FDR Conspiracy to bomb Pearl Harbor

World War II General WWII Discussion
#21

Why to critize the some historian like Sinnet, gentlemens , if we have the primary source from “another side”.
Let’s better read theadmiral Kimmel interview
CM: Admiral Kimmel, for myself and the radio audience, I am very greatful for the privilege of this interview. You know, of course, that you hold the key to one of the great tragic mysteries in our country’s history. What you are doing here to day is a continuation of the great patriotic service to which your whole life has been dedicated.

HEK: Thank you, Dean Manion. In view of our long family friendship, I’m delighted to give this information to you, and through you, to the American people.

CM: To your present knowledge, how many people knew in advance that the Japanese planned to attack Pearl Harbor on December 7?

HEK: I believe those who had seen the intercepted and decoded Japanese messages, including the 14 part message received on December 6 and December 7, 1941, knew war with Japan was inevitable. And the almost certain objective of the Jpanese attack would be the fleet at Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, at 1 p.m. Washington time.

CM: Who are some of these people and from what source did they get the information?

HEK: Those who saw the intercepted Japanese messages as they were received included: the President, Mr. Roosevelt; the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull; the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson; the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Knox; the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Marshall; the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark; the Chief of War Plans, Army, General Gerow; the Chief of War Plans, Navy, Admiral Turner; the Chief of Army Intelligence, General Miles; Chief of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Worthington. Recorded testimony shows that all of these, except General Marshall and Admiral Stark were shown 13 parts of the 14-part message by 9 p.m. December 6, 1941, or shortly thereafter. When Mr. Roosevelt had read the 13 parts, about 9 p.m. December 6, 1941, he remarked: “This means war.” All investigations of the disaster have failed to disclose where George Marshall spent the evening of December 6, 1941, or what he did. Admiral Stark, some two years after he had first been asked, finally produced evidence that he had attended the theater on that evening, though he still maintained that he had no independent recollection of where he spent the evening or what he did during the evening of December 6, 1941. In 1957, I received information, which I believe to be reliable, that the British subject serving in the Chinese government as commissioner of education and in telligence in China, received on November 30, 1941, from his intelligence sources in Japan, information of the planned at tack on Pearl Harbor to be launched on December 7. Where the Japanese fleet would congregate to launch the planes, the hour the planes were to be launched, the berths of the U.S. fleet in Pearl and which ships were to be bombed first. This information was sent to London in a coded message, on Sunday, November 30, and Monday, December 1, 1941. Whether the Chinese commissioner’s intelligence was transmitted from London to Washington, I do not know, but it appears highly probable that it was made available to Mr. Roosevelt. If Mr. Roosevelt did, in fact, receive the Chinese commissioner’s intelligence, it was merely a detailed confirmation of the in tercepted Japanese messages already available to him.

CM: In your opinion, why were you and General Short not notified well in advance that the attack was expected?

HEK: My belief is that General Short and I were not given the information available in Washington and were not informed of the impending attack because it was feared that action in Hawaii might deter the Japanese from making the attack. Our president had repeatedly assured the American people that the United States would not enter the war unless we were attacked. The Japanese attack on the fleet would put the United States in the war with the full suppport of the American public.( i.e. answer to previous Nick’s post)

CM: Thank you, Admiral Kimmel, for this interview and for the patriotic persistence with which you have pursued and corralled the tragic facts about the attack upon Pearl Harbor.

Who will first call him “conspiracy theory admirer”?

#22

There is nothing in the 14 part message to support Kimmel’s opinion that Pearl Harbor was or could have been identified in or from the message as the target, let alone the time and date of the attack on Pearl or that it was the fleet at Pearl that was the target.

Indeed, the message text merely confirms that Japan was pretending to be looking for peace while its attack force was steaming towards and about to attack Pearl Harbor, and that it was a sneak attack.

JAPANESE NOTE TO THE UNITED STATES DECEMBER 7, 1941
(Generally referred to as the “Fourteen Part Message.”)

(Dept. of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 129, Dec. 13, 1941)

On November 26 the Secretary of State handed to the Japanese
representatives a document which stated the principles governing
the policies of the Government of the United States toward the
situation in the Far East and setting out suggestions for a
comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific
area.

