a rocky outcrop like a spine, which falls steeply away to the northern side, in Argentines had used wire, angle irons and rocks to build sangars (bunkers) that would keep out small arms fire. They were very well positioned and took some getting out. The engagements took place at about fifty metersâ range, then closed to the use of grenades and bayonets.
I was commanding a company fire support team, six of us with two machine guns. To operate a machine gun properly, using link ammunition, you need somebody to feed in the ammuntion plus a third person as gun controller to direct fire. The actual firer gets tunnel vision at night, and canât see anything apart from what heâs shooting at. We were firing initially at about twenty-five to thirty meters, at positons as the platoons went in to attack them. After a while, the ranges became a little more, but not much. The rifle platoons were in close-quarter battle - gutter fighting. I was directing fire at muzzle flashes in the darkness, with the occassional stab of light from exploding artillery, which revealed the people we were firing at.
Sergeant Ian McKay VC 3 Para. Mount Longodn
Citation
During the night of 11th/12th June 1982, 3rd Battalion The Parachute Regiment mounted a silent night attack on an enemy battalion position on Mount Longdon, an important objective in the battle for Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands. Sergeant McKay was platoon sergeant of 4 Platoon, B Company, which, after the initial objective had been secured, was ordered to clear the Northern side of the long East/West ridge feature, held by the enemy in depth, with strong, mutually-supporting positions. By now the enemy were fully alert, and resisting fiercely. As 4 Platoonâs advance continued it came under increasingly heavy fire from a number of well-sited enemy machine gun positions on the ridge, and received casualties. Realising that no further advance was possible the Platoon Commander ordered the Platoon to move from its exposed position to seek shelter among the rocks of the ridge itself. Here it met up with part of 5 Platoon.The enemy fire was still both heavy and accurate, and the position of the platoons was becoming increasingly hazardous. Taking Sergeant McKay, a Corporal and a few others, and covered by supporting machine gun fire, the Platoon Commander moved forward to reconnoitre the enemy positions but was hit by a bullet in the leg, and command devolved upon Sergeant McKay.
It was clear that instant action was needed if the advance was not to falter and increasing casualties to ensue. Sergeant McKay decided to convert this reconnaissance into an attack in order to eliminate the enemy positions. He was in no doubt of the strength and deployment of the enemy as he undertook this attack. He issued orders, and taking three men with him, broke cover and charged the enemy position.
The assault was met by a hail of fire. The Corporal was seriously wounded, a Private killed and another wounded. Despite these losses Sergeant McKay, with complete disregard for his own safety, continued to charge the enemy position alone. On reaching it he despatched the enemy with grenades, thereby relieving the position of beleagured 4 and 5 Platoons, who were now able to redeploy with relative safety. Sergeant McKay, however, was killed at the moment of victory, his body falling on the bunker.
Without doubt Sergeant McKayâs action retrieved a most dangerous situation and was instrumental in ensuring the success of the attack. His was a coolly calculated act, the dangers of which must have been too apparent to him beforehand. Undeterred he performed with outstanding selflessness, perseverance and courage. With a complete disregard for his own safety, he displayed courage and leadership of the highest order, and was an inspiration to all those around him.
The Battle :
Major Philip Neame, D Company, 2 Para
We bypassed 3 Para on Longdon, and exploited beyond them on to Wireless Ridge - with a very sparse set of orders telling us to get cracking. Fortunately, it was delayed 24 hours; the Guards werenât ready in the South, and as the Tumbledown and Wireless Ridge features dominated each other, the two attacks had to go in together.
Major John Crossland, B Company 2 Para
The delay allowed us to look over the ground, iron out a more definitive plan of attack and change the orders. We had terrific fire support, plus two troops of light armoured vehicles. Goose Green had been a âcome-as-you-areâ party, whereas this was a much more deliberate attack.
Drop Zone flashes worn on the upper arm :
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/0/0c/Paras_DZ_Flash_updated.GIF
Iâve met Julian Thompson on several occassions, a very nice chap, and this statement is rather typical of his good nature.
Brigadier Julian Howard Thompson, Commander 3 Commando Brigade:
I remember standing on the Wireless Ridge skyline with one of my staff officers, looking down towards Stanley with my binoculars, When a 2 Para sergeant major bellowed: âGET DOWN OFF MY SKYLINE YOU IDLE PEOPLE!â I thought how unhelpful and unpopular it was to be standing around on somebody elseâs skyline and flung myself down behind cover, feeling very chastened.
Iâd take odds of a penny to a pound that said sergeant major was more than aware of whom it was he was âbracing-upâ.
This âbracing-upâ probably had a lasting effect after the battle:
Lt. Col. David Robert Chaundler, Commaniding Officer, 2 Para.
I got B Company moving forward on to the final ridgeline of Wireless Ridge and I was about to order them down into the valley when Julian Thompson arrived by helicopter. I was standing out on the forward slope wearing my red beret, feeling pretty pleased with life. He wouldnât have been fully aware of the tactical situation, so he crawled up the ridge behind a rock. Seeing me standing out there in the open and thinking he was about to loose another commanding officer of 2 Para, he rushed out and rugger tackled me! I said: âItâs all right brigadier, itâs all over. Weâve got to get into Port Stanley.â
he said: âYup, youâre right.â
With the advantage of seeing the outcome of events 28 years ago, argentinians were too naive: we should put the islanders on a ship with their cattle (so not to mess with their sexual life) and send them to Madagascar.
Would the brits come anyways? For sure. The Iron bi-tch was looking at the polls, so she had to go on.
With the advantage of seeing the outcome of events 28 years ago, argentinians were too naive: we should put the islanders on a ship with their CATTLE (so not to mess with their sexual life) and send them to Madagascar.
er SHEEP on the Islands
Would the brits come anyways? For sure. The Iron bi-tch was looking at the polls, so she had to go on.
The Junta were not looking to divert attention away from troubles at home either then?
Maybe the Argentinians fancied the sheep for themselves. 
Speaking as an American bystander who was riveted by the cheek of the Argentine invasion of the Falklands at the time, am I permitted the simple and irrefutable observation that no violence of any kind would be discussed in this thread if the Argentines had not invaded in the first place? It was unlikely that the Falkland Islanders were preparing to invade or otherwise threaten Argentina by off-loading thousands of sheep and stampeding them through the capitol. Frankly, I believe that the Argentine leadership made the same mistake that Hitler made when he prepared to invade Poland - that the English and French would never go to war. And none of this would have occurred if âGeneralâ Galtieri hadnât seen his position at home as weak and getting weaker. Nothing like an âeasyâ little war to get the juices flowing. Galtieri showed about as much common sense as President Bush when he lied us into a war with Iraq in the belief that it would be a simple, cheap victory against an enemy who had not attacked us. But thatâs another topic. Or is it?