At 1 p.m. December 7 the Japanese Ambassador asked for an
appointment for the Japanese representatives to see the
Secretary of State. The appointment was made for 1:45 p.m. The
Japanese representatives arrived at the office of the Secretary
of State at 2:05 p.m. They were received by the Secretary at
2:20 p.m. The Japanese Ambassador handed to the Secretary of
State what was understood to be a reply to the document handed
to him the Secretary of State on November 26.

Secretary Hull carefully read the statement presented by the
Japanese representatives and immediately turned to the Japanese
Ambassador and with the greatest indignation said:

“I must say that in all my conversations with you [the Japanese
Ambassador] during the last nine months I have never uttered one
word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record.
In all my 50 years of public service I have never seen a
document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and
distortions - infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so
huge that I never imagined until today that any Government on
this planet was capable of uttering them.”

The text of the document handed by the Japanese Ambassador to
the Secretary of State at 2:20 p.m., December 7, 1941, reads as
follows:

"Memorandum

"1. The government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to
come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the
United States in order that the two countries by their joint
efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby
contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued
negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the
Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and
advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization
of the Pacific Area.

"The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its
views concerning the claims the American Government has
persistently maintained as well as the measure the United States
and Great Britain have taken toward Japan during these eight
months.

"2. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to
insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and
thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in
the world.

"Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the
part of China to comprehend Japan’s true intentions, the
Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and
it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the
extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end
that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pace
with Germany and Italy.

"However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted
to every possible measure to assist the Chungking regime so as
to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan
and China, interfering with Japan’s constructive endeavours
toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the
Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they
have attempted to frustrate Japan’s aspiration to the ideal of
common prosperity in cooperation with these regimes.
Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with
France took measures of joint defense of French Indo-China, both
American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it
as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the
Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets
freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan.
While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these
countries have strengthened their military preparations
perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a
situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

"Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of
Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the
United States for a discussion of important problems between the
two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the
American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese
proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an
agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential
questions.

"3. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government
submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the
American Government, taking fully into consideration past
American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated
discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement
of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised
proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding
the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and
endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American
Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions,
failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of
conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

"Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its
utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations,
submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to
arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent
questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated
the following points:

"(1) The Government of Japan and the United States undertake
not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting
French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern
Pacific area.

"(2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing
the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods
and commodities of which the two countries are in need.

"(3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial
relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.

"The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the
required quantity of oil.

"(4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to
resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for
the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.

"(5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now
stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of
peace between Japan and China or establishment of an equitable
peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the
Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the
northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

continued

#23

"On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast
to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an
inch on its impractical principles, cause undue delay in the
negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the
American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call
the attention of the American Government especially to the
following points:

"1. The American Government advocates in the name of world peace
those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese
Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may
be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable
formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and
mutual appreciation of one another’s position. An attitude such
as ignores realities and impose (sic) one’s selfish views upon
others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the
consummation of negotiations.

"Of the various principles put forward by the American
Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there
are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in
principle, but in view of the world’s actual condition it seems
only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to
attempt to force their immediate adoption.

"Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression
pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the
Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned
after the old concept of collective security, is far removed
from the realities of East Asia.

"2. The American proposal contained a stipulation which states -
‘Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has
concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted
by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose
of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace
throughout the Pacific area.’ It is presumed that the above
provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from
fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the
United States participates in the war in Europe, and, as such,
it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

"The American Government, obsessed with its own views and
opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the
war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by
stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand,
in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of
self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to
establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at
variance with the many principles upon which the American
Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area
through peaceful means.

continued

#24

"3. Whereas the American Government, under the principles it
rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through
military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great
Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse
to such pressure as a means of dealing with international
relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane
that military pressure.

"4. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the
American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in
coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant
position in has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other
areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries
of East Asia have for the past two hundred years or more have
been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-
American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice
themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese
Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation
since it directly runs counter to Japan’s fundamental policy to
enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

"The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to
French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-
mentioned American policy. Thus the six countries, - Japan, the
United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China, and
Thailand, - excepting France, should undertake among themselves
to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French
Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would
be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint
guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from
the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of
France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that
such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to
French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty
structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present
predicament of East Asia.

"5. All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government
regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or
unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination
in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of
China, and are calculated to destroy Japan’s position as the
stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American
Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily,
politically or economically any regime other than the regime at
Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking
Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiations.
This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in
line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the
Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the
American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal
relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to
East Asia.

"5. (sic) In brief, the American proposal contains certain
acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including
the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the
freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar
exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China.
On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores
Japan’s sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair,
menaces the Empire’s existence itself and disparages its honour
and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese
Government regrets it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of
negotiation.

"6. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early
conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the
conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to
be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries.
The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However,
since the American Government has made the proposal of November
26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain,
Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by
catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions
of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at
one with the United States in ignoring Japan’s position.

"7. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to
conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct
Japan’s effort toward the establishment of peace through the
creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve
Anglo-American rights and interest by keeping Japan and China at
war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course
of the present negotiation.

"Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust
Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the
peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American
Government has finally been lost.

"The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the
American Government that in view of the attitude of the American
Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach
an agreement through further negotiations.

“December 7, 1941.”
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/14_part.html

#25

'My belief" by Kimmel is not supported by facts to support his following florid conspiracy statement.

It is more consistent with the facts that there was no need to notify him of an impending attack because:
(a) Nobody in authority in America knew that the Japanese fleet was approaching Hawaii to attack.
(b) Everybody in authority in America expected the Japanese attack to be in the Philippines, as indeed its first major land attack against America was.

Kimmel was entitled to feel hurt by his treatment after Pearl, and quite probably was unfairly made a scapegoat by politicians and others in the nature of the world in such things, but that doesn’t give his opinions any weight beyond the facts which contradict them.

#26

Newspaper articles aren’t always the most reliable source or comment, but this one is worth considering and notably in the context of this thread the part I have highlighted in red.

Pearl Harbor Truly a Sneak Attack, Papers Show
By HOWARD W. FRENCH
Published: December 9, 1999

TOKYO, Dec. 8— Freshly discovered diplomatic papers published here this week seem to overturn standard versions of the events leading up to Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, which have been told with little disagreement over the essential facts in history books on both sides of the Pacific.

The picture that emerges from the papers is one of a breathtakingly cunning deceit by Tokyo aimed at avoiding any hint to the Roosevelt administration of Japan’s hostile intentions.

For decades, conventional wisdom has held that Japan attacked without any official warning of a break in relations only because of fateful accidents and plain bumbling that delayed the delivery of a document to Washington hinting at war.

Textbooks have dwelt on the problems of transmission and translation of the so-called Final Memorandum, on Dec. 7, 1941 – the day Pearl Harbor was attacked – in which Japan notified the United States that it was ‘‘impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.’’

The accounts have focused on the slowness of the Japanese Embassy in Washington to produce a cable of the memorandum from Tokyo, and on delays caused by security rules prohibitingthe embassy’s American secretary from typing the document.

The newly discovered documents include an earlier draft of the Final Memorandum, dated Dec. 3, in which the Japanese Foreign Ministry, mindful of the country’s obligation under the Hague Convention to declare war before attacking, proposed stating that ‘‘we are forced to terminate negotiations.’’

More ominously, it added that Washington ‘‘would be held responsible for any and all the consequences that may arise in the future.’’

Takeo Iguchi, the researcher who discovered the papers in the Foreign Ministry archives, said the draft memorandum, together with the wartime diary of Japan’s general staff, pointed to a vigorous debate inside the government over how, indeed whether, to notify Washington of Japan’s intention to break off negotiations and start a war.

In its entry for Dec. 4, the diary mentions the draft version of the Final Memorandum and makes clear that the general staffs of the navy and army rejected the Foreign Ministry’s proposed warning to Washington. The definitive memorandum, with its much weaker wording, was drafted the next day.

That document was intercepted before its delivery and read by President Roosevelt, who saw it as amounting to a declaration of war. But his aides saw nothing new in the message, and preparations against an attack were not taken.

While the wording and timing of Tokyo’s message were being fine-tuned, Japan’s diplomats in Washington, deliberately kept in the dark by their capital, were meeting with their American counterparts.

A Dec. 7 entry in the war diary notes approvingly that ‘‘our deceptive diplomacy is steadily proceeding toward success.’’

‘‘The diary shows that the army and navy did not want to give any proper declaration of war, or indeed prior notice even of the termination of negotiations,’’ said Mr. Iguchi, a professor of law and international relations at the International Christian University in Tokyo. ‘‘And they clearly prevailed.’’ Mr. Iguchi said the general staff, together with a pliant Foreign Ministry, had controlled not only the content of the message to Washington, but also its timing.

The staff specified that the message be delivered to the State Department at 1 p.m. Washington time on Dec. 7. But in the end, the document was delivered to Secretary of State Cordell Hull about 2:20 p.m., approximately one hour after the sinking of the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

The famous delay in delivering the message, he said, was probably the result of deliberate planning. As evidence, he cited the many unusual, heavy garbles in the original cable that set it apart from most of Tokyo’s clean transmissions and may have been intended to slow its delivery to Washington.

‘‘The stereotypical version says that Japan attacked Pearl Harbor after intending to submit an ultimatum to Washington,’’ Professor Iguchi said, ''but because of a misunderstanding, the message was delivered an hour too late. It has long been taught that had there not been this delay, the attack would have been honorable. Instead, it has been called treachery.

Mr. Iguchi said many of Japan’s top historians had long spoken of the supposed embassy mix-up that delayed the delivery of Tokyo’s final message to Washington as an ‘‘ugly blemish’’ on the country’s history. ‘‘But the blemish belongs to those who engaged in deliberate deception, or who have failed to ever go into the documentary evidence,’’ he said.

A spokesman for the Foreign Ministry confirmed that the documents at the center of Mr. Iguchi’s research were genuine but declined to make any further comment, saying only that ‘‘there are many views about these events.’’

The first account of Mr. Iguchi’s work was a small notice in the daily Yomiuri Shimbun in April. This week, The Japan Times, an English-language daily, printed a long article on the research. Mr. Iguchi said almost none of Japan’s other news publications had shown any interest in his work.

Mr. Iguchi’s findings clash with more comfortable views of the start of the war, and even many historians whose expertise focuses on the same events say they were unaware of his research.

Shinji Sudo, who teaches the history of international relations at Kyoto Sangyo University, was one of those who learned of the newly uncovered documents from a foreign journalist.

‘‘Professor Iguchi’s enthusiasm has moved the debate forward, and I value his work highly,’’ he said. ‘‘I had thought that the blame should be placed on the negligent embassy staff, but my views have changed considerably. Still, the are others in academic circles who regard Professor Iguchi’s work rather coldly, saying that he is just trying to clear the dishonor of his father.’’

Mr. Iguchi, who is himself a retired diplomat, is the son of a senior counselor who was serving in the Japanese Embassy in Washington at the time of the attack. Until now the embassy staff has been forced to carry most of the blame for not informing the State Department in time. Speculation in Japan has focused on drunkenness among key staff members the night before, and late arrival at work.

Many in Japan, particularly conservative historians, have clung to the view that Washington forced war on their country. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was a feat of bold and courageous military planning and would have been completely honorable, they say, were it not for an incompetent diplomatic staff in Washington.

Other historians, though, said Mr. Iguchi’s work would be taken immediately into account by specialists of this period and would gradually work its way into textbook accounts of the start of the war.

‘‘We have, in essence, a new historical drama told to us by Professor Iguchi, and it is a contribution that will encourage further research and teaching,’’ said John Stephan, a professor of modern Japanese history at the University of Hawaii. ''Time magazine once described the Pearl Harbor attack as ‘murder hidden by a toothy smile.’ But since the early 1960’s, this has been tempered by research that focused on the communications blunders.

‘‘The evolution right now would seem to be back in the direction of the kind of interpretive leanings that existed in this country during the war. But these sorts of vicissitudes are constant in history.’’

http://www.nytimes.com/1999/12/09/world/pearl-harbor-truly-a-sneak-attack-papers-show.html?pagewanted=1

#27

Just in case it’s not clear from reading it, the 14 Part Message does not indicate that war is about to commence, let alone that it is a declaration of war.

Any inference that Roosevelt or others drew from it that war was about to commence is a tribute to their ability to perceive Japanese deceit and duplicity rather than anything on the Japanese side which overtly expresses Japan’s intention to attack America, and sundry other nations.

#28

HEK: I believe those who had seen the intercepted and decoded Japanese messages, including the 14 part message…

JAPANESE NOTE TO THE UNITED STATES DECEMBER 7, 1941

I think the Kimmel meant the another Japane masages that was interrupted and decoded by US intelligence.Usially the official diplomatic notes are not classified for the side to be sent which, right?

There is nothing in the 14 part message to support Kimmel’s opinion that Pearl Harbor was or could have been identified in or from the message as the target,

Well i believe the Japanese were not that stupid to identify the target of their sneak attack in the official diplomatic note for US gov, preceding to attack:)
But their military radio massages , probably those which Sinnett talk about, definitally contained the information about first strike.

#29

This is an opinion that is highly questionable. There were two aspects of the Pearl Harbor attack that combined to cause the American public to almost universally support the war against the Japanese. The first was the nature of the attack itself; a surprise attack in time of peace when both countries were ostensibly continuing negotiations in good faith to avoid war. This deeply offended American’s sense of justice and fair play and made it impossible for them to contemplate any future negotiations with the Japanese of any sort until the Japanese had been severely chastised.

The second aspect of the PH attack was that of the sense of humiliation that America’s strongest base in the Pacific had been so easily attacked and severe casualties inflicted. This deepened the outrage felt by Americans and reinforced their attitude that the Japanese were not to be trusted in negotiations.

Had the Japanese attack on PH been foiled by an alert military and naval force that consequently suffered only moderate casualties while inflicting severe damage on the attackers (or possibly even destroying them), the sense of humiliation would not have been engendered in the American public. But the feelings of outrage and anger at Japanese duplicity and the nature of the attack would still prevail, and would cause the American public to demand a war to chastise the Japanese.

Moreover, I find it interesting that you characterize the American public as “lazy” simply because they refused to support entry into a war that did not directly concern them. It seems to me that the world would have been a lot better off in the 1930’s and 1940’s if the world’s populations had refused to support wars unless they were directly attacked.

I agree whole-heartedly.

It’s absurd for Admiral Kimmel to assert that had he seen the 14-part message that he would have intuited an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent. Nothing in the message explicitly or implicitly indicates a military attack anywhere in the world. The message, had it been transmitted to Kimmel would simply have puzzled him, as it is NOT a declaration of war, but only a list of diplomatic complaints and alleged grievances. It did not even directly break off peace negotiations, although that was implied.

President Roosevelt’s statement, “This means war”, upon seeing the message was merely his assessment of the likely next steps o be taken by Japan and the US. There is certainly no hint in that statement that Roosevelt, or any one else, believed that the future war would start with an attack on Pearl Harbor. Unless Kimmel was far more prescient than events ultimately demonstrated, he would have probably had the same reaction; that war was coming, but where and when the first shots would be fired would be anyone’s guess.

#30

What other messages? The messages that Sinnett refers to do not exist and never did. The Japanese never sent radio messages either specifying a surprise attack on US forces nor identifying the intended location of the attack. This is confirmed by post-war Japanese records. The US government knew that war with the Japanese was about to commence because Japanese troops convoys had been spotted by the British and Dutch moving in the direction of Malaya and this information was transmitted to the US. This fact reinforced the very logical belief that the first attack on US territory would come in the Philippines.

#31

I’m quite sure that this late november radio report wouldn’t be irrelevant at all ,since, according to Sinnett’s version of the document, it is a clear indisputable evidence that the attack was unavoidable:

“…the task force, keeping its movements strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow….”
http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=408

If we had Budianski’s version of this transcription we all would be capable of making a judgment about this issue, and determine who is the lier. It would be even better having the official document content.

#32

Budiansky affirms that those Sinnett’s radio messages were “misquoted”, he doesn’t say they don’t exist.

#33

Then it’s surprising that in the past seventy or so years nobody, and most of all the Kimmel supporters and the different group of conspiracy theorists, has produced those messages.

The beauty of conspiracy theories is that they invariably rely upon the absence of allegedly secret information known only to the adherents of the theories, so they can never be disproved because the absent information is not available.

Meanwhile the rest of us just work on the facts known from the historical record.

As for ‘decoded by US Intelligence’’, there was no overall US intelligence agency at the time. Even if there was it hadn’t got anywhere near breaking any Japanese code which would have given warning of PH, not least because the Japaneses naturally did not transmit anything in code or, much less likely, plain language to or from the approaching fleet which would have revealed to the enemy the fleet approaching Hawaii or its intentions.

Read up on the fleet and you’ll find that radio silence was observed most carefully. Meanwhile deception signals were being transmitted from Japan to suggest that the capital ships were at home. Not unlike Patton’s army in Britain for similar but larger radio purposes to deceive the enemy some years later.

The 14 part message was sent in a code, which America had largely broken.

The problem with a lot of arguments by people who claim that America should have seen what was coming (and some others who claim a different conspiracy by Australia’s Prime Minister to keep Australia in a war which virtually had been won by early 1942) because the Japanese diplomatic code had been largely broken by America, is that they ignore the inconvenient facts that the IJA codes and, especially in relation to PH, IJN codes had not been broken to any useful extent at the critical time.

Exactly.

Which is why Roosevelt etc had and would have had no warning of it, because there is nothing in the diplomatic code transmissions to suggest it.

It has to be remembered that, worldwide, the most significant decrypts from the Japanese diplomatic code related to instructions that caused the diplomatic missions to start burning and otherwise destroying their records, which was a firm sign that war was coming.

Q. So why haven’t Sinnett et al been able to produce the ‘military radio messages’ containing information about the the ‘first strike’?

A. Because they don’t exist.

A very long time ago in another existence one of my jobs was to check the security of war instructions held by Australian navy and merchant ships. These instructions were held in captain’s safes, to be opened only in time of war. You would never find any radio transmissions regarding them, because they hadn’t been opened, nor will you ever find even nowadays any version of them because it can still put people in gaol for revealing official secrets. More to the point, nobody(apart from the people who prepared them) should be able to say what was in those plans, or in current plans, because nobody should have opened them as we never had a war which authorised opening them.

Given that nobody will find any radio or other record of the many copies of the many versions of those plans distributed fairly widely by a peaceful nation which never went to war on them, what do you think are the chances of finding radio records of an aggressive nation which mounted a sneak attack based very much on radio silence and which towards the end of the war enthusiastically destroyed those records which had not been destroyed by Allied (i.e. American) bombing?

The whole purpose of the attack on PH was to approach without detection, including radio detection.

And Japan did that 100% successfully.

#34

That assumes that all Americans felt exactly the same way, which they didn’t.

A good number of Americans were fighting and fighting well, mainly as pilots and aircrew, in Britain and China long before PH.

At the other extreme a good number of Americans were still shoeless in remote parts of the nation and more concerned with personal survival than international conflict.

In the very large middle there was a mix of opinions but which, I think, was predominantly in favour of keeping out of what was seen as a European war which threatened to bleed America pointlessly of more young men as WWI had done (albeit in numbers about the same as Australia in WWI from a vastly larger population in America).

Whatever they may have been, Americans in 1939-41 were anything but ‘lazy’.

As they demonstrated 1942-45 when they fuelled America’s industrial capacity which, more than its military manpower, overwhelmed the Axis powers and won the war.

Even if he had got it and somehow magically interpreted it as a threat to strike PH at the time it actually occurred, what could he have done in the short time between receiving it and the Japanese attack on PH that would significantly have altered the result?

#35

So?

If the Japanese attack was unavoidable, WTF did it matter what anyone on the American side did to prepare for an unavoidable attack they didn’t know was coming?

#36

This is going beyond silly.

I don’t give a flying **** what Budiansky affirms.

If Sinnett, and you, say those radio messages exist, then produce them.

The burden of proof is upon the person who claims something is the case.

#37

Here it is. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/Wallin/Wallin-6.html

The document you rely upon is about a fortnight before PH, which merely confirms the bleeding obvious that Japan had to launch its PH fleet and attack long before the 14 part rubbish was sent at the last moment.

Do us a favour and stop presenting Japan as a victim of America in WW II

The last time I looked America didn’t start the conflict by invading any of Japan’s territories and massacring the people there.

#38

Maybe is my english shortcomings, but I understood that you cited Budiansky as a valid testimony against Sinnett’s book, you quoted him, not anyone else. He was your “witness” , not mine.
Budiansky, as the head of the official version defenders, affirms that radio message was “misquoted”, hence he accepts it’s existence but doesn’t tell us what it “actually” said.
I posted twice Sinnett’s version of the radio message.

#39

War is not about victims and murderers, nor about good and evil, is just about interests, that’s my point and hipocrisy is what results disgusting to my taste.

#40

The case under discussion is whether the US military and government knew it or not. Of sure it matter, IF they knew it and didn’t prepare for the attack, they WOULD BE gilty of indirectly causing thousands of american casualties in Pearl Harbor